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

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ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

OF THE GROUNDS OF

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

PART OF ANOTHER BOOK UPON THE SAME SUBJECT,

LEFT UNFINISHED BY THE AUTHOR.

TOGETHER WITH

A LETTER TO A DEIST.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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By the Right Reverend Father in God

EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, D.D.

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THE foundations of religion being thus established in the being of God, and the immortality of the soul, we

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now come to erect our superstructure upon them, by asserting the undoubted truth and certainty of that account of the world which is given us in the writings of Moses; which, beginning with the world itself, leads us to a particular consideration of the origin of the universe; the right understanding of which hath great influence upon our belief of all that follows in the word of God. For although we should assert with Epicurus the being of a Deity, if yet with him we add that the world was made by a casual concourse of atoms, all that part of religion which lies in obedience to the will of God is unavoidably destroyed. All that is left is only a kind of veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of men's lives, and so will have no force at all upon the generality of the world, who are only allured by hopes, or awed by fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Besides, what expressions of gratitude can be left to God for his goodness, if he interpose not in the affairs of the world? What dependance can there be on Divine goodness, if it be not at all manifested in the world? What apprehensions can we have of God's infinite wisdom and power, if neither of them are discernible in the being of the world? And as the opinion of Epicurus destroys religion, so doth that of Aristotle, which attributes eternity to the universe, and a necessary emanation of it from the first cause, as light comes from the sun; for if so, as Maimonides well observes, *the whole religion of Moses is overthrown, all his miracles are but impostures, all the hopes which are grounded on the promises of God are vain and fruitless.* For if the world did of necessity exist, then God is no free agent; and if so, then all instituted religion is to no purpose: nor can there be any expectation of reward, or fear of punishment, from him who hath nothing else to do in the world but to set the great wheel of the heavens going. So much is it our concernment to enquire into the true original of the world, and on what evidence of reason those opinions are built, which are so contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the books of Moses; wherein we read the true origin of the world to have been by a production of it, by the omnipotent will and word of God. This being then the plain assertion of Moses, we come to compare it, in point of reason, with all those several hypotheses which are repugnant to it, which have been embraced in several ages by the philosophers of greatest

Maimon. More Nevoch. p. ii. c. 25.

esteem in the world; which may be reduced to these four: 1. *Such as suppose the world to have existed as it is from all eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the formation of the world as it is to God; but withal assert the preexistence and eternity of matter.* 3. *Such as deny any eternity to the world, but assert the origin of it to have been by a casual concourse of atoms.* 4. *Such as endeavour to explain the origin of the universe, and all appearances of nature, merely by the mechanical laws of the motion of matter.* CHAP. II.

II. I begin with those who assert the eternity of the world as it is, among whom Aristotle hath borne the greatest name, who seems to have arrogated this opinion to himself; for when he enquires into the judgment of the philosophers who had wrote before him, he says of them, γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, *all the philosophers asserted that the world was made,* though some one way, some another. And were this true which Aristotle saith, it would be the strongest prejudice against his opinion; for if the world had been eternal, how should it come to pass that the oldest philosophers should so readily and unanimously embrace that opinion which asserted the production of the world? Was it not a strong presumption of the novity of the universe, that all nations to whom the philosophers resorted had memorials left among them of the first origin of things? And from hence it is observable, that, when the humour of philosophizing began to take the Greeks, (about the 40th Olympiad, when we may suppose Thales to flourish,) the beginning of the world was no matter of dispute; but, taking that for granted, the enquiry was, out of what material principle the universe was formed. Of which Thales thus delivers his opinion in Tully; *Aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret;* wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material cause of the world. The prime efficient was God; the material principle, water. It is a matter of some enquiry, whether the first principles of philosophy among the Greeks were not rather some traditional things conveyed to them from others, than any certain theories which they had formed from their own experiments and observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this; that the first principles of the two founders of the chief sects of philosophers, viz. the Ionic and Italic, (for all the other were but the various issues of these two,) did come near to that which we have the greatest reason to believe to have

Aristot. de Cœlo, l. i. c. 10. Ed. Par.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 25.

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been the most certain account of the origin of the world. For this opinion of Thales seems to have been part of that universal tradition which was continued in the world concerning the first principles of things; for I do not see any reason to aver, with so much confidence as some do, that those philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to Moses, must presently converse with the Jews, transcribe their opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them conveyed to them in some secret cabala of the creation, as it is affirmed of Pythagoras and Plato, and may with no less reason of Thales But this I suppose may be made evident to any considerative person, that those philosophers of Greece, who conversed most abroad in the world, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, than such who only endeavoured by their own wits to improve or correct those principles which were delivered by the other philosophers; which I impute not so much to their converse with the Mosaic writings, as to that universal tradition of the first ages of the world, which was preserved far better among the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, and others, than among the Greeks. For which we have this evident reason, that Greece was far more barbarous and rude in its elder times, than those other nations were, which had means of preserving some monuments and general reports of the first ages of the world, when the Grecians wanted them: and therefore we find that Greece, from its beginning, shined with a borrowed light; and saw not by an extramission of rays of knowledge from itself, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were received from other nations. Those who formed Greece first into civil societies, and licked it into the shape of well ordered commonwealths, were such who had been traders for knowledge into foreign parts. To which purpose Diodorus Siculus informs us, *that Lycurgus and Solon, as well as the poets Orpheus, Musæus, Melampus, and Homer, and the philosophers, afterwards Pythagoras, Plato, and others, had gained most of their knowledge and wisdom out of Egypt*; nay, he saith in general, ὅσοι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι δεδοξασμένων ἐπὶ συνέσει καὶ παιδείᾳ, παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα τῶν ἐνταῦθα νομίμων καὶ παιδείας μετάσχωσιν. *All those who were renowned among the Greeks for wisdom and learning, did in ancient time resort to Egypt, to be acquainted with their laws and knowledge.* On this account, therefore, we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine tradition of the world from the native

Diodorus, l. i. c. 96. Ed. Wesseling. V. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. l. x

and homebred Greeks, such as Aristotle and Epicurus, but from those who took the pains themselves to search into those records which were preserved among the elder and more knowing nations: and although the nations they resorted to sought to advance their own reputation in the histories of their ancient times, of which we have already given a large account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the origin of the whole universe. For it appears from Diogenes Laertius, that the Egyptians did constantly believe *that the world had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was spherical, and the stars were of the nature of fire; that the soul was of an immortal nature, and did pass up and down the world:* which Laertius cites from Hecatæus and Aristagoras. So that we need not make Pythagoras acquainted with such a cabala of the creation, which in all probability neither the Jews nor he ever dreamt of: we find a fair account may be given of most of the opinions of Pythagoras, and whence he derived them, without forcing the words of Moses into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the writings of Moses argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny, from those concurrent testimonies of Hermippus and Aristobulus, besides Origen, Porphyry, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others, that Pythagoras might have had an opportunity of conversing with the Jews, (which it is most probable was in Chaldæa, after the captivity, at which time Pythagoras was there among them;) but that Pythagoras should converse with the successors of Elisha on Mount Carmel, as Vossius thinks; or that Moschus, the Sidonian philosopher, in Iamblichus, should be Moses, as others fancy; or that preexistence of souls should be part of the Mosaic cabala; or that the Pythagoric numbers, as they are explained by Nicomachus Gerasenus in Photius, should be adequate to the days of the creation, cabalistically understood, are fancies too extravagant and Pythagorean to be easily embraced. If Pythagoras was circumcised, it was more for love of the Egyptians than the Jews, among whom he spent twenty-two years; if preexistence of souls be a rational hypothesis, we may thank the Egyptians for it, and not Moses; if numbers be so expressive of the work of creation, we are beholden to the arithmetical hieroglyphics of Egypt for them. But although Pythagoras might not be acquainted with such a philosophic cabala of the creation, which none of the Jews, as far as we can find, understood, till one more versed in Plato and

Diog. Laert. Procem. p. 7.

V. Selden. de Jure Nat. et Gen. apud Ebræos, l. i. c. 2.

Voss. de Sectis Philosoph. c. 6. sect. 5.

V. Mathem. Hierogl. Kircheri, tom. iii. Oedip. Egypt.

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Pythagoras, than in the learning of his own nation, viz. Philo of Alexandria, began first to exercise his wit on the text of Moses, with Platonic notions; yet I shall easily grant that Pythagoras, by means of his great industry and converse with the learned nations, might attain to far greater knowledge of many mysterious things in natural philosophy, and as to the origin of the universe, than any of the homebred philosophers of Greece, or it may be, than any one of the nations he resorted to, because he had the advantage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judged the best of them. And hence Plutarch tells us, that the first principles of the world, according to Pythagoras, were these two: the one was τὸ ποιητικὸν αἰτίον καὶ εἰδικὸν (ὅπερ ἐςὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) *an active and forming principle*, and that was God, whom he called mind (as Anaxagoras likewise did;) the other was τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐςὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος) *passive and material*, which is, *the visible world.*

Plutarch. de Plat. Philos. l. i. cap. 5. Ed. Franc.

III. And thus we see these two renowned founders of the Ionic and Italic societies of philosophers, both giving their concurrent testimony with Moses as to the true origin of the world, and not at all differing from each other; for thus Thales speaks in Diogenes Laertius, πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων, θεός· ἀγέννητον γάρ. κάλλιστον κόσμος, ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ· *God is the eldest Being, because unbegotten; the world the most beautiful, because it is God's workmanship.* To which those expressions of Plato, in his Timæus, come very near, (whose philosophy was, for substance, the same with the Pythagorean,) when he had before ascribed the production of the world to the goodness of God; which goodness of his did incline him to make all other things like himself. Θέμις ἔτ' ἦν ἔτ' ἐςὶ τῷ ἀρίςῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιςον. *For the most excellent Being cannot but produce the most excellent effects.* And as to the material principle out of which the world was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of Thales, and the ὕλη of Plato and Pythagoras; for Plato, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material principle was, he describes it thus, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, which, as Chalcidius renders it, is *motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quiescens*, it was a *visible corporeal thing* (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατόν) *which was never at rest, but in continual disorderly motion and agitation:* which is a full explication, I suppose, of what Thales meant by his water, which is the same with that ὑλὺς, or mixture of

Diog. Laer. V. Thalet. p. 9. Ed. Lond.

Plato in Tim. p. 1047. Ed. Ficini.

Chalcid. Tim. p. 24. Ed. Meurs.

mud and water together, which others speak of as the principle of the universe; as Orpheus in Athenagoras, and the scholiast on Apollonius, cited by Grotius and others. Which we have the more reason to believe, because the successors of Thales, Anaximander and Anaxagoras, express themselves to that purpose. Anaximander called the sea, τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, *the remainder of the primitive moisture:* and Anaxagoras says, before the Νοῦς, or God, set things in their order, πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ πεφυρμένα, *all things were at first confused together;* which must needs make that which Chalcidius tells us Numenius attributes to Pythagoras, which his translator calls *sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid matter*. Which is the same likewise with the Phœnicians' Μὼτ, which, as appears by Eusebius, some call ἰλὺν, others ὑδατώδους μίξεως σῆψιν, some, *mud* or *slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery mixtures*, which they say was σπορὰ κτίσεως, καὶ γένεσις τῶν ὅλων, *the seed-plot of the creation, and the generation of things*. Thus we see how Thales, with the Phœnicians, from whom he was derived, as Laertius tells us, and Pythagoras, with the Egyptians and others, concur with Moses, not only in the production of the world, but in the manner of it, wherein is expressed a fluid matter, which was the material principle out of which the world was formed; when we are told, that *the earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters*, i. e. that all at first was but fluid matter; for P. Fagius, from R. Kimchi, renders תהו by ὕλη, which fluid matter was agitated and moved by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plastica mundi;* so Chrysostom calls it ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ, and so Drusius and P. Fagius explain רחף by motion or agitation. And herein we have likewise the consent of those forenamed excellent philosophers, who attribute the origin of particular things in the world to this agitation or motion of the fluid matter. For Chalcidius, speaking not only of Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, but of Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and others, says thus of them, *omnes igitur hi—in motu positam rerum originem censuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the origin of things was to be ascribed to the motion of the parts of matter*. So the Phœnicians called this motion of the particles of matter ἀέρα ζοφώδη καὶ πνευματώδη, *a dark and blustering wind*. And how suitable this explication of the origin of things, from the motion of fluid matter, is to the history of nature, appears by those many experiments by which mixed bodies are shewed to spring from no

Grot. Annot. in l. i. de Ver. Christ. Rel.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. i. c. 10. Ed. Par.

Gen. i. 2.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 378.

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other material principle than the particles of fluid matter: of which you may read a discourse of that ingenious and learned gentleman, Mr. Boyle, in his Sceptical Chymist. Only thus much may here suffice to have made it appear that all those philosophers, who were most inquisitive after the ancient and genuine tradition of the world concerning the first beginning of things, did not only concur with Moses in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular circumstances of it, as to the fluid matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the testimony of Homer in Plutarch.

Boyle's Sceptical Chymist, p. 115, &c.

Homer. Iliad. ξ'. v. 246. Odyss. ι'.

Ὠκεανὸς, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Chalcid. p. 378. V. Meurs. in Chal. p. 37.

And in Chalcidius: *Inque eadem sententia Homerus esse invenitur, cum Oceanum et Thetin dicat parentes esse geniturae; cumque jusjurandum Deorum constituat aquam, quam quidem ipse appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, et jurejurando nihil constituens reverentius.* To which purpose likewise Aristotle speaks in his Metaphysics, that the reason why Styx was made the oath of the Gods, was because water was supposed to be the material principle of things; which he saith was ἀρχαίαν τὶς ἀΰτη καὶ παλαιὰ περὶ τῆς φύσεως δόξα, *a most ancient tradition concerning the origin of the universe.* And tells us before, that some were of opinion, τὰς παμπαλαιὰς, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας, *that the most ancient and remote persons, and first writers of theology, held this opinion of water being the first material principle of things.*

Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. 3. Ed. Par.

IV. Having thus made it appear what a consent there was between the ancient tradition of the world, and the writings of Moses, concerning the origin of the world, I now come to consider upon what pretence of reason this tradition came to be contradicted, and the eternity of the world asserted. For which we are to consider, that the difference of the former philosophers of the Ionic sect, after the time of Thales, as to the material principle of the world, one substituting air, another fire, instead of water, rendered the tradition itself suspected among other philosophers, especially when the humour of innovating in philosophy was got among them; and they thought they did nothing unless they contradicted their masters: thence came that multiplicity of sects presently among them, and that philosophy, which at first went much on the original tradition of the world, was turned into dis-

putes and altercations, which helped as much to the finding out of truth, as the fighting of two cocks on a dunghill doth to the finding out the jewel that lies there. For which, scraping and searching into the natures of things had been far more proper than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humour, philosophy, from being a design, grew to be a mere art; and he was accounted the best philosopher, not that searched further into the bowels of nature, but that dressed and tricked up the notions he had in the best posture of defence against all who came to oppose him. From hence those opinions were most plausible, not which were most true, but which were most defensible, and which, like Des Cartes's second Element, had all the angles cut off, on which their adversaries might have an advantage of justling upon them; and then their opinions were accounted most pure, when they were so spherical as to pass up and down without interruption. From such a degeneracy of philosophy as this we have now mentioned, arose the opinion of the eternity of the world; for the certain tradition of the world being now lost in a crowd of philosophers, whose main aim was to set up for themselves, and not to trade with the common bank, so that there could be no certain and convictive evidence given to a shuffling philosopher that things were ever otherwise than they are; they found it most defensible to assert that the world never had a beginning, nor would have an end, but always did, and would continue in the state they were in. This opinion, though Aristotle seems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched, as far as we can find, at first under Pythagoras's successors, by Ocellus Lucanus, as appears by his book still extant, *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, of the nature of the universe*; to whom Aristotle hath not been a little beholden, as Ludov. Nogarola hath in part manifested in his notes on Ocellus; although Aristotle had not the ingenuity of Pliny, *agnoscere per quos profecerit*. From Aristotle this opinion, together with his name, spread itself much farther, and became the opinion most in vogue among the Heathen philosophers, especially after the rise of Christianity; for then not only the Peripatetics, but the modern Platonists, Plotinus, Apuleius, Taurus, Iamblichus, Alcinous, Proclus, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the eternity of the world, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Christianity. Hence came the hot and eager contests between Proclus, Simplicius, and

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Philoponus; who undertook to answer Proclus's eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world, and to charge Aristotle with self-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubled about, than to reconcile the Timæus of Plato with the eternity of the world, which they made to be a mere hypothesis, and a kind of diagram to salve Providence withal; although the plain words of Plato, not only there, but elsewhere, do express, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real judgment to have been for the production of the world by God. For which purpose we have this observable testimony in his Sophista, where he divides all manner of productions of things into divine and human, and opposes the opinion that conceived all things to be produced by an eternal power, to the opinion of the vulgar; which, saith he, was τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυέσης, *that all things were produced by a blind force of nature, without any reason or counsel;* to which he opposeth the other opinion, that they are made μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, *by a Divine power, with infinite reason and wisdom;* and when Theætetus expresseth himself in an academical way as to either of these opinions, the Hospes Eleatensis, who there acts the part of the philosopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other opinion, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν, *he would undertake to make him confess the contrary, by the evidence of reason which he would bring.* And we shall see what great reason there is for this opinion, when we consider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the arguments which either Ocellus, or Aristotle, or the modern Platonists make use of, are built on these following suppositions; which are all false. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been in any other state than they are.* 2. *That there is no other way of production but by generation.* 3. *That God is no free agent, but produced the world by necessity of nature.*

Plato. Sophist. p. 185. Ed. Fic.

V. 1. *That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been any otherwise than they are.* The reason of which supposition was this: That the general conclusions of reason, which they proceed upon in philosophy, were taken up from the observation of things as they are at present in the world. Which is evident from the ground of Aristotle's condemning the opinion of Empedocles; who asserted the production of the world, and yet the incorruptibility of it: τὸ μὲν ἓν γενέσθαι μέν, ἀίδιον δ' ὅμως εἶναι

φάναι, τῶν ἀδυνάτων, which he accounts impossible; and gives this as his reason, μόνα γὰρ ταῦτα θετέον εὐλόγως, ὅσα ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἢ πάντων ὁρῶμεν ὑπάρχοντα. *For*, saith he, *nothing else can be rationally asserted, but what we find to be in all things, or at least in most;* now because there could nothing be found in the world which was produced, (i. e. by generation,) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impossible it should be so with the universe. By which we evidently see what the grand principles of reason among the philosophers were; viz. such observations as they had made from the present course of nature in the order of the universe. From hence arose that strong presumption among them, which hath been so taken for granted, that it hath been looked on as a common notion of human nature, viz. *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main argument used by them to prove the eternity of the world, and by others, to prove the *preexistence of matter*. So Ocellus argues against both the dissolution and production of the world, from this principle: *If the world be dissolved*, saith he, *it must either be* ἤτοι εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, *either into that which is, or into that which is not*. It cannot *be dissolved into that which is, because then the universe cannot be destroyed; for that which is, is either the universe, or a part of it: neither can it be dissolved into that which is not,* ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀποτέλεσθαι ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι, *for it is impossible that a thing should be made out of that which is not, or be dissolved into nothing*. And Aristotle somewhere tells us, that it is a principle which all the writers of *Natural Philosophy* are agreed in (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τῆς φύσεως,) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, *that it is impossible for any thing to come out of nothing*. But now when we observe upon what grounds this principle was took up by these philosophers, we have no reason to admit of it as an universal standard of nature. For we find by these naturalists, who thus asserted this principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the course of generations in the world, or from the works of art, both which suppose matter preexistent; and from these short collections they form this universal maxim. And from hence, when they discoursed of the manner whereby God did produce the world, their imaginations ran presently upon that which the Epicurean in Tully enquires after, *Quæ molitio? Quæ ferramenta? Qui vectes? Quæ machinæ? Qui ministri tanti operis fuerunt?* They apprehend God only as an artificer, that con-

Arist. de Cœlo, l. i. cap. 10.

Vid. Laert. in Vit. Democriti.

Ocellus Lucanus, p. 16. Ed. Comm.

Aristot. Physic. l. iv.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 19.

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trives the world first into a platform, and then useth instruments to erect it; and consequently still suppose the matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of Balbus in Tully, when he comes to discourse of the nature of God; *In quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere, nothing is more difficult than to abstract our minds from the observations of this visible world, when we seek to apprehend the nature of the Deity.* Thus we see upon what general grounds the philosophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how insufficient any collections from the present order of the universe are to determine any thing concerning its production by. For supposing a production of the world, several things must of necessity be supposed in it different from what the present order of the world is; and it is an unreasonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greatest perfection, to what must always have been in the same thing; for by this means we must condemn many things for falsities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently false. For which Maimonides useth an excellent similitude. *Suppose,* saith he, *one of exquisite natural parts, whose mother dies as soon as he is born, and his father brings him up in an island, where he may have no society with mankind till he be grown up to years of understanding, and that he never saw any female of either man or beast; suppose now this person to enquire of the first man he speaks with, how men are born, and how they come into the world? The other tells him, that every man is bred in the womb of one of the same kind with ourselves, thus and thus formed; and that while we are in the womb, we have a very little body, and there move and are nourished; and we grow up by little and little till we come to such a bigness, and then we come forth into the world, and yet grow still till we come to such a proportion as we are of. Here presently this young man stops him, and enquires, when we were thus little in the womb, and did live, move, and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breathe at our mouth and nostrils as we do now? Did we not ease nature as we do now? If it be answered him, No, then he presently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonstrations that it was utterly impossible that it should be so. For,* saith he, *if either of us cease breathing but for an hour, our motion and life is gone: how is it then possible for one of us, though never so little, to live and move in the womb for so many months, when it is so close, and shut up, and in the middle of the body? If one of us,* saith he, *should*

Ibid. l. ii.

Maimon. More Nev. l. ii. c. 17.

swallow a little bird, it would presently die as soon as it came into the stomach; how much more if it were in the belly? If we should be but for few days without eating and drinking, we could not live; how can a child then continue so many months without it? Again; if one doth eat, and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be killed with it in few days; how can it possibly be otherwise with a child? If it be replied, that there is a passage open in the belly, at which the child receives his nourishment, he will presently say that it is as impossible as the other; for if our bellies were so open, we should be quickly destroyed. And again, if the child hath all its limbs perfect and sound, how comes it not to open its eyes, use the feet, mouth, and hands, as we do? And so concludes it impossible that man should ever be born after this manner. Much after this way, saith that excellent author, do Aristotle and others argue against the production of the world; for if the world were produced, say they, it must have been thus and thus; and it is impossible that it should have been so. Why? Because we see things are otherwise now in the world. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the consideration of the former similitude, in which the arguments are as strong to prove the impossibility of that which we know to be true, as in the case about which we dispute. CHAP. II.

VI. 2. And this now leads us to the second false hypothesis, which the opinion of the world's eternity was founded on, which is, *That there is no other way of production but by generation.* Most of the arguments which are used by Ocellus and Aristotle against the production of the world, run upon this supposition, that it must be generated, as we see things are in the world. So Ocellus argues, πᾶν τε τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἰληφὸς, καὶ διαλύσεως ὀφεῖλον κοινωνῆσαι, δύο ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ' ἧπερ ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται, ἀκμή· δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται φθορὰ καὶ διάλυσις. *Every thing that comes into being, and is subject to dissolution, hath two observable mutations in it: the one is whereby it grows from less to greater, and from worse to better; and this is called generation, and the height of this mutation, perfection. The other begins from better to worse, and from bigger to less; and the conclusion of this is corruption and dissolution. But now,* saith he, *if the world had a beginning, there would be such a mutation* Ocell. Luc. p. 8. Ed. Comm.

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in it; and it would have grown by degrees greater, till it had come to its perfection, and from thence it would sensibly decay till it came to dissolution: but nobody hath ever observed such a mutation in the world, neither is there any appearance of it; ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ: *but the world is semper idem; it varies not, nor alters any thing from itself.* For which he particularly instanceth in the courses, symmetries, figures, positions, intervals, proportions of motion which are in the world; which things are all capable of such a mutation: yet we see no such thing in the universe: from whence he infers that the universe was always, and will be, as it is. Upon the same principle doth Aristotle dispute for the eternity of the world, from the nature of his *materia prima;* because if the first matter were generated, it must be generated of other matter, and so *in infinitum;* and so he argues from the nature of the heavens, that they are not capable of generation and corruption as other bodies are. All which arguments signify no more than this, that the world was not generated as plants or animals are; and who ever, right in his wits, asserted that it was? But do any of these arguments prove it impossible that God, having infinite power, should produce the universe after another way, than any of those things are produced in, which we observe in the world? For we assert an infinite and eternal Being, which was the efficient cause of the world, who by his omnipotent power produced it out of nothing, and continues it in its being; which is well expressed by the author of the Refutation of Aristotle, in Justin Martyr's works. *We assert,* saith he, *one God who is eternal himself, that hath nothing else coequal with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose power is so great that nothing can hinder it; by which power he produced the world,* ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐκείνου θέλησιν; *which hath no other cause either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his will.* Who fully answers, in a philosophical manner, the particular allegations out of Aristotle, concerning the *eternity of the world;* his design being, as he saith, to shew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ' ἣν ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κτίσεως τὰς λόγους ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένους, *that the Greek philosophers, in their discourses concerning God and the creation, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the laws of demonstration; but instead of them, proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures.* And

Aristot. Dogmat. Confut. in Præfat. Ed. Par.

Ibid.

as to this particular of the possibility of another way of production, besides that of generation, he proves it from Aristotle's own opinion, from the equal necessity of the existence of matter, as of God. *For*, saith he, *if God can produce any thing out of matter, which is as necessarily existent as himself, he may produce something out of nothing; for the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced, the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent.* How then can God produce something out of matter which necessarily exists, and not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if matter have its original from itself, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we acknowledge God to have his being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to matter. But whatever hath infinite power in itself, hath a power upon something beyond itself; but if God and matter have it both, they can never have power upon each other, or without themselves; which is a far greater absurdity than the mere asserting a power to produce something out of nothing, which is implied in the very notion of infinite power; for if it be confined to any matter, the power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than matter doth. So that a power of creation is implied in the very notion of a Deity; and therefore it is a mere sophism to argue, because the world could not be generated, therefore it could not be produced, unless any other way of production, but by generation, be proved impossible.

CHAP. II.

Just. Mar. Ep.

A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this, *That the being of the world was no effect of God's will, but of the necessity of nature.* For although the philosophers we now speak of did assert a Deity, which in some sense might be called the cause of the world, yet they withal asserted, that the world was coequal with God himself; and so, though there might be some priority in order of causes between them, yet there was none in order of time or duration; as we see the light, though it flows from the sun, yet the sun is never without light. This Aristotle proves from the necessity of motion and time. *For*, saith he, *whatever is moved, must be moved by something else, and consequently there must be a running in infinitum*; but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual physical motion in things, which we deny, since God, by his infinite power, may give motion to that

VII. 3.

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which had it not before; and so all that can be proved is the necessity of some first cause, which we assert, but no necessity at all of his continual acting, since he may cause motion when he pleases. And for time continually existing, it denotes nothing real in itself existing, but only our manner of conception of the duration of things, as it is conceived to belong to motion; and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity. But the latter Platonists look upon these as insufficient ways of probation, and therefore argue from those attributes of God, which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to God's nature, and by which the world was produced, if at all; so that by the same arguments whereby we prove that the world was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eternity. It was well and truly said in Plato, in his Timæus, *that the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the world;* from which speech the more modern Platonists gather a necessity of the world's eternity; for from hence they infer, that since God was always good, he must always have an object to exercise his goodness upon; as the *sun disperseth his light as soon as he is himself.* True, were God of the nature of the sun, it would be so with him, or were the sun of the nature of God, it would not be so with it. But there is this vast difference between them, that though God be essentially and necessarily good, yet the communications of his goodness are the effects of his will, and not merely of his nature; for, were not the acts of beneficence and goodness in God the free acts of his will, man must be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his first existence in the world, but as long as it should continue, by mere necessity of nature, without any intervention of the will or actions of men. And so there could be no such difference as that of good and bad men in the world; for, if the lettings forth of God's goodness to the world be so necessary, all men must become necessarily good, if God's goodness be so great as to be able to make men so; which I suppose will not be questioned. By this, then, when we see that the communications of God's goodness to the world are free, and depend upon the eternal counsels of his will, which is a depth too great for us to approach or look into; by what necessity, then, if God be a free agent, and of infinite wisdom as well as goodness, must we either assert the eternity of the world, or fear to deprive God of his essential goodness? Whereas to make the communications of God's goodness

ad extra necessary, and therefore to make the world from eternity, that he might have an object to exercise his goodness on, is to take as much off from the infinite perfection and self-sufficiency of the Divine nature, as it would seem to flatter his goodness. For God cannot be himself without his goodness; and if his goodness cannot be without some creature to shew or display it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy without his creatures, because these are necessary issues of his goodness; and consequently we make the being of the creatures necessary to his being God, which is the highest derogation from the absolute perfection of the Divine nature. We assert then so much goodness in God, as none can be imagined greater; we assert, that it was the communication of this Divine goodness, which gave being to the world; but withal we acknowledge God to be an agent infinitely wise and free, who dispenseth this goodness of his in such a way and manner as is best pleasing to himself, though ever agreeable to his nature. As God is infinitely good in himself, so whatever he doth is suitable to this nature of his; but the particular determinations of the acts of God's beneficence belong to the will of God, as he is a most free and independent agent; so that goodness, as it imports the necessary rectitude of the Divine nature, implies a perfection inseparable from the true idea of God; but as it is taken for the expressions of Divine bounty to somewhat without, as the object of it, it is not implied in our conception of God, as to his nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his will. We cannot then, neither ought we, to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of God's bounty towards the whole universe, or any part of it, any farther than God himself hath declared it to us. Now we see the world exists; we have cause to adore that goodness of God, which not only gave a being to the universe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the creatures which he hath made in it: which the Heathen was so sensible of, that the Stoic in Tully, taking notice of the abundant provision which is made in the world, not only for man's necessity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum pronœa nostra Epicurea esse videatur; God's providence doth abundantly exceed man's necessity.* We see then from this discourse how unsafe and unsatisfactory (that I may not say bold and presumptuous) those arguments are, which are drawn from a general consideration of the Divine nature and goodness, without regard

CHAP. II.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. ii.

BOOK III. had to the determinations of his will, as to the existence of things in the world. It cannot certainly then be an argument of any great force with any candid enquirers after truth and reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that Pythagorean hypothesis of the preexistence of souls, viz. *that if it be good for men's souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the wisdom and goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into those terrestrial bodies, (it being better for them to enjoy themselves than not,) they must be before they come into these bodies. Wherefore the preexistence of souls is a necessary result of the wisdom and goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, than he can to understand it.* I now seriously enquire of such who love reason above Plato and Pythagoras, whether, if the eternity of the world were put into the argument instead of the preexistence of souls, this argument would not hold as strongly for that as it doth for preexistence? and if I am bound to believe preexistence on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the souls of men eternal, if not the universe? But how reconcileable the eternity of the world is to the Pythagoric *cabala* of the creation, I am yet to understand. But if this argument doth not at all infer the eternity of the world, as we have shewed it doth not, much less doth it preexistence of souls.

VIII. We have thus far considered the first hypothesis, which is repugnant to Moses, concerning the origin of the universe, which is that which asserts the *eternity of the world as it is;* we come now to the second, which attributes the formation of the world, as it is, to God, as the efficient cause; but attributes eternity to the matter out of which the world was framed. I am not ignorant that some, who would be taken for the masters of reason, are so far from conceiving this hypothesis to be repugnant to the text of Moses, that they conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, viz. that there was a preexistent matter, out of which God formed the world. But I would willingly understand how Moses would have expressed that matter itself was created, supposing it had been his intention to have spoken it: for although the word ברא may not of itself imply necessarily the production of things out of nothing, i. e. out of no preexistent matter, yet it is acknowledged by all, that no word used by the Jews is more proper to that than ברא is; and P. Fagius cites it

Volkelius de Vera Rel. l. ii. c. 4.

from R. Nachmani, *that the Hebrew language hath no other word to signify such a production out of nothing, but* ברא. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, that, because ברא is sometimes used for no more than עשה, therefore the world was created out of preexistent matter; all that can rationally be inferred is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: but if other places of Scripture compared, and the evidence of reason, do make it clear that there could be no preexistent matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow that creation must be taken in its proper sense. And in this sense it is evident, that not only Jews and Christians, but even the Heathens themselves, understood Moses, as is plain by Galen, where he compares the opinion of Moses with that of Epicurus, and ingenuously confesseth that of Moses, which attributed the production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable than that of Epicurus, which assigned the origin of things to a mere casual concourse of atoms: but withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with Moses as to the origin of such things as depend on generation, but asserts the preexistence of matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend itself beyond the capacity of the matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est*, saith he, *in quo ratio nostra ao Platonis, tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conscripserunt, a Mose dissidet.* How true these words are, will appear afterwards. Chalcidius, in his Commentaries on Plato's Timæus, where he speaks of the origin of ὕλη, which in him is still translated *sylva*, and enquires into the different opinions of all philosophers about it, takes it for granted, that, according to Moses, this ὕλη had its production from God. *Hebræi sylvam generatam esse confitentur; quorum sapientissimus Moyses non humana facundia, sed divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; "Initio "Deus fecit cœlum et terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis "et incompta." Ut vero ait Aquila; "Caput rerum con- "didit Deus cœlum et terram; terra porro inanis erat et "nihil." Vel ut Symmachus; "Ab exordio condidit Deus "cœlum et terram. Terra porro fuit otiosum quid, confu- "sumque et inordinatum." Sed Origines asseverat ita sibi ab Hebræis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exemplari, terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia*

Galen. de Usu Part. l. xi.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 372.

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tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut et generata sit ea, quæ subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur. Where we find, by the testimony of Chalcidius, an universal consent as to the production of the universal corporeal matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of *generata est.* But this same author afterwards tells us, that by heavens and earth, in the first verse of Genesis, we are not to understand the visible heavens and earth; *for,* saith he, *the heavens, which are called the firmament, were created after; and on the third day, when the waters were separated, the* Ibid. p. 374. *dry land appeared, which was called earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, et terram qua subvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, sed secundo die.* And therefore by the heavens he understands *incorpoream naturam,* and by earth, ὕλη, or the primogenial matter. *And this,* saith he, *appears by the following words, The earth was invisible, and without form;* i. e. this corporeal matter, before it was brought into order by the power and wisdom of God, remained a rude and indigested lump; and that which is so, might well be called invisible and without form: and therefore it is called *inanis* and *nihil,* because of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. Symmachus calls it *otiosa et indigesta;* the former, because of its inability to produce any thing of itself; the latter, because it wanted a Divine power to bring it into due order. The stupidity and admiration which Origen attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the majesty of God, who was the orderer and contriver of it, *siquidem opificis et auctoris sui majestate capta stupuerit.* Thus we see, that, according to Moses, the first matter of the world was produced by God, which is largely manifested by Origen against the Marcionists, a fragment of which is extant in his Philocalia; and by Tertullian against Hermogenes, and others, who, from the opinion of the preexistence of matter, are called *Materiarii.*

Origen. Philoc. c. 24. Tertull. ad Hermog. per tot.

IX.

Having thus cleared the sense of Moses, it is far more difficult to find out the true opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the production or eternity of corporeal matter, there having been so great dissensions, not only about the thing itself, but about the opinions of some about it; for it is plain by Plutarch's ψυχογονία, as well as the discourses of the later Platonists, how eager some have been to interpret Plato's Timæus in favour of the eternity, at least of matter, if not of the world. But

Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. e Tim.

although Plato doth assert therein a preexistence of rude matter before the formation of the world, yet I see no reason why he should be otherwise understood, than in the same sense that we believe a chaos to have gone before the bringing the world into the order it is now in. And in that sense may those places in Plutarch be interpreted, ὁ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ἢ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος· and so likewise those following words, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, ὅτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more than that Plato conceived that all the productions of the kinds of things which are in the world was out of a preexistent hyle: the one spiritual and intelligible, out of which he supposed souls to be formed; the other sensible and corporeal, out of which other beings, which were more gross and material, were produced. So Chalcidius tells us, that both Pythagoras and Plato looked upon *constitutionem sylvæ* to be *opus providentiæ;* which I suppose relates not only to the bringing of matter into form, but to the production of matter itself. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to search out the true meaning of Plato concerning the origin of hyle, and mentions the great dissensions among the Platonists about it, and the obscurity of the Timæus in it. To him therefore I refer the reader; who likewise brings in Numenius, largely discoursing concerning the opinion of Pythagoras about it, who condemns all those, as not understanding Pythagoras, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate hyle. These are his words, *Numenius ex Pythagoræ magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram Deum quidem singularitatis nominasse, (nomine appellasse) sylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem, indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam esse dicere. Hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque et ordinem nanciscereturr, sine ortu et generatione; exornatam vero atque illustratam, a digestore Deo esse generatam. Atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo est ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim sententiæ non recte assecutos, putasse, dici etiam illam indeterminatam, et immensam, duitatem, ab una singularitate institutam, recedente a natura sua singularitate, et in duitatis habitum migrante.* But however these Pythagoreans might be deceived, who thought the Unity itself became the Deity, yet it is evident by Numenius, that he looked on

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377.

Pag. 401.

Pag. 393.

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the undetermined and confused matter to have been coeval with God himself, and not produced by him. And if Numenius be as much to be credited in this, as when he calls Plato Moses Atticus, then the creation of universal matter can be no part of Pythagoras's philosophic *cabala*. But whatever were the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the first origin of matter, we are certain that the Stoics generally asserted the improduction of matter, and make that to be as necessary a passive principle for the being of the world, as God is the active and efficient cause. So Diogenes Laertius reports of the Stoical principles concerning the origin of the universe: Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον, εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν Θεόν. *They make two principles of the universe, one active, and the other passive; the passive, an essence without quality, called hyle, or confused matter; the active, the reason which acts on the other, which is God.* These two principles Seneca calls *causa et materia. Esse vero debet,* saith he, *aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc causa est, illud materia.* Although Seneca seems to make a query of it elsewhere; *quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an data utatur?* But Zeno is express in Stobæus, Οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον, ὅτε πλείω γιγνωμένην ὅτε ἐλάττω. *The first essence of all is matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution.* To the same purpose Chalcidius speaks, *Stoici ortum sylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipsam et Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentia præditos facientem, et quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute, quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam esse.*

Laert. V. Zenon. p. 196. Ed. Lond.

V. Lipsium in Physiol. Sto. l. i. c. 4.

Senec. Epist. 65.

Idem Præfat. ad Nat. Quæst.

Stob. Eclog. Physic.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 348.

X. Having now found out the certain assertors among the Heathen philosophers of the eternity and improduction of matter as the passive principle of things, we come to examine the reason of this hypothesis, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon to all eternity. It might be sufficient prejudice against this opinion, that it was built on the same infirm conclusions which that of the eternity of the whole world was, viz. that maxim which Lipsius attributes to Democritus, but was embraced by all those philosophers who denied production of matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, *that nothing could be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing*; which, as we have

already said, was only taken up from the established order of the universe, and the manner of production of material beings. But this is not all we have to charge this hypothesis with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an omnipotent power; for otherwise we degrade him to the imbecility of finite creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God should give a being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by creation, viz. the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produced. Now what repugnancy is there to any free principle of reason, that a power infinite should raise an insect into being, without any passive principle out of which it was caused? And if an infinite power can do that, it may as well produce the world out of nothing, else the power would not be infinite; for it would have its bounds set, that thus far it could go, and no further. Now if such a power in God implies no contradiction in itself, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of matter implies a contradiction to this power. For, 1. A power to produce something out of nothing would be to no purpose, if a passive principle or preexistent matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something; which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not infinite, and so the same power is infinite and not infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of matter.

2. If matter be unproduced, then necessary existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary existence belongs to matter, infinite power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is self-originated; whatever is self-originated could not by any cause whatsoever be hindered from being; what cannot by any cause be hindered from being, hath infinite power; what hath infinite power may produce any thing, and is God; and so matter cannot be a mere passive principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be

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more Gods than one. To an argument something of this nature Hermogenes in Tertullian replies, that matter would not lose the name or nature of matter because of its coeternity with God; neither could it be God merely on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the nature of God as well as that. But I have already shewed that necessary existence implies other perfections going along with it; which is likewise thus proved by Tertullian in answer to Hermogenes. The reason of the imperfections which are to be seen in any creatures, is from hence, that they derive their beings from a higher cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from itself, must on that account want those imperfections which other creatures in the world have; and therefore if necessary existence be of the nature of matter, all other perfections must belong to it too: and so there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and matter, because on both sides there will be necessary existence. *Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and so the eternal existence of matter is repugnant to the unity of God.

Tertull. advers. Hermog. c. 4.

Tertull. c. 7.

3. It is repugnant to the independency of God; for it makes God subject to matter, and not matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without preexistent matter, the matter is necessary to his action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so God's using matter is, as Tertullian speaks, *ex necessitate mediocritatis suæ*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget ut possit uti*, as he goes on. Thus matter at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so, as Tertullian sharply says, *God is beholden to matter for every being known to the world; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognosceretur, et omnipotens vocaretur, nisi quod jam non omnipotens, si non et hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we see how irreconcileable this hypothesis is with these attributes of God.

Ibid. c. 8.

4. It is repugnant to the immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this eternal matter, or was conjoined with it: if conjoined with it, then both made but one being, as Maximus or Origen argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be three real improduced things. If it be answered that they are neither conjoined nor separate, but God is in matter as in his proper place, as the Stoics

Orig. Philos. c. 24.

asserted, it is easily replied, that either then he is in a part of matter, or the whole matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole, as his adequate place, how could he then ever frame the world? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass, that he might fashion that part of the world which he was about, or else he must likewise frame part of himself with that part of the world which he was then framing of; which consequence is unavoidable, on the stoical hypothesis of God's being corporeal, and confined to the world as his proper place. And so much for this second hypothesis concerning the origin of the universe, which supposeth the eternity of matter as coexisting with God. CHAP. II.

XI. I come now to that which makes most noise in the world, which is the atomical or Epicurean hypothesis; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the origin of the universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which produced the world, and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the world, that many of the phenomena of the universe are far more intelligibly explained by matter and motion than by substantial forms and real qualities, few free and unprejudiced minds do now scruple. But because these little particles of matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of nature, that therefore there should be nothing else but matter and motion in the world, and that the origin of the universe should be from no wiser principle than the casual concourse of these atoms, is one of the evidences of the proneness of men's minds to be intoxicated with those opinions they are once in love with; when they are not content to allow an hypothesis its due place and subserviency to God and Providence, but think these atoms have no force at all in them, unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the world; for it is most evident that it was not so much the truth, as the serviceableness of this hypothesis, which hath given it entertainment among men of atheistical spirits. Epicurus himself, in his Epistle to Pythocles, urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his opinion, that he brought no God down upon the stage to put things in order, καὶ ἡ θεῖα φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμὴ προσαγέσθω, which his paraphrast Lucretius hath thus rendered: Diog. Laer. l. x. p. 290. Lucret. de Nat. l. v. v. 199.

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum.

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If this opinion then be true, the history of the creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are obliged more particularly to consider the reason of it. The hypothesis then of Epicurus is, *that before the world was brought into that form and order it is now in, there was an infinite empty space, in which were an innumerable company of solid particles, or atoms of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion; and that by the various occursions of these, all the bodies of the universe were framed into that order they now are in.* Which is fully expressed by Dionysius in Eusebius, and very agreeably to the sense of Epicurus, in his Epistles to Herodotus and Pythocles, and to what Plutarch reports of the sense of Epicurus, though he names him not, (if at least that book be his, which Muretus denies.) The words of Dionysius are these, concerning the Epicureans, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀτόμους προσειπόντες ἄφθαρτά τινα καὶ σμικρότατα σώματα, πλῆθος ἀνάριθμα, καί τι χωρίον κενὸν, μέγεθος ἀπεριόριστον προβαλόμενοι, ταύτας δή φασι τὰς ἀτόμους ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐν τῷ κενῷ φερομένας, αὐτομάτως τε συμπιπτούσας ἀλλήλαις διὰ ῥύμην ἄτακτον καὶ συμπλεκομένας διὰ τὸ πολύσχημον, ἀλλήλων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ ὅτω τόντε κόσμον, ἢ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ κόσμους ἀπείρους ἀποτελεῖν. So that, according to this opinion, all the account we have of the origin of the world is from this general rendezvous of atoms in this infinite space; in which, after many encounters and facings about, they fell into their several troops, and made up that ordered battalia which now the world is the scheme of. It was not imprudently done of Epicurus to make the worlds infinite, as well as his space and atoms; for by the same reason that his atoms would make one world, they might make a thousand; and who would spare for worlds, when he might make them so easily? Lucretius gives us in so exact an account of the several courses the atoms took up in disposing themselves into bodies, as though he had been muster-master general at the rendezvous; for thus he speaks of his atoms.

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. xiv. c. 23. Ed. Par. Plutarch. de Placitis Phil. l. i. c. 4. Muret. Annot. in Senec. de Provid.

Lucret. l. i. v. 1023. Ed. Oxon.

Quæ quia multimodis, multis, mutata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus et cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in taleis disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum consistit summa creata.

And more particularly afterwards;

Id. l. v. v. 423.

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,

Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omnimodisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possent congressa creare;
Ut non sit mirum, si in talèis disposituras
Deciderunt quoque, et in talèis venere meatus,
Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc summa novando.

Thus we see the substance of the Epicurean hypothesis, that there was an infinite number of atoms, which by their frequent occursions did at last meet with those of the same nature with them, and these being conjoined together, made up those bodies which we see; so that all the account we are able to give, according to this hypothesis, of all the phenomena of the universe, is from the fortuitous concourse of the atoms in the first forming of the world, and the different contexture of them in bodies. And this was delivered by the ancient Epicureans, not with any doubt or hesitation, but with the greatest confidence imaginable. So Tully observes of Velleius the Epicurean, beginning his discourse, *fidenter sane ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset:* confidence was the peculiar genius of that sect, which we shall see in them to be accompanied with very little reason. Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i.

XII. For those two things which make any principles in philosophy to be rejected, this atomical hypothesis is unavoidably charged with; and those are, *If the principles be taken up without sufficient ground in reason for them; and if they cannot give any sufficient account of the phenomena of the world.* I shall therefore make it appear, *that this hypothesis,* as to the origin of the universe, is, *first, merely precarious, and built on no sufficient grounds of reason; secondly, that it cannot give any satisfactory account of the origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious hypothesis, and hath no evidence of reason on which it should be taken up; and that will be proved by two things. 1. *It is such an hypothesis as the Epicureans themselves could have no certainty of, according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main principles of the hypothesis itself are repugnant to those catholic laws of nature which are observed in the universe.*

1. *The Epicureans, according to their own principles, could have no certainty of the truth of this hypothesis.* And that, 1. *Because they could have no certain evidence of*

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its truth. 2. *Because their way of proving it was insufficient.*

1. *That they could have no certain evidence of the truth of it,* I prove from those *criteria,* which Epicurus lays down as the only certain rules of judging the truth of things by; and those were, *sense, anticipation,* and *passion.* Let sense be never so infallible a rule of judgment, yet it is impossible there should be any evidence to sense of the truth of this hypothesis; and let him extend his τὸ προσμενόμενον as long as he please, which was his great help for correcting the errors of sense, viz. as it was in the Roman court, when the case was not clear, *amplian-dum est:* so Epicurus would have the object represented every way it could be before he passed his judgment; yet this prudent caution would do him no good for this hypothesis, unless he were so wise as to stay till this world were crumbled into atoms again, that by that he might judge of the origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of things inevident to sense, (as by Epicurus's own confession all these atoms are, which are now the component particles of bodies; much more those which by their fortuitous concourse gave being to the world,) and that is, if something evident to sense doth apparently prove it, which *is his way of proving a* vacuity in nature from motion: but though that be easily answered by principles different from those of Epicurus, and more rational, yet that very way of probation fails him in this present hypothesis. For what is there evident to sense which proves a fortuitous concourse of atoms for the production of things? Nay, if we grant him that the composition of bodies is nothing else but the contexture of these insensible particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to sense, that these particles, without any wise and directing Providence, should make up such bodies as we see in the world. And here, when we speak of the evidence of sense, we may well ask, as the Stoic in Tully doth, whether ever Epicurus found a poem made by the casual throwing of letters together; and if a concourse of atoms did produce the world, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? Why did it never produce a cloister, a temple, a house, a city?* which are far easier things than the world. I know Epicurus will soon reply, *That things are otherwise in the world now than when it was first produced.* I grant it, and from thence prove, that because no such thing ever happens in the

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. ii.

world now, as a merely casual concourse of atoms to produce any thing, Epicurus could have no evidence from sense at all to find out the truth of his hypothesis by. And as little relief can he find from his second *criterium*, viz. anticipation; for by his own acknowledgment all anticipation depends on the senses, and men have it only one of these four ways. 1. By incursion, as the species of a man is preserved by the sight of him. 2. By proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that species of a man either into a giant or pigmy. 3. By similitude, as we may fancy the image of a city by resemblance to one which we have seen. 4. By composition, whereby we may join different images together; as of a horse and a man to make a centaur. Now though it be very questionable how some of these ways belong to a *criterium* of truth, yet none of them reach our case; for there can be no incursion of insensible particles as such upon our senses: we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them; but what is this to the proving the truth of the hypothesis? Similitude can do no good, unless Epicurus had ever seen a world made so; the only relief must be from composition, and that will prove the origin of the world by atoms to be as true as that there are centaurs in the world, which we verily believe. These are the only *criteria* which Epicurus would judge of the truth of natural things by, (for the third, passion, relates wholly to things moral, and not physical;) and now let any one judge whether the hypothesis of the origin of the universe by atoms can ever be proved true, either by the judgment of sense or by anticipation.

CHAP. II.

V. Gassend. de Logica Epicuri. Op. tom. i. c. 7. can. 7.

The way they had to prove this hypothesis was insufficient; and that was, by proving that the bodies of the world are compounded of such insensible particles. Now granting the thing, I deny the consequence; for what though the composition of bodies be from the contexture of atoms, doth it therefore follow that these particles did casually produce these bodies? Nay, doth it at all follow, that because bodies upon their resolution do fall into insensible particles of different size, figure, and motion, therefore these particles must be preexistent to all bodies in the world? For it is plain that there is now an universal lump of matter, out of which these insensible particles arise, and whither they return on the dissolution of bodies; and all these various corpuscles may be of the same uniform substance, only with the alteration of size, shape, and motion. But what then? Doth this prove,

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that because particular bodies do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of insensible particles of that matter which exists in the world, that therefore this whole matter was produced by the casual occursions of these atoms? It will ask more time and pains than is usually taken by the philosophers, either ancient or modern, to prove that those things, whatsoever they are, whether elements or particles out of which bodies are supposed to be compounded, do exist separately from such compounded bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no Aristotelian elements pure in the world, nor any particles of matter destitute of such a size, figure, and motion, as doth make some body or other. From whence then can we infer either the existence of Aristotle's *materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality, or the Epicurean atoms without such a contexture as makes up some bodies in the world? Our profound naturalist Dr. Harvey, after his most accurate search into the natures and generation of things, delivers this as his experience and judgment concerning the commonly reputed elements or principles of bodies. For, speaking of the different opinions of Empedocles and Hippocrates, and Democritus and Epicurus, concerning the composition of bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum similarium generatione (sive ea partium animalium, sive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium, &c. fuerit,) vel congregationem ejusmodi, vel miscibilia diversa in generationis opere unienda præexistere, observare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceived most rational and consonant to experience in the generation of things, he concludes his discourse with these words. *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora similaria mista, elementa sua tempore priora non habeant, sed illa potius elementis suis prius existant (nempe Empedoclis atque Aristotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel chymicorum sale, sulphure, et mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipsis perfectiora. Sunt, inquam, mista, et composita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuslibet sic dictis, in quæ illa corrumpuntur et desinunt; dissolvuntur scilicet, in ista ratione potius quam re ipsa et actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non sunt priora istis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; sed posteriora potius, et reliquiæ magis quam principia. Neque Aristoteles ipsemet aut alius quispiam unquam demonstravit, elementa in rerum natura separatim existere, aut principia esse corporum similarium.* If then none of these things which bodies are

Harvey de Generat. Anim.

resolved into, and are supposed to be compounded of, either have been or can be proved to exist separate from and antecedent to those bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of atoms, which are supposed, by their concourse in an infinite space, to be the origin of the world? I know not where to find them, unless dancing with the schoolmen's chimeras in a vacuum, or in a space as empty as the infinite one, viz. some Epicurean's brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great master Epicurus, if we believe the character which the Stoic in Tully gives of him; who saith, he was *homo sine arte, sine literis, insultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore.* But allowing the Stoic some of that passion (which he disclaimed so much) in these words, yet we may rather believe what Tully himself elsewhere speaks of Epicurus's sentiments, that they were none of them handsome, or becoming a man. *At ille quid sentit?* saith he of Epicurus; and soon replies, *sentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum.* And in another place, speaking of his morals, he saith, *nihil generosum sapit atque magnificum, there was nothing noble and generous in him;* which censure of Epicurus, all the pains that P. Gassendus hath taken in the vindication of the life and opinions of Epicurus, hath not been able to wipe off. For although we should yield what that learned man so much contends for, that all the calumnies which were cast on Epicurus arise from the antipathy between Zeno and the following Stoics, and the school of Epicurus; yet all this will not make Epicurus to have been comparable with some other philosophers for parts and judgment, whose principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them than the morals of Epicurus had, taking them in their more refined sense.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 74.

Idem de Divinat. l. i.

Idem de Finibus, l. i.

XIV. But it is not the morality of Epicurus which we now enquire after; our business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendering an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity. And so we come to consider the hypothesis itself, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the catholic laws of nature which appear in the world. Two things I shall here enquire into, which are the main principles of Epicurus, viz. the motion of these atoms in the infinite space, and the manner of the concretion of bodies by the concourse of these atoms.

1. I begin with their motion; which Epicurus attributes to his atoms without any hesitation, and yet never

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undertakes to give an account of the origin of that motion; which argues his whole hypothesis to be extremely precarious. The thing then (which he must assume as his main principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, that motion doth inseparably belong to the least atom or insensible particle; for without this there cannot be imagined any concourse of atoms at all, much less any such contexture of bodies out of them. But for one to say that atoms move, because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the least satisfaction to an inquisitive mind: and it will be the least of all pardonable in the exploders of substantial forms and occult qualities, when the origin of the whole world is resolved into an occult quality which gives motion to atoms. And herein the Atomists outdo the most credulous Peripatetics, seeing they lay the prime foundation of the world and of their own philosophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all; which is, the motion of atoms in an infinite vacuity. If it be replied, which is all Epicurus hath to say, *that the motion of atoms depends upon their gravity*, the question returns upon him with the same violence; how comes this gravity to belong to these atoms in such an empty space, where there can be no impulsion from other bodies, no attraction from any magnetic particles, which are supposed to be the causes of the descent of heavy bodies? Nay, Epicurus himself takes away any centre of that motion of atoms, and yet attributes a necessary descent to his atoms by virtue of their gravity; and if a philosopher may beg such things as these are, so repugnant to the phenomena of nature, without assigning any other reason for them, but that it is their nature, let us never venture philosophizing more, but sit down in that contented piece of ignorance, which attributes the causes of every thing unto specific forms and occult qualities; for this is so shameful a piece of beggary, that P. Gassendus doth more than once disclaim it; and in his discourse of motion doth prove an impossibility of motion in an infinite empty space. Might not Epicurus then have saved his credit better by sitting down with the opinions of his forefathers, than thus to go a begging for such hypotheses, which none, who are not resolved to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gassendus Phys. sect. i. l. iii. c. 7. De apparent. Magnitud. Solis humilis et sublimis, Ep. iv. sect. iii. — De Motu Phys. sect. i. l. v. c. 2. V. Ep. de Motu impresso a Motore translato, tom. iii. Op.

XV. But yet this is not all: but according to this fundamental principle of Epicurus, viz. that there is a principle of motion in every insensible particle of matter, he plainly

overthrows another principle of his, which is, the solidity and different magnitude of these atoms. These particles are supposed so solid, that Dionysius in Eusebius tells us, the account given why they are called ἄτομοι was, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα, because of their indissoluble firmness; and the different sizes of these atoms is so necessary a principle, that from thence they undertake to resolve many phenomena of the universe. Let us now see how consistent these things are with the inseparable property of motion belonging to atoms: for if there be particles of such different sizes, then it is plain that there are some particles which may not only be conceived to be bigger than others, but are really so; and so there must be more parts of matter imagined in this bigger particle than in another less; and if there be more parts, these parts may be conceived separate from each other, that this particle may be equal to the other. Now then I demand, if motion doth inseparably belong to the least particle of matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we see that every particle is not in distinct motion: for there cannot but be more imaginable particles in an atom of a bigger size than in a less; and if so, there must be some union of those imaginable particles in that bigger atom; and how could such an union be without rest, and what rest could there be, if motion doth inseparably belong to every particle of matter? And so it must be in all those atoms which are supposed to have angles and hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other for the composition of bodies; how come these hooks and angles to be annexed to this atom? For an atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if such a principle of motion be in each particle? If it be answered, *that motion did belong to all these particles, but by degrees the lesser particles hitting together made up these angled and hooked particles;* I soon reply, that the difficulty returns more strongly: for if these angled and hooked particles be supposed necessary to the contexture and union of bodies, how came those least imaginable particles ever to unite without such hooks and angles? And so the question will return *in infinitum*. If then the solidity and indivisibility of these angled atoms doth depend on the union and rest of those lesser imaginable particles joined together, then it is evident that motion is no inseparable property of all these particles, but some are capable of union, in order to the making of such hooks and angles, which are necessary for the contexture

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. xiv. c. 23.

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of bodies; and where there is union and solidity, there is rest, which is at least accompanied with it, if it be not one of the great causes of it: and without which the Atomists, of all other philosophers, will be least able to give an account of firmness in bodies, when they make bodies to consist of an aggregation of particles; by which it will be very hard finding a sufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm bodies, unless it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid bodies, and the rest of the small and contiguous parts that make up the firm body, according to that catholic law of nature whereby things continue in the state they are in till some stronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the Epicurean Atomists have left to give any account of the solidity of particles of such different sizes, is, the want of vacuity: for, say they, *the ground of divisibility of bodies is the interspersion of a disseminated vacuum: now where there is no vacuity, though the particles be of different size, yet they may be solid and indivisible.* But this is taken off by the instance produced against other persons, by that ingenious and honourable person Mr. Boyle, in his Physiological Essays, which is to this purpose. *Suppose two of these presumed indivisible particles, both smooth and of a cubical figure, should happen to lie upon one another, and a third should chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two, what should hinder but that this aggregate may, by the violent knock of some other corpuscles, be broken in the midst of the whole concretion, and consequently in the middlemost body?* For suppose them as solid as may be, yet since corpuscles as hard as they can be made very violently to knock against them, why may not those grate or break the middlemost corpuscles, or any of the others? And if there be a possibility of breaking off these cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of vacuity is no sufficient account of their being indivisible. By this we see how far the Atomists are from giving any rational account of the origin of the motion of the atoms themselves without a Deity.

V. Descartes, Princip. p. ii. art. 54, 55, 56.

History of Fluid. and Firm. p. 202.

XVI. 2. Supposing this motion to be granted them, yet they *cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concretion of bodies, by the casual occursions of these atoms moving in an infinite empty space;* which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of Epicurus, in order to the making these atoms of his so hit together that they make up any bodies by their contexture.

1. He supposeth as it were two regions, a superior and

inferior, in an infinite empty space, which hath no centre at all in it, nor any body, from which to measure those respects of above and below, as appears by his Epistle to Herodotus, wherein he saith, *These terms of ἄνω and κάτω, or upwards and downwards, must be conceived without any bounds or limits at all. So that though we conceive something superior, we must imagine nothing supreme; and so on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as Gassendus confesseth, that Epicurus thought the surface of the earth to be a plane, and this plane to be continued up in a level superficies to the heavens, and so to all that immense space of the universe; so that all those heavy bodies which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the earth, as in Europe, Asia, and Africa, would never meet (if they continued their motion) in the centre of the earth, but would continue their motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagined that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the world, and so the descent of his atoms must necessarily be downwards towards the earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy mathematical supposition, for one who would undertake to give an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity?

Gassend. Physic. sect. i. l. iii. c. 7.

This motion of descent, by reason of the gravity of atoms, would not serve his turn; for if the atoms moved downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contexture of bodies? Now for this purpose he invented a *motion of declination;* for finding the motion *ad lineam,* or *ad perpendiculum* as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of bodies which are in the universe, he supposed therefore the descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so several particles, in their descent, might make some occursions one upon another. And this Epicurus added to Democritus; but therein, as Tully observes, was very unhappy; that where he adds to Democritus, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur;* that he marred what Democritus had said, by mending of it. The reason of which motion of declination is thus given by Lucretius:

Cicero de Fin. l. i.

> *Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum,*
> *Imbris uti guttæ, caderent per inane profundum;*
> *Nec foret offensus natus, neque plaga creata*
> *Principiis; ita nil unquam natura creasset.*

Lucret. l. ii. v 221.

It was obvious to object, that, according to the principles

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of Epicurus, there could have been no concourse at all of atoms in an infinite space, on the two grounds he went on; which were the natural descent of atoms, and the æqui-velocity of the motion of all atoms of what size soever; which he likewise asserted (although one would think, if gravity were the cause of motion, then the more gravity the swifter the motion would be.) From hence, I say, it were not easy to conceive how the atoms should embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as Lucretius expresseth it, *like drops of rain;* and therefore they saw a necessity to make their motion decline a little, that so they might justle and hit one upon another. But this oblique motion of the atoms, though it be the only refuge left to salve the origin of things by a concourse of atoms, is yet as precarious, and without reason, as any other supposition of theirs whatsoever. Tully chargeth this motion of declination with two great faults; futility and inefficacy, *quæ cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult.* It is a childish fancy, and to no purpose: For, first, it is asserted without any reason at all given for it, which is unworthy a philosopher; neither is it to any purpose: for if all atoms, saith he, decline in their motion, then none of them will stick together: if some decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagined, to assign a diversity of motion in indivisible particles, which yet have all the same velocity of motion; and, as Tully saith, *Hoc erit quasi provincias atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur,* as though Epicurus were the general at this rendezvous of atoms, who stands ready to appoint every one his task and motion. This, Plutarch tells us, was the great charge against Epicurus, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, *because he introduced such a motion of declination out of nothing, upon no pretence of reason.* And Turnebus tells us, that the ground why they desired so small a declination, was, because they were conscious to themselves that it was founded upon no ground of reason; *Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, et minimam sibi postulabant.* To which purpose Turnebus cites those verses of Lucretius:

Cicero de Fin. Bon. et Mal. l. i.

Plutarch. de Anim. procreat. è Timæo.

Turnebus in Ciceron. de Fato.

Lucret. l. ii. v. 243.

Quare etiam atque etiam paulum clinare necesse est
Corpora, nec plusquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, et id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,
Pondera, quantum in se est, non posse obliqua meare,

E supero cum præcipitant, quod cernere possis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare, quis est, qui possit cernere, sese?

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But this argument of Lucretius will hold, if at all, further than this little declination, (for it is no more they desire than as little as may be imagined, *quo nihil possit fieri minus*, as Tully expresseth it;) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? Nay, it is impossible to conceive, but a little oblique motion at first will in an infinite space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the motion which way it bends: now if there be never so little motion of declination, the atom will be inclined that way; and what then should hinder, but that the obliquity in a motion through a great space should at last come to be very great; there being no centre at all to guide the motion towards, and the gravity not hindering this little declination? Therefore Tully asks that question, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three? For*, saith he, *it is no impulsion from any other atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the space to hinder it from declining more; so that*, as he well saith, *optare hoc quidem est, non disputare*, this is to beg hypotheses, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have proved Epicurus to do. Which was the first thing premised, viz. that this hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of reason.

Cicero de Fato.

2. *It is unsatisfactory and insufficient, as well as precarious*; for should we grant his two main principles, atoms, and his infinite empty space, yet we deny that his atoms, with all their occursions, would ever produce those things which are in the universe. To run through the noted phenomena of the universe, and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them from a fortuitous concourse of atoms, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I shall rather suggest, than insist upon, to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them, and shall then leave it with the reader to judge, what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the creation of the world for the sake of the Epicurean hypothesis; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the world ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of atoms.

XVII.

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1. *The great variety of appearances in nature,* which are attributed to particles of the same nature, only with the alteration of size, shape, and motion. That some things in the world should have no other reason given of them, may not only be tolerable but rational; as in the objects and operations on the organs of sense, those affections which are mistaken for real qualities, &c. But that all those effects which are seen in nature should have no other cause but the different configuration and motion of atoms, is the height of folly as well as impiety. To imagine that the particles of matter, as they are in men, should be capable of sensation, memory, intellection, volition, &c. merely because of a different shape, size, and motion from what they have in a piece of wood, is a riddle that requires a new configuration of atoms in us to make us understand. May it not be hoped, that at least one time or other, by this casual concourse of atoms, the particles may light to be of such a nature in stones, as to make them fly; in plants, to make them all sensitive; and in beasts, to make them reason and discourse? What may hinder such a configuration or motion of particles, if all these effects are to be imputed to no higher principle? We see in other bodies what different appearances are caused by a sudden alteration of the particles of the matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out so in the things mentioned? Neither can this be unreasonable to demand. 1. Because the motion of these particles of matter is casual still according to them: and who knows what chance may do? for the seminal principles themselves are, I suppose, according to them, of the same uniform matter with the rest of the world, and so are liable to different motion and configuration. 2. Because all particles of matter are supposed to be in continual motion, because of that disseminated vacuity which is presumed to be in the world, and because a coacervate vacuity is not only asserted as possible, but as probably existent: I assume only then, (that which is insisted on as probable, viz.) that that space which lies between our atmosphere and the stars is empty of any other thing but only the rays of the stars which pass through it; I then supposing it a vacuity, whether would not the particles of those bodies, which lie contiguous to that space, presently dislodge from the bodies wherein they are, and begin a new rendezvous of atoms there? for all atoms are supposed to be in perpetual motion; and the cause assigned why in solid bodies they do not fly

away, is because of the repercussion of other atoms, that when they once begin to stir, they receive such knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the bodies contiguous to this space; for both those bodies are more fluid, and so there is no such knocking of particles to keep them at rest: but which is more, those which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from motion, and so those particles will necessarily remove into that empty space where there is no impediment of their motion, and so the next atoms to those must remove, because that space wherein the other were is made empty by their removal; and so the next, and so on, till not only the air, but the whole mass of the earth will, on supposition of such a vacuity, be dissolved into its first particles, which will all mutiny in the several bodies wherein they are, and never rest till they come to that empty space, where they may again rendezvous together. So dangerous is the news of liberty, or of an empty space, to these democratical particles of the universe! Neither can I see how a disseminated vacuity can salve the difficulty; for those particles of the most solid bodies being in continual motion, and the ground of their union being repercussion, it thence follows, that, towards that part where the disseminated vacuum is, the particles meeting with no such strokes may fairly take their leaves of the bodies they are in, and so one succeed in the place of another, till the configuration of the whole be altered; and consequently different appearances and effects may be caused in the same bodies, though it results from seminal principles. So that, according to the atomical principles, no rational account can be given of those effects which are seen in nature. This Dionysius in Eusebius urgeth against the Atomists, that from the same principles, without evident reason given for it, they make of the same uniform matter some things conspicuous to sense, others not; some short-lived, others extremely long-lived. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον μιᾶς ὕσης καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἁπασῶν οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, ὡλὴν τῶν μεγεθῶν, ὡς φασι, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων, τὰ μέν ἐστι θεῖα καὶ ἀκήρατα καὶ αἰώνια, ὡς αὐτοὶ φήσαιεν ἄν, σώματα, ἢ μακραίωνά γε κατὰ τὸν ὕτως ὀνομάσαντα, φαινόμενά τε καὶ ἀφανῆ; *What ground can there be assigned of so vast a difference between things, if they all be of the same nature, and differ only in size and shape?* saith that excellent person, who there with a great deal of eloquence lays open the folly of the atomical philosophy, Θαυμαστή γε τῶν ἀτόμων ἡ δημο-

Eusch. Præp. Ev. l. xiv. c. 25. Ed. Par.

Ib. p. 776.

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κρατία, δεξιουμένων τε ἀλλήλας τῶν φίλων καὶ περιπλεκομένων, εἰς μίαν τε κατασκηνοῦν συνοικίαν ἐπειγομένων. *It is a rare democracy of atoms,* saith he, *where the friendly atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thenceforward live in the closest society together.*

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact order and beauty of the world,* is a thing unaccountable by the atomical hypothesis. Were the whole world still a Hesiod's chaos, (from the consideration of which Diogenes Laertius tells us Epicurus began to philosophize,) we might probably believe an agitation of particles (supposing matter created) might settle it in such a confused manner; but that there should be nothing else but a blind impetus of atoms to produce those vast and most regular motions of the heavenly bodies, to order the passage of the sun for so great conveniency of nature, and for the alternate succession of the seasons of the year; which should cut such channels for the ocean, and keep that vast body of the water (whose surface is higher than the earth) from overflowing it; which should furnish the earth with such seminal and prolific principles, as to provide food and nourishment for those animals which live upon it, and furnish out every thing necessary for the comfort and delight of man's life; to believe, I say, that all these things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourse of atoms, is the most prodigious piece of credulity and folly that human nature is subject to. But this part which concerns the order and beauty of the parts of the universe, and the argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous principle, but an infinitely wise God, hath been so fully and judiciously handled by a learned person already, that I shall rather choose to refer the reader to his discourse, than insist any more upon it.

Laert. l. x.

Dr. H. More Antidote against Atheism, part ii.

3. *The production of mankind* is a thing which the Atomists are most shamefully puzzled with, as well as the formation of the internal parts of man's body; of which I have already spoken in the precedent chapter. It would pity one to see what lamentable shifts the Atomists are put to, to find out a way for the production of mankind, viz. *that our teeming mother the earth at last cast forth some kind of bags like wombs upon the surface of the earth, and these by degrees breaking, at last came out children, which were nourished by a kind of juice of the earth like milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be men.* Oh what will not Atheists believe rather than a Deity and Providence! But lest we should

seem to wrong the Atomists, hear what Censorinus saith of Epicurus; *Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros nescio quos radicibus terræ cohærentes, primum increvisse, et infantibus, ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante præbuisse; quos ita educatos et adultos, genus humanum propagasse.* But because Lucretius may be thought to speak more impartially in the case, how rarely doth he describe it!

Censor. de Die Nat. c. 2.

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, aurasque petissens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et succum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Consimilem lactis; sicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, vestem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa et molli lanugine abundans.

Lucret. l. v. v. 806.

Had Lucretius been only a poet, this might have passed for a handsomely described fable; but to deliver it for a piece of philosophy, makes it the greater mythology. That man's body was formed out of the earth, we believe, because we have reason so to do; but that the earth should cast forth such *folliculi*, as he expresseth it, and that men should be brought up in such a way as he describes, deserves a place among the most incredible and poetic fables. But if poets must be credited, how much more like a man did he speak, who told us,

Natus homo est; sive hunc divino semine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo;
Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cœli;
Quam satus Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Ovid. Metam. l. i. v. 78.

Thus have we considered the Epicurean hypothesis, both as to the principles on which it stands, and the suitableness of it to the phenomena of the universe; and I suppose now there cannot be the least shadow of reason found, from the atomical philosophy, to make us at all question that account of the origin of the universe, which ascribes it not to the fortuitous concourse of atoms, but to the infinite wisdom of a Deity. I conclude then this discourse of the Epicurean hypothesis with the words of Automedon in the Greek epigram.

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Ταῦτ' εἰδὼς σοφὸς ἴσθι, μάτην δ' Ἐπίκουρον ἔασον
Πῆ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, καὶ τίνες αἱ μονάδες.

Anthолog. l. i. c. 15.

Learn to be wise; let Epicurus chase
To find his atoms, and his empty space.

XVIII. I come now to the last hypothesis mentioned, which undertakes to give an account of the origin of the universe, *from the mere mechanical laws of motion and matter;* which is the hypothesis of the late famous French philosopher, Mr. Des Cartes. For although there be as much reason as charity to believe that he never intended his hypothesis as a foundation of atheism, having made it so much his business to assert the existence of a Deity, and immateriality of the soul; yet because it is apt to be abused to that end by persons atheistically disposed, because of his ascribing so much to the power of matter, we shall therefore so far consider it, as it undertakes to give an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity.

Cartesii Princip. p. iii. art. 46, &c.

His hypothesis therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted that all the matter of the world was at first of one uniform nature, divisible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in motion: from hence he supposeth, 1. *That all the matter, of which the universe is composed, was at first divided into equal particles of an indifferent size, and that they had all such a motion as is now found in the world.* 2. *That all those particles were not at first spherical, because many such little globes joined together will not fill up a continued space, but that of whatever figure they were at first, they would by continual motion become spherical, because they would have various circular motions; for seeing that at first they were moved with so great force that one particle would be disjoined from the other, the same force continuing would serve to cut off all angles which are supposed in them, by their frequent occursions against each other; and so when the angles were cut off, they would become spherical.* 3. *He supposeth that no space is left empty; but when those round particles being joined, leave some intervals between them, there are some more subtle particles of matter, which are ready to fill up those void spaces which arise from those angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them spherical; which fragments of particles are so little, and acquire thereby such a celerity of motion, that by the force of that they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and so will fill up all those spaces which other particles could not enter in at.* 4. *That those particles, which fill up the*

intervals between the spherical ones, have not all of them the same celerity of motion, because some of them are more undivided than others are, which filled up the space between three globular particles when their angles were cut off; and therefore those particles must necessarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for motion, and thence it comes to pass that such particles easily stick together, and transfer the greatest part of their motion upon those other particles which are less, and therefore have a swifter motion; and because these particles are to pass through such triangular spaces which lie in the midst of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he supposeth them, as to their breadth and depth, to be of a triangular figure; but because these particles are somewhat long, and the globular particles, through which they pass with so swift motion, have their rotation about the poles of the heavens, thence he supposes that those triangular particles come to be wreathed. Now, from these things being thus supposed, Des Cartes hath ingenuously, and consonantly to his principles, undertaken to give an account of the most noted phenomena of the world; and those three sorts of particles mentioned he makes to be his three elements. The first is that subtle matter which was supposed to arise from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the sun and fixed stars consist, as those particles of that subtle matter being in continual motion have made those several vortices or ethereal whirlpools. The second element consists of the spherical particles themselves, which make up the heavens: out of the third element, which are those wreathed particles, he gives an account of the formation of the earth, and planets, and comets; and from all of them, by the help of those common affections of matter, size, figure, motion, &c. he undertakes to give an account of the phenomena of the world. How far his principles do conduce to the giving men's minds satisfaction as to the particular phenomena of nature, is not here our business to enquire, but only how far these principles can give an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity. And that it cannot give a satisfactory account how the world was framed without a Deity, appears by the two grand suppositions on which all his elements depend; both which cannot be from any other principle but God. Those are, 1. *The existence of matter in the world*, which we have already proved cannot be independent on God, and necessarily existent; and therefore supposing that matter ex-

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istent and put into motion would grind itself into those several particles by him supposed, yet this cannot give an account of the origin of the universe without a Deity. 2. *The motion of the particles of matter supposeth a Deity;* for matter is no self-moving principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judicious philosopher Dr. H. More, who plainly manifests, that if motion did necessarily belong to matter, it were impossible there should be sun, or stars, or earth, or man in the world; for the matter being uniform, it must have equal motion in all its particles, if motion doth belong to it. For motion being supposed to be natural and essential to matter, must be alike every where in it; and therefore every particle must be supposed in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and moved alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in bigness or motion, it is manifest that this universal matter, to which motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in nature; for nothing could be caused by this thin and subtle matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our senses; and what a strange kind of visible world would this be! From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise God, who must both put matter into motion, and regulate the motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the world. And this necessity of the motion of matter by a power given it from God, is freely acknowledged by Mr. Des Cartes himself, in these words; *Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, et nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit.* So that this great improver and discoverer of the mechanical power of matter doth freely confess the necessity, not only of God's giving motion in order to the origin of the universe, but of his conserving motion in it for the upholding it; so that we need not fear from this hypothesis the excluding of a Deity from being the prime efficient cause of the world. All the question then is concerning the particular manner which was used by God as the efficient cause in giving being to the world. As to which I shall only in general suggest what Maimonides says of it. *Omnia simul creata erant, et postea successive ab invicem separata;* although I am somewhat inclinable to that of Gassendus, *Majus est mundus opus,*

Dr. More Antidote, b. ii. ch. 1. Immortality of the Soul, b. i. c. 11. sect. 3. &c. Ep. 3. ad Cartes. p. 88.

Cartes. Resp. ad. Ep. 3. H. Mori, p. 104.

Maimon. More Nev. l. ii. c. 30.

quam ut assequi mens humana illius molitionem possit. To which, I think, may be well applied that speech of Solomon; *Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun: because though a man labour to seek it out; yea further, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it.* CHAP. II. Gassendi Physic. sect. 1. l. vii. c. 6. Eccl. viii. 17.

CHAP. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. Epicurus's *Arguments against it refuted. The Necessity of the Belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence proved from a Consideration of the Nature of God and the Things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great Objections against Providence propounded. The first concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. *God cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The Account, which the Scriptures give of the Fall of Man, doth not charge God with Man's Fault. God's Power to govern Man by Laws, though he gives no particular Reason of every positive Precept.* VI. *The Reason of God's creating Man with Freedom of Will, largely shewed from* Simplicius; *and the true Account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. *God's permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The Account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil, compared with that of* Heathen *Philosophers.* IX. *The Antiquity of the Opinion of ascribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the Judgment of the* Persians, Egyptians, *and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæism.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The Opinion of the ancient* Greek *Philosophers; of* Pythagoras, Plato, *the* Stoics; *the Origin of Evil not from the Necessity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The Remainders of the History of the Fall among the* Heathens. XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the Malignity of Dæmons.* XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the Sufferings of good, and the Impunity of bad Men. An Account of both from natural Light, manifested by* Seneca, Plutarch, *and others.*

BOOK III. I. IT being now manifested not only that there is a God, but that the world had its being from him, it thence follows, by an easy and rational deduction, that there is a particular hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the world in its being, and wisely disposeth all events in it. For it is a most irrational and absurd opinion to assert a Deity, and deny Providence; and in nothing did Epicurus more discover the weakness and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if Epicurus had no other design in asserting a Deity, than (as many ancient philosophers imagined) to avoid the imputation of direct atheism, and yet to take away all foundations of religion, he must needs be said to serve his hypothesis well, though he did assert the being of an excellent nature, which he called

God, while yet he made him sit as it were with his elbows folded up in the heavens, and taking no cognizance of human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Divine Providence were once rooted out of men's minds, the thoughts of an excellent Being above the heavens would have no more awe or power upon the hearts and lives of men, than the telling men that there are jewels of inestimable value in the Indies, makes them more ready to pay taxes to their princes; for that philosopher could not be ignorant that it is not worth but power, nor speculation but interest, that rules the world. The poor tenant more regards his petty landlord, than the greatest prince in the world that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reason for it; for he neither fears punishment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his landlord may dispossess him of all he hath upon displeasure, and may advantage him the most if he gains his favour. Supposing then that there were such an excellent Being in the world, which was completely happy in himself, and thought it an impairing of his happiness to trouble himself with an inspection of the world, religion might then be indeed derived *à relegendo*, but not *à religando*; there might be some pleasure in contemplating his nature, but there could be no obligation to obedience. So that Epicurus was the first founder of a kind of philosophical Antinomianism; placing all religion in a veneration of the Deity purely for its own excellency, without any such mercenary eye (as those who serve God for their own ends, as they say, are apt to have) to reward and punishment. And I much doubt that good woman whom the story goes of, who in an enthusiastic posture ran up and down the streets with emblems in her hands, fire in the one, as she said, to burn up heaven, and water in the other to quench hell, that men might serve God purely for himself, would, if she had compassed her design, soon have brought proselytes enough to Epicurus; and by burning heaven would have burnt up the cords of religion, and in quenching hell would have extinguished the awe and fear of a Deity in the world. Indeed the incomparable excellency and perfection which is in the Divine nature, to spirits advanced to a noble and generous height in religion, makes them exceedingly value their choice, while they disregard whatever rivals with God for it; but were it not for those magnetical hooks of obedience and eternal interest, there are few would be drawn to a due consideration of, much less a delight in, so amiable and

BOOK III. excellent a nature. And it is impossible to conceive why God, in the revelation of his will, should ever so much as mention a future punishment, or promise an eternal reward, were not the consideration of these things the sinews of religion.

II. Which they, whose design was to undermine the very foundations on which all religion was built, understood far better than those weak pretended advancers of religion, who while in such a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if men ought not to have an eye and respect to their own future condition, nor serve God on the account of his power to make our souls miserable or happy, much less ought men to serve God with any regard to his Providence; since the matters which Providence is employed about in this world, are of infinitely less moment than those which concern our future state. And if we have no eye on Divine Providence in the exercise of religion, we shall scarce be able to understand for what end God should take so much care of mankind, and manifest so much of his goodness to them, were it not to quicken them in their search after him, and excite them to the more cheerful obedience to him. And when once we question to what end God troubles himself with the world, we are come next door to Epicurus, and may in few steps more delight in the flowers of his garden. For this was his strongest plea against Providence, that it was beneath the majesty and excellency of the Divine nature to stoop so low, and trouble himself so far, as to regard what was done on earth. This being one of his *ratæ sententiæ*, or undoubted maxims, Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, *The blessed and immortal Being neither hath any employment himself, nor troubles himself with others.* Which, as Maximus Tyrius well observes, is rather a description of a Sardanapalus than a Deity; nay, of a worse than a Sardanapalus; for he, in the midst of all his softness and effeminacy, would yet entertain some counsels for the safety and good of his empire: but Epicurus's Deity is of so tender a nature, that the least thought of business would quite spoil his happiness. This opinion of Epicurus made the more raised-spirited moralists so far contemn the unworthy apprehensions which he entertained of the Divine nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a philosopher in it, and ranked him beneath the most fabulous poets, who had written such unworthy things of their Gods; as is evident by the censures which Tully, Plu-

Diog. Laert. l. x.

Max. Tyr. Dissert. 29.

tarch, and others, pass upon him for this very opinion. And they tell him, that some of their own men were of a more noble and excellent spirit than Epicurus's Deity, who abhorred softness and idleness, and made it their greatest delight to do good to their countries. But Epicurus must needs make his God of his own humour, (the usual flattery which men bear to themselves, to think that most excellent which they delight in most,) as Xenophanes was wont to say, that if his horse were to describe a God, it would be with a curled mane, a broad chest, &c. and in every thing like himself. Had Epicurus himself so little of an Athenian in him, as not to make it some part of his delight to understand the affairs of the world? Or at least, did he take no pleasure in the walks of his famous garden, nor to order his trees, and set his flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Would Epicurus then count this a part of his happiness? And is it inconsistent with the happiness of the Deity to take notice of the world, and order all things in it for his own glory? Must so excellent a nature as God's was, by his own acknowledgment, be presently tired with business, when the more excellent any nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and dispatch matters of moment, with the least disturbance to itself? Is it a pleasure to a nurse to fill the child with her milk? Doth the sun rejoice to help the world with his constant light? And doth a fountain murmur till it be delivered of its streams which may refresh the ground? And is it no delight to the Divine nature to behold the effects of his goodness upon the world? We see here then the foundation on which Epicurus went, viz. that his God must be like himself, or there must be none; and truly he might more suitably to his principles question his existence, than supposing his existence deny his Providence on such miserable accounts as these are; which yet are the chief which either Epicurus or Lucretius could bring against it, from the consideration of the Divine nature.

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Cicero de Finib. l. i. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. Plutarch. advers. Colot.

III. The which, to any one who considers it, doth necessarily infer a peculiar eye and hand of Providence in the world. For can we imagine that a Being of infinite knowledge should be ignorant of what is done in the world? and of infinite power, should stand by and leave things to chance and fortune? Which were at first contrived, and brought into being, by the contrivance of his wisdom and exercise of his power. And where the foundation of

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existence lies wholly and solely in the power of an infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that existence must lie in the same power conserving. When men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reason of that is, because what man doth is out of matter already existent, and his work is only setting materials together; but now what God effects, he absolutely gives a being to, and therefore its duration depends on his conservation. What is once in its being, I grant, will continue till some greater force than itself put it out of being; but withal I add, that God's withdrawing his conservation is so great a force, as must needs put that being, which had its existence from his power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the sun continues in the air, and as long as the sun communicates it, nothing can extinguish the light but what will put out the sun: but could we suppose the sun to withdraw his beams, what becomes of the light then? This is the case of all beings which come from an infinite power: their subsistence depends on a continual emanation of the same power which gave them being; and when once this is withdrawn, all those beings which were produced by this power must needs relapse into nothing. Besides, what dependence is there upon each other in the moments of duration of any created being? The mode of existence in a creature is but contingent and possible; and nothing is implied in the notion of an existent creature beyond mere possibility of existence: what is it then which gives actual existence to it? That cannot be itself, for it would be necessarily existent. If another then gives existence, this existence must wholly depend upon him who gave it; for nothing can continue existence to itself, but what may give it to itself, (for it gives it for the moment it continues it;) and what gives existence to itself must necessarily exist, which is repugnant to the very notion of a created being. So that either we must deny a possibility of non-existence, or annihilation in a creature, which follows upon necessity of existence; or else we must assert that the duration or continuance of a creature in its being doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and conservation; which is with as much reason as frequency said to be a continued creation. But yet further. Was an infinite wisdom and power necessary to put things into that order they are in? And is not the same necessary for the governing of them? I cannot see any reason to think that the power of matter,

when set in motion, should either bring things into that exquisite order and dependence which the parts of the world have upon each other; much less that, by the mere force of that first motion, all things should continue in the state they are in. Perpetual motion is yet one of the *desiderata* of the world. The most exquisite mechanism cannot put an engine beyond the necessity of being looked after. Can we then think this dull, unactive matter, merely by the force of its first motion, should be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the world, and to keep it from tumbling, at least by degrees, into its pristine chaos? It was an infinite Power, I grant, which gave that first motion; but that it gave power to continue that motion till the conflagration of the world, remains yet to be proved. Some therefore finding, that, in the present state of the world, matter will not serve for all the noted and common phenomena of the world, have called in the help of a spirit of nature, which may serve instead of a man-midwife to matter, to help her in her production of things: or, as though God had a plurality of worlds to look after, they have taken care to substitute him a vicar in this; which is the spirit of nature. But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetually resident in the world, and that the power which gives life, and being, and motion to every thing in the world, is nothing else but his own Providence; especially since we have learnt from himself, that it is *in him we live, and move, and have our being*. CHAP. III. Acts xvii. 28.

IV. Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence, whether we consider the Divine nature, or the phenomena of the world; but yet the case is not so clear, but there are two grand objections behind, which have been the continual exercise of the wits of inquisitive men almost in all ages of the world. The one concerns the first origin of evil; the other concerns the dispensations of Providence, whence it comes to pass that good men fare so hard in the world, when the bad triumph and flourish. If these two can be cleared with any satisfaction to reason, it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the divinity of the Scriptures; which give us such clear light and direction in these profound speculations, which the dim reason of man was so much to seek in.

I begin with the origin of evil; for if there be a hand of Providence which orders all things in the world, how comes evil then into it, without God's being the author of

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it? Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity, it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of God's holiness, and how far he is from being the author of sin; and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the origin of evil, as to make it appear that God is not the author of it. I easily then assent to what Origen saith on this subject, when Celsus, upon some mistaken places of Scripture, had charged the Scripture with laying the origin of evil upon God; εἴπερ οὖν ἄλλος τις τόπος τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐξετάσεως δεόμενος, δυσθήρατός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ταχθείη ἂν γένεσις. *If any thing which calls for our enquiry be of difficult investigation, that which concerns the origin of evils is such a thing;* and as Simplicius well begins his discourse on this subject, περὶ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῶν κακῶν ὁ λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθωθείς, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβείας αἴτιος γέγονε, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἠθῶν εὐαγωγίας τὰς ἀρχὰς διετάραξε, καὶ πολλαῖς καὶ ἀλύτοις ἀπορίαις ἐνέβαλε τοὺς μὴ καλῶς αἰτιολογοῦντας αὐτήν. *The dispute concerning the nature and origin of evil, not being well stated, is the cause of great impiety towards God, and perverts the principles of good life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities, who are not able to give a rational account of it.* So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question; in which I intend not to launch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purposes of God's will, (which is beyond our present scope,) but I shall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the first man. For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method:

Origen cont. Celsum, l. iv. p 207.

Simplic. in Epictet. c. 34 Ed. Salmas.

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin.*

2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of evil, doth not charge it upon God.*

3. *That no account given by philosophers of the origin of evil, is so clear and rational as this is.*

4. *That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the Heathens themselves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without hesitation to yield our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of suspending assent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine truth, but the want of certain evidence whether it be of Divine revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effectual ways to put an end to the

numerous controversies of the Christian world, (especially to those bold disputes concerning the method and order of God's decrees,) if the plain and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the rule and standard whereby we ought to judge of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous. And could men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal happiness, and the means in order to it, (which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture,) and the moment of all other controversies be judged by their reference to these, there would be fewer controversies and more Christians in the world. Now there are two grand principles which concern men's eternal condition, of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with safety rely, without perplexing our minds about those more nice and subtle speculations, (which it may be are uncapable of all full and particular resolution;) and those are, *That the ruin and destruction of man is wholly from himself;* and, *That his salvation is from God alone.* If then man's ruin and misery be from himself, which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions, then without controversy that which is the cause of all the misery of human nature is wholly from himself too, which is sin. So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the author of that, by which (without the intervention of the mercy of God) man's misery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what authority and majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin? With what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin? With what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin? With what justice and severity doth he punish sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners? And is it possible (after all this, and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to express the holiness of God's nature, his hatred of sin, and his appointing a day of judgment for the solemn punishment of sinners) to imagine that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the origin of evil to God, or make him the author of sin? *Shall not the Judge of all the world do right?* Will a God of infinite justice, purity, and holiness, punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of? Far be such unworthy thoughts from our apprehensions of a Deity, much more of that God whom we believe to have declared his mind so much to

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the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the author of sin, we come to enquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture, whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of man's fall; either, first, by the giving him that positive law which was the occasion of his fall; or, secondly, by leaving him to the liberty of his own will. First, The giving of that positive law cannot be the least ground of laying man's fault on God; because, 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by laws, or declarations of the will of his Maker: for, considering man as a free agent, there can be no way imagined so consonant to the nature of man as this was, because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of reward and punishment, and acting in the consideration of them, there must be a declaration of the will of the lawgiver, according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment. If it were suitable to God's nature to promise life to man upon obedience, it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will; considering the absolute sovereignty and dominion which God had over man as being his creature, and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and absolute right to require from man what he did, as to the law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive how there should be a testimony of man's obedience towards his Creator, without some declaration of his Creator's will. Secondly, God had full power and authority not only to govern man by laws, but to determine man's general obligation to obedience to that particular positive precept by the breach of which man fell. If God's power over man was universal and unlimited, what reason can there be to imagine it should not extend to such a positive law? Was it because the matter of this law seemed too low for God to command his creature? But whatever the matter of the law was, obedience to God was the great end of it, which man had testified as much in that instance of it as in any other

whatsoever; and in the violation of it were implied the highest aggravations of disobedience; for God's power and authority were as much contemned, his goodness flighted, his truth and faithfulness questioned, his name dishonoured, his majesty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other law whatsoever it had been. If the law were easy to be observed, the greater was the sin of disobedience; if the weight of the matter was not so great in itself, yet God's authority added the greatest weight to it; and the ground of obedience is not to be fetched from the nature of the thing required, but from the authority of the legislator. Or was it then because God concealed from man his counsel in giving of that positive precept? Hath not then a legislator power to require any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? If so, what becomes of obedience and subjection? It will be impossible to make any probative precepts on this account; and the legislator must be charged with the disobedience of his subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires; which as it concerns human legislators, (who have not that absolute power and authority which God hath,) is contrary to all laws of policy, and the general sense of the world. This Plutarch gives a good account of, when he discourseth so rationally of the sobriety which men ought to use in their enquiries into the grounds and reasons of God's actions; *For*, saith he, *physicians will give prescriptions without giving the patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them:* οὐδὲ γὰρ οὓς ἄνθρωποι νόμους τίθενται, τὸ εὔλογον ἁπλῶς ἔχουσι καὶ πάντοτε φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖ κομιδῇ γελοῖα τῶν προσταγμάτων. *Neither have human laws always apparent reason for them; nay, some of them are to appearance ridiculous:* for which he instanceth in that law of the Lacedemonian ephori, μὴ τρέφειν μύσακα, to which no other reason was annexed but this, καὶ πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις ὡς μὴ χαλεποὶ ὦσιν αὐτοῖς: *They commanded every magistrate, at the entrance of his office, to shave himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey laws themselves.* He further instanceth, in the Roman custom of manumission; their laws about testaments, Solon's law against neutrality in seditions; and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλως πολλὰς ἂν τὶς ἐξείποι νόμων ἀτοπίας, μήτε τὸν λόγον ἔχων τοῦ νομοθέτου, μήτε τὴν αἰτίαν συνιεὶς ἑκάστου τῶν γραφομένων. *Any one would easily find many absurdities in laws, who doth not consider the intention of the legislator, or the ground of what he re-*

Plutarch. de his qui sero puniuntur a numine.

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quires. Τί δὴ θαυμαστὸν, saith he, εἰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὕτως ἡμῖν ὄντων δυσθεωρήτων, οὐκ εὔπορόν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τῶν θείων εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τινι λόγῳ τοὺς μὲν ὑστερον, τοὺς δὲ πρότερον τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων κολάζεσιν. *What wonder is it, if we are so puzzled to give an account of the actions of men, that we should be to seek as to those of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reason, to lay the charge of man's disobedience upon God, because he required from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the *forbidden fruit.*

VI. The only thing then left is, *Whether God be not liable to this charge, as he left man to the liberty of his will?* And that may be grounded on two things; *either that God did not create man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned; or that, knowing his temptation, he did not give him power to resist it.* If neither of these will lay any imputation of the origin of evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. *First, concerning man's being created a free agent.* If the determination of the schools be good, that possibility of sinning is implied in the very notion of a creature, and consequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created being, then we see a necessary reason why man was created in a state of liberty.

Vid. Thom. 1. p. q. 63. art. 1. Estium in Sentent. l. ii. dist. 7. sect. 9.

But endeavouring to shew that the grounds of our religion are not repugnant to natural reason, I shall rather make use of the testimony of such who professed to be followers of nothing else but reason and philosophy: among whom I shall make choice of Simplicius, both for the reason he produceth, and because he is farthest from any suspicion of partiality, by reason of his known opposition to the Mosaic history of the creation. He then, in his Commentaries on Epictetus, professedly disputes this very subject of the origin of evil; and, after having rejected that fond opinion of two principles, one of good, and the other of evil, undertakes to give an account whence evil came into the world; which, because it tends so much to the illustrating our present subject, I shall give an account of. *God,* saith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all good, not only produced things which were in themselves good, nor only those things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too; which were such things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call evil. And that after those bodies which were* (as he supposeth) *incorruptible, others were produced which are subject to mutation*

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

and corruption; and so after those souls which were immutably fixed in good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that so the riches of God's goodness might be displayed in making to exist all beings which are capable of it; and that the universe might be perfect, in having all sorts of beings in it. Now, he supposeth, *that all those beings which are above this sublunary world are such as are immutably good, and that the lowest sort of beings, which are liable to be perverted to evil, are such which are here below. Therefore,* saith he, *the soul being of a more noble and immutable nature, while it is by itself, doth not partake of evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joined with these terrestrial bodies, (by the providence of the Author of the universe, who produced such souls, that so both extremes might be joined by the bonds of vital union,) thereby it becomes sensible of those evils and pains which the body is subject to; but these things are not properly evils, but rather good, considering our terrestrial bodies as parts of the universe, which is upheld by the changes and vicissitudes which are in this lower world;* which he largely discourses on, to shew that those particular alterations, which are in bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the universe, than are any real evils in it. *But now,* saith he, *for the origin of those things which are properly evils,* viz. *moral evils, which are* τὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς πταίσματα, *the lapses and errors of the human soul, we are to consider, that there are souls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the souls of brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having something in them parallel both to the appetites and evils which are in men; which will therefore be understood by an account of the other.* Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μέση προελθοῦσά τῶν τε ἀεὶ ἄνω μενουσῶν ψυχῶν, διά τε τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχικῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀκρότητα, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ μέθεξιν, καὶ τῶν ἀεὶ κάτω διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συγγένειαν τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς, καὶ σύνδεσμος ζωτικὸς γινομένη τῶν τε ἄνω καὶ τῶν κάτω, διὰ τῆς αὐτεξουσίου σχέσεως, ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ποτὲ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιοῦται. *The soul of man is* nexus utriusque mundi, *in the middle between those more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the sublimity of its nature and understanding, and those inferior terrestrial beings, with which it communicates through the vital union which it hath with the body; and by reason of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it sometimes is assimilated to the one, sometimes to the other of these extremes.* Ibid. p. 180. Ed. Salmas.

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So that while it approacheth to the nature of the superior Beings, it keeps itself free from evil, but because of its freedom it may sometimes sink down into these lower things; and so he calls *the cause of all evil in the soul* τὴν αὐτοθελῆ κάθοδον εἰς τόνδε τὸν ὑνητὸν τόπον, *its voluntary descent into this lower world*, and immersing itself in the *feculency of terrestrial matter*: κᾆν φύσιν δὲ ἀμφίβολον ἔλαχεν, οὐκ ἀναγκαζομένη κάπισιν ἢ ἄνεισιν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ὑπέςη, ὡς ὅταν αὐτὴ θέλῃ καττέναι τε καὶ ἀνιέναι. *For though the soul be of a kind of amphibious nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way, according to its internal liberty. But*, saith he, *while the rational soul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the body, and makes use of it only as an instrument for its own good, so long it keeps pure and free from any stain of evil; but when it once forgets the similitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the sceptre of its power, and drowns itself in the body and brutish affections, (preferring the pleasure of sense above that of reason;) when it so far degenerates below the principles of reason, that instead of commanding the brutish faculties it becomes a slave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not through any coaction or necessity, but through the abuse of that power and liberty which it hath: for the choice is a proper action of the soul itself: which he proves from hence, because God and the laws, and all good men, do not measure the good and evil of actions so much by the event, as by the will and intention of the person; and that punishment and reward have chiefly a respect to those. And therefore men are pardoned for what they do out of constraint and force, and the fault is ascribed,* οὐ τῷ πράττοντι ἀλλὰ βιαζομένῳ, *not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it.* And so from hence he concludes, *that, because of the freedom of the will of man, nothing else can be said to be the author of evil properly, but the soul of man*; and concludes that discourse with this excellent speech, Ἔχοντες οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κακοῦ, λαμπρᾷ τε φωνῇ βοῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιος, διότι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτεξουσίως, καὶ οὐκ ὁ Θεός· εἰ μὲν γὰρ βίᾳ τὸ κακὸν ἔπραττεν ἡ ψυχὴ, τάχα ἂν τις τὸν Θεὸν ἠτιάσατο τὸν ἀναιτίως αὐτὴν συγχωρήσαντα βιασθῆναι, καίτοι οὐδὲ κακὸν ἦν τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον· κατὰ προαίρεσιν δὲ αὐτὸ αἱρουμένη, αὐτὴ ἂν αἰτία λέγοιτο δικαίως. *Having thus found out the true origin of evil, let us cry out with a loud voice that God is not the author of sin, because the soul freely doth that which is evil, and not God; for if the soul were forced to do what it doth, one*

Ibid.

Id. p. 184.

might justly lay the blame on God, who permits such a force to be offered it, neither could it be properly evil which the soul was constrained to; but since it acted freely, and out of choice, the soul must alone be accounted the author and cause of evil. Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of reason be accounted the author of evil, because he gave the soul of man a principle of internal freedom; when the very freedom of acting which the soul had, put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling. And certainly he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a person, who gave him a stock to set up with, and supposed him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed, had not man had this freedom of will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational agent, which supposing no corruption, doth speak freedom of action. So that while we enquire after the origin of evil, we have no other cause to assign it to but man's abuse of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be so curious as to enquire further, why God did create man with such a freedom of will, and not rather fix his soul immutably on good; if the order of beings be no satisfactory reason for it, we can give no other than that why he made man, or the world at all, which was the good pleasure of his will. CHAP. III.

VII. But secondly, *Supposing God's giving man this freedom of will, doth not entitle him to be the author of evil;* doth not his leaving man to this liberty of his in the temptation, make him the cause of sin? I answer no: and that on these accounts.

1. *Because man stood then upon such terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act.* He had a power to stand, in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his faculties; but he had a pure and undefiled soul, which could not be polluted without its own consent. Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which man stood, (which were the trial of his obedience to his Creator,) had he been irresistibly determined any way. Simplicius puts this question after the former discourse, *Whether God may not be called the author of sin, because he permits the soul to use her liberty? But,* saith he, *he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul, must say one of these two things; either that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to good or evil, it should have been wholly kept from the choosing evil, or else that it should have been made of such a nature, that it should not have had a power of choosing evil. To* Simplic. in Epictet. p. 184, 187.

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first is irrational and absurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been, where the mind was necessitated only to one part? For the second we are to consider, saith he, *that no evil is in itself desirable, or to be chosen; but withal, if this power of determining itself either way must be taken away, it must be either as something not good, or as some great evil; and whoever saith so, doth not consider how many things in the world there are which are accounted good and desirable things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of will: for it excels all sublunary beings; and there is none would rather desire to be a brute or plant, than man. If God then shewed his goodness, in giving to inferior beings such perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to God's nature and goodness to give man the freedom of his actions, and a self-determining power, though he permitted him the free use of it? Besides,* as that author reasons, *had God, to prevent man's sin, taken away the liberty of his will, he had likewise destroyed the foundation of all virtue, and the very nature of man; for virtue would not have been such, had there been no possibility of acting contrary; and man's nature would have been Divine, because impeccable. Therefore,* saith he, *though we attribute this self-determining power to God, as the author of it, which was so necessary in the order of the universe, we have no reason to attribute the origin of that evil to God, which comes by the abuse of that liberty. For,* as he further adds, *God doth not at all cause that aversion from good, which is in the soul when it sins, but only gave such a power to the soul, whereby it might turn itself to evil, out of which God might afterwards produce so much good; which could not otherwise have been without it.* So consonantly to the Scripture doth that philosopher speak on this subject.

2. *God cannot be said to be the author of sin, though he did not prevent the fall of man; because he did not withdraw before his fall any grace or assistance which was necessary for his standing.* Had there been indeed a necessity of supernatural grace to be communicated to man for every moment, to continue him in his innocency; and had God, before man's fall, withdrawn such assistance from him, without which it were impossible for him to have stood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the fall of man. But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the author of sin; for there appears no necessity at all for as-

serting any distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace in man before his fall, that the one should belong only to a radical power of standing, the other to every act of good which Adam did. For if *God made man upright*, he certainly gave him such a power as might be brought into act without the necessity of any supervenient act of grace to elicite that habitual power into particular actions. If the other were sufficient, it was sufficient for its end; and how could it be sufficient for its end, if, notwithstanding that, there were no possibility of standing unless efficacious help were superadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the creature in his integrity, but what he had a power to obey; and if there were necessary further grace to bring the power into act, then the subtracting of this grace must be by way of punishment to man; which it is hard to conceive for what it should be before man had sinned; or else God must subtract this grace on purpose that man might fall, which would necessarily follow on this supposition, in which case man would be necessitated to fall; *Veluti cum subductis columnis domus necessario corruit*, as one expresseth it, *As a house must needs fall, when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual grace from man, whereby he must necessarily fall, then though God permit man to use his liberty, yet he cannot be said to be any ways the author of evil, because man had still a *posse si vellet*, a power of standing, if he had made a right use of his liberty; and God never took from man his *adjutorium quo potuit stare, et sine quo non potuit*, as divines call it, man enjoying still his power, though by the abuse of his liberty he fell into sin; so that granting God to leave man to the use of his liberty, yet we see God cannot in the least be charged with being the author of sin, or the origin of evil, by the history of the fall of man in Scripture: which was the thing to be cleared. CHAP. III.

VIII. We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the origin of evil in Scripture, with that which was embraced by Heathen philosophers, in point of reason and evidence. There was no one enquiry whatsoever, in which those who had nothing but natural light to guide them, were more to seek for satisfaction in, than this concerning the origin of evil. They saw, by continual experience, how great a torrent of both sorts of evils, of sin and punishment, did overflow the world; but they were like the Egyptians, who had sufficient evidence of

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the overflowing their banks by the river Nile, but could not find out the spring or the head of it. The reason was, as corruption increased in the world, so the means of instruction and knowledge decayed; and so as the phenomena grew greater, the reason of them was less understood; the knowledge of the history of the first ages of the world, through which they could alone come to the full understanding of the true cause of evil, insensibly decaying in the several nations; insomuch that those who are not at all acquainted with that history of the world, which was preserved in sacred records among the Jews, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and some kind of obscure traditions which were preserved among them: which, while they sought to rectify by their interpretations, they made them more obscure and false than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that mankind was in a low and degenerate condition, and subject to continual miseries and calamities. They who cried up the most the αὐτεξούσιον, or the self-determining power of the soul, could not certainly but strangely wonder, that a principle indifferent to be carried either way, should be so almost fatally inclined to the worst of them. It was very strange, that, since reason ought to have the command of passions, by their own acknowledgment, the brutish part of the soul should so master and enslave the rational, and the beast should still cast the rider in man; the sensitive appetite should throw off the power of the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, of that faculty of the soul which was designed for the government of all the rest. The philosophers could not be ignorant what slaves they were themselves to this *terrestrial hyle*, how easily their most mettlesome souls were mired in the dirt, how deep they were sunk into corporeal pleasures, that it was past the power of their reason to help them out. Nay, when the soul begins to be fledged again, after her πτεροῤῥύησις, or moulting, at her entrance into the body, which Plato speaks of, and strives to raise herself above this lower world, she then feels the weight of such plummets hanging at her feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her cage of earth. So Hierocles complains, that when reason begins to carry the soul to the perception of the most noble objects, the soul with a generous flight would soar above this world, ὅταν μὴ ταῖς παθητικαῖς ὁλκαῖς ὥσπερ τισὶ μολύβδοισιν, ὑποφέρηται πρὸς κακίαν, *were it not borne down to that which is evil by the force of passions, which hang like*

Hierocl. in Aurea Carmina, p. 17.

leads upon the soul's feet. What a strange unaccountable thing must this needs be to those who beheld the constancy of the effect, but were to seek for the cause of it! It could not but be clear to them, that the αὐτεξούσιον they were wont to extol so high, was (in the state man was now in) but a more noble name for slavery; when themselves could not but confess the ῥοπὴ, or inclination in the soul, was so strong to the evil. And could that be an even balance, where there was so much down-weight in one of the scales, unless they made, as some of them did, the voluntary inclinations of the soul to evil an evidence of her liberty in this most degenerate condition? As though it were any argument that the prisoner was the freer, because he delighted himself in the noise of his shackles. Neither was this disorder alone at home in the soul, where there was still a Xantippe scolding with Socrates, passion striving with reason; but when they looked abroad in the world, they could not but observe some strange irregularities in the converse among men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings, and destroying each other, and that with the greatest cruelty, and that frequently among countrymen, friends, nay relations and kindred! And could this hostility between those of the same nature, and under the most sacred bonds of union, be the result of nature, when even beasts of prey are not such to those of their own kind? Besides all this, when they summed up the life of man together, and took an account of the weaknesses and follies of childhood, the heats and extravagancies of youth, the passions, disquietments, and disappointments of men in their strength and height of business, the inquietude, aches, and infirmities of old age, besides the miseries which through every one of these all men are subject to, and few escape, into how small a sum will the solid pleasure and contentment of the life of man be reduced? Nay, if we take those things in the world which men please themselves the most in enjoyment of, and consider but with what care they are got, with what fear they are kept, and with what certainty they must be lost, and how much the possession of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near men are upon the top of Tenariff to fall into the depth of the sea, how often they are precipitated from the height of prosperity into the depth of adversity, we shall find yet much less that by the greatest chemistry can be extracted of real satisfaction out of these things. Whence then should it come that men's souls should so delight to feed on these husks, and to

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embrace these clouds and shadows, instead of that real good, which is the true object of the soul's desire? They could easily see there was no pure, unmixed good in the world; but there was a contemperation of both together, according to that of Euripides:

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir.

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
Ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.

There is a kind of continual mixture of good and evil in the world; which Socrates observed upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch, ὡς ἄτοπον, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ παλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ; ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν; *What a strange thing is that which men are wont to call pleasure? How near akin is it to that which seems so contrary to it, pain?*

Plat. in Phæd.

IX. Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things, and what near neighbours pain and pleasure were to each other, (so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other,) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the origin of both these. Those who believe there was a God who produced the world, and ordered all things in it, did easily attribute whatever was good in the world to the fountain of all goodness; but that any evil should come from him, they thought it repugnant to the very notion of a Deity; which they were so far right in as it concerned the evil of sin; which we have already shewed God could not be the author of; but therein they shewed their ignorance of the true cause of evil, that they did not look upon the miseries of life as the effects of God's justice upon the world for the evil of sin. And therefore that they might set the origin of evil far enough off from God, they made two different principles of things; the one of good, and the other of evil. This, Plutarch tells us, was the most ancient and universal account which he could meet with of the origin of good and evil. To which purpose we have this ample testimony of his, in his learned discourse

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. c. 45. Ed. Oxon.

De Iside et Osiride, Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν, εἴς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδύσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένην, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἱρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἴαξιν ἤ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος; ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ μεμιγμένα κακοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μηδὲν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄκρατον ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως φερού-

σης· οὐ δυεῖν πίθων εἶς ταμίας, ὥσπερ νάματα τὰ πράγματα καπηλικῶς διανέμων ἀνακεράννυσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ δυεῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν, καὶ δυεῖν ἀντιπάλων δυνάμεων, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ κατ' εὐθείαν ὑφηγεμένης, τῆς δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀναστρεφούσης καὶ ἀνακλώσης, ὅ τε βίος μικτὸς, ὅ τε κόσμος εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ περίγειος οὗτος καὶ μετὰ σελήνην, ἀνώμαλος καὶ ποικίλος γέγονε, καὶ μεταβολὰς πάσας δεχόμενος· εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀναιτίως πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, αἰτίαν δὴ κακοῦ τἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν παράσχοι, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. Which words I have the more largely cited, because they give us the most full account of the antiquity, universality, and reason of that opinion, which asserts two different principles of good and evil. *It is a tradition* (saith he) *of great antiquity, derived down from the ancient masters of Divine knowledge, and formers of commonwealths, to the poets and philosophers, whose first author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unshaken belief, not only in ordinary discourses and reports, but was spread into the mysteries and sacrifices both of Greeks and others, that the universe did not depend on chance, and was destitute of mind and reason to govern it; neither was there one only reason which sat at the stern, or held the reins, whereby he did order and govern the world; but since there is so much confusion and mixture of good and evil in the world, that nature doth not produce any pure untainted good, there is not any one who, like a drawer, takes the liquor out of two several vessels, and mixeth them together, and after distributes them; but there are two principles and powers contrary to each other, whereof one draws us to the right hand, and directs us straight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; since we see the life of man so mixed as it is; and not only that, but the world too, at least so much as is sublunary and terrestrial, which is subject to many varieties, irregularities, and changes. For if nothing be without a cause, and good cannot be the cause of evil, it necessarily follows, that as there is a peculiar nature and principle which is the cause of good, so there must be another, which is the cause of evil.*

But lest we should think it was only a sect of a kind of Heathen manichees which held this opinion, he tells us, to prevent that, καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο τοῖς πλείοσι καὶ σοφωτάτοις, *It was the opinion of the most, and wisest of the Heathen.* Now these two principles some (saith he) call *two opposite Gods*, whereof the one is the cause of good, and the other of evil; him thy call Θεὸς, this Δαίμων. By this

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one would imagine that this very ancient tradition was nothing else but the true account of the origin of evil a little disguised. For the Scripture making the Devil the first author of evil himself, and the first solicitor and tempter of man to it; who when God directed him straight forward, pulled man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the miseries of the world came into it: for while man kept close to his Maker, his integrity and obedience were to him what the *vasa umbilicalia* are to the child in the womb; by them he received whatever tended to his subsistence and comfort: but sin cut those vessels asunder, and proved the widwife of misery; bringing man forth into a world of sorrow and sufferings. Now, I say, the Scripture taking such especial notice of one, as the chief of devils, through whose means evil came into the world, this gave occasion to the Heathens, when length of time had made the original tradition more obscure, to make these two, God and the Dæmon, as two Anti-gods; and so to be the causes, the one of all good, and the other of all evil. Which at last came to that, (which was the Devil's great design in thus corrupting the tradition,) that both these Anti-gods should have solemn worship by sacrifices; the one by way of impetration, for bestowing of good; the other by way of deprecation, for averting of evil. Such, Plutarch there tells us, were the Oromasdes and Arimanius of Zoroastres, which were worshipped by the Persians; the one for doing good, and the other for avoiding evil: the one they resembled to light, (or fire,) the other to darkness and ignorance. What animals were good and useful they ascribed to Oromasdes, and all venomous and noxious ones to Arimanius; whom Plutarch elsewhere calls τὸν πονηρὸν Δαίμονα Περσῶν, *The evil Dæmon of the Persians*. The same Diogenes Laertius relates of the *magi*, the philosophers of Persia, that they made two distinct principles, Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, *a good and bad Dæmon*; for which he quotes Dinon, Aristotle, Hermippus, Eudoxus, and others. The same Plutarch makes to be the opinion of the ancient Greeks; who attribute the good to Jupiter Olympius, the bad to Hades. The Chaldeans, saith he, *make the planets their gods*; of which two they suppose the cause of good; two more of only a malignant influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The same he affirms of the Egyptians, that whatever was evil and irregular, they ascribed to Typho;

Plut. in Alex. Diog. Laertius in Proœm.

what was good, comely, and useful, they attributed to Isis and Osiris; to Isis as the passive, Osiris as the active principle. CHAP. III.

Thus we see how large a spread this opinion of the origin of evil had in the Gentile world. Neither did it expire with Heathenism; but Manes retained so much of the religion of his country, being a Persian, that he made a strange medley of the Persian and Christian doctrine together. For that was his famous opinion, of which St. Austin tells us; *Iste duo principia inter se diversa atque adversa, eademque æterna, et co-æterna, hoc est, semper fuisse, composuit; duasque naturas atque substantias, boni, scilicet, et mali, sequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus est.* St. Austin thinks that Manes had his opinion concerning two principles from the ancient heretics; by whom I suppose he means the Marcionists and Valentinians; but it seems more probable that Manes had his doctrine immediately from his countrymen, though it be generally thought that Scythianus and Buddas were his masters in it. But from whomsoever it came, the opinion was merely Heathen, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to reason. The former I meddle not with, that opinion being now extinct in the Christian world; I only briefly consider the unreasonableness of it, to shew what a far better account of the *origin of evil* the Scriptures give us, than was discovered by the Heathen philosophers. For on both sides that opinion is repugnant to the notion of a Deity; so that while they would make two such Gods, they make none at all. For how can the principle of good be God, if he hath not infinite power as well as goodness? And how can he have infinite power, if he hath not the management of things in the world? And how can he have the management of things, if they be liable to evil, which the other God, which is the principle of evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this supposition, the principle of good cannot rescue it? So that they who hold this opinion, cannot, as Simplicius tells us, give God τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, *the half of that infinite power* which belongs to him; for neither can he keep the good creatures which he makes from the power of the evil Dæmon, and therefore if he loves them, must be in continual fears of the power of the contrary principle: neither can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them; for then God's power would be far greater than the evil Dæmon's, and so he could be no Anti-god. And on the other side, the

X.

August. de Hæres. c. 46.

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notion or idea of an infinite evil Being, is in itself an inconsistent idea; for it is an infinite nonentity, if we suppose his very being to lie in being evil, which is only a privation of goodness: and besides, if he be infinitely evil, he must be infinitely contrary to the good principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary, which enjoys several of the same perfections which the other hath; which are infinity of essence, and necessity of existence? Now if this principle of evil be absolutely contrary to the other, it must be contrary in all his perfections; for whatever is a perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now if it be contrary in every perfection, infinity of essence, and necessity of existence, being two, it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them; by which this evil principle must be infinitely defective in being and existence, and so it will be an infinite nonentity which yet exists, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be such a contrary principle, which is the cause of all evil, then all evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this infinitely evil principle, by which means not only all religion, but all virtue and goodness will be taken out of the world, if this principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no Anti-god: and not only so, but all difference of good and evil will be taken away; (and then what need making two such contrary principles to give an account of the origin of evil?) for when once evil becomes thus necessary, it loseth its nature as a moral evil; for a moral evil implies in it a voluntary breach of some known law: but how can that breach be voluntary, which was caused by an infinite power in the most proper way of efficiency? And thus, if all freedom of will be destroyed, (as it is necessarily by this supposition,) then no government of the world by laws can be supposed, and consequently no reward or punishment, which suppose liberty of action; and by this means all religion, law, and providence are banished out of the world, and so this evil Dæmon will get all into his own hands, and instead of two contrary principles, there will be but one infinitely evil Dæmon: which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithstanding all the evil in the world, there is so much good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil Dæmon had infinite power. By this we see there cannot be a principle infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two such contrary principles infinite, they make neither of them so; and so while they make two Gods, they take away any at all. So that this opinion of the

origin of evil is manifestly absurd, irrational, and contradictious. CHAP. III.

But all the Heathen philosophers were not so gross as to imagine two such Anti-gods, with infinitely active power; but yet those who would not in terms assert it, might be driven to it by the consequence of their opinion concerning the origin of evil, which did suppose a necessity of it in nature, as flowing from that passive principle out of which the world was produced. Hence it was that Heraclitus, as Plutarch tells us, attributed the origin of all things to discord and antipathy, and was wont to say, that when Homer wished XI.

Ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔριν ἔκτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέσθαι. Plutarch. de Isid. et Osiride.

That all contention were banished out of the world, that he did secretly curse the origin of things, and wished the ruin of the world. So Empedocles called the active principle which did good, harmony and friendship, but the other

Νεῖκος ὐλόμενον καὶ δῆριν αἱματόεσσαν. Carm. p. 21. et 25. Ed. Steph.

by which he makes it to be a quarrelsome, pernicious, and bloody principle. The same Plutarch tells us of these two renowned philosophers, *Pythagoras and Plato*. Thence he tells us the Pythagoreans called the principle of good τὸ ἓν, πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περισσὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρὸν, *Unity, finite, quiescent, straight, uneven number, square, right, and splendid*; the principle of evil they called τὴν δυάδα, τὸ ἄπειρὸν, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινὸν, *The binary, infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one side, unequal, left, obscure*. The opinion of Plato, he tells us, is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it; but he saith in his old age, in his book *de Legibus*, ἐ δι' αἰνιγμῶν, οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, *without any if's or and's* he asserts the world to be moved by more than one principle; by two at the least, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθεργὸν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων δημιεργόν. *The one of a good and benign nature, the other contrary to it both in its nature and operations*. Numenius in Chalcidius thus delivers the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato *de originibus*, as he speaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam et sine qualitate sylvam esse censet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, sed plane noxiam; Deum quippe esse (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium et causam bonorum, sylvam malorum:* Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.

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so that, according to Numenius, both Plato and Pythagoras attributed the origin of evil to the malignity of matter, and so they make evils to be necessarily consequent upon the being of things. For thus he delivers expressly the opinion of Pythagoras; *Qui ait, existente providentia, mala quoque necessario substitisse, propterea quod sylva sit, et eadem sit malitia prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; unam beneficentissimam; malignam alteram sc. sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero, matris sylvæ vitio cohæserunt.* But Plutarch will by no means admit that Plato attributes the origin of evil merely to matter; but he makes the principle of evil to be something distinct from matter, which he calls τὴν ἄτακτον, καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὴν ἀρχήν, *A confused, infinite, self-moving, stirring principle;* which (saith he) he elsewhere calls *necessity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἄτακτον καὶ κακοποιόν, *a disorderly and malignant soul;* which cannot be understood of mere matter, when he makes his *hyle* ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἐρήμου, *without form or figure, and destitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impossible* (saith he) *that that which is of itself such an inert principle as matter is, should by Plato be supposed to be the cause and principle of evil;* which he elsewhere calls ἀνάγκην πολλὰ τῷ Θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσαν καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσαν, *Necessity which often resisted God, and cast off his reins.* So that, according to Plutarch, Plato acquits both God and Hyle from being the origin of evil, τὴν γε ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος, and therefore attributes it to that malignant spirit which moves the matter, and is the cause of all the disorderly motions in the world. But what this spirit should be, neither he nor any one else could ever understand. What darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of philosophers concerning the origin of evil, when they were so confused and obscure in the account which they gave of it, that their greatest admirers could not understand them!

Plutarch. de Animæ procreat. e Tim.

XII. But though Plato seemed so ambiguous in his judgment of the origin of evil, whether he should attribute it to the *hyle*, or some malignant spirit in it, the Stoics were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cause of evil to the perversity of matter. So Chalcidius tells us, that the Stoics made matter not to be evil in itself, as Pythagoras, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igi-*

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

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tur unde mala? perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt: they made the perversity of matter the origin of evil; but as he well observes, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipsa perversitas, cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum, Deus et sylva. Deus summum et præcellens bonum; sylva ut censent, nec bonum nec malum.* They give no rational account whence this perversity of matter should arise; when, according to the Stoics, there are but two principles of things, God and matter: whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perversity, they tell us, is something necessarily consequent upon the generation of things. Ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι πάθη τὰ τῇ γενέσει προεπόμενα ὥσπερ ἰὸς τῷ χαλκῷ, καὶ ὁ ῥυπὸς τῷ σώματι, *these are affections* (viz. the disorders in the world) *which follow the generation of things, as rust comes upon brass, and filth upon the body,* as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks; so Maximus Tyrius saith that evils in the world are οὐ τέχνης ἔργα, ἀλλ' ὕλης πάθη, *not any works of art, but the affections of matter. Non potest artifex mutare materiam,* saith Seneca, when he is giving an account *why God suffers evils in the world:* and elsewhere gives this account why evils came into the world, *non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, inobsequens arti est.* So that the origin of evil, by this account of it, lies wholly upon the perversity of matter, which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produced the world out of that matter which the Stoics supposed to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cause of evil to God, seems to have been the great reason why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and coexistent with God; and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoics in this opinion, that he might set God far enough off from being the author of sin. But I cannot see what advantage comes at all by this hypothesis, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other: for, 1. *It either destroys God's omnipotency, or else makes him the approver of evil;* so that if he be not *auctor,* he must be *assentator mali,* as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes, because he suffered evil to be in matter; for, as he argues, *Aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: si potuit et noluit, malus et ipse, quia malo favit; et sic jam habetur ejus quod licet non instituerit; quia tamen si noluisset illud esse, non esset; ipse jam fecit esse, quod noluit non esse: quo quid est turpius? si id no-*

Maxim. Tyr. Serm. XXV.

Seneca de Provid. c. 5.

Idem Præf. ad Natur. Quæst.

Tertull. adv. Hermogen. c. 10. Ed. Pam

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luit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse, adversum semetipsum egit, cum et voluit esse quod noluit fecisse, et noluit fecisse quod voluit esse. So that little advantage is gained for the clearing the true origin of evil by this opinion; for either God could have taken away evil out of matter, but would not, or else would but could not. This last destroys God's omnipotency, the former his goodness; for by that means evil is in the world by his consent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindered it, it would not have been; and so God, by not rooting out of evil, will be found an assertor of it; *Mule si per voluntatem: turpiter si per necessitatem, aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus:* if God's will were the cause why sin was, it reflects on his goodness; if God's power could not hinder it, it destroys his omnipotency. So that by this opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to evil. 2. *This principle overturns the foundations of religion, and all transactions between God and men's souls, in order to their welfare*, because it makes evil to be necessarily existent in the world; which appears from hence, in that evil doth result from the being of matter, and so it must necessarily be as matter is supposed to be; for whatever results from the being of a thing, must be coexistent with it; and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist, must have the same mode of existence which the being itself hath; as is evident in all the attributes of God, which have the same immutability with his nature: now then if evil did exist from eternity together with matter, it must necessarily exist as matter doth, and so evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the world; which if once granted, renders religion useless, makes God's commands unrighteous, and destroys the foundation of God's proceedings in the day of judgment. 3. *This opinion makes God not to be the author of good*, while it denies him to be the author of evil. For either there was nothing else but evil in this eternal matter, or there was a mixture of good and evil; if nothing else but evil which did necessarily exist, it were as impossible for God to produce good out of it, as to annihilate the necessarily existent matter. If there were a mixture of good and evil, they were both there either necessarily or contingently; how could either of them be contingently in that which is supposed to be necessarily existent, and no free agent? If they be both there necessarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two such contrary things as good and

Ibid.

evil should necessarily be in the same uniform matter. 2. Then God is no more the author of good than of evil in the world; for he is said not to be the author of evil because it comes from matter; and so it appears good doth too: and so God, according to this opinion, is no more the author of good than he is of evil. But if it be said *that good is not in matter, but God produced that out of nothing*; then I reply, 1. If God did produce good out of nothing, why did he not produce matter out of nothing too? If he were so powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of power as to the other. What insufficiency is there in God's nature for producing all things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If God did produce good out of evil, why could he not have removed all evil out of matter? For good could not be produced but by the removing of some evil which was before that good; and so God might have removed all evil out of matter. And so, by not doing it when he might, this opinion gives not the least satisfaction, in point of reason, for acquitting God from being the author of sin, nor for clearing the true origin of evil. CHAP. III.

XIII. Thus we have now compared the account given of it in Scripture, with that given by the Heathen philosophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational, and satisfactory than theirs is; which doubtless is the reason why the more modern philosophers, such as Hierocles, Porphyry, Simplicius, and others, though otherwise great opposers of Christianity, did yet in this side with the Scriptures, and attribute the original of evil not to matter, but to the will of man. And whoever is seriously conversant with the writings of those philosophers, who were ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς γενεᾶς, of the sacred succession out of the shool of Ammonius at Alexandria, such as Plotinus, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, and Hierocles, will find them write in a higher strain concerning many weighty and important truths, as of the degeneracy of men's souls from God, and the way of the soul's returning to him, than the most sublime of the ancient philosophers had done. Which speculations of theirs no doubt arose not so much from the school of Plato and Pythagoras, as of that great restorer of philosophy, Ammonius of Alexandria, whose scholars Herennius, Origen, and Plotinus were; who living and dying a Christian, as Eusebius and Hierom assure us, whatever Porphyrius suggests to the contrary, did communicate to his scholars the sublimer mysteries of Divine revelation, together with the speculations of the ancient

Euseb. Eccles. Hist. l. vi. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

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philosophers: which Holstenius conceives he did with an adjuration of secrecy, which he tells us Porphyrius himself acknowledgeth, that those three scholars of Ammonius, Herennius, Origen, and Plotinus, were under an obligation to each other not to reveal and discover; though it were after violated by them. It is an easy matter to conceive what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient Platonic philosophy by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was so well versed in both of them as Ammonius is supposed to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that philosophy seem which had only its rise from Plato, but its height and improvement from those rich and truly Divine truths which were inlaid with them? The want of observing this, viz. whence it was that those excellent discourses in the latter Platonists had their true original, hath given occasion to several mistakes among learned men: as first, the over-valuing of the Platonic philosophy; as though in many of the discourses and notions of it, it seemed to some (who were more in love with philosophy than the Scriptures) to outgo what is discovered therein concerning the same things. A most groundless and unworthy censure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifested, were it here a fit opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the sublimest discourses of the Platonists, had not only its primitive rise, but its accession and improvement from the Scriptures, wherein it is still contained in its native lustre and beauty, without those paintings and impure mixtures which the sublimest truths are corrupted with in the Platonic writings. The reason of which is, though these philosophers grew suddenly rich through the spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known from whence they had them, and would seem to have had that out of their own gardens, which was only transplanted from the sacred writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures and the Christian doctrine without some contempt of its meanness and simplicity; and whatever improvement they had gained by them, they would have it less taken notice of by professing their opposition to the Christians; as is notorious in those great philosophers, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, Hierocles, Simplicius, and others: it being their design to take so much and no more out of the Christian doctrine as they could well suit with their Platonic notions; by which means they so disguised the

Holsten. de Vit. et Script. Porphyr. c. 6.

faces of the truths they stole, that it were hard for the right owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand artifice of their great master Plato, who doubtless, by means of his abode and acquaintance in Egypt, about the time when the Jews began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many truths of grand importance concerning the Deity, the nature of the soul, the origin of the world, than many other Greek philosophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and disguised his notions in such a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly it might be less known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the Greeks, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dress. Which Plato himself seems somewhere to intimate, when he saith, that what the Greeks received from the Barbarians, κάλλιον τῦτο εἰς τέλος ἀπεργάζονται, *they put it into a better fashion*, i. e. they disguise it, alter and change it as they please, and put it into a Greek habit, that it might never be suspected to have been a foreigner. Thence Tertullian speaks with a great deal of truth and freedom of such philosophers, who did *ingenii sitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare*, (as he expresseth it,) that quenched their thirst after knowledge with the waters of Jordan, (though they did not, like Naaman, cure the leprosy of the head by washing in them;) for, as Tertullian saith, they came only *ex negotio curiositatis*, more to please the itch of their curiosity than to cure it.

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Plato in Epinom. p. 1012. Ed. Ficin.

Tertul. Apol. c. 47.

And wherein they seemed most to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque et consonantia prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorsum subornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falsis, aut patrocinari. Whatever the philosophers speak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little truth a plea for the rest of their errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient philosophers; but the primitive Christians began to discern the underhand workings of such, who sought to blend philosophy and Christianity together: for Tertullian himself takes great notice of such, who did *Veritatis dogmata ad philosophicas sententias adulterare*, suborn Christianity to maintain philosophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et dialecticum Christianismum pro-*

Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.

Tertul. de Prescrip. advers. Hæret. c. 7

BOOK III. *tulerunt*; by which we see what tampering there was betimes rather to bring Christianity down to philosophy, than to make philosophy truckle under the truth and simplicity of the Scriptures. Whether Ammonius himself, and some others of the school of Alexandria, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to enquire; though it be too evident in the writings of some, that they rather seek to accommodate the Scriptures to the sentiments of the school of Plato, than to reform that by the Scriptures: but I say, however it were with those who were Christians, yet those who were not, but only philosophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcileable with the doctrine of Plato in the Scriptures, done already to their hands by the endeavours chiefly of Ammonius and Origen, they greedily embrace those improvements of their philosophy, which would tend so much to the credit of it, and as contemptuously reject what they found irreconcileable with the dictates of their philosophy. Now what an unreasonable thing is it, when, whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen philosophy, was derivative from the Scriptures, as the sacred fountain of it, that the meeting with such things should in the least redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally derived? When on the other side it should be a great confirmation to our faith, as to the Scriptures, that they, who were professed philosophers and admirers only of reason, did so readily embrace some of those grand truths which are contained in the word of God.

XIV. For which we need no other instance than that before us concerning the origin of evil; the making out of which will tend to the clearing the last thing mentioned concerning it, which was, that *the most material things in it are attested by the Heathens themselves.* And this honey which is gained out of the lion's mouth, must needs taste sweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundless mistake on the other side, which is the second, (which ariseth from meeting things consonant to the Scriptures in the writings of philosophers,) presently to conclude from such things that they were Christians, (as it is said some have lately done in the behalf of Hierocles.) For there being such clear accounts given in Scripture of the grand difficulties and perplexities which the minds of men were troubled with, when these came to the knowledge of such who were of philosophic and inquisitive heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation

among them, especially if they might be made consistent with their former speculations: thus it was in our present case concerning the origin of evil. We have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient philosophers were in about it, what meanders they were lost in for want of a clue to guide them through them: now it pleased God, after the coming of Christ in the flesh, to declare to the world the only way for the recovery of souls and their eternal salvation; the news of which being spread so far that it soon got among the philosophers, could not but make them more inquisitive concerning the state and condition of their souls; and when they had searched what the philosophers had formerly discovered of it, their curiosity would presently prompt them to see what account of things, concerning the souls of men, was delivered by the preachers of this new doctrine. By this they could not but presently understand that they declared all men's souls to be in a most degenerate and low condition, by being so continually under the power of the most unreasonable and unruly passions, that they were estranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unsuitable to their nature; as to all which, their own inward sense and experience could not but tell them, that these things were notoriously true; and therefore they enquire further how these things came to be so; which they receive a full account of in Scripture: that man's soul was at first created pure and holy, and in perfect friendship with God: that God dealt bountifully and favourably with man; only expected obedience to his laws: that man being a free agent, did abuse his liberty, and disobeyed his Maker; and thence came the true πτεροῤῥύησις, the feathers of the soul, whereby it soared up to heaven, moulted away, and the soul sunk below itself into a degenerate and apostate condition; out of which it is impossible to be recovered without some extraordinary expression of Divine favour. Now what is there in all this account, but what is hugely suitable to principles of reason, and to the general experience of the world, as to those things which were capable of being tried by it? And those philosophers who were any thing ingenuous, and lovers of truth, could not but confess the truth of those things which we are now speaking of, viz. *That men's souls are in a very degenerate condition; that the most rational account of it is, that man, by the act of his own will, brought himself into it; and that, in order to the*

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happiness of men's souls, there was a necessity of recovery out of this condition.

As to the degeneracy of the souls of men; this was the common complaint of those philosophers who minded the government of themselves, and the practice of virtue; especially of the Platonists and Stoics. Seneca, in all his moral discourses, especially in his Epistles, may speak sufficiently in behalf of the Stoics, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the world. And the Platonists all complain of the slavery of the soul in the body, and that it is here by way of punishment for something which was done before; which makes me somewhat inclinable to think that Plato knew more of the lapse of mankind than he would openly discover, and for that end disguised it, after his usual manner, in that hypothesis of preexistence, which, taking it cabalistically, (for I rather think the opinion of preexistence is so to be taken than the history of the fall of man,) may import only this, *That men's souls might be justly supposed to be created happy; but by reason of the apostasy of man's soul from God, all souls came now into their bodies as into a kind of prison, they being enslaved to the brutish part within them; there having been such a true* πτωροβρώτις, *the soul being now deprived of her chiefest perfections in this her low and degenerate condition.* And it seems far more rational to me to interpret those persons' opinions to a cabalistical or an allegorical sense, who are known to have written designedly in a way obscure and ambiguous, than to force those men's expressions to *cabalas*, who profess to write a plain history, and that with the greatest simplicity and perspicuity. But it cannot but seem very strange, that an hypothesis capable of being reconciled to the plain literal sense of the Scriptures (delivered by a person who useth great artifice and cunning to disguise his opinions, and such a person withal, who (by such persons themselves who make use of this opinion to that end) is supposed to have been very conversant with the writings of Moses) should be taken in its literal sense, as it really imports preexistence of each particular soul in the grossest manner; and this should be made to be a part of the philosophic *cabala* of the writings of such a person, who useth not the least artifice to disguise his sense, nor gives us any where the least intimation that he left behind him such plaited pictures in his history of the beginning of the world, that if you look straight forward, you may see a literal *cabala*;

on the one side a philosophical, and on the other a moral. But now if we remove the *cabala* from Moses to Plato, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all, either as to Plato's way of writing, or the consonancy of the opinion so interpreted to the plain genuine sense of Moses; if by Plato's opinion of the preexistence and descent of souls be understood, by the former, the happy state of the soul of man in conjunction with God, and by the latter, the low and degenerate condition which the soul is in after apostasy from him; which the latter Platonists are so large and eloquent in expressing. Porphyry, where he speaks of some things he counsels men to do, hath these words: *But if we cannot do them, let us at least do that which was so much lamented of old,* Τὸ θρηνούμενον πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν, which is, ὡς τοίων ἔκτ' ἐρίδων, ἔκτε νεικέων γενόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκήρατον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀβλαβὲς σώζειν οὐ δυνάμεθα. *Let us at the least join with our forefathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of such disagreeing and contrary principles, that we are not able to preserve divine, pure, and unspotted innocency.* And Hierocles fully expresseth his sense of the degeneracy of mankind in these words; Οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ καὶ τῆς προσπαθείας ἥττους καὶ φρενοβλαβεῖς ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς γῆν νεύσεως γενόμενοι· ὡς καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ κακὸν ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι φυγεῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομερίσαι αὑτοὺς τῆς τούτου ὁμιλίας, ἧς εὐτύχουν ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ διάγοντες· τὸν γὰρ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ χωρισμὸν βλάπτοντα τὰς φρένας ἡ πρὸς γῆν νεῦσις δηλοῖ. *The most of men in the world are bad, and under the command of their passions, and grown impotent through their propensity to earth; which great evil they have brought upon themselves by their wilful apostasy from God, and withdrawing themselves from that society with him which they once enjoyed in pure light; which departure of men's souls from God, which is so hurtful to the minds of men, is evident by their strong inclination to the things of this world.* The same author mentions, with much approbation, that speech of Heraclitus, speaking of those souls which are ἄπτωτοι εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good;* he saith, ὅτι ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον· *We live their death, and die their life:* κάτεισι γὰρ καὶ ἀποπίπτει τῆς εὐσαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *For man is now fallen down from that blessed region,* and as Empedocles the Pythagorean speaks,

Porphyr. de Abstinent. l. iii. sect. 2.

Hieroc. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261. Ed. Lond.

Ibid. p. 253.

Φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης
Νείκει μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

Ibid. p. 254.

BOOK III. Which words cannot be better rendered than in the words the Scripture useth concerning Cain; *and he went from the presence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the earth,* and under continual perplexities. For the soul of man having left τὸν λειμῶνα τῆς ἀληθείας, (it is Hierocles's own Ibid. expression,) *the pleasant meadow of truth,* (a fit description of Paradise,) τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς πτεροῤῥύησεως εἰς γῆϊνον ἔρχεται σῶμα ὀλβίᾳ αἰῶνος ἀμελθεὶς, *through the violence of her moulting, or deplumation, she comes into this earthly body deprived of that blessed life which she before enjoyed.* Which he tells us is very consonant to Plato's sense of the κάθοδος, or descent of souls; that when, by reason of their impotency of fixing wholly on God, they suffer συντυχίαν τὴ πτεροῤῥύησιν, *some great loss, and a deprivation of former perfections,* (which I suppose is meant by the πτεροῤῥύησις, the soul's impotency of flying up above this earthly world,) then they lapse into these terrestrial and mortal bodies. So Hierocles concludes with this excellent and divine speech, P. 257. ὥσπερ ἂν ἡ θεόθεν φυγὴ, τὴ ἡ πτεροῤῥύησις τῶν κουφιζόντων ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὰ ἄνω εἰς τὸν τῶν θνητῶν ἤνεγκε τόπον, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συνεισέρχεται· ὅτως ἂν ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀποβολὴ, τὴ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, οἷον πτερῶν τινῶν, ἔκφυσις πρὸς τὸν τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore, by apostasy from God, and the moulting of those feathers of our souls, whereby we may be raised up above this world, we have fallen into this place of mortals which is compassed about with evils; so by the casting off carnal affections, and by the growth of virtues like new feathers to the soul, we shall ascend to the place of pure and perfect good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine life.* So much more becoming Christians do these excellent philosophers speak of the degeneracy of men's souls, and the consequents of it, than some who would be accounted the followers of reason, as well as of Christ, who make it so much of their business to extenuate the fall of man: which we find those who were mere philosophers far more rational and ingenuous in, than those who pretend so highly to reason; but I think with as little of it as any, supposing the Scriptures to be of Divine authority. But it is not here our business to consider the opinions of those who pretend to Christianity, but only of such who, pretending only to reason, have yet consented with the doctrine of the Scriptures as to the degeneracy of the souls of men, that it lies in an apostasy from God, and having lost those perfections which they had before.

XVI. 1 *That man's will is the cause of his apostasy;* this we

have already manifested at large from the testimony and reason of Simplicius; and Hierocles is as large and clear in it as the other, with expressions much of the same nature. Μέση γὰρ ἔσα ἡ τῆ ἀνθρώπου ἐσία τῶν τε ἀεὶ νοούντων τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν μηδέποτε νοεῖν τετυκότων, ἄνεισι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ κάτεισι πρὸς ταῦτα, νοῦ κτήσει καὶ ἀποβολῇ, πρὸς τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν καὶ τὴν θήρειον, διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀμφίβιον ἀναμέρος οἰκειουμένη. *Man's nature lying between those beings which perpetually contemplate God, and those which are uncapable of it, it sometimes ascends to those, and sometimes descends to these, according as it observes or rejects the dictates of reason; and so, by reason of the indifferency of the will, is liable to take upon it the similitude of God or a beast.* Hieroc. in Aur. Carm. p. 258. Ταῦτ' ἂν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐγνωκὼς οὐσίας, οἶδε πῶς αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ τάλανες ταῖς ἑαυτῶν αἱρέσεσι γίνονται. *And whoever thoroughly considers this, will easily understand how men are the causes of their own evils, and become unhappy and miserable through their own choice and self-wills.* Ibid. Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden Pythagorean verse,

> Γνώσῃ δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντας
> Τλήμονας.

Men are grown miserable through their own fault. And afterwards Hierocles excellently describes the nature of evil in these words, ἦν δὲ συμφυὲς ἅμα καὶ ἐπίκτητον ἡμῖν κακὸν, ἡ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου παρὰ φύσιν κίνησις. *Both our natural and contracted pravity is nothing else but the unnatural motion of our free wills:* P. 263. according to which, saith he, ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς θείοις νόμοις πειρώμεθα, οὐδὲν ἐπαισθανόμενοι ὅσον ἑαυτοὺς βλάπτομεν, διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἀντιτείνειν. Θεῷ· ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦτο τυφλῶς ὁρῶντες, ὅτι ἐδυνήθημεν ἀφηνιάσαι τῶν ἐκείνου δεσμῶν. *We dare to contradict the laws of God, not being sensible how much we injure ourselves when we do it; and only look at this, that we are able to cast off the reins of God's laws from our necks.* P. 264. And he truly saith, *That it is the greatest abuse of liberty to offend God, when we either do what he forbids, or neglect what he requires.* Ἵνα ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς ἀθλιότητος ἑαυτοὺς πληρώσωσιν οἱ τὸν θεῖον νόμον ἐκβαίνοντες, τῷ τε μὴ ποιεῖν τὰ προστεταγμένα καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ ἀπηγορευμένα. *So that on both sides men bring misery upon themselves, by transgressing the Divine law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden.* Ibid. So that he fully ascribes the origin of evil to the τὸ αὐτεξούσιον κίνημα παρὰ φύσιν διατεθὲν, as he calls it, *the irregular motion*

BOOK III.

of the will of man; which we have already shewed to be the doctrine of the Scriptures.

3.

As to the necessity of the soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have these philosophers expressing their consent with the Scriptures. Porphyrius, as St. Augustine tells us, in the end of his first book *de Regressu Animæ*, doth acknowledge the necessity of a way of recovering souls, which should be universal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, nondum receptam unam quandam sectam, quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, ——nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam.* But the necessity of the purgation of the soul in order to its felicity, is so largely and fully discoursed of by all the Platonists and Pythagoreans, that it will be needless to insist upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of evil in Scripture to be embraced by the sublimest of the Heathen philosophers, as most rational and satisfactory; which was the thing to be proved.

August. de Civit. Dei, l. x. c. 32. Ed. Par. 1613.

XVII.

Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational; but we may trace some not obscure footsteps of the truth of particular circumstances which concern the fall of man, among the Heathens; such as the *Devil's envying of man's happiness, his disguising himself under the form of a serpent, and man's being thrown out of Paradise upon his fall.*

D. Casaub. Original of temporal Evils.

1. *The Devil's envying the happiness of man.* It hath been truly observed by a learned man, that the original of that very ancient opinion among the Heathen, *de invidia Dæmonis*, had its rise from the history of the fall of man; which he hath made out so fully, that I shall the less need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted tradition of some malignant spirits which envied the welfare of mankind, appears by that ample testimony of Plutarch, in his *Dio*, mentioned by the same author;

Vit. Paral. p. 968. Ed. Franc.

Οὐκ οἶδα, μὴ τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον, ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐνιζάμενα, ταραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ἀρετήν· ὡς μὴ διαμείναντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι, βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τύχωσιν. Plutarch was much troubled to give an account of the apparitions which Brutus and Dio, who were learned and philosophical men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no just account of it, unless he embraced that very ancient tradition

(which yet seemed absurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant dæmons, which envy good men, and withstand their enterprizes, by raising fears and troubles to them, that so they might hinder them in their pursuit of virtue; lest, if they continue stedfast and unmoveable in good, they should be at last partakers of greater felicity than they enjoy.* There being so ancient a tradition of such ὑβρισταὶ δαίμονες, (as the learned man mentioned hath more fully shewed in his notes on this place of Plutarch,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being so great an instrument in procuring the fall of man. To him therefore I refer the inquisitive reader, and shall only add to the testimonies of him cited, that of Xenocrates in Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, where he saith, that the calamities of life, and misfortunes men meet with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good spirits, Ἀλλ' εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυρὰς, δυσρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. *But that there are in the air some great and potent beings, which are of a surly and malignant nature, and rejoice to do men all the mischief they can.* Iamblichus, in his answer to Porphyrius concerning the Egyptian mysteries, undertakes to give an account of these evil spirits or dæmons, and that from them the origin of evil in the world is; for thus he speaks, (as he is translated by Ficinus:) *Si verum est quod de idolis dicebamus, improbisque Dæmonibus, hinc sane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum præsentiam, Dæmonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem suum jubent esse justum, ut ipsi videantur boni, sicut et Dii; quoniam vero natura sunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injusta conducunt. Hi sunt omnino qui et in oraculis mentiuntur et fallunt, et turpia consulunt atque peragunt.* By which we see he acknowledgeth some spirits whose natures are wicked, and help men to do evil; and that these very spirits may sometimes command that which is good, lest they should be suspected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant nature, which only design the ruin of men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable delivered by the Heathen oracles; which yet might come from the Devil still, by this confession of Iamblichus himself.

CHAP. III.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 361. et c. 26. Ed. Oxon.

Iamblich. de Myster. p. 105. Ed. Lugd.

For the Devil's appearing under the form of a serpent. XVIII

It is very probably conjectured, that from hence it was that the prince of those who contended with Saturn, was

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by that enigmatical writer, Pherecydes Syrius, called Ὀφιονεύς. Celsus, who had so little skill in antiquity as to think that the history of Moses was, as to many passages of it, taken out of Heathen fables, insists on this very story of Ophioneus as the groundwork of that relation in Genesis concerning the fall. But Origen well answers him, ὅρα ἂν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν, ὡς σφαλλομένοις ἀσεβέστατα, καὶ ἀποπεπλανημένοις θείων αἰνιγμάτων, αὐτὸς σαφῶς σφάλλεται; μὴ κατανοήσας ὅτι τὰ πολλῷ ἐ μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου ἀρχαιότερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γράμματα εἰσήγαγε τὸν περὶ τῆ πονηρᾶ αὐτῆ ϗ ἐκπεσόντος τῶν οὐρανίων λόγον. *See therefore if this rare antiquary, who chargeth us with impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen fables, be not himself more justly chargeable with the same fault, not understanding the far greater antiquity of the writings of Moses, than either of Heraclitus, or Pherecydes, or Homer himself, which reports the story of that evil one which fell from heaven,* ὁ γὰρ ὄφις (παρ' ὃν παρὰ τῷ Φερεκύδῃ γέγονεν Ὀφιονεὺς) αἴτιος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐκβληθῆναι τοῦ θείου παραδείσου τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τοιαῦτά τινα αἰνίσσεται, ἐπαγγελίᾳ θεότητος καὶ μειζόνων ἀπατήσας τὸ θηλύτερον γένος· ᾧ συνηκολουθηκέναι λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ· *For the serpent, (from which Ophioneus in Pherecydes derived his name,) which was the cause why man was cast forth of Paradise, doth intimate some such thing, while under a pretence of divinity, and of a better condition, he first deceived the woman, and by her means the man.* Cælius Rodiginus calls this Ophioneus *Dæmonicum serpentem, qui antesignanus fuerit agminis a Divinæ mentis placito deficientis.* This Pherecydes, as appears by Eusebius, had much converse with the Phœnicians; where he purposely speaks concerning this Ophioneus. Now the Phœnicians, as Eusebius likewise tells us, worshipped their God under the form of a serpent; which probably might be occasioned by the Devil's ambition and tyranny over men, that would be worshipped among them in that very form wherein he had done so much mischief to the world. It was very early in the world when the Phœnicians and Egyptians did begin to adore their gods under the form of serpents; for the beginning of it is attributed to Taautus by Eusebius, τὴν μὲν ὖν τῆ Δράκοντος φύσιν ϗ τῶν ὄφεων αὐτὸς ἐξεθείασεν ὁ Τάαυτος, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοίνικές τε καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι. Neither was this only among the Phœnicians and Egyptians; but wherever the Devil reigned, the serpent was had in some peculiar veneration: thence Justin Martyr saith, παρὰ παντὶ νομιζομένων παρ' ὑμῖν θεῶν, ὄφις ὀύμβολον μέγα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται. *The serpent was*

Orig. cont. Celsum, l. vi. p. 304. Ed. Spenc.

Cæl. Rhodig. Antiq. Lect. l. ii. c. 7.

Euseb. de Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 10.

Just. Mart. Apolog. i. c. 27. Ed. Par.

the symbol of adoration among them; and was the proper *indicium*, or note of a consecrated place, as is evident by that of Persius. CHAP. III.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, sacer est locus. Pers. Satyr. i. v. 113.

Thence the scholiast on Aristophanes, on that place in Plutus, ἐξηξάτην ἓν δύο δράκοντ' ἐκ τοῦ νεώ, observes, κοινῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἥρωσι δράκοντες παρετίθεντο, so that wherever any God or hero was to be worshipped, there were serpents painted to denote so much. So Orus Apollo saith of the Egyptians, ἔθος ἐστὶν ἑλληνιστὶ βασίλισκον χρυσοῦν περιτιθέσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, *they were wont to put the form of a golden basilisk to their gods.* Heinsius conceives that the first worship of Apollo at Delphi was under the form of a serpent; whither Nonnus tells us that Cadmus the Phœnician went upon his first coming into Bæotia; and from hence he derives the name Pytho, from the Hebrew פתן, which signifies a serpent. *Ut non dubitandum sit,* saith he, *quin Pythius Apollo, hoc est, spurcus ille spiritus, quem Hebræi Ob et Abaddon, Hellenistæ ad verbum* Ἀπολλύωνα, *cæteri* Ἀπόλλωνα *dixerunt, sub hac forma qua miseriam humano olim generi invexit, primo cultus sit in Græcia.* And which is further observable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the world think that the knowledge of good and evil was to come by the serpent still. Thence the famous oracle of Apollo here at Delphi; thence came the use of serpents so much in divination; thence נחש signifies to divine, from נחש, a serpent; and so among the Greeks οἰωνίζεσθαι is taken in the same sense, from οἰωνὸς, a serpent. So that excellent glossographer, Hesychius; οἰωνὸς, ὄφις· ἐπεικῶς γὰρ λέγεται εἰς τὰς μαντείας τοὺς ὄφεις ἔχειν, ἃς καὶ οἰωνοὺς ἔλεγον. The serpent was reckoned among the *pedestria auspicia* by the Romans; and Homer tells, in that solemn divination concerning the Greeks' success at Troy, there appears, Heins. Aristarch. p. 19. Ed. 1627.

Δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δαφοινός. Iliad. β'. v. 308.

Which, saith Heinsius, is an exact description of the Nachas; whom they would have so called from the marks on his back, which they accurately observed in divination. Thus we see how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the world under that form, wherein he had deceived mankind into so much folly and misery.

3. We meet with some remainders of man's being cast out of Paradise, upon his fall, among the Heathens. Origen thinks that Plato, by his converse with the Jews in Egypt, Orig. cont. Cels. l. iv. p. 189. Ed. Spenc.

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did understand the history of the fall of man; which he, after his way, enigmatically describes in his *Symposiacs*. Where he brings in Porus, *the God of Plenty, feasting with the rest of the gods; after supper Penia comes a begging to the door; Porus being drunk with nectar, goes into Jupiter's garden, and there falls asleep; Penia observing it, steals to him, and by this deceit conceived by him.* In this fable of Plato, Origen takes notice what a near resemblance the garden of Jupiter hath to Paradise, Penia to the serpent which circumvented Adam, and Porus to man, who was deceived by the serpent. Which he conceives more probable, because of Plato's custom, τὰ μεγάλα ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενα δόγματα κρύψαι μὲν διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ τοῦ μύθου σχήματι, *to wrap up those excellent things he knew under some fables, because of the vulgar;* for which he after speaks of his custom in altering and disguising what he had from the Jews, lest he should too much displease the fabulous Greeks, if he should adhere too close to the Jews, who were so infamous among them. Some have thought the story of Paradise was preserved among the Heathens in the fable of the gardens of Adonis, which comes near that of Eden; but what footsteps may be gathered of the truth of Scripture-history in the Heathen mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may serve to have manifested the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of evil by the fall of man, to be in itself rational, and attested by the consent of such persons, who cannot be suspected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

XX. We come now to consider the other grand difficulty which concerns the origin of evil, and the truth of Divine Providence together: which is, that if sin be the cause of misery, and there be a God which governs the world, *whence comes it to pass that the worst of men do so frequently escape sufferings, and the best do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all ages of the world, where men have been philosophical and inquisitive, one of the great enquiries which the minds of men have been perplexed about. The true and full resolution of which question depends much upon those grounds and principles which are discovered to us by Divine revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of God's patience towards wicked men; the nature and end of sufferings which good men are exercised with. And certainly this should very much commend the Scriptures to all sober and inquisitive persons, that they contain in them the

most clear and certain grounds of satisfaction to the minds of men, in such things wherein they are otherwise so irresolved. But of that afterwards. Our present business is to give an account of this difficulty from natural reason; which will be most satisfactorily done by the producing those grounds from which they have resolved this question, *Cur malis bene, et bonis male*, who either have not had, or at least owned any thing of Divine revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the prosperity and impunity of wicked men, which men have with more confidence insisted on, on this account, because all men could not but understand a general reason of sufferings, by reason there were none whose consciences could wholly acquit them of evil actions; but why persons notoriously wicked should live in impunity, when others suffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretence of atheism; as Simplicius tells us, συμβαίνει δέ τινας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀναποδείκτως πιστεύειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσυχοῦντας, ποτὲ δὲ κακοὺς ἐν εὐπραγίαις εὑρισκομένους, ὀλιγωρεῖν ὧν ἔχουσι προλήψεων, καὶ χώραν διδόναι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λέγειν, Simplic. Comment. in Epictet. c. 38. p. 223.

Τολμῶ κατειπεῖν μήποτ' οὐκ εἰσὶν Θεοὶ,
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντες ἐπιπλήττουσί με.

It comes to pass, that such who have no grounded belief of a Deity, when they observe the miseries of good men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad men, they regard not the common notions they have of a Deity, and are ready to cry out with the tragedian,

Shall I not dare to say there are no Gods,
When those do prosper who have injur'd me?

And it is observable, that the most of those who have taken occasion amongst the Heathens to question Providence, have done it upon some remarkable injury which they have conceived to be done to themselves; and so we have ground to think that it was more passion and interest, than any clear reason, which was the inducement to it. So Diagoras resolves to set up for an Atheist, because the perjured person was not struck dead in the place.

And Jason in Seneca, when he sees Medea fly away after killing his children, cries out,

Testare nullos esse qua vehris Deos. * Med. v. ult.

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Thou tell'st the world there are no Gods that way
Where thou dost fly.

And so Claudian, who largely reasons the case on both sides, for Providence and against it, at last tells us what it was which was the main cause of his doubts, viz. the long impunity of Rufinus.

In Rufin. v. 20.

Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Absolvitque Deos.

Rufinus' death doth clear the Gods, and set
My mind at ease.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. iii.

But because some carry it higher, as Cotta in Tully, who reasons the most (as became a statesman) in reference to such persons who had been useful or hurtful to the commonwealths, we may suppose there might be somewhat more of reason than interest in such argumentations; and yet even in those discourses we may still find, that the main original of this quarrel against Providence was an over-high esteem of themselves; that they thought they deserved better from the Gods than to receive such injuries, or undergo such calamities. Therefore Cotta cries out on Providence, because such persons who were useful to the Roman commonwealth were destroyed, when the enemies to it escaped; as though Providence had been only a tutelar Deity of Rome, and had nothing to do elsewhere. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two Scipio's destroyed in Spain by the Carthaginians? Why was Maximus killed by Hannibal? Why were the Romans, with Paulus, ruined at Cannæ? Why did Regulus undergo so much cruelty by the Carthaginians? Why did not Africanus die in his own bed? Nay, saith he, to come nearer home, why is my uncle Rutilius in banishment? Why was my friend Drusus killed in his own house? On the other side, why did Marius die in peace, and the most cruel Cinna enjoy so long tranquillity? With many other instances of both sorts. But this is it which I take notice of these for, because we hereby see how common it is for men to question Providence, more out of passion and interest, than out of any solid grounds of reason.

XXI. Let us therefore appeal from persons who were particularly engaged by some private interest in those passages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to such who stood by unconcerned, and made

use of the free dictates of their reason in these cases. And such persons, when they come to reason the case like philosophers, and men out of passion, have given satisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wise providence may sometimes suffer the worst of men to go on in impunity, when good men may go through the troubles of this world. As,

1. *God forbears wicked men, to propound the example of his goodness to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their injuries too greedily on each other.* This Plutarch, in that admirable discourse of his on this subject, insists on, as his first reason, why God doth not presently punish wicked men. For, saith he out of Plato, *God hath set forth himself in the midst of the world for our imitation; and true virtue is nothing else but an imitation of the Divine nature. And therefore God,* saith Plato, *gave man the use of sight, that by the sight of the heavenly bodies, and the exact motions which are in them, men should learn* τὸ εὔσχημον καὶ τεταγμένον, *that which was comely and orderly, and hate all disorderly and irregular motions;* for, as he excellently speaks, Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅ, τι μεῖζον ἄνθρωπος ἀπολαύειν Θεοῦ πέφυκεν, ἢ τὸ μιμήσει, καὶ διώξει τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν εἰς ἀρετὴν καθίσασθαι, *There is no greater benefit man can receive from God, than to attain true virtue by the imitation and pursuit of those perfections which are in him.* And thence, saith Plutarch, God forbears to punish wicked men presently, not lest, if he should punish them, he might do that he would repent of afterwards; ἀλλ' ἡμῶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες καὶ λάβρον ἀφαιρῶν, *but that he might take away the fury and violence of men in revenging their injuries on each other,* that they should not do it in wrath and anger, with as much eagerness as they satisfy their hunger and thirst, whereby they do, ἐπιπηδᾶν τοῖς λελυπηκόσιν, *leap upon them who have injured them,* with as much fury as a wild beast upon his prey; but men should learn to imitate τὴν ἐκείνου πραότητα καὶ μέλλησιν, *God's gentleness and patience,* whereby he gives the offender time to consider with himself what he hath done before he doth severely punish him. As Plato, when his boy had angered him, stood still awhile without striking him, τὸν θυμὸν κολάζων, as he said, *punishing himself first for his anger,* before he would chastise the boy for his fault; and Archytas, when he saw how negligent his workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, εὐτυχεῖτε ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν, *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now, saith Plutarch, if

Plutarch. de his qui sero puniuntur a numine, tom. ii. p. 550. Ed. Fr.

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the consideration of this forbearance in men should tend to moderate men's heat and violence, how much more should the consideration of the lenity and patience of God do it! καὶ θεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι μόριον ἀρετῆς τὴν πραότητα καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπάθειαν; *and to account gentleness and forbearance to be an imitation of Divine perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our apprehensions of a Divine nature than this is, that he should shew his goodness to all, and, by his forbearance of so many, teach the world more meekness and gentleness towards each other? For if offences rise by the quality of the person against whom they are committed, no injuries can be so great in one man to another, as those affronts are which men put upon God by their continual provocations of him: and if God then be of so infinite patience to forbear such who have offended him, what justice and reason is there, but that men should express more lenity and patience towards each other? So Hierocles excellently speaks, μιμεῖται καὶ ἐν τοῖς φιλίας μέτροις τὸν Θεὸν, ὃς μισεῖ μὲν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, τὸ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀγαθὸν κοινῷ τῷ γένει προτείνων, *A good man imitates God in the measures of friendship, who hates no man, and extends his loving-kindness to all mankind.* Of which Seneca likewise somewhere speaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effusa benignitate sacrilegi negligentesque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura sua, et cuncta, interque illa ipsos munerum suorum malos interpretes, juvant. The Divine benignity extends itself to all; even to such as affront and dishonour them, and abuse the gifts they bestow upon them.* And since there is so much truth and reason in that of Plato, τέλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ ὁμοιωθῆναι Θεῷ, *it is the height of goodness to be like to God;* we see what excellent reason there is for that command of our Saviour, *Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.*

Sen. de Beneficiis, l. i. c. 1.

Luke vi. 35, 36.

2. *God forbears presently to punish wicked men, to give them time to become better.* This the same excellent moralist gives as another account of God's patience; that thereby he gives them χρόνον πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, *a space to repent in,* as the Scripture calls it. *For men,* saith Plutarch, *in their punishments look at nothing further than mere satisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them pursue those that have offended them with so much rage and eagerness; but God,* saith he, *aims at the cure of*

Plutarch. p. 551.

Rev. ii. 21.

those who are not utterly incurable; to such he gives μεταβαλέσθαι χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of such who were bad at first, and came afterwards to be changed from what they were; for which he instances in Cecrops, who was thence called Διφυὴς, because, from a cruel severe prince, he became gentle and mild; and so Gelon and Hieron of Sicily, and Pisistratus the son of Hippocrates, who, from being usurpers, became excellent princes. If Miltiades, saith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a tyrant, and Cimon in his incest, or Themistocles in his debaucheries, what had become of Marathon, Eurymedon, Dianium, by which the Athenians got so great glory and liberty? And, as he well observes, Οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις μικρὸν ἐκφέρουσιν, *great spirits do nothing mean;* Οὐδὲ ἀργεῖ δι' ὀξύτητα τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ δραστήριον, ἀλλ' ἐν σάλῳ διαφέρονται, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μόνιμον καὶ καθεκτικὸς ἦθος ἐλθεῖν, *That sharp and active spirit that is in them can never lie at rest by reason of its vigour, but they are tossed up and down, as it were in a tempest, till they come to a settled composed life.* But as the multitude of weeds argues the richness and softness of the ground, though for the sake of those weeds one not skilled in husbandry would not account such ground worth looking after, so, saith he, ἄτοπα πολλὰ καὶ φαῦλα προεξανθοῦσιν αἱ μεγάλαι φύσεις, *great spirits usually bring forth no commendable fruits at first; which we considering the danger and hurtfulness of, are presently for cutting them down: but one that more wisely considers the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leisure, till reason and age begin to master these headstrong passions.* And therefore, according to the prudent law of the Egyptians, *the woman with child must be reprieved till the time of her delivery.*

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Id. p. 552.

3. *God spares some wicked men from punishment, to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others.* Ἐνίοις γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ κολαστὰς ἑτέρων πονηρῶν, ἅτε ἐπιμοκοίνοις, ἀπεχρήσατο τὸ δαιμόνιον, as Plutarch goes on, *God spares some from punishment, that by them he might punish others.* Which he supposeth to be the case of all tyrants: and thereby Cotta's difficulty concerning Marius, Cinna, Sylla, and those other cruel and tyrannical persons who usurped authority among them, is clearly taken off: for Divine Providence might let those trees grow, from whence he intended to take his rods to scourge others withal. God makes the same use of tyrants (saith Plutarch) to commonwealths, that physicians do of the gall

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of a hyæna and other hurtful creatures; which may be good for curing some dangerous diseases; so may the tyrannical severity and sharpness of such persons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀπαλλάξαι καὶ καθάραι, *till the diseases of the political body be cured by these sharp medicines.* Such a one was Phalaris to the Agrigentines, and Marius to the Romans; and the Oracle told the Sicyonians in express terms, μαστιγονόμων δεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν, *the city wanted some severe discipline.* Thence Totilas, when he found what strange success he had in his enterprizes, called himself *Flagellum Dei*, and thought God raised him up on purpose to be a scourge for the sins of the world. And no doubt those strange passages of the Roman commonwealth, (which made Cato at least dispute Providence, and say, *Res divinas multum habere caliginis*, when he saw Pompey successful as long as he served his ambition, but presently overthrown when he stood for the commonwealth;) these things, I say, had a higher end than they looked at, which was to make both Pompey and Cæsar the instruments of Divine justice to punish the Romans for their lusts, ambition, and cruelty; which were never greater than in that age. Now then, if God must justly punish offenders, why may he not spare some to make them his instruments in the punishing of others: especially since, after he hath used his rods, he may cast them into the fire too? As was evident in the instance of Cæsar, who, after all his slaughters and triumphs, was murdered in the senate, and that by some who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine justice, both as to the punishment of the persons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in a multitude of instances; which every one's reading may afford him.

Id. p. 553.

4. Therefore another account why God may spare wicked men a while, is, *that Divine Providence might more remarkably be observed in the manner of their punishment afterwards.* Plutarch tells us of Callippus, who was stabbed by his enemies with the same dagger with which he had killed Dion under a pretence of friendship. And when Mitius, the Argive, was killed in a tumult afterwards, upon the day of a solemn shew, a brass statue in the market-place fell upon his murderer, and killed him there. But most remarkable is the story of Bessus, recorded by the same author, who having killed his father, and a long time concealed it, goes one night to supper to some friends; and while he was there, thrusts up his spear into a swallow's nest, and pulls it down, and

kills the young ones. His friends asking him the reason of so strange an action, Οὐ γὰρ (ἔφη) μοῦ πάλαι καταμαρτυροῦσιν αὗται ψευδῶς καὶ καταβοῶσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτονότος τὸν πατέρα, *Do not you hear, saith he, how they falsely accuse me, and cry out that I have killed my father?* Which being by the persons present carried to the king, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such strange ways doth Providence sometimes use to shew how vigilant it is, even when we think it sleeps the most! CHAP. III.

5. *Though God spares the persons of wicked men, he doth not defer their punishment*, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greatest torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna est, peccasse*, as Seneca speaks; sin bears its own punishment along with it. Wickedness is δεινή τις βίᾳ δημιουργὸς οἰκτρᾷ, *the most exquisite contriver of misery*, which fills the minds of those who commit it with continual consternations, anxieties, and perplexities of mind. But as that often and deservedly cited author on this subject, Plutarch, tells us, most men are in this like children, who when they behold malefactors in the theatres in their cloth of gold and purple robes, with their crowns on their heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagine them to be most happy men, till they see them lashed and beaten, and fire come out from their brave apparel; so, saith he, as long as men see others in their pomp and grandeur, they think them very far from punishment, till they behold their execution; which, adds he, is not so much the entrance of their punishment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their lives is, the longer is the time of their punishment here; Οὐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι. *They are not punished when they grow old, but are grown old in punishments.* Cannot we say a person is punished while he is in prison, and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk poison, is a dying while he walks about, till the cold comes to his heart and kills him? *If we deny*, saith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors, and anxieties of mind, which wicked men have, are no part of their punishment, we may as well say that a fish which hath swallowed the hook is not taken, because he is not fried, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked man; he hath swallowed the hook when he hath committed an evil action, (τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδοκε,) and this conscience within him, as he expresseth it,

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Θύννος βολαῖος πέλαγος ὡς διαῤῥοῒ·

Which in the prophet's expression is, *The wicked are like a troubled sea, which casts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As Apollodorus dreamt that he was flayed and boiled by the Scythians, and that his heart spake to him out of the cauldron, Ἐγώ σοι τούτων αἰτία, *I am the cause of all this.* God deals by wicked men, as Caligula was wont to say of those he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut sentiant se mori,* he so punishes them, as to make them sensible of their punishments. And as Tacitus speaks of cruel and wicked persons, *quorum mentes si recludantur, possint aspici laniatus et ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedness is the only fury which continually haunts and lashes those who delight in it, and leaves still behind it αἰσχρὰ καὶ φοβερὰ πάθη, *loathsome and terrible perturbations,* secret gripings of conscience, and self-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedness; like Lysimachus, who for extreme thirst offered his kingdom to the Getæ to quench it, which when he had done, φεῦ τῆς ἐμῆς κακίας, ὃς δι' ἡδονὴν ὅτω βραχείαν, ἐξέρημαι βασιλείας τηλικαύτης, *What a wretch was I* (saith he) *to lose such a kingdom for so short a pleasure!* And though wicked men be not sensible of the loss of a far more glorious kingdom than this of Lysimachus, viz. that of heaven, yet they cannot but be sensible how much they have lost that kingdom which every good man hath in the tranquillity of his spirit, and the command of his passions.

Ibid. p. 554. Isa. lvii. 21.

6. *The time that God spares wicked men, is not so long as we think for.* It is all one, as Plutarch saith, as if we should complain, that the malefactor was punished in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compared with his own duration. We measure God by the short hour-glass of our time, when we are so ready to confine him to our measures. The time seems long to us, but it is as nothing in itself: ἐπὶ τοῖς τε θεοῖς ὧν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου διάστημα, τὸ μηδὲν ἐστι, *The whole life of man, compared with eternity, is nothing.* Besides, all this time God suffers wicked men to live here; he hath them under safe custody; he doth but let them take the air within the prison-wall; or it may be they may play and sport themselves there, but there is no possibility of escaping out of the hands of Divine justice.

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7. *God forbears wicked men here, because the time is to come wherein God intends to punish them.* This is the highest vindication of Divine Providence, as to the present impunity of wicked men in the world, because this is not the proper season for the open execution of justice. There are but few in comparison, whom justice causeth to be executed in the prison, of what are reserved for the general assizes; God reserves them for a fair and open trial, for the greater vindication of his honour, and manifestation of his justice to the world. And although God's judgments, even in this world, be sometimes so remarkable that we cannot but see a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth so remarkably punish here, to make us more firmly believe a day of judgment to come. Which, though it be most clearly and fully revealed in Scripture, yet the Heathens themselves, from mere reason, have had such a persuasion of it, that they have given this as another great reason why God did forbear to punish wicked men here, because he did reserve them for future punishment. For, as the same moralist speaks in the same discourse concerning the soul, Ἀγωνίζεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴς κατὰ τὸν βίον, ὅταν δὲ διαγωνίσηται τότε τυγχάνει τῶν προσηκόντων. *This present life is the place of the soul's combat, which when it hath finished, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before speaks, Εἰς ἐστι λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον. *The same reason which confirms Providence, doth likewise confirm the immortality of the soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* Οὔσῃ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ τὴν τελευτὴν, μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἐστι καὶ τιμὰς ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ τιμωρίας. *And if the soul doth subsist after death, it stands to the greatest reason that it should there receive either reward or punishment.* Thus we see how far natural light and moral reason will carry men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the present impunity of wicked men.

Plutarch. p. 561. &c. xviii. Ed. Oxon.

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The other part, which concerns the *sufferings of good men*, is not of so great difficulty, because there are none so good as not to have a mixture of evil in them; and as they have a mixture of evil, so they have but a mixture of punishment; none lying under so great miseries here, but withal they have some share in the comforts of this life. And therefore it is less wonder that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the sufferings of men,

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hath not wanted some among the Heathen moralists, who have made it their design to vindicate it; which, setting aside what Simplicius on Epictetus and many others have done, is fully performed by Seneca, in his tract on this subject, *Cur bonis male sit, cum sit Providentia*, (as Muretus restores the title of that book;) wherein these following accounts are given of it.

1. *God brings them up as his children, under sharp discipline, for their future benefit.* A good man, in Seneca's language, is, *Discipulus Dei, æmulatorque, et vera progenies;* which in the language of the Scripture is, *one taught of God, and a follower of God, and one born of him.* Now, saith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, sicut severi patres, durius educat. God, who is the great Father of good men, keeps them under discipline while under age, and by hardship fits them for the practice of virtue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of fathers and mothers to their children: the father he hastens them to school, suffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and sometimes cry; the mother she is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adversus bonos animum, et illos fortiter amat. God bears the indulgence of a father towards his children, and loves them with greater severity.*

Senec. de Provid. c. 1.

Ibid. c. 2.

2. *Good men receive benefit by their sufferings; Quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit,* saith Seneca of a good man; which in the language of the Apostle is, *Every thing works together for his good. The sea loseth nothing,* saith he, *of its saltness, by the rivers running into it; neither doth a good man by the current of his sufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exercise and trial of his virtue and patience is most discernible. *Marcet sine adversario virtus;* as soon as Carthage was destroyed, Rome fell to luxury. *True wrestlers desire to have some to try their strength upon them; Cui non industrio otium pœna est?* An active spirit hates idleness and cowardice; for, *etiamsi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, though his legs be cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to God's honour, when good men bear up under sufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compositus.* It is a spectacle God delights to see, a good man combat with calamities. God doth, in Seneca's phrase, *quosdam fastidio transire,* pass them

by in a slight. *An old wrestler scorns to contend with a coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up presently. *Calamitates sub jugum mittere proprium magni viri est.* It argues a noble spirit to be able to subdue miseries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increase of their strength.* Seneca highly extols that speech of the philosopher Demetrius, *Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adversi; non licuit enim illi se experiri.* He is the most unhappy man who never knew what misery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he saith, to pass one's life way *sine morsu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverse of nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis spectatur qui saucius redit.* Though he that comes home sound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded person hath the more pity, and is most cried up for his valour. The pilot is seen in a tempest, a soldier in the battle, and a good man in sufferings. God doth by such as masters do by scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior spes est;* who set the best wits the hardest tasks.

5. *God exerciseth good men with sufferings, to discover the indifferency of those things which men value so much in the world, when he denies them to good men.* Blindness would be hateful, if none were blind but such whose eyes were put out; and therefore Appius and Metellus were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worst as well as the best have them. *Nullo modo magis potest Deus concupita traducere, quam si illa ad turpissimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* God could not traduce or defame those things more which men desire so much, than by taking them away from the best of men, and giving them to the worst.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and constancy:* for, as Seneca concludes, *Nati sunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to these things we add what the word of God discovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that glory which shall be revealed, in comparison with *which exceeding weight of glory, these light and momentary afflictions are not at all to be valued;* then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence as to the sufferings of good men, as well as to the impunity of such as are wicked. But however, from hence we see how far the

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mere light of reason hath carried men in resolving these difficulties concerning God's providence in the world, and what a rational account may be given of them, supposing evil of punishment to arise from sin, and that there is a God in the world, who is ready to punish the wicked, and to reward the good: which was the thing to be shewed.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind derived from* Adam, *if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary Supposition an Introduction to Atheism.* III. *The Truth of the History of the Flood. The Possibility of an universal Deluge proved.* IV. *The Flood universal as to Mankind, whether universal as to the Earth and Animals; no Necessity of asserting either.* V. *Yet supposing the Possibility of it demonstrated without Creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The Proportion which the Height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth No Mountains much above three Miles perpendicular. Of the Origin of Fountains. The Opinion of* Aristotle *and others concerning it discussed. The true Account of them from the Vapours arising from the Mass of subterraneous Waters.* VII. *Of the Capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from* Bateo *and others.* VIII. *The Truth of the Deluge from the Testimony of* Heathen *Nations. Of the Propagation of Nations from* Noah's *Posterity.* IX. *Of the Beginning of the* Assyrian *Empire. The Multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the Time between the Flood and* Abraham, *and the Advantages of it.* X. *Of the Pretence of such Nations, who called themselves* Aborigines. XI. *A Discourse concerning the first Planters of* Greece: *the common Opinion propounded and rejected. The* Hellens *were not the first Inhabitants of* Greece, *but the* Pelasgi. *The large Spread of them over the Parts of* Greece. XII. *Of their Language different from the* Greeks. XIII. *Whence these* Pelasgi *came; that* Phaleg *was the* Pelasgus *of* Greece, *and the Leader of that Colony, proved from* Epiphanius. XIV. *The Language of the* Pelasgi *in* Greece *Oriental: thence an Account given of the many* Hebrew *Words in the* Greek *Language, and the Remainders of the* Eastern *Languages in the Islands of* Greece; *both which not from the* Phœnicians, *as* Bochartus *thinks, but from the old* Pelasgi. XV. *Of the Ground of the Affinity between the* Jews *and* Lacedæmonians. *Of the peopling of* America.

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the history of the first ages of the world contained in Scripture, is the peopling the world from Adam; which is of great consequence for us to understand, not only for the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the true origin of nations, but also in order to our believing the truth of the CHAP. IV.

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Scriptures, and the universal effects of the fall of man: neither of which can be sufficiently cleared without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of man's fall should extend to all mankind, unless all mankind were propagated from Adam; so it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture should be true, if there were persons existent in the world long before Adam was; since the Scripture doth so plainly affirm, *That God hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on the face of the earth.* Some Greek copies read it ἐξ ἑνὸς, leaving out αἵματος, which the vulgar Latin follows: the Arabic version, to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or, as De Dieu renders it, *ex Adamo uno*; there being but the difference of one letter in the Eastern languages between דמם and אדם, the one denoting blood, and the other man. But if we take it as our more ordinary copies read it, ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, yet thereby it is plain that the meaning is not that all mankind was made of the same uniform matter, as the author of the Præ-Adamites weakly imagined, (for by that reason not only mankind, but the whole world might be said to be ἐξ ἑνὸς αἵματος, of the same blood, since all things in the world were at first formed out of the same matter;) but αἷμα is taken there in the sense in which it occurs in the best Greek authors, for the stock out of which men come: so Homer,

Acts xvii. 26.

Hom. Odyss. ω. v. 300.

Εἰ ἐτεόν γ' ἐμὸς ἐσσὶ καὶ αἵματος ἠμετέροιο.

Thence those who are near relations are called in Sophocles οἱ πρὸς αἵματος, thence the name of consanguinity for nearness of relation; and Virgil useth *sanguis* in the same sense,

Virg. Æn. l. i. v. 23.

Trojano a sanguine duci.

So that the Apostle's meaning is, that however men now are so dispersed in their habitations, and differ so much in language and customs from each other, yet they were all originally of the same stock, and did derive their succession from that first man whom God created. Neither can it be conceived on what account Adam in the Scripture is called the first man, and that *he was made a living soul, and of the earth, earthy*, unless it were to denote that he was absolutely the first of his kind, and so was to be the standard and measure of all that follows. And when our Saviour would reduce all things to the beginning, he instanceth in those words which were pronounced after Eve was formed. *But from the beginning of the*

1 Cor. xv. 45 47.

Mark x. 6, 7.

creation God made them male and female; for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and cleave unto his wife. Now nothing can be more plain and easy than from hence to argue thus: those of whom these words were spoken, were the first male and female which were made in the beginning of the creation; but it is evident these words were spoken of Adam and Eve: *And Adam said, This is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh; therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife.* If the Scriptures then of the New Testament be true, it is most plain and evident that all mankind is descended from Adam; and no less conspicuous is it from the history of the creation, as delivered by Moses. CHAP. IV. Gen. ii. 23, 24.

For how necessary had it been for Moses, when he was giving an account of the origin of things, to have discovered by whom the world was first planted, if there had been any such plantation before Adam. But to say that all the design of Moses was only to give an account of the origin and history of the Jewish nation, and that Adam was only the first of that stock, is manifestly ridiculous; it being so clear, that not only from Adam and Noah, but from Sem, Abraham, and Isaac, came other nations besides that of Jews. And by the same reason that it is said that Moses only speaks of the origin of the Jewish nation in the history of Adam, it may as well be said that Moses speaks only of the making of Canaan, and that part of the heavens which are over it, when he describes the creation of the world in the six days work. For why may not the earth, in the second verse of Genesis, be as well understood of the land of Judea, and the light and production of animals and vegetables refer only to that, as to understand it so in reference to the flood, and in many other passages relating to those eldest times? But the author of that hypothesis answers, *That the first chapter of Genesis may relate to the true origin of the world, and the first peopling of it; but in the second Moses begins to give an account of the first man and woman of the Jewish nation.* Very probable! But if this be not a putting asunder those which God hath joined together, nothing is. For doth not Moses plainly at first give an account of the formation of things in the first six days, and of his rest on the seventh? But how could he be said to have rested then from the works of creation, if after this followed the formation of Adam and Eve in the second chapter? Besides, if the forming of man, mentioned Gen.

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ii. 7. be distinct from that mentioned Gen. i. 27. then by all parity of reason, תולדות השמים והארץ, the *generations* of *heaven and earth* mentioned Gen. ii. 4. must be distinct from the *creation of the heaven and earth* mentioned Gen. i. 1. And so if there were another creation of heaven and earth belonging to the Jews in Gen. ii. we may likewise believe that there was a new creation of man and woman in that chapter, distinct from that mentioned in the former. Again further, if there had been any such persons in the world before Adam, no doubt Adam himself was ignorant of them; or else it had been a false and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his wife

Gen. iii. 20. חוה, *because she was* אם כל חי, *the mother of all living*; not of all living things, for that had been a more proper description of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our grandmother the earth; but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living creatures that are of human nature came from her. So the Chaldee paraphrast understands it: she was called Hava, because she was אמא דכל בני אנשא, *the mother of all the sons of men*. And so the Arabic version, *quia ipsa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis*. To which purpose our learned Selden cites the version of the Mauritanian Jews, and the Persic of Tawasius.

Selden. de jure Natur. et Gent. l. i. c. 5. p. 65.

But whatever the credit or authority of these versions be, this is most certain, that Adam had no reason at all to have given this name to his wife, as being *the mother of all living*, if there had been any of mankind existing in the world from other mothers, which had been long before Eve was formed. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the hypothesis of Præ-Adamites is undoubtedly false. And certainly, whoever seriously considers the frequent reflections on the authority of the Scriptures, which were cast by the author of that fiction, and his endeavouring on all occasions to derogate from the miracles recorded in it, may easily suspect the design of that author was not to gain any credit to his opinion from those arguments from Scripture which he makes shew of, (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous,) but having, by the help of such arguments, made his opinion more plausible, his hope was, that his opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themselves, when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the world was unsatisfactory, since there were men before Adam; which the Scriptures, to please the Jewish na-

tion, take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to prostitute the Scriptures to his opinion, his next work had been to have turned them out of doors, as not of credit to be relied on by any, when they were so common to every opinion. But how impious, absurd, and rude that attempt was upon the sacred and inviolable authority of the Scriptures, hath been so fully discovered by his very many not unlearned adversaries, that it might seem needless so much as to have taken notice of so weakly grounded and infirmly proved an opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way, in order to the clearing the true origin of nations according to the Scriptures: the main foundations of which fabulous opinion lying chiefly in the pretended antiquities of the Chaldæans, Egyptians, and others, have been fully taken away in our first book; where our whole design was to manifest the want of credibility in those accounts of ancient times, which are delivered by Heathen nations in opposition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture, from the creation of Adam to the flood, which seems to give any countenance to that figment, but only what may be easily resolved, from the consideration of the great conciseness of the Mosaic history, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the fall of Adam and the flood; by means of which conciseness such things are reported as speedily done, because immediately succeeding in the story, which asked a very considerable time before they could be effected; and besides, all things which were done before the flood being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous posterity of Adam being then destroyed, (only Noah and his family excepted,) to what purpose had it been any further to have reported the passages before the flood, otherwise than thereby to let us understand the certainty of the succession of persons from Adam, and such actions in those times, which might be remarkable discoveries of God's providence and man's wickedness in it: which being most apparent at first in Cain and his posterity, did by degrees so spread itself over the face of the then inhabited world, that the just God was thereby provoked to send a deluge among them, to sweep away the present inhabitants, to make room for another generation to succeed them.

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III. This therefore we now come to consider, viz. *The history of the flood*, and the certainty of the propagation of the world, from the posterity of Noah after the flood. I begin with the history of the flood itself; as to which

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two things will be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to reason.* 2. *If we have sufficient evidence of the truth of it, from such who yet have not believed the Scriptures.* There are only two things which seem questionable to reason concerning the flood. The first is *concerning the possibility of the flood itself;* the other is *concerning the capacity of the ark for preserving all kinds of animals.* The only ground of questioning the possibility of such a flood as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence: that some have supposed it impossible that all the water which is contained in the air, supposing it to fall down, should raise the surface of water upon the earth a foot and a half in height; so that either new waters must be created to overflow the earth, or else there must be supposed a rarefaction of the water contained in the sea and all rivers; so that it must take up at least fifteen times the space that now it doth: but then, they say, if the water had been thus rarefied, it could neither have destroyed man nor beast, neither could Noah's ark have been borne up by it, any more than by liquid air. To this therefore I answer,

First, I cannot see any urgent necessity from the Scripture to assert, that the flood did spread itself over all the surface of the earth. That all mankind (those in the ark excepted) were destroyed by it, is most certain, according to the Scriptures. When the occasion of the flood is thus
Gen. vi. 5, 7. expressed, *And God saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the Lord said, I will destroy man, whom I have created, from the face of the earth.* It could not be then any particular deluge of so small a country as Palestine, which is here expressed, as some have ridiculously imagined; for we find an universal corruption in the earth mentioned as the cause; an universal threatening upon all men for this cause; and afterwards an universal destruction expressed,
Gen. vii. 21. as the effect of this flood. *And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, and every man. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowl of*
Ver. 23. *the heaven; and they were destroyed from the earth, and Noah only remained alive, and they that were with him in the ark.* So then it is evident that the flood was universal as to mankind; but from thence follows no necessity at all of asserting the universality of it as to the globe of the earth, unless it be sufficiently proved that the whole earth

was peopled before the flood; which I despair of ever seeing proved. And what reason can there be to extend the flood beyond the occasion of it, which was the corruption of mankind? And it seems very strange, that in so short an interval, in comparison, as that was from Adam to the flood, according to the ordinary computation, viz. 1656 years, and not much above two thousand, according to the largest, the world should then be fully peopled, when in so much longer a space of time, since the flood to this day, the earth is capable of receiving far more inhabitants than now it hath. The only probability then left for asserting the universality of the flood, as to the globe of the earth, is from the destruction of all living creatures, together with man. Now though men might not have spread themselves over the whole surface of the earth, yet beasts and creeping things might, which were all destroyed with the flood; for it is said, *That all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man.* To what end should there be not only a note of universality added, but such a particular enumeration of the several kinds of beasts, creeping things, and fowls, if they were not all destroyed? To this I answer, I grant, as far as the flood extended, all these were destroyed: but I see no reason to extend the destruction of these beyond that compass and space of earth where men inhabited: because the punishment upon the beasts was occasioned by, and could not but be concomitant with the destruction of mankind; but (the occasion of the deluge being the sin of man, who was punished in the beasts that were destroyed for his sake, as well as in himself) where the occasion was not, as where there were animals, and no men, there seems no necessity of extending the flood thither. But to what end, then, it will be replied, *did God command Noah with so much care to take of all kind of beasts, and birds, and creeping things into the ark with him, if all these living creatures were not destroyed by the flood?* I answer, because all those things were destroyed wherever the flood was. Suppose then the whole continent of Asia was peopled before the flood, which is as much as we may in reason suppose, I say all the living creatures in that continent were all destroyed; or if we may suppose it to have extended over our whole continent of the anciently known world, what reason would there be, that, in the opposite part of the globe, viz. America,

BOOK III. which we suppose to be unpeopled then, all the living creatures should there be destroyed, because men had sinned in this? And would there not, on this supposition, have been a sufficient reason to preserve living creatures in the ark for future propagation, when all other living creatures extant had been in such remote places as would not have been accessible by them in many generations, and those beasts growing wild for want of inhabitants, would not have proved presently serviceable for the use of men after the flood? Which was certainly the main thing looked at in the preservation of them in the ark, that men might have all of them ready for their use after the flood; which could not have been, had not the several kinds been preserved in the ark, although we suppose them not destroyed in all parts of the world.

IV. All this proceeds on supposition that animals were propagated much further in the world than men were, before the flood. Which I confess seems very probable to me on this account; because the production of animals is parallel in Genesis with that of fishes, and both of them different from man. *For God saith, Let the waters bring forth every moving creature that hath life, viz. fish and fowl;* and accordingly it is said, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living creature after their kind, and every fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the production of beasts, we read, *Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind; and it was so.* But in the production of man, it is said, *Let us make man in our own likeness.* From hence I observe this difference between the production of animals and of man; that in the one God gave a prolific power to the earth and waters for production of the several living creatures which came from them; so that the seminal principles of them were contained in the matter out of which they were produced: which was otherwise in man, who was made by a peculiar hand of the great Creator himself, who thence is said to have *formed man of the dust of the ground.* Now therefore although there were but one male and female of mankind at first, which had a special formation by God himself, yet there is no reason we should conceive it to be so as to the production of other living creatures, whether fish, or fowl, or beasts; but the prolific virtue being by God's power given to that material principle out of which they were formed, it may very well be supposed that many of the same kind were at first produced. For

Gen. i. 20, 21.

Ver. 24.

Ver. 26.

Gen. ii. 6.

it seems very strange to imagine, that in the whole ocean there should be only two of a kind produced; but fish and fowl both arising from the water, we may have just reason to think, that the waters, being separated before this prolific virtue was communicated to the whole mass of waters, might in the several parts of the globe of the earth bring forth both fish and fowl after their kinds. The same I say of the production of animals in the sixth day's work, which are ranked into three sorts; cattle, creeping things, and beasts of the earth after their kinds. Now God saying, *Let the earth bring forth her living creatures*, (and that after the waters had divided some parts of the earth from other, so that there could be no passage for the cattle, creeping things, and beasts out of one part into another, without the help of man,) it seems very probable that at least those parts of the earth, which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth these several living creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in those parts, without being brought thither by the help of man. If now this supposition be embraced, by it we presently clear ourselves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of animals in the world, and their conversation in the ark, which many have been so much to seek for satisfaction in: as how the unknown kind of serpents in Brasil, the slow-bellied creature of the Indies, and all those strange species of animals seen in the West Indies, should either come into the ark of Noah, or be conveyed out of it into those countries which are divided from that continent where the flood was, by so vast an ocean on the one side, and at least so large a tract of land on the other, (supposing any passage out of one continent into another, which yet hath not been discovered.) Besides, some kinds of animals cannot live out of that particular clime wherein they are; and there are many sorts of animals discovered in America, and the adjoining islands, which have left no remainders of themselves in these parts of the world. And it seems very strange that these should propagate into those remote parts of the world from the place of the flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in those parts from whence they were propagated. These things at least make that opinion very probable, which extends the production of animals beyond that of mankind in the old world; and that the flood, though it destroyed all mankind, and every living creature within that compass wherein mankind inhabited, yet might not extend itself to those parts, and the animals therein, in which men

BOOK III. had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make so many miracles as some are fain to do about the flood; and all those difficulties, concerning the propagation of animals, do of themselves vanish and fall to the ground. This is the first way of resolving the difficulty concerning the possibility of the flood, by asserting it not to have been over the whole globe of the earth, but only over those parts where mankind inhabited.

V. Secondly, Suppose the flood to have been over the whole globe of the earth, yet there might have been water enough to have overwhelmed it to the height mentioned in Scripture. For which we are to consider that many causes concurred to the making of this deluge: first, the air was condensed into clouds, and those fell down with continued force and violence; not breaking into drops, but all in a body, (which Sir Walter Rawleigh parallels with the spouts of the West Indies,) which are thence called the cataracts or flood-gates of heaven, God loosening (as he expresseth it) the power retentive which was in the clouds, and so the waters must needs fall in abundance, according to the expression of Job, *Behold, he withholdeth the waters, and they dry up; also he sendeth them out, and they overturn the earth.* Now I say, although these waters falling down with so much fury and violence, as well as in so great abundance, might quickly destroy all living creatures, yet this was not all; for God, who held in the ocean within its bounds, whereby he saith to it, *Thus far it shall go, and no further,* might then give it commission to execute his justice upon the sinful world: and to all this we have another cause of the deluge, which was, *That the fountains of the great deep were broken up;* by which Vatablus most probably understands, *Immensam illam et profundam aquarum copiam quæ est subter terram,* that vast body of water which lies in the bowels of the earth. Now when all these fountains were broken up, and the waters within the earth rush out with violence and impetuosity upon it, it must needs cause an inundation so great as that is mentioned in the Scripture. For as that judicious historian, Sir W. Rawleigh, observes, Let us consider that the earth had above 21,000 miles compass, the diameter of the earth, according to that circle, 7000 miles, and then from the superficies to the centre 3500 miles; take then the highest mountain of the world, Caucasus, Taurus, Teneriff, or any other, and I do not find, saith he, that the highest exceeds thirty miles in height. It is not then impossible, answering reason with reason, that all those waters mixed

Sir Walter Rawleigh's History.

Job xii. 15.

Gen. vii. 11.

Sir Walter Rawleigh. Ibid.

within the earth, 3500 miles deep, should be able to cover the space of 30 miles in height, which 30 miles upright being found in the depths of the earth 116 times; for the fountains of the great deep were broken, and the waters drawn out of the bowels of the earth. But then withal, saith he, if we consider the proportion which the earth bears to the air about it, we may easily understand the possibility of the flood, without any new creation of waters: for supposing so much air to be condensed, and so turned into water which doth encompass the earth, it will not seem strange to men of judgment, yea but of ordinary understanding, that the earth (God so pleasing) was covered over with waters, without any new creation. But this will yet appear more probable, if the height of the highest mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the diameter of the earth, than of the 1670th part to the whole, supposing the diameter of the earth to be 8355 miles, as P. Gassendus computes both. And it is more than probable that men have exceedingly mistaken as to the height of mountains, which comes so far short of what Sir Walter Rawleigh allows to them, that the highest mountain in the world will not be found to be five direct miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the plain they stand upon. Olympus, whose height is so extolled by the poets and ancient Greeks, that it is said to exceed the clouds; yet Plutarch tells us that Xenagoras measured it, and found it not to exceed a mile and a half perpendicular, and about 70 paces; much about the same height Pliny saith that Dicæarchus found the mountain Pelion to be. The mount Athos is supposed of extraordinary height, because it casts its shadow into the Isle of Lemnos, which, according to Pliny, was 87 miles; yet Gassendus allows it but two miles in height; but Isaac Vossius, in a learned discourse concerning the height of mountains, in his notes on Pomponius Mela, doth not allow above 10 or 11 furlongs at most to the height of Mount Athos. Caucasus, by Ricciolus, is said to be 51 miles in height: Gassendus allowing it to be higher than Athos or Olympus, yet conceives it not above three or four miles at most; but yet Vossius will not yield it above two miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reason: Polybius affirms, there is no mountain in Greece which may not be ascended in a day's time, and makes the highest mountain there not to exceed 10 furlongs; which, saith Vossius, it is scarce possible for any one to reach, unless he be a mountaineer born; any other

Gassend. tom. ii. Op. Phys. sect. 3. l. i.

Plut. in Æmilian. Plin. l. ii. c. 65.

Voss. in Pomp. Melam, l. v. c. 2. p. 115, &c.

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will scarce be able to ascend above six furlongs perpendicular; for in the ascent of a mountain every pace doth reach but to an hand-breadth perpendicular: but if we do allow eight furlongs to a day's ascent, yet thereby it will appear that the highest mountains in the world are not above 24 furlongs in height, since they may be ascended in three days time: and it is affirmed of the top of Mount Caucasus, that it may be ascended in less than the compass of three days, and therefore cannot be much above two miles in height. Which may be the easier believed of any other mountain, when that which is reputed the highest of the world, viz. the Pike of Teneriff, which the inhabitants call *Pica de Terraria*, may be ascended in that compass of time, viz. three days; for in the months of July and August (which are the only months in which men can ascend it, because all other times of the year snow lies upon it, although neither in the Isle of Teneriff, nor any other of the Canary Islands, there be snow ever seen) the inhabitants then ascend to the top of it in three days time; which top of it is not pyramidal, but plain, from whence they gather some sulphurous stones, which are carried in great quantities into Spain. So that according to the proportion of eight furlongs to a day's journey, this Pike of Teneriff will not exceed the height of a German mile perpendicular, as Varenius confesseth; than which he thinks likewise that no mountain in the world is higher. For what Pliny speaks of the Alps being fifty miles in height, must be understood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the ascent of it; so that he might account so much from the foot of the Alps to the top of them, and yet the Alps, in a perpendicular line, not come near the height of a German mile. If then the highest mountains do not exceed much above three miles in height, (for the Spaniards themselves affirm, that those lofty mountains of Peru, in comparison of which, they say, the Alps are but like cottages, may be ascended in four days compass,) we see from hence, then, far greater probability how the waters in the time of the general flood might overtop the highest mountains.

V. Varenium Geog. General. l. i. c. 10. prop. 3.

VI. Especially if it be made evident that there is so great an abyss of subterraneous waters, that the breaking open of the fountains of it may so much increase the inundation arising from the clouds, and from the breaking in of the ocean upon the main land. And that there is such a mass of waters in the body of the earth, is evident from the origin of fountains; for the opinion of Aristotle im-

puting them to the condensation of air in the caverns of the earth, and that of other philosophers ascribing them to the fall of rain-water received into such cisterns in the earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unsatisfactory, unless we suppose a mass of waters in the bowels of the earth, which may be as the common stock to supply those fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving how mere air should be so far condensed, as to cause not only such a number of fountains, but so great a quantity of water as runs into the sea by those rivers which come from them, (as the river Volga is supposed to empty so much water in a year's time into the Caspian sea, as might suffice to cover the whole earth;) by which likewise it is most evident, that there must be some subterranean passages into the sea, or else of necessity, by that abundance of water which continually runs into it from the rivers, it would overflow and drown the world. And from this multitude of waters which comes from fountains, it is likewise evident, that the origin of fountains cannot be merely from such water which falls from the clouds, which would never suffice to maintain so full and uninterrupted a stream as many fountains have; especially if that be true which some assert, that rain-water doth never moisten the earth above ten feet deep; for of far greater profundity many fountains are. And besides, the rain-water runs most upon the surface of the earth, and so doth rather swell the rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their passage to the ocean, and doth not lodge itself presently in the earth; especially if it descends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill such cisterns supposed to be in the earth, especially in mountains, which may keep a stream continually running. Although therefore we may acknowledge that the fall of rain may much conduce to the overflowing and continuance of fountains, as is evident by the greater force of springs after continued rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the sun's exhaling, by his continued heat, those moist vapours in the earth, which should continually supply the springs, than merely to the want of rain,) and by the rise of most great rivers from such fountains which came from the foot of mountains, where the ground is supposed to be of so hard and consistent a substance as stone or chalk, or something of like nature, which might help to the conservation of water there, from whence it after ran in streams to the ocean, (which was the great

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argument of the famous Peireskius for his opinion;) although, I say, these things may argue thus far, that rain-water doth much conduce to the preservation of springs, yet it cannot give a sufficient account of the origin of them; which with the greatest reason and probability is imputed to those subterraneous waters which pass up and down through the bowels of the earth. Some have fancied the earth to be as one great animal, whose subterraneous passages were like veins in the body, which received water out of the sea, as the veins do blood out of the liver; and that there are some kind of vapours in the earth, which supply the place of vital spirits, which are diffused up and down the body through the arteries. And that as in an animal there are some parts which upon the least prick do send forth blood, and others are more callous, where the incision must be deeper before any blood appears, so it is in the earth; when it is opened in a right vein, we find presently a spring of water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep, and may find none; not that water is wanting, but we have not hit on the veins through which it runs. And thence as the blood, with equal freedom and velocity, ascends into the head as it runs into the legs, because it is equally dispersed into all the parts from the centre of it; so in the body of the earth it is as natural for the water to ascend into the tops of mountains, as it is to fall down into the centre of the earth; and that it is no more wonder to see springs issue out of mountains, than it is to see a man bleed in the veins of his forehead, when he is let blood there. So in all places of the earth the parts of it are not disposed for apertion; for some of them are so hard and compact, that there seems to be no passage through them, (which is the most probable reason why there is no rain neither in those places, because there is no such exsudation of those moist vapours through the surface of the earth, which may yield matter for rain, as it is in many of the sandy places of Africa;) but usually mountainous countries have more large, and as it were temple-veins, through which the moist vapours have a free and open passage; and thence there are not only more frequent springs there, but clouds and rains too. Now if this account of the origin of springs in the earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handsome, (and there is not much can be said against it, but only that then all fountains should be salt as the water is from whence they come,) then we easily understand how the earth might be over-

V. Gassend. Vit. Peireskii, l. iii. p. 292.

flowed in the universal deluge; for then the fountains of the deep were broken up, or there was an universal opening of the veins of the earth, whereby all the water contained in them would presently run upon the surface of the earth, and must needs, according to its proportion, advance itself to a considerable height. But because the salving the difference of the water in springs from what it is in the sea is so considerable a phenomenon in our present case, I therefore rather take this following as the most rational account of the origin of fountains, viz. that there are great cavities in the earth, which are capable of receiving a considerable quantity of water, which continually runs into them from the sea, (which as it continually receives fresh supplies from the rivers which empty themselves into it, so it dispatcheth away a like quantity through those spongy parts of the earth under the ocean, which are most apt to suck in and convey away the surplusage of water;) so that by this means the sea never swells by the water conveyed into it by the rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the earth of the water which passeth out of the ocean into the subterraneous caverns, and from thence to the mountains, and thence into the sea again, as there is a circulation of blood in man's body from the heart by the arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the veins into the heart. According to which we may imagine such a place in the heart of the earth like Plato's *Baratrum*,

Τῆλε μάλ', ὅχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον. Iliad. Θ'. v. 14.

As Plato in his Phædrus describes it out of Homer, *a long and deep subterraneous cavity*, εἰς γὰρ τῆτο τὸ χάσμα συῤῥέυσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ ἐκ τέτε πάλιν πάντες ἐκρέυσι. *Into which cavity all the rivers at last flow, and from which they again disperse themselves abroad.* Now this cavity of the earth, thus filled with water, supplies the place of the heart in the body of the earth, from which all those several aqueducts which are in the earth have their continual supply; but that which makes those passages of water, which we call springs and fountains properly, I suppose, is thus generated: from those cavities filled with water in the earth, by reason of the hot steams which are in the body of the earth, there are continually rising some vapours, or little particles of water, which are disjoined from each other by the heat, by reason of which they attain a greater celerity of motion, and so

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pass through the inner pores of the earth, till they come near the superficies of it; which when they have approached to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the surface of the earth, or at least are so arrested by the cold, and condensed by it, that they lose the form of vapours, and become perfect water again: which water, being now more gross than while it was a mere vapour, cannot descend again through the same pores through which it ascended before, because these are not now capable of receiving it; and therefore it seeks out some wider passages near the surface of the earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other vapours which are arrested in the same manner. Now when these are grown to a considerable body in the surface of a mountain or a plain, and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper fountain, whose streams are still maintained by the same condensation of vapours; which, when they are once come abroad, are in continual motion, whereby rivers are made, which are still finding a passage through the declivity of the surface of the earth, whereby they may return to the ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand phenomenon of the freshness of fountain-water, when the water of the sea is salt, whence it originally comes, is sufficiently resolved. For mere transcolation may by degrees take away that which the chemists call the fixed salt; and for the volatile salt of it, (which being a more spirituous thing, is not removable by distillation, and so neither can it be by transcolation;) yet such an evaporation as that mentioned may serve to do it, because it is evident that fresh water will fall from the clouds, which hath risen from those vapours which have come out of the sea; and besides, these vapours, or small particles of water, in their passage through the earth, (especially when they come near the surface of it,) do incorporate with other sweet vapours, as those which come from rain and others, by which means they insensibly lose their former acidity and sharpness. But those fountains which do retain their former saltness, as there are many such in the world, may very probably be supposed not to have come from those vapours condensed, but to be a kind of breaking of a vein, in which the salt water was conveyed up and down the body of the earth. Now then, considering that mass of waters, and multitude of vapours arising thence which are in the earth, how easy is it for us to understand what the breaking open the fountains of the

deep means in Scripture, and how by that means, together with the falling down of the cataracts of the clouds, and the letting loose of the ocean, the whole earth might be overspread with an universal deluge! The possibility of which was the thing to be shewed. CHAP. IV.

VII. The next thing we come to concerning the flood, is the capacity of the ark for receiving the several animals which were to propagate the world afterwards. Concerning which, two things are necessary to be understood; what the measure of the ark was, and what the number of animals contained in it. The measure of the ark must be determined by the proportion of the cubit; which there is no reason at all to suppose, either with Origen and others, to have been the geometrical cubit, which contains six ordinary cubits, or nine feet; both because we find no mention at all of any such cubit in Scripture, and because the fabric of the ark would have been of too vast a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir W. Rawleigh supposeth, that this cubit must be of a proportion as much exceeding ours as the stature of a giant doth ours, both because there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or reason, that the proportion of men then did generally exceed what is now; and, besides, this tends not in the least to make the thing more plain. For according to that proportion, we must then have imagined beasts to have been as well as men; for the horse must have been proportionably as great to have been serviceable to men of that stature; and so the animals would have taken up as much more room in the ark as the cubit is supposed to be bigger. I suppose, then, that Moses speaks of the cubit most in use in his own time, (for he wrote so that they for whose use he wrote might be easily able to understand him.) Now this cubit, by the consent of writers, contained a foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, supposing the ark, by Moses's description, to have 300 cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the ark, according to the computation of Joh. Buteo, comes to 450,000 solid cubits. For the length of 300 cubits being multiplied into the breadth of 50 cubits, and the product by the height of 30 cubits, makes the whole concavity 450,000. Which Matthæus Hostus reducing to the German measure, makes the longitude of the ark to be 31 perches, 4 cubits, 5 fingers; the latitude 5 perches, 2 cubits, and 11 fingers; the altitude 3 perches, 1 cubit, 9 fingers, allowing to every perch 15 Roman feet. So

Gen. vi. 15.

Buteo de Area Noe, p. 93

Hostus de Fabrica Arcæ Noachi, c. 6

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that if we take a perch to contain 10 Hebrew cubits, which exceeds the former 11 fingers, the whole capacity of the ark will be 450 cubical perches. And as he saith, *Hujusmodi sane ædificii amplitudo capacissima est, et quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie sufficere potuit*, the ark of so large a capacity might easily contain the several kinds of animals in it. Which will be easily understood, if, according to our former supposition, only the animals of the inhabited part of the world were preserved in the ark; but admitting that all kinds of animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for provision for them. For which Sir W. Rawleigh gives a prudent caution, that men ought not to take animals of a mixed nature, as mules and hyænas, nor such as differ in size and shape from each other, as the cat of Europe, and ounce of India, into the several species of animals. Sir W. Rawleigh, following Buteo, reckons eighty-nine, or, lest any be omitted, one hundred several kinds of beasts; and undertakes to demonstrate, from a triple proportion of all beasts to the ox, wolf, and sheep, that there was sufficient capacity for them in the ark. Hostus allows one hundred and fifty several kinds of animals, yet questions not the capacity of the ark: but these things are so particularly made out by those learned authors, especially by Buteo, that I shall rather refer the reader, for further satisfaction, to the authors themselves, than take the pains to transcribe them.

VIII.

I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of this universal deluge, of which we have most clear and concurring testimonies of most ancient nations of the world. For which purpose Grotius and others have at large produced the testimony of Berosus, the Chaldean, out of Josephus, concerning the flood and the ark in which Noah was preserved; of Abydenus, out of Cyril and Eusebius, concerning Xisuthrus, or Noah's sending out of the birds to see if the flood was assuaged; and of Alexander Polyhistor, concerning the preservation of animals in the ark; of Plutarch, concerning the sending out of the dove; of Lucian de Dea Syria, concerning the whole story; and so of Molon and Nicolaus Damascenus. Besides, it is manifested by others, how among the Chaldeans the memory of Noah was preserved under the fable of Oannes, which had part of a fish, and part of a man: as is evident from the fragments of Apollodorus, Abydenus, and Alexander Polyhistor, preserved in Eusebius's Greek Chronica; among the Chinese, under the

V. Grot. Annot. in l. i. de Verit. Relig. Christ. Voss. Isagog. Chron. dissert. iv. c. 2. et 3. Bochart. Geogr. Sacr. l. i. c. 4. August. de Civit. Dei, l. xviii. c. 12. et ibid. Lud. Viv. Euseb. Chr. p. 5. ed. 2. Scaliger.

name of Puoncuus, who by them is said to have escaped alone with his family out of the universal deluge, saith Isaac Vossius, who supposeth Pu or Pi to be only a prefix to the name; and so that Puoncuus is the same with ὁ Νῶχος. Martinius tells us, *de diluvio multa est apud Sinicos scriptores mentio*, that the ancient writers of the Sinic history speak much of the flood. Johannes de Laet tells out of Lescharbotus, how constant the tradition of the flood is among the Indians, both in New France, Peru, and other parts. This being therefore so fully attested by the evident and apparent consent of so many writers and historians, which did not own the authority of the Scriptures, I shall suppose this sufficiently proved, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the origin of nations, which is, *the certainty of the propagation of mankind from the posterity of Noah.* Of which there is this strong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of nations from the sons of Noah, there is some remainder in the history of that nation to justify the reason of the imposition of the name from the names of the nations themselves, which have preserved the original name of their founder in their own; as the Medes from Madai; the Thracians from Thiras; the Ionians from Javan; the Sidonians from Sidon; the Philistines from Polesthim; the Arcæans, Aradians, Elymæans, Assyrians, Lydians, from Arki, Arad, Elam, Assur, and Lud; and many others produced by Grotius, Montanus, Junius, and especially Bochartus, who, with admirable industry and learning, hath cleared all this part of sacred history which concerns the reason of the imposition of the names of the people which were propagated from the posterity of Noah, and given a full and satisfactory account of the several places where the posterity of Noah seated themselves after the deluge. Instead of that, therefore, I shall consider the pretences which can be brought against it; which are chiefly these three: 1. That the Chaldæan empire seems to have greater antiquity than can be attributed to it by the history of Moses. 2. That the most learned Heathen nations pretend to be self-originated, and that they came not from any other country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence America should be peopled.

CHAP. IV.

Is. Voss. Epist. ad Colvium. p. 409. Martin. Hist. Sinic. l. i. p. 12. Joh. de Laet. de Orig. Gent. American. l. i. p. 115. Gro. Annot. ad l. i. de Verit. Ari. Montan. Phaleg. Junius in Gen. x. Bochart. Geogr. Sacr. p. 1.

IX. 1. The history of the Assyrian empire seems inconsistent with the propagation of the world, from the sons of Noah; for the reign of Ninus and Semiramis is placed

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by many chronologers within the first century after the flood, which seems a manifest inconsistency with the propagation of mankind from the sons of Noah; for it seems utterly impossible that the foundations of so great an empire should be laid in so small a compass of time by the posterity of three persons; and besides, Ninus and Semiramis were not the first who began the Assyrian empire, for Belus not only reigned fifty-five years before Ninus, but, according to the Chaldæan antiquities from Evechous, who they say first reigned among them, are reckoned 495 years. But admit that the beginning of the Assyrian empire be placed so low as Petavius and other chronologers would have it, viz. in the year after the flood 153, yet the difficulty is only somewhat abated, but not removed; for it seems yet unconceivable, that from three persons, in 150 years, such multitudes should spring, as to make so large an empire as that of Ninus, and that within an hundred years after the flood there should be such vast multitudes for the building the tower of Babel, and dispersion up and down the world; so that, according to the Hebrew computation, in the compass of 300 years, viz. about Abraham's time, the world was so fully peopled, that we read of several kings encountering one another; by which it is evident the world had been peopled some time before, or else there could not have been such potent kings as some of them were at that time. This being the grand difficulty, to it I answer these things.

Petav. de Doct. Temp. l. ix. c. 14. tom. ii.

1. There is no such certainty of the beginning of the Assyrian empire, as for the sake of that to question the truth of the propagation of the world by the sons of Noah. I have already largely manifested the want of credibility in the chronology of the ancient Chaldæans, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it; especially as to those seven first Babylonian kings which are cited out of Africanus, by Eusebius and Georgius Syncellus, viz. Evechous, Chomasbolus, Porus, Nechubes, Abius, Oniballus, Chinzirus, who are said to reign 225 years two months; and alike fabulous, I suppose, is the other dynasty of six Arabian kings, whose empire is said to have stood 215 years, to the time of Belus, who expelled the Arabians, and took the power to himself. And it is much more agreeable to reason to reject these two dynasties, which had no record of them left in any history of the Assyrian empire, but only in Berosus, whose authority in this case hath been discussed

already, than to follow our late excellent primate of Armagh, who punctually sets down the reign of the kings of these two dynasties, but cuts off at least eight ages in the time of the Assyrian empire from Ninus to Sardanapalus; which time he confines to 496 years, and placeth Ninus in the 2737th year of the world, according to the Hebrew computation, and so to live in the time of the Judges, and be contemporary with Deborah: which he builds only on a place in Herodotus, which relates not to the time between Ninias and Sardanapalus, but to the time of the defection of the Medes from the Assyrian empire, as Isaac Vossius hath already shewed. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the Assyrian empire, which may give us cause to question the propagation of the world from the posterity of Noah.

Usser. Ann. Vet. Test. A. M. 2737.

Castigat. adv. Horn. c. 10.

2. We have reason to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the world from the sons of Noah after the flood. For as God had before punished the world by destroying mankind in it by an extraordinary manner, so after the flood he did in a particular manner bless Noah and his sons, and said unto them, *Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth*; which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted, by learned men, to make appear to what a vast number the posterity of Noah would increase in the space of two or three hundred years after the flood. Petavius supposeth that the posterity of Noah might beget children at seventeen, and that each of Noah's sons might have eight children in the eighth year after the flood, and that every one of these eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one family, as of Japhet in the year after the flood 238, he makes a diagram, consisting of almost an innumerable company of men. Johannes Temporarius, as our most learned primate tells us, takes this way; that all of the posterity of Noah, when they attained twenty years of age, had every year twins; on which supposition, by arithmetical progression he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102d year after the flood there would be, of males and females, 1,554,420; but taking away the one half, because of the groundless supposition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388,605 males, besides females. Others suppose that each of the sons of Noah had ten sons; and, by that proportion, in few generations it would amount to many thousands within a century. Others insist on the parallel between the multiplication

Gen. ix. i.

Petav. de Doct. Temp. l. ix. c. 14.

Uss. Chron. Sacr. c. 5.

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of the children of Israel in Egypt; that if from 72 men, in the space of 215 years, there are procreated 600,000, how many will be born of three men in the space of an hundred years? Some have said above 23,000; but with what success in their arithmetic, I shall not determine. But whether all or any of these ways be sufficient and satisfactory, we have yet cause to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the posterity of Noah after the flood.

Horn. Def. Dissert. de Ætat. Mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of those copies which the Septuagint followed in their version, all this difficulty is then ceased. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almost a thousand years between the flood and Abraham; by which means there will be sufficient space given for the propagation of mankind, the building of the tower of Babel, the dispersion of nations, the founding the Assyrian empire, the plantation of Egypt, China, and other places; all which seem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as Josephus doth, and the whole primitive Church before Jerome, which certainly ought in no case to be disregarded.

The whole controversy concerning this part of the chronology of the world comes at last to this: Whether it be more probable that the Jews, who lived under the second Temple, (who then were the trustees to whom were committed *the oracles of God*,) whom the LXX. followed in their version, had the true reading, or the Talmudic Jews, after their dispersion and banishment from their country, when they were discarded by God himself from being his people, when he broke up house among them at the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple. But if the reader desire further satisfaction concerning this difference of the chronology of the LXX. from that of the present Hebrew copies, he may consult the learned dissertation of the late learned Bishop of Chester upon the LXX. and the later discourses of Isaac Vossius on this subject. Setting aside then the controversy between the present Hebrew copies and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but subscribe to the judgment of our judicious historian, Sir Walter Rawleigh: *That if we look over all, and do not hastily satisfy our understanding with the first things offered, and thereby being satiated do slothfully and drowsily sit down, we shall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who, ac-*

Walton Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. sect. 58, 63, &c.

Isaac Vossius de LXX. Interpr. et Ætat. Mundi.

Sir Walter Rawleigh's Hist. p. i. b. ii. c. 1. sect. 7.

cording to some editions, make it above 1072 years between the flood and Abraham's birth, than to take away any part of those 352 years given. For if we advisedly consider the state and countenance of the world, such as it was in Abraham's time, yea before Abraham was born, we shall find that it were very ill done of us, by following opinion without the guide of reason, to pare the time over deeply between Abraham and the flood; because in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole story might perchance bleed thereby, were not the testimony of the Scriptures supreme, so as no objection can approach it; and that we did not follow withal this precept of St. Austin, that whersoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceived disagreeing to the whole, the same is by ignorance of misinterpretation understood. For in Abraham's time all the then known parts of the world were peopled; all regions and countries had their kings. Egypt had many magnificent cities, and so had Palestine and all bordering countries; yea all that part of the world besides, as far as India: and those not built with sticks, but of hewn stones, and defended with walls and rampiers; which magnificence needed a parent of more antiquity than those other men have supposed. And therefore where the Scriptures are plainest, and best agreeing with reason and nature, to what end should we labour to beget doubts and scruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving also strength thereby to common cavillers, and to those men's apish brains, who only bend their wits to find impossibilities and monsters in the story of the world and mankind. Thus far that excellent historian, whose words deserve consideration. Thus much for the first objection. CHAP. IV.

The second is, *From the great pretence of several nations that they were self originated,* or came not from any other place. This was the pretence of the Egyptians, Grecians, ancient inhabitants of Italy, and others. But how little reason we have to give credit to these pretences, will appear on these accounts. 1. The impossibility in nature that mankind should be produced in such a way as they imagined; which we have manifested already in our discourse of the origin of the universe. 2. That the nations which pretended this, were never able to give sufficient evidence of it to any other nation which demanded it; which is manifest by their want of any certain records of their ancient times; which is fully proved in our discourse in the first book of the want of credibility in the Heathen histories. 3. The only probable reason which induced X. 2.

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these nations to make themselves *Aborigines*, was, because they supposed themselves to be the first inhabitants of the countries they lived in; which although I may allow to the Egyptians, and some other ancient nations, yet I cannot do it to the Hellens or Greeks, who most vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which because it may give more light into the greatest antiquities of Greece, and some other nations, than hath been yet discovered or taken notice of; and because it may further tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures as to the origin of nations, I shall more particularly enquire into the first plantation of Greece. That it was first inhabited by some of Noah's posterity, is out of question with all those who prefer the most ancient and undoubted records of Scripture before the fabulous impostures of men's brains. But by whose immediate posterity the country of Greece was first inhabited, is not yet so clear as it hath been generally presumed to be, by most who had rather follow the dictates of others, than spend time in such enquiries themselves; which yet certainly are so far from being unworthy men's labour and industry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-history, than the reconciling the antiquities of the elder nations to what we find delivered of the plantation of the world from the posterity of Noah. As to this particular, therefore, of the first plantation of Greece, I shall first propound the opinion generally embraced among learned men, and then shew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from Moses, Gen. x. 5. that the posterity of Japhet took possession of the Isles of the Gentiles, *i. e.* according to the Hebrew idiom, not only such as are properly so called, but all those countries which lay much upon the sea, being at any distance from Palestine, especially such as lay between the ocean and Mediterranean sea; and so both Greece and Italy come under the name of the Isles of the Gentiles. Among the sons of Japhet, none is conceived so probable to have first peopled Greece, as he whose name was preserved among the inhabitants of Greece, with very little alteration; and so as the Medes from Madai, the Assyrians from Assur, the Thracians from Thiras, by the like analogy the Ionians from Javan. From which it is observable, that although among the Greeks themselves the Ionians were but as one division of that people which inhabited Greece, yet other nations comprehended all under the name of Ionians. For which we have sufficient

evidence from Hesychius, and the Scholiast on Aristophanes. Οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς Ἕλληνας Ἴωνας λέγουσιν, saith Hesychius; and more to this purpose the Scholiast speaks. Πάντας τὲς Ἕλληνας Ἰάονας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκάλουν. For Ἰάονες, with the insertion of the Æolic digamma, (which is always done when two vowels meet,) is Ἰάφονες, *i. e.* Javones; and Stephanus Byzantius tells us, that from Ἰάων comes Ἰών, and so Homer,

Hesych. v. Ἴαονι. Acharnen. Schol. in Aristoph. Stephanus de Urb. v. Ἰών.

Ἔνθα δὲ Βοιωτοὶ, καὶ Ἰάονες ἑλκεχίτωνες. Iliad. ν. v. 685.

And Dionysius Periegetes reckons up Ἰάων as one of the rivers of Arcadia,

Ἔνθα μέλας, ὅθι Κρᾶθις, ἵνα ῥέει ὕγρος Ἰάων. Dionys. v. 416.

And which much confirms this opinion, the Hebrew word for Javan, before the points added by the Masorites, viz. יון bears a perfect analogy with the Greek Ἰών; and ארץ יון in Scripture is taken for Greece; and so Dan. viii. 21. Alexander is called מלך י, which the LXX. render Βασιλεὺς Ἑλλήνων; and Joel iii. 6. *You have sold my sons* לבני היונים *to the sons of Javan*, i. e. to the Grecks, as it is generally understood. But as Javan cannot be supposed to have come into these parts without his family, so it is generally presumed that there are no obscure footsteps left of Javan's eldest son, Elisha's seating himself in Greece. For from him Josephus derives the name Αἰωλεῖς, with whom the Jerusalem paraphrast concurs. Montanus from thence derives the name Elis; from whence he supposeth the Grecks are called Ἕλληνες. Bochartus finds the clearest remainders of Elisha in Elis, the same with Peloponnesus, one part of which by Homer is called Alisium; thence Ezek. xxvii. 7. we read of the *purple and scarlet from the isles of Elisha*, which makes it most probable to be that part of Greece which lay upon the Ionian sea, where the best purple next to the Tyrian was found, as the learned Bochartus hath demonstrated from several authors. This is now the substance of the generally received account concerning the plantation of Greece from the posterity of Noah; which if it be taken as to that people which did at length possess Greece, I see no reason to disapprove it; but, if it be extended to the first plantation of Greece, I see as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judge more freely of the first inhabitants of Greece, it is requisite we take an account of it from those who profess themselves most versed in their own antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature,

Ed. Oxon. Ar. Mont. Phaleg. p. 24. Bochart. Phaleg. l. iii. c. 10.

BOOK III. which is attested by the common consent of the most learned antiquaries of Greece, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver may be supposed to come from an ancient and undoubted tradition.

XI. It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the most learned and judicious even of the Greeks themselves, that Greece was first inhabited by a people by them called *barbarous*, i. e. a people different from them in language and manners. So Ephorus, whom Polybius commends as the best writer of the Greek antiquities, saith that Greece was inhabited by a barbarous people before the Hellens came into it. And Hecatæus Milesius, cited by Strabo concerning Peloponnesus, ὅτι πρὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ᾤκησαν αὐτὴν βάρβαροι, which Strabo himself not only believes of Peloponnesus, but of all Greece, that it was κατοικία βαρβάρων τὸ πάλαιον, *anciently a plantation of barbarians*. The same is affirmed by Aristotle, writing of the commonwealth of the Tegeates concerning Arcadia, that before its being possessed by the Arcadians it was inhabited by a barbarous people, who, because they were expulsed their country before moon-rising, the Arcadians called themselves προσέληνοι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boast, (of which many reasons are given by learned men,) I here dispute not; it is sufficient that we find the Grecians were not the first who peopled any of these several places; which is likewise attested by Herodotus, Thucydides, and others, whose testimonies we shall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the Grecians were not the first who inhabited that country after from them called Greece, it follows to be enquired what this barbarous people was, and from whence they came. Strabo hath given us in a large catalogue of the names of many of them; as the Dryopes, Caucones, Leleges, besides the Aones, Tembices, Hyantes, and many others; but these seem not to have been that ancient people, but rather some latter castlings of the Carians, who, as Thucydides tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of Greece. That people which had the largest spread, and greatest antiquity, was the Pelasgi: thence Peloponnesus was anciently called Πελασγία; Stephanus Byzantius Πελοποννήσῳ τρεῖς ἐπωνυμίαι, Ἀπία, Πελασγία, and Ἄργος; and Apollodorus saith, that the Peloponnesians were anciently called Pelasgi; and Euripides,

Strabo, l. vii. p. 222.

V. Schol. in Apollon. l. iv. v. 262.

Πελασγιώτας ὠνομασμένους τὸ πρὶν
Δαναούς.

And elsewhere,

Πρῶτον Πελασγοὶ, Δαναΐδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

These Pelasgi were not only in Peloponnesus, but in Attica too, as appears by Strabo, where he saith the nation of the Pelasgi did inhabit; and by the Athenians (that is after their mixture) they were called πελαργοὶ, Storks, διὰ τὴν πλάνην, for their frequent removals from place to place: and Pausanias mentions their being under the Acronoli at Athens: that they were in Thessaly, is evident from Hesychius. Πελάσγοι, οἱ Θεσσαλοί· καὶ ἔνιοι τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ γένος ἀπὸ Πελασγοῦ τοῦ Ἀρκάδος γενόμενον πολυπλάνητον. Arcadia seems to have been the first or chief place of their residence; for the Arcadians, who were accounted παλαιότατα ἔθνη τῶν ἑλλήνων, do vindicate the founder of this nation, whom they call Pelasgus, to themselves, and say he was an αὐτόχθων among them, that is, the first who came into that country; for all those, whose original they knew not, they called *Terræ Filios*, and *Genuinos Terræ*. Pausanias rightly conjectures that he was the first man among them, not as though he was alone, but because the chief ruler and commander among them, and that brought them into the country; but though they might fix themselves about Arcadia, it is evident they spread further, for Menecrates Eleates, in his book of the founders of cities, affirms, that all the sea-coasts of Greece called Ionica, beginning from Mycale, were first inhabited by the Pelasgi: nay, we find them yet much higher in Epirus, who were, as Strabo tells us, the first founders of the famous oracle of Dodona; for so Ephorus in him saith it was Πελασγῶν ἵδρυμα, and that these were τῶν περὶ τὴν ἑλλάδα δυναστευόντων ἀρχαιότατοι: thence the poet,

Strabo, l. ix. p. 273. Ed. Casaub.

Pausan. in Arcad.

Strabo, l. xiii. p. 427.

Idem, l. vii. p. 226.

Ζεῦ ἄνα, Δωδωναῖε, Πελασγικέ.

Iliad. π. v. 233.

And Hesiod,

Δωδώνην φηγόν τε Πελασγῶν ἕδρανον ἦεν.

Hesiod. Fragment. Ed. Oxon.

Strabo further makes it evident that they were a barbarous people, which lived about Dodona, from the description Homer gives of them,

ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναίουσ' ὑποφῆται, ἀνιπτόποδες, χαμαιεῦναι.

Iliad. π. v. 234.

Which Philostratus best interprets, when he saith they were αὐτοσχέδιοί τινες καὶ ὅτε κατεσκευασμένοι τὸν βίον, *such that thought the Gods were best pleased with their simpli-*

Philostr. in Imag.

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city and severity of life, and therein far different from the Grecian humour. Suidas in Thessalicis (cited likewise by Strabo) saith that the temple of Dodona was removed from Scotusa in Pelasgia to Thessala; which is confirmed by Herodotus in Euterpe, where he largely speaks of the temple and oracle at Dodona. These Pelasgi confined not themselves to Greece neither, but were dispersed into the neighbour islands, as Chios, Crete, Lesbos, Lemnos, Imbro, Samos, as will appear afterwards; and at last came into Italy, as is well known, and are thought to be the same with the Tyrrhenians, and by some conceived to be the first founders of Rome. We see what a large spread the Pelasgi had over Greece, which was divided, after the Hellens began to appear, into τὸ πελασγικὸν and τὸ ἑλληνικὸν, as Herodotus witnesseth; and so these two appear to be a very different people from one another, and not the same, under different names, as is commonly thought.

XII. Herod. l. i. c. 21. Ed. Wess.

Which sufficiently appears from their language, which was quite different from one another. So Herodotus, Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ *βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἱέντες, they used a barbarous language*, i. e. a language not understood by the Hellens, who at first had their chief residence in Thessaly; from whence by degrees they came forwards into Greece, as Thucydides shews. For although the name of Hellens at last spread itself over all the people of Greece, yet it was at first peculiar to that part of Thessaly called Phthiotis; and thence Homer calls them properly Hellens which followed Achilles from thence: and it appears by Homer, that there was a city there called Ἑλλάς, which, as Stephanus de Urbibus tells us, was there built by Ἕλλης; although he will not have him to be Hellen the son of Deucalion, but the son Phthius, wherein he is mistaken; for Thucydides plainly shews that it was from Hellen, the son of Deucalion, that the name Ἕλληνες came; and this Hellen lived in Phthiotis. But although they were first in Phthiotis, yet they daily increasing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all Thessaly into their hands, of which one part was called Πελασγιῶτις; afterwards under Dorus, the son of Hellen, they conquered Hestiæctis, that part of Thessaly which lies under the mountains Ossa and Olympus; from thence they were beaten back by the Cadmeans into Pindus, where the Greeks were first called Μακεδνοὶ, as Herodotus tells us; from hence they went into Dryopis, and thence into Peloponnesus, and there had the name Dorians; but before their coming hither, they had first secured them-

selves of the Hellens lying between Thessaly and Peloponnesus, and there they dispossessed the Pelasgi in all the Attic region, who were now forced to submit or to fly. They who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the Greeks, and became one people with them; and so by degrees lost that former language which was peculiar to themselves, and wholly distinct from the Greek tongue. That the Hellens did thus gradually come into Peloponnesus, is evident from the names of people and places common to Thessaly and Peloponnesus; which came from hence, that though the Greeks left the cities behind them, yet they carried most of the names along with them. Thus the Achæi, Ionians, and Æolians, and Dorians in Peloponnesus came from those of the same names in Thessaly; and so likewise the names of these following regions and cities were common to both, as Ellopia, Estiæa, Eretria, and Oropos, Graia, Larissa, Psophis, Iton, Oechalia, and very many others. Salmasius seems to be of opinion, that the Pelasgi never used any language distinct from the Hellens; but besides that it is directly contrary to the testimony of Herodotus, the arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The first is, because the Pelasgi that went into Italy did use the Greek tongue, from their calling Agylla Cære, from χαῖρε, a word pronounced from one on the walls; and because the Arcades used only the Greek language in the Æolian dialect, which Evander carried with him into Italy, and from which most of the old Roman language was derived. But doth not Herodotus expressly say, that, after the mixture between the Greeks and Pelasgi, these by degrees lost their own proper language, and made use of the common Greek tongue? Yet afterwards, too, it is evident from Herodotus, in some places, as at Crotona, they did use a language different from the Greek. His other argument is, *That the names of the eldest persons mentioned were originally Greek;* but this is expressly denied by Strabo, who makes the contrary one of his strongest arguments, that the Barbarians did anciently inhabit Greece; and instanceth in Cecrops, Codrus, Æolus, Cothus, Drymas, Crimanus. Thus we have abundantly proved, against the common opinion, that Greece was not first peopled by the Hellens, or the posterity of Elisa, although these did afterwards come to the full possession of Greece.

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Salmas. de Hellen. p. 315.

XIII. It remains that we shew whence these Pelasgi came, and of whose posterity they were, and what the language

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was which was used by them. He that gave the name to this people, according to the Grecian fables, was one Pelasgus; which none will wonder at among them, whose constant custom it was (partly by reason of their ignorance of the true account of their names, and partly by their pride, that they might not seem ignorant of any thing,) when they met with any names of people, to find out some person near it, who was the founder of them. Thus Attica from Actæus, it being anciently called Ἀτθική, and Cranæ from Cranaus, Ægialea from Ægialeus, Mauritania from Maurus, Scythia from one Scythes, Galatæa from Galates, and thus in multitudes of other names. But from the name Pelasgi we may probably find out the true founder of the people, allowing that variation which is usually caused through the Greeks' melting the harsher words of the Eastern languages into a sound fit for their more delicate palates; as is evident in the comparing the names of the prophets in Hebrew, with what they are in the Greek Version. Thus the Pelasgi may with great probability be derived from פלג, Phaleg; for which we have the concurrent testimony of two learned persons, Grotius and Salmasius, who are contented to mention it without bringing much evidence of reason for it. What they only touch at, we shall endeavour to make out more at large; which we shall do by removing the great presumptions against it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great presumptions lying against it are; for that the isles of the nations fell to the posterity of Japhet, and that Phaleg lived with Eber in Chaldæa. For the first, it must be acknowledged that the greatest part of the countries lying upon the Ocean and Mediterranean were in the time when Moses wrote so inhabited; not that the habitations of the sons of Noah had their bounds and limits set them either by God or Noah, but that the posterity of Japhet did chiefly address themselves to those parts which lay towards Europe; but yet not so as to exclude any of the posterity of Sem, if their necessities for further room made it necessary for them to seek for habitations further abroad. For we can have no reason to think, that, because the chief of Sem's posterity did live together, therefore none of them went further off, which necessity would put them upon because of their great increase; for we read of Phaleg and others, that, besides those in direct line to Abraham, (whose genealogy it was Moses's great design to recount,) they begat many other sons and daughters, which would make it necessary for

Grot. Not. in lib. i. de Jure Bel. &c. c. 3. Salm. de Hellen.

Gen. xi. 19, 21.

them to seek their habitations further abroad. And that Phaleg and Ragau did so, we have the express testimony of Epiphanius, Φαλὲκ καὶ Ῥαγαῦ οἵτινες ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης κλῖμα νενευκότες τῷ τῆς Σκυθίας μέρει, καὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσι προσεκρίθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Θήρας ἡλικίας, ᾗ ἐπέκεινα, ἐξ ὧπερ οἱ Θρᾷκες γεγόνασι, *That from the age of Therah, and thence forward, Phaleg and Ragau diverted towards the clime of Europe, to part of Scythia, and were joined with those nations from which the Thracians arose.* Several things make this not so improbable as some have imagined it to be: for first, it is the constant acknowledgment of all sober enquirers into the original of the Greeks, that Greece was first peopled from Scythia; and indeed almost all the nations in Europe have come out of that country: besides, there is evidence of it even in the Grecian fables; for Prometheus (from whom the Greeks derived themselves) is fancied by them to lie bound in Mount Caucasus, which must be supposed to be the country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that the Hellens came not into Greece before it was peopled by the Pelasgi, and that these had different language and customs from one another. Now then in all probability, although the posterity of Elisa might come first down from Scythia into those parts, and seat themselves in Macedonia and Thessaly, where they had in probability more than room enough at first, and a country to their desire, they might be willing to permit the posterity of Phaleg to pass on further; for in those first plantations we cannot otherwise conceive, but that the last comers must be the furthest goers, unless they had strength enough to drive the former inhabitants out of their seats, whereof they were already possessed, as the Scythians did afterwards, and so the Hellens. So then the posterity of Phaleg being forced to quit their own country, because of the multitude of inhabitants, must be supposed to take that course, where in probability they might find an empty seat fit for them to dwell in. Thence they come towards Europe; for they saw how the posterity of Sem did spread itself eastwards already, and Cham southwards, and coming to part of that vast country of Scythia which was both already taken up, and not so convenient an habitation for them, they draw downwards towards Thracia; and there the posterity of Thiras, from whom the Thracians came, had already possessed themselves. Passing further into Thessaly, they find that already planted by some of the posterity of Elisa, but as yet but scant a

Epiph. de Scythis, l. Ep. ad Acu. et Paulum. sect. 2.

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thin of inhabitants; therefore they disperse themselves up and down through some part of Epirus, most part of Ellas, and some pass into Peloponnesus, where they fix themselves chiefly upon Arcadia, and thence spread up and down by degrees towards the sea-side; for we cannot but think that the maritime parts were the last peopled, partly for fear of another deluge, partly for want of conveniency of navigation, most of their travels being by land, and partly, when navigation grew more in use, for fear of pirates, who drove a great trade upon the coasts of Greece in elder times, as is most evident from Thucydides in the beginning of his history. Thus we have a reasonable account given of the Pelasgi, their first coming into Greece, and how by degrees the Hellens came to possess their country, and what a fair pretence the Arcadians had to boast of the greatest antiquity; their country being probably first peopled by the Pelasgi of any part of the whole Chersonese, and the seat of the leader of the whole company whom they call Pelasgus, and the Scriptures Phaleg.

XIV. Having thus far cleared the antiquities of Greece as to the first planters of it, whom we have evidenced to have been the Pelasgi, and these derived from Peleg, it will be no great difficulty to resolve what language they brought along with them; which must be supposed to be the same with that used in the family from whence Peleg or Phaleg came, as to the substance of it, although it might admit as great variation of dialect from it as the Chaldee or Syriac doth. But this I will not only suppose, but offer these probabilities for the proof of it. The first is, the agreement of the ancient Greek language with the Hebrew, in many of its primitive words. And here we have a most rational and probable account given of it; which is, the Greeks mixing with the Pelasgi, and both coming to be one people, they must needs retain many of the old words used by the Pelasgi in their Greek language, which are evidently of an Eastern extraction; the ground of which cannot with such probability be fetched from Cadmus and the Phœnicians, because it is not so easy admission of a foreign language after the perfection of their own, unless by long tract of time, or great numbers overrunning the former people, neither of which can be so truly affirmed of Cadmus and his company; for they were soon driven out of Greece, he himself ending his days in Illyricum: neither was their spread so large as that of the Pelasgi, who were before possessors of the

country; and it is continually seen how impossible it is for any conquerors, as the Greeks were, to bring their own language so into a place, where some of the former people are suffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and so make the language mixed of both, as it is in all nations conquered by the Romans; the Roman not being purely spoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former language in use among them. The second argument is from the different pronunciation and dialects in use in the Greek language; of which no account so likely can be given, as the mixture with different languages. This is most evident in the Doric dialect; for the Dorians inhabiting probably where most of the Pelasgi had been, their pronunciation and dialect comes the nearest to the Eastern of any of the Greeks; for in the Doric dialect the Πλατειασμὸς, or *broad pronunciation*, is most taken notice of. So he in Theocritus upbraids the Dorians, ὅτι πλατειάσδεσιν ἅπαντα, they speak every thing *very broad*; which answers to the pronunciation of the Eastern languages: besides, the Doric dialect delights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which besides that it is the custom of Eastern tongues, especially the Syriac, it doth much widen the pronunciation. The third argument is from the remainders of the Eastern tongues in those places, especially where the Pelasgi had been. The Pelasgi are much taken notice of for their frequent removes, and travelling from one place to another; which I suppose was chiefly after the Hellens had conquered the country where they dwelt, then they were forced to go seek better habitations abroad: thence Strabo calls the nation of the Pelasgi πολύπλανον καὶ ταχὺ τὸ ἔθνος πρὸς ἐπαναστάσεις: and elsewhere, that they were πολλαχοῦ τῆς Εὐρώπης τὸ παλαιὸν πλανώμενοι, they went up and down to a great part of Europe: but we may suppose them to have made their first and chief resort to the neighbour islands to Greece; where we shall see what evidence they left of their language there. The first island we meet with them in, is Crete; so Strabo speaking of them, Καὶ γὰρ τῆς Κρήτης ἔποικοί γ' γόνασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ὅμηρος, that a colony of them lived in Crete, for which he voucheth Homer's authority:

Strabo, l. xiii. p. 247.

Id. l. xii. p. 394.

Id. l. v. p. 153.

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη· ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοὶ,
Ἔν δ' Ἐτεόκρητες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δὲ Κυδῶνες,
Δωριέες τε τριχάϊκες, δῖοί τε Πελασγοί.

Hom. Odyss. τ'. 175.

It is evident then that the Pelasgi were in Crete. Now

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most of the Cretan words are of an Eastern extraction, if we believe the learned Bochartus, who hath promised a discourse on that subject: besides Crete, we find the Pelasgi in Chios, καὶ Χῖοι δὲ οἰκισὰς ἑαυτῶν Πελασγούς φασι τὲς ἐκ Θετταλίας, saith Strabo; the inhabitants of Chios say that the Pelasgi of Thessaly were their first inhabitants; and here the fore-named learned person hath derived the name Chios, the mountain Pelinæus, and the wine Arvisium, all from the Eastern languages. The next we find them in, is Lesbos, καὶ γὰρ τὴν Λεσβὸν Πελασγίαν εἰρήκασι, which from them was called Pelasgia, saith Strabo, whose name is likewise fetched out of the East. By Bochartus further we find them in Lemnos and Imbros. So Anticlides in Strabo, πρώτες φησὶ Πελασγὲς τὰ περὶ Λέμνον καὶ Ἴμβρον κτίσαι; concerning whose names, see Bochartus, 82. I know that learned author makes the Phœnicians the authors of all these names, from no other ground generally, but because they are of an Eastern derivation; but according to what we have laid down we may yield to the thing itself, and upon clearer grounds; for of some of these islands he ingenuously confesseth he can find no evidence of the Phœnicians being in them. *Phœnices in his insulis habitasse nusquam legimus:* but we find it very plain, that in those very islands the Pelasgi inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the reader judge. One thing more I shall insist on, which is the original of the Samothracian mysteries. That these were, as to their names, from the Eastern languages, is now acknowledged by all learned men; the Cabiri being so evidently derived from כביר, which signifies *strength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*, so Cabiri is explained by Varro and Tertullian, and the particular names of the several Cabiri mentioned by the Scholiast on Apollonius, Ἀξιερὸς, Ἀξιόκερσα, Ἀξιόκερσος, and Κάδμιλος, are very handsomely explained by that learned and excellent Bochartus, from the Eastern languages: only he will needs have them derived from the Phœnicians; whereas Herodotus expressly tells us, that they were from the Pelasgi, whose words are these: ὅσις δὲ τὰ Καβείρων ὄργια μεμύηται, τὰ Σαμοθρήικες ἐπιτελέυσι παραλαβόντες παρὰ Πελασγῶν. And again, τὴν γὰρ Σαμοθρηίκην οἴκεον πρότερον Πελασγοὶ ἔτοι, τοί περ Ἀθηναίοισι σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ παρὰ τέτων Σαμοθρήικες τὰ ὄργια παραλαμβάνυσι. We see evidently by this, that the Samothracians derived their mysteries from the Pelasgi; and without all question they had their names from thence, whence they derived

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. i. c. 15.

Strabo, l. v. p. 153.

Bochart. Geogr. p. ii. l. i. c. 12.

Id. l. i. c. 9.

Tertull. de Spect. c. 8.

Bochart. ibid. l. i. c. 12.

Herod. l. ii. c. 51. Ed. Wess.

their mysteries. And to this purpose it is further observable, that, as the old Hetrurians were certainly a colony of the Pelasgi, upon their removal out of Greece, so Vossius observes, that the old Hetruscan language (*fere a Syris habet cuncta sacrorum nomina*) hath almost all the sacred appellations from the Eastern tongues. For which purpose it is further observable, which Grotius takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the Hetrusci, and the Hetrurians had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eastern parts. CHAP. IV. Vossius de Idol. l. ii. c. 57. Grot. Annot. in Mat. xii. 1.

XV. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithstanding its novelty, is advanced to as high a degree of probability as any that stands on the like foundations; and not only so, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the labyrinth of antiquities, and gives us a fair account whence the Eastern tongues came to be so much used among both the ancient Grecks and Hetrurians. One thing more, this will help us to understand far better than any *salvo* hath been yet used for it; which is the affinity spoken of by Arius, king of Lacedæmon, in his letters to Onias, between the Jews and Lacedæmonians: εὑρέθη ἐν γραφῇ περί τε τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν καὶ Ἰουδαίων, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀδελφοὶ, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἐκ γένους Ἀβραάμ· which is explained by Josephus thus: ἐντυχόντες γραφῇ τινι, εὕρομεν ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶεν γένους Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀβράμον οἰκειότητος. *They had found in a book that the Jews and Lacedæmonians were of the same stock, from their mutual relation to Abraham.* Vossius thinks the original of this was from those of the posterity of Anak, who came into Greece, and peopled Sparta, and would seem to have been of the posterity of Abraham; or that they were partly of the posterity of Abraham by Agar or Ceturah, and partly of the Canaanites, driven out by Joshua. But how unlikely a thing is it (supposing Sparta peopled by the Canaanites, which yet is not evident) that they should give out themselves to be of that stock which they had been expelled their country by? And for the true posterity of Abraham coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare assertion, so we have this strong evidence against it, that all that came from Abraham were circumcised, as the Ishmaelites, Hagarens, &c. which we never read of among the Lacedæmonians. Hugo Grotius differs not much from the opinion of Vossius concerning the ground of this kindred between the Jews and Spartans; for in his notes on that place in the Maccabees, where it is spoken of, he gives this account of it. The Dorians, of whom the Spar- 1 Maccab. xii. 21. Joseph. Antiq. l. xii. c. 4. Ed. Oxon. Voss. de Idol. l. i. c. 13.

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tans were a part, came from the Pelasgi; the language of the Pelasgi was different from that of the Greeks, as appears by Herodotus in his Clio: ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶτταν ἵεντες. Now the Pelasgi (saith he) are פלגי *dispersi*, a *scattered nation*; thence he supposeth these Pelasgi, or banished people, to have come from the confines of Arabia and Syria, in which the posterity of Abraham and Ceturah had placed themselves. But, 1. It is uncertain whether the posterity of Abraham, by Ceturah, were placed so near Canaan or no. I know Junius endeavours to find the seat of all the sons of Ceturah in Arabia; but Mercer gives several not improbable reasons why he conceives them placed not in the East of Canaan, but in the Eastern parts of the world. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of these sons of Abraham by Ceturah out of the parts of Arabia, supposing them placed there, nor any reason why they should be banished thence. 3. That which was the badge of Abraham's posterity, was never, that we read of, in use among the Spartans; which was circumcision. Indeed, in much later ages than this we speak of, we read of a people among the Thracians who were circumcised, whom the Greeks themselves judged to be Jews. So Aristophanes brings the Odomantes in.

Aristoph. Acharnen. act 1. sc. 4.

Τίς τῶν Ὀδομάντων τὸ πέος ἀποτέθρακεν ἄν·

ἀποτέθρακεν, (saith the Scholiast,) i. e. ἀνέτιλε, ἐλεαίνοντο δὲ καὶ ἀπετίλλοντο οἱ Θρᾷκες τὰ αἰδοῖα καὶ ἀποσεσυρμένα εἶχον αὐτά. Whereby it is plain that circumcision was in use among the Thracians; for these Odomantes were (saith the Scholiast) a people of Thrace: φασὶ δὲ αὐτὸς Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It seems it was a tradition among them, that they were Jews. If so, it seems most probable that they were some of the ten tribes, who were placed about Colchis, and the adjacent places: for Herodotus in Euterpe saith, that the Syrians that lived about the rivers Thermodoon and Parthenius, learned circumcision from the Colchi; of whom he saith, Μοῦνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες περιτέμνονται ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὰ αἰδοῖα. *Only the Colchi, and Egyptians, and Ethiopians had originally the custom of circumcision.* Or else the Odomantes might be some of the dispersed Jews in Armenia, where Strabo mentions a region called Odomantis; and so they retained the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into Thrace. But whatever these Odomantes were, they were far enough from the Spartans, who never were thus

Strab. l. xi.

suspected of Judaism, nor laughed at for circumcision; so that this opinion of Grotius, on that account, seems not very probable. Bochartus, who hath been so happy in many other conjectures, yet here gives out, unless it may depend upon the testimony of Claudius Iolaus in Stephanus Byzantius, who fabulously derives the Jews from one Judæus Sparton, who went from Thebes along with Bacchus into the wars; which Sparton they might confound with another Sparton, the son of Phonoreus, the founder of Sparta; which yet is rejected as a fable by Pausanias in Laconicis. Surely the Lacedæmonians were very ambitious of kindred with the Jews, that would claim it upon such grounds as these, especially at such a time when the people of the Jews were under distress, and their kindred might be like to cost them so dear; and if they had never such a mind to have claimed kindred with the Jews, they would certainly have done it upon a more plausible testimony than the fable of one Claudius Iolaus, that had neither sense nor reason in it; and yet supposing his fable true, it had been nothing to the purpose without the linking another fable to it, which was so gross, that even the Greeks themselves were ashamed of it, who were always the most daring forgers of fables in the world. But let us see further what the divine (as some have loved to call him) Jos. Scaliger saith to it. All that he saith, is only a wonder or two at it; *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos esse*, &c. and a refutation of an absurd opinion, that Oebalus, the father of Tyndareus, and grandfather of Castor, Pollux, and Helena, was the same with Ebal, mentioned Gen. x. 28. which there can be no reason for, since Ebal was the son of Joktan, and so of another race from Abraham; and Joktan's sons were placed eastward, but chiefly Oebalus was within an hundred years before the destruction of Troy; but Phaleg, uncle to Ebal, died 664 years before Oebalus, in A. M. 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plausible account of this claim of kindred; but though it be an endless task to make good all the claims of kindred in the world, especially to persons of power and authority, yet there being no visible interest or design which the Spartans could have in such a claim, especially at that time, with a nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen idolaters, we cannot suppose but there must be some at least plausible ground for such a persuasion among them. What if we should conjecture that the Spartans might find in the Greek

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. i. c. 22.

Scalig. Canon. Isag. p. 332.

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version of the Pentateuch, which was much spread abroad at that time among the sons of Ishmael, one whose name makes the nearest approach to their Cadmus, from whom they suppose themselves derived; for the youngest of Ishmael's sons was called Kedemah, Gen. xxv. 15. which the Syriac renders Kedem, the very name of Cadmus in the Eastern tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I pass it by, and return to the subject of our discourse, which gives a plausible account of the ground of this kindred. We have already shewed that the Pelasgi were the first who peopled Greece, (*κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν ἐπεπόλασε*, is Strabo's expression of that nation, that it spread over all Greece;) and withal it appears that the chief seat of the Pelasgi was in Arcadia, to which next adjoins Laconia, and therefore in all probability was peopled by them; and besides, the Dorians sprang from the Pelasgi, and the Spartans were a part of the Dorians, as appears already out of Grotius; so that what kindred the Pelasgi had, was derived down to the Spartans; and we have manifested that these Pelasgi were from Phaleg; and the Scripture tells us that Phaleg was the son of Eber, from whom Abraham came in a direct and lineal succession. And thus the Jews coming from Abraham, and the Spartans by the Pelasgi from Phaleg, they both came out of the same stock: for so Josephus expresseth it; not that the Lacedæmonians came from Abraham, but that the Jews and they were both *ἐξ ἑνὸς γένους*, *out of the same stock, and both had relation to Abraham*; the Jews as coming in a direct line, the Spartans as deriving from Phaleg, from whom Abraham came. And thus much may now suffice to clear the first plantation of Greece, and to shew how consonant it is to sacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, because of the serviceableness of this discourse to that end, and to shew what use may be made of this kind of learning, for vindicating the honour of the sacred Scriptures.

Gen. xi. 17, 28.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of nations, is the peopling of that vast continent of America, which I cannot think we have yet sufficient information, either concerning the passages thither, especially east and north, or concerning any records the Indians have among themselves, absolutely to determine any thing in it. It seems most probable that the several parts of it were peopled at several times, and from several parts, especially north and east; but to go about absolutely to determine from what nation, in what age, by what means they were first

peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain discoveries of it. I choose therefore rather to refer the reader to the bandyings of this controversy in the many writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the decision of it. Only in the general it appears, from the remaining tradition of the flood, and many rites and customs used among them, that they had the same original with us; and that there can be no argument brought against it from themselves, since some authors tell us, that the eldest accounts and memoirs they have do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their testimony can be of no validity in a matter of so great antiquity as the origin of nations is.

CHAP. IV.

V. Grot. Joh. de Laet. Horn. de Orig. Gent. American. V. Manesse Ben Israel. Spes Israel. Et Spizzel. de Israel. American.

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

I. *That there were some Remainders of the ancient History of the World preserved in the several Nations after the Dispersion.* II. *How it came to be corrupted: by Decay of Knowledge, Increase of Idolatry, Confusion of Languages.* III. *An Enquiry into the Cause of that. Difficulties against the common Opinion that Languages were confounded at* Babel. IV. *Those Difficulties cleared.* V. *Of the Fabulousness of Poets. The particular Ways whereby the* Heathen *Mythology arose. Attributing the general History of the World to their own Nation. The Corruption of* Hebraisms. *Alteration of Names. Ambiguity of Sense in the* Oriental *Languages.* VI. *Attributing the Actions of many to one Person; as in* Jupiter, Bacchus, *&c.* VII. *The Remainders of Scripture-history among the* Heathens. *The Names of God,* Chaos: *formation of Man among the* Phœnicians. *Of* Adam *among the* Germans, Egyptians, Cilicians. Adam *under* Saturn; Cain *among the* Phœnicians; Tubal-Cain *and* Jubal *under* Vulcan *and* Apollo; Naamah *under* Minerva. VIII. Noah *under* Saturn, Janus, Prometheus, *and* Bacchus. IX. Noah's *three Sons under* Jupiter, Neptune, *and* Pluto. Canaan *under* Mercury; Nimrod *under* Bacchus; Magog *under* Prometheus. *Of* Abraham *and* Isaac *among the* Phœnicians. X. Jacob's *Service under* Apollo's. *The* βαιτύλια *from* Bethel; Joseph *under* Apis; Moses *under* Bacchus; Joshua *under* Hercules; Balaam *under the old* Silenus.

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I. THE main particulars contained in the Scriptures concerning the history of ancient times, being thus far cleared, there remains only that evidence which there is of the truth of the historical part of those eldest times, in those footsteps of it which are contained in the Heathen mythology. For we cannot conceive, since we have manifested that all mankind did come from the posterity of Noah, that all those passages which concerned the history of the world should be presently obliterated and extinguished among them, but some kind of tradition would be still preserved; although by degrees it would be so much altered for want of certain records to preserve it in, that it would be a hard matter to discover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true history itself from whence it was first taken. For it fared with this

tradition of the first ages of the world, as with a person who hath a long time travelled in foreign parts, who, by the variety of climes and countries, may be so far altered from what he was, that his own relations may not know him upon his return, but only by some certain marks which he hath in his body; by which they are assured, that, however his complexion and visage may be altered, yet the person is the same still. Thus it was in this original tradition of the world, through its continual passing from one age to another, and the various humours, tempers, and designs of men, it received strange disguises and alterations as to its outward favour and complexion; but yet there are some such certain marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main subject of our enquiry here. 1. *By what means the original tradition came to be altered and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may discern its true original*, or what evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-history in the Heathen mythology. CHAP. V.

II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the tradition by degrees came to be corrupted; there may be some more general, and others more particular. The general causes of it were,

1. The gradual decay of knowledge, and increase of barbarism in the world, occasioned by the want of certain records to preserve the ancient history of the world in; which we at large discoursed of in our entrance on this subject. Now in the decay of knowledge, there must needs follow a sudden and strange alteration of the memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preserve it but the most uncertain report of fame, which alters and disguiseth things according to the humours, and inclinations, and judgments of those whose hands it passeth through. Book i. c. 1. sect. 16.

2. The gradual increase of idolatry in the world; which began soon after the dispersion of nations, and in whose age we cannot at so great a distance, and in so great obscurity, precisely determine; but as soon as idolatry came in, all the ancient tradition was made subservient in order to that end; and those persons, whose memories were preserved in several nations, by degrees came to be worshipped under diversities of names; and such things were annexed to the former traditions, as would tend most to advance the greatest superstition in the world.

3. The confusion of languages at Babel was one great reason of corrupting the ancient tradition of the world.

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For in so great variety (as suddenly happened) of languages in the world, it cannot be conceived but such things which might be preserved in some uniform manner, had all nations used the same language, would, through the diversity of idioms, and properties of several tongues, be strangely altered and disguised, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of languages in the world, upon the confusion of tongues at Babel, brought as great a confusion into the original tradition, as it did among those who were the designers of that work.

III. And because this subject of the original and cause of this diversity of languages among men, doth both tend to explain the present subject, and to clear the truth of Scripture-history, I shall a little further enquire into it; chiefly on this account, because it is pretended that such a confusion is needless, which is delivered in Scripture, for the producing such diversities of languages, which would arise through mere length of time, and the varieties of climes and customs in the world. But if we only speak concerning the sense of Moses about it, the enquiry is of greater difficulty than at first view it seems to be. For it is pretended that Moses no where speaks of a diversity of languages, as we understand it, but only of a confusion of their speech who were at Babel, which might well be, although they all used the same language; that is, there might be a confusion raised in their minds; that they could not understand one another; their notions of things being disturbed, so that, though they heard one word, they had different apprehensions of it; some thinking it signified one thing, and some another: as Julius Scaliger tells us, that the Jews he had conversed with did not understand by it a multiplication of tongues, but only by that confusion their former notions of things, by the same words, were altered. As if one called for אבן, a stone, one by that word understands lime, another water, another sand, &c. this must needs produce a strange confusion among them, and enough to make them desist from their work. But supposing no such division of languages there, yet after their dispersion, which might be caused by the former confusion, by the different laws, rites and customs, commerce and trading, and tract of time, there would have risen a division of their several tongues. But if there were such a division of tongues miraculously caused there, (that, as it is commonly said, all those who were of the same language went together in their several companies,) whence comes it to pass, that

V. Mer. Casaub. de quatuor Linguis, p. 3, &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cordan. 259. sect. 1.

in their dispersion we read of several families dispersed which used the same language after their dispersion; as all the sons of Canaan, mentioned Gen. x. 15, 16, 17, 18, used the Canaanitish tongue; in Greece, Javan and Elisa had the same language; in Egypt, Misraim and Pathrusim; in Arabia, the sons of Joktan and Chus; in Chaldæa, Aram, and Uz, the inhabitants of Syria, Mash of Mesopotamia, Nimrod of Babylon, Assur of Assyria: whence comes it to pass, if their several tongues were the cause of their dispersion, that these several heads of families should use the same tongue? Another reason against the common opinion is this, which seems to have a great deal of force in it. If tongues were divided at Babel, as it is imagined, whence was it, that the nearer any nation lay to those who had the primitive language, the Hebrew, they did participate more of that tongue than those who were more remote, as is plain in the Chaldæans, Canaanites, Greeks, and others? Whereas if their languages were divided at Babel, they would have retained their own languages as well as others. This very argument prevailed so far with the learned Is. Casaubon, as appears by his *Adversaria* on this subject, (published by the learned Doctor's son,) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the several tongues to be only some variations from the Hebrew; but yet so as many new words were invented too. Hence he observes, that the Asiatic Greeks came nearer to the Hebrew than the European. And if this opinion hold true, it is the best foundation for deriving other languages from the Hebrew; a thing attempted by the same learned person, as you may see in the book fore-cited, and endeavoured by Guichardus, Avenarius, and others. Thus we see there is no agreement in men's minds concerning the division of tongues at Babel.

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Casaub. Diatrib. de L. Heb. p. 17, 18.

P. 47.

But having set down this opinion, with its reasons, I shall not so leave the received opinion, but shall first see what may be said for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the understanding reader. And it seems to be grounded on these reasons. 1. That had it been left to men's own choice, there cannot be a sufficient reason assigned of the diversity of languages in the world. For there being one language originally in the world, whereby men did represent their conceptions to one another, we cannot imagine that men should of themselves introduce so great an alteration, as whereby to take off that necessary society and converse

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with each other, which even nature itself did put men upon. Hence Calvin and others conclude that *prodigii loco habenda est linguarum diversitas;* because there having been that freedom of converse among men, it is not to be supposed they should of themselves cut it off to their mutual disadvantage. But to this it is said, *That the long tract of time, and diversity of customs, might alter the language.* I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their languages, wherein their customs differed: so that there would remain still such an agreement as whereby they might understand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldest languages. As for the length of time, though that doth alter much in reference to words and phrases, in which that of Horace holds true, *Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere,* &c. yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of time hath brought a whole language out of use, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deserves well to be considered, is this, that the greatest alteration of languages in the world hath risen from colonies of nations that used another language; and so by the mixture of both together, the language might be much altered: as the Hebrew by the Chaldees in Babylon; the Spanish, Italian, and others, by the Latin, as Breerwood shews; our own by the Normans and others. So that were there not a diversity of languages supposed, this interfering of people would bring no considerable alteration along with it, no more than a colony from New England would alter our language here. And as for another cause assigned of the change of languages, the difference of climates, which Bodin gives as the reason why the northern people use consonants and aspirates so much, especially the Saxons, and those that live by the Baltic sea, who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus ponum finum.* And so R. D. Kimchi observes of the Ephraimites, Judges xii. 6. that it was the air that was the cause of their lisping, and calling it Sibboleth, as he there observes the men of Sarphath, that is, the French, that they could not pronounce Schin, but pronounced it like Thau Raphe. But by these examples we see that this would cause only an alteration as to some letters and syllables, and rather as to the pronunciation, than any variety of the language. So that we see that, setting aside the confusion of languages at Babel, there can be no reason sufficient assigned for the variety of languages in the world. 2. Though it be granted that a

Calvin. Annot. in Gen. xi. 1, 2.

Breerwood's Enquiries, c. 5, 6.

Bodin. Method. Hist. c. 9. p. 370.

Mayer. Prodr. Chaldaism. c. 1.

confusion in their minds, without distinct languages, were enough to make them desist from their work, yet the context in that place, Gen. xi. doth infer a diversity of tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and consequents; as from the first verse, where it is not conceivable why it should be there taken notice of as such a remarkable circumstance, that then they had but one language before they set upon this work, if there was not a diversity of tongues caused by the work they went about; but especially ver. 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing, that they had but one language, wherein they were so confident to carry on their work; therefore, ver. 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their language, it must be by multiplying that language into many more; for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other verse. And what is there added, *their not understanding one another's speech*, seems to refer not to their inward conceptions, as though they did not understand one another's minds, but to the outward expressions, as שפת doth apparently relate to them: further, in ver. 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion; which, had the tongue been the same afterwards as it was before, could have been no reason for it. Again, some argue from the name Babel given to the place, from בלל, which signifies to *confound* and mingle things of several kinds together. So used Judges xix. 21. Isaiah xxx. 24. Job vi. 5. &c. thence the name בבל for בלבל, the middle ל left out, as in Golgotha for Golgoltha, Kigaltha for Kilkaltha, and others of a like nature. Besides, there seems to be somewhat in what is said, *that the families were divided according to their tongues*, Gen. x. 5, 20, 31; which doth at least imply a diversity of tongues among them; the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of languages at Babel. Further, this seems most agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a present judgment upon them, but that which might remain to posterity as a note of the folly of their ancestors. Those who recede from the common opinion, lest they should give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a miracle which might be done without, seem to be more wary than wise in it. For besides that it is certain that miracles may be in those things which might be effected otherwise by natural causes, when they are produced without the help of those causes,

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and in a space of time impossible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet proved how such diversity of tongues as is in the world would have been effected without such a miracle, it must be granted by them that there was a miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there should be in the variety of languages, than in the signification of the same words, I understand not. But I see no necessity of asserting that every one of the families had a distinct language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72 (as the Gr.) families, and as many languages, is now taken for a groundless fancy by learned men; as is easily proved from the dividing father and children, whose families could not certainly be without them; and some supposed to be unborn then, as Joktan's 13 children; especially if we say, as many do, that the confusion was at the birth of Phaleg, and Joktan was his younger brother, as the Jews generally do. To the last objection it may be replied, that the agreement of languages in some radical words doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other; as is plain in the Persian and German, in which learned men have observed so many words alike. And so by Busbequius of the inhabitants about Tauric Chersonese; and so in most of our modern tongues there may be some words alike, without any such dependence or derivation. Again, though it be granted that the languages of them who were at Babel were confounded, yet it is not necessary we should say that all Noah's posterity were there. It is thought by some that they were chiefly Cham and his company; if so, then Sem and his posterity might retain the language they had before, only with some variations. But this is very uncertain, unless we take it for Heber and Phaleg, from whose vicinity other bordering nations might make use of many of their primitive words; and for the Greeks, it will be granted that many of their words, especially the old Bœotic, had affinity with the Hebrew; but it was from the Pelasgi at first, and Cadmus the Phœnician afterwards; the old Canaanitish language being, if not the pure Hebrew, yet a dialect of that tongue, as is proved by many learned men. But however these things be, it is not necessary to say that all mother-tongues, so called, were then existent at that confusion: but the present curse did divide their languages who were there, and that all division of languages since is to be looked upon as the effect of that curse.

Bochart. Geog. l. i. c. 15.

Buxt. Diatr. sect. 54.

Ibid. sect. 68.

Lips. cent. 3. Ep. xliv.

Busbeq. Ep. xxiv.

Mayer. Philol. Sacr. p. ii. c. 6.

It being thus manifested what a strange confusion of

languages was caused in the world, we may thereby easily understand how the ancient tradition came to be corrupted and altered in the world. CHAP. V.

Another reason of the alteration of the ancient traditions, was the fabulousness of the poets: for these made it their design to disguise all their ancient stories under fables, in which they were so lost, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder poets of Greece being men of greater learning than generally the people were of, and being conversant in Egypt and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times, which they received from the nations they went to; and by mixing their own traditions and others together, and by suiting what was remaining of the ancient tradition to these, they must needs make a strange confusion of things together, and leave them much more obscure and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and subtlety lay, in putting a new face on whatever they borrowed from other nations, and making them appear among themselves in a Greek habit, that the former owners of those traditions could scarce challenge them as theirs under so strange a metamorphosis. For those things which were most plain and historical in the fountains whence they derived them, they did so τερατεύειν, as Clemens Alexandrinus speaks, (or as Origen, παραχέσαντες ἀνέπλασαν,) wrapt them up under so great mythology, that the original truths can hardly be discerned, because of that multitude of prodigious fables with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their artifice was in the doing this, we may yet discern apparently many of those particular courses which were taken by them to disguise and alter the primitive tradition. V. 4. Clemens Strom. 6. c. Orig. cont. Celsum, l. iv.

1. Attributing what was done by the great ancestors of mankind to some persons of their own nations. Thus the Thessalians make Deucalion to be the person who escaped the flood, and from whom the world was peopled after it. And whoever compares the relation of the flood of Deucalion in Apollodorus, with that in the Scripture, might easily render Apollodorus's Greek in the language of the Scriptures, only changing Greece into the whole earth, and Deucalion into Noah, Parnassus into Ararat, and Jupiter into Jehovah. On the same account the Athenians attribute the flood to Ogyges; not that the flood of Ogyges and Deucalion were particular and distinct deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needless pains to place in their several ages, but as Deu- Apollod. Biblioth. l. i. p. 1.

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calion was of the eldest memory in Thessaly, so was Ogyges at Athens; and so the flood, as being a matter of remotest antiquity, was on the same account in both places attributed to both these: because as mankind was supposed to begin again after the flood, so they had among them no memory extant of any elder than these two, from whom, on that account, they supposed mankind derived. And on the same reason it may be supposed that the Assyrians attribute the flood to Xisuthrus, whom they supposed to be a king of Assyria: but the circumstances of the story, as delivered by Alexander Polyhistor and Abydenus, are such as make it clear to be only a remainder of the universal flood, which happened in the time of Noah. So the Thessalians make Prometheus to be the Protoplast; the Peloponnesians Phoroneus, as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us, whom Phoronides the poet calls πατέρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *The Father of Mankind.* This may be now the first way of corrupting the ancient tradition, by supposing all that was conveyed by it to have been acted among themselves; which may be imputed partly to their ignorance of the state of their ancient times, and partly to their pride, lest they should seem to be behind others in matters of antiquity.

Apud Cyr. c. Julian.

Clemens Pæd. l. i. c. 8. p. 138. Ed. Oxon.

2. Another fountain of Heathen mythology, was the taking the idiom of the Oriental languages in a proper sense. For whether we suppose the ancient traditions were conveyed to them in the ancient Hebrew by the Pelasgi, or were delivered to them by the Phœnicians, or were fetched out of the Scriptures themselves, (as some suppose, though improbably, of Homer and some ancient poets,) yet all these several ways agreeing in this, that the traditions were oriental, we thereby understand how much of their mythology came by taking the Hebrew in a proper and literal sense, without attending to the idiom of the tongue. From hence Bochartus hath ingeniously fetched many Heathen fables. Thus when Noah is said to be איש האדמה Gen. ix. 20. which in the idiom of the Hebrew only signifies a *husbandman*, they took it in a proper sense for ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γῆς, and thence Saturn, who was the same with Noah, (as will appear afterwards,) is made by mythologists the husband of Rhea; which was the same with the *earth*. So the giants making war against heaven, was only a poetical adumbration of the design at the building of Babel, whose top in the Scripture is said to reach בשמים, which in the Hebrew signifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the story, was taken in

Gen. xi. 4.

the literal interpretation, that they attempted heaven. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, Bochartus thinks it might be taken from that phrase of Nimrod, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לפני יהוה, *before the Lord* we render it, but it sometimes signifies *against the Lord*. So what Abydenus saith of the giants, that they were ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀνάσχοντες, *those that came out of the earth*, is supposed to be taken from that phrase, Gen. x. 11. מן הארץ יצא, *terra ipsa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which learned men are generally agreed in concerning Bacchus's being born of Jupiter's *thigh*, which is only an expression of that Hebraism יצאי ירכו, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phrase for ordinary procreation.

Ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. ix. c. 14.

Gen. xlvi. 26.

3. A third way observable, is the alteration of the names in the ancient tradition, and putting names of like importance to them in their own language. Thus Jupiter, who was the same with Cham, was called Ζεὺς παρὰ τὴν ζέσιν, as חם from חמם *fervere, incalescere*. Ἄμμωνα γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι καλέουσι τὸν Δία, saith Herodotus; him whom the Greeks call Ζεὺς, the Egyptians call Cham. So Japhet, whose memory was preserved under Neptune, to whose portion the islands in the sea fell, was called by the Greeks Ποσειδῶν, which comes (saith Bochartus) from the Punic פישיט, which signifies *large* and *broad*, which is the very importance of the Hebrew יפת; thence, in allusion to the name, it is said, Gen. ix. 27. יפת אלהים ליפת, *God shall enlarge Japhet*. Thence the epithets of Neptune are Εὐρύστερνος, Εὐρύοψ, Εὐρυχρείων, all equally alluding to the name Japhet. So Ἀπόλλων, in the Greek, is of the same importance with the Hebrew שד, *Dæmon*, from שדד, *to destroy*. Thence we read, Deut. xxxii. 17. *they sacrificed* לשדים, *to devils*. Canaan in the Hebrew signifies a merchant; thence Mercury, under whom the memory of Canaan, the son of Cham, was preserved, is derived by many from כנר, *to sell*. Ceres, which was the inventress of agriculture, from גרש, which imports *bread-corn*. These and many others are produced by Vossius, Heinsius, Bochartus, and other learned men, which I insist not on, because my design is only *digitos ad fontes intendere*, and to make these handsome and probable conjectures argumentative to our purpose, and to bind up those loose and scattering observations into some order and method, in which they have not yet appeared, nor been improved to that end which I make use of them for.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. i. c. 1.

When the Oriental phrases were ambiguous and equi-

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vocal, they omitted that sense which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more strange and fabulous. From hence the learned Bochartus hath fetched the fable of the Golden Fleece, which was nothing else but robbing the treasury of the king of Colchis; but it was disguised under the name of the *Golden Fleece*, because the Syriac word גזא signifies both a *fleece* and a *treasury*. So the bulls and dragons that kept it were nothing but the walls and brazen gates; for שור signifies both a *bull* and a *wall*, and נחש, *brass* and a *dragon*. And so the fable of the brass bull in the mountain of Tabyrus, which foretold calamities, arose from the equivocation of the Phœnician or Hebrew words מנחש אליף, which signify either *doctor, augur*, or *bos ex ære*, a *foreteller* of *events*, or a *brazen bull*. From the like ambiguity of the word אלפיא arose the fable of Jupiter stealing Europa in the form of a bull, because the word either signifies a *ship*, in which he conveyed her away, or a *bull;* or it may be the ship had παράσημον *bovis*, as the ship St. Paul sailed in had Castor and Pollux; it being usual to call their ships by the names of the signs they carried. From the like equivocation in the Phœnician language doth Bochartus fetch many other Heathen fables, in his excellent piece *de Phœnicum Coloniis;* as particularly that of Arethusa coming from Alpheus, which was from אלפי a *ship*, because it was not far from an *excellent haven*. And so he makes the Chimæra to be no more than a mere *ens rationis;* for he takes the Chimæra which Bellerophon conquered, to be only the people of Solymi under the three generals, Aryus, Trosibis, and Arsalus; ארי that signifies a *lion;* Trosibis was ראש חויא, *the head of a serpent;* Arsalus was אורזיל, a *young kid;* and so the Chimæra consisted of *the form of a lion, a goat, and a serpent*. Thus we see how easy a matter it was to advance the Heathen mythology from the equivocation of the Oriental languages, in which their traditions were conveyed to them.

Bochart. Canaan. l. i. c. 28.

Ibid. l. i. c. 6.

VI. 5. But yet a more prolific principle of mythology was by attributing the actions of several persons to one, who was the first or the chief of them. Thus it was in the stories of Jupiter, Neptune, Mars, Mercury, Minerva, Juno, Bacchus, and Hercules; which were a collection of the actions done by a multitude of persons, which were all attributed to one person. So Vossius tells us, before the time of the Trojan wars, most of their kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called Joves. Now when the actions of all these were attributed to one Jupiter of

Voss. de Idol. l. i.

Crete, they must needs swell his story up with abundance of fables. Vossius hath taken a great deal of pains to digest, in an historical manner, the stories of the several Jupiters; whereof he reckons two Argives, a third the father of Hercules, a fourth a king of Phrygia, and two more of Crete; to one of which, without any distinction, the actions of all the rest were ascribed, and who was worshipped under the name of Jupiter. And so besides the ancient Neptune, who was the same with Japhet, they sometimes understood any insular prince, or one that had great power at sea: but besides these, there were two famous Neptunes among the Greeks; the one of Athens, the other the builder of the walls of Troy. Now the stories of all these being mixed together, must needs make a strange confusion. So for Mars, besides that ancient one they had by the Oriental tradition, they had a Spartan, Thracian, and Arcadian Mars. What abundance of Mercuries are we told of by Tully; and of no less than five Minervas! Every angry, scornful, jealous queen would fill up the fables of Juno; who was equally claimed by the Argives and Samians. What contests were there between the Greeks and Egyptians, concerning the country of Bacchus, or *Liber Pater*, whose story was made up of many patches of the Oriental story, as will appear afterwards. The same may be said of Hercules. Now what a strange way was this to increase the number of fables! When they had one whose memory was anciently preserved among them, they attributed the actions of all such to him, who came near him in that which his memory was most remarkable for: and in those things which they did retain of the Eastern tradition, it was an usual thing to confound persons, places, and actions together. So the story of Enoch and Methuselah is joined together by Stephanus de Urbibus, under the name of Ἄννακος, who is there said to live above 300 years (which agrees with Enoch, as the name doth,) and that at his death the world should be destroyed by a flood; which agrees with Methuselah. So Abraham by Orpheus is called Μονογενὴς, which belongs to Isaac his son; so the actions of Nimrod, Ninus, and Cham, are confounded together in their mythology. By these several ways now we understand how the original tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen mythology.

CHAP. V.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. iii.

Steph. V. Ἰκόνιον.

VII. I come now to the footsteps of Scripture-history, which, notwithstanding these corruptions, may be discerned in the Heathen mythology; which I shall me-

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thodically enquire after according to the series of Scripture-history. That the names given to God in Scripture were preserved among the Phœnicians, appears sufficiently by the remainders of the Phœnician theology, translated by Philo Byblius out of Sanchoniathon; wherein we read of the God Ἰάω, which hath the same letters with יהוה; besides which, there we meet with Ἐλιοῦν, the same with עליון, *The most High*, and Ἶλος, which is אל, *The strong God*; Beelsamen, which is בעל שמין *The God of Heaven*; and Ἐλωεὶμ, the very name of God used in the beginning of Genesis so often. Besides, in those fragments we have express mention of the chaos, and the evening following it, or *the darkness on the face of the deep*; the *creation of angels* under the Ζοφασημὶν, צופה שמים, those beings which contemplate the heavens; and the creation of mankind, Ἐκ τῆ κόλπου ἀνέμου, i. e. קול פי יה, saith Bochartus, *The voice of the mouth of God*, which is by God's word and inspiration, when it is expressed that God said, *Let us make man*, and that he *breathed into him the breath of life*. After we read of γήϊνος and αὐτόχθων, which properly agree to Adam, who was made out of the earth. Vossius conceives that the memory of Adam was preserved among the old Germans; of whom Tacitus speaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuistonem Deum, terra editum, et filium Mannum, originem gentis conditoresque.* Either by *Tuisto* Adam is understood, who was formed of the earth, and by *Mannus*, Noah; or by *Tuisto* God may be understood, and by *Mannus*, Adam: to which conjecture may be added further, that the same author reports that some of the Germans sacrificed to Isis; which Vossius likewise conceives to be a remainder of the Hebrew Ischa. And so among the Egyptians it is with like probability conceived that Adam and Ischa were preserved under Osiris and Isis, as they were historically taken. In Cilicia, the city Adana is thought to have some remainder of the name of Adam; for the Greeks had no termination in M, therefore for Adam they pronounced it Adan, and that from Ἀδανὸς; and so the city Adana. Now that Ἀδανὸς, by Stephanus de Urbibus, is said to be the *son of Heaven and Earth.* Ἔστι δὲ ὁ Ἀδανὸς γῆς καὶ οὐρανῦ παῖς. This Adanus, he tells us, was otherwise called Κρόνος, or Saturn, under whom the Greeks preserved the memory of Adam; for Diodorus, Thallus, Cassius, Severus, and Cornelius Nepos, do all (as Tertullian saith) confess Saturn to have been a man; and, according to their fables, he must have been the first of men. Saturn

V. Scaliger. Not. in. Frag. Græc. Selden. de Diis Syr. Bochart. Cana. l. ii. c. 2.

Voss. de Idol. l. i. c. 38. Tacit. de Moribus German. c. 2. Ed. Ernest.

Stephan. V. Ἀδανά.

Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.

was the son of *Heaven and Earth*, and so was Adam: he taught men husbandry: and was not Adam the first that tilled the ground? Besides, that power which Saturn had, and was deposed from, doth fitly set out the dominion man had in the golden age of innocency, which he lost by his own folly; and Adam's hiding himself from the presence of the Lord, gave occasion to the name of Saturn, from *satar*, to hide. We find something of Cain preserved in the Phœnician antiquities, under the name of Ἀγρούηρος, or Ἀγρότης, the first countryman or husbandman, who with his brother Ἀγρὸς built houses; and the first foundation of a city is attributed to Cain: and on that account Vossius conjectures that the memory of Cain's wife was preserved under Vesta, both because she was the daughter of Saturn, *i. e.* of Adam, and that she is said τῶν οἰκῶν κατασκευὴν εὑρεῖν, *to find out first the way of building houses.* That Tubal-Cain gave first occasion to the name and worship of Vulcan, hath been very probably conceived, both from the very great affinity of the names, and that Tubal-Cain is expressly mentioned *to be an instructer of every artificer in brass and iron;* and as near relation as Apollo had to Vulcan, Jubal had to Tubal-Cain, who was the *inventor of music, or the father of all such as handle the harp and organ;* which the Greeks attribute to Apollo. And if that be true which Genebrard and others ascribe to Naamah, the sister of Jubal and Tubal-Cain, viz. that she was the inventor of spinning and weaving, then may she come in for Minerva. Thus we see there were some, though but obscure footsteps preserved even of that part of Scripture-history which preceded the flood.

CHAP. V.

Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 17.

Gen. iv. 22.

Gen. iv. 21.

VIII. The memory of the deluge itself we have already found to be preserved in the Heathen mythology; we come therefore to Noah and his posterity. Many parcels of Noah's memory were preserved in the scattered fragments of many fables, under Saturn, Janus, Prometheus, and Bacchus. Bochartus insists on no fewer than 14 parallels between Noah and the Heathen Saturn; which he saith are so plain, that there is no doubt but under Saturn Noah was understood in the Heathen mythology. Saturn was said to be the common parent of mankind; so was Noah. Saturn was a just king; Noah not only righteous himself, but a preacher of righteousness. The golden age of Saturn was between Noah and the dispersion of nations. In Noah's time all mankind had but one language, which the Heathens extend under Saturn both to

Bochart. Phal. l. i. c. 1.

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men and beasts. The plantation of vines attributed to Saturn by the Heathens; as to Noah by the Scriptures. The law of Saturn mentioned by the poets, that none should see the nakedness of the Gods without punishment, seems to respect the fact and curse of Cham, in reference to Noah. Saturn and Rhea, and those with them, are said to be born of Thetis, or the ocean; which plainly alludes to Noah and his company's escaping the flood: thence a ship was the symbol of Saturn; and that Saturn devoured all his children, seems to be nothing else but the destruction of the old world by Noah's flood. And not only under Saturn, but under Prometheus too, was Noah's memory preserved. Diodorus speaks of the great flood under Prometheus; and Prometheus implies one that hath forecast and wisdom, such as Noah had, whereby he foretold the flood, and was saved in it, when others were Epimetheus's, that had not wit to prevent their own destruction.

Diod. l. i.

And no wonder, if Prometheus were Noah, that the forming mankind was attributed to him, when the world was peopled from him. Herodotus' saying that Asia was Prometheus's wife, might relate to the country Noah lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of Noah's memory was preserved under Janus. The name of Janus is most probably derived from יין, because of Noah's planting a vine; and Janus was called Consivius, saith Macrobius, *à conserendo, hoc est, à propagine generis humani, quæ Jano autore conseritur.* Now to whom can this be so properly applied as to Noah, from whom mankind was propagated? And Janus's being *bifrons*, or looking πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω, *forward and backward*, is not so fit an emblem of any thing as of Noah's seeing those two ages before and after the flood. And it is further observable, which Plutarch speaks of in his Roman Questions, that the ancient coins had on one side the image of Janus with his two faces, on the other πλοίου πρύμναν ἢ πρῷραν ἐγκεχαραγμένην, *the fore or hinder part of the ship*; by which the memory of the ark of Noah seems to have been preserved. Thus we see what analogy there is in the story of Janus to that of Noah: not that I give credit to those fooleries which tell us of Noah's coming from Palestine with his son Japhet into Italy, and planting colonies there, for which we are beholden to the spurious Etrusean antiquities: but all that I assert is, that the story of Noah might be preserved in the eldest colonies, though disguised under other names, as here in the case

V. Mayer. Philol. Sacr. p. ii. c. 5.

of Janus. And on the same account that the name of Janus is attributed to Noah, some likewise believe him to have been the most ancient Bacchus, who was, according to Diodorus, Εὑρετὴς τῆς ἀμπέλου, *the first planter of vines, and instructer of men in making wines:* and besides, Bacchus's being twice born, seems only an adumbration of Noah's preservation after the flood; which might be accounted a second nativity, when the rest of the world was destroyed. And withal, Philostratus, in the Life of Apollonius, relates, that the ancient Indian Bacchus came thither out of Assyria, which yet more fully agrees with Noah. So that from these scattered members of Hippolytus, and these broken fragments of traditions, we may gather almost an entire history of all the passages concerning Noah. CHAP. V. Diod. Bibl. l. iii. Philostr. Vit. Apoll. c. 4.

IX. As the story of Saturn and Noah do much agree, so the three sons of Noah and those of Saturn, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, have their peculiar resemblances to each other: of which Vossius and Bochartus have largely spoken, and we have touched on already. Besides which, this latter author hath carried the parallel lower, and finds Canaan, the son of Cham, the same with Mercury, the son of Jupiter. As it was the curse of Canaan to be a servant of servants, so Mercury is always described under servile employments. His wings seem to be the ships of the Phœnicians, who were derived from Canaan, and his being the god of trade, noting the great merchandise of the Phœnicians, and Mercury's thievery noting the piracies, or at least the subtlety and craft of the Phœnicians. He was the father of eloquence and astronomy; as letters and astronomy came from the Phœnicians into Greece. The same author parallels Nimrod and Bacchus, and Magog and Prometheus together. The name of Bacchus is but a light variation of בר כוש, Bar-chus; as Nimrod was the son of Chus, and Bacchus is called Nebrodes by the Greeks, which is the very name of Nimrod among them; and Bacchus is called Ζωγρεὺς, which excellently interprets Nimrod's being a *mighty hunter*. Bacchus's expeditions into India were the attempts of Nimrod and the Assyrian emperors; on which account Vossius makes Nimrod or Belus the most ancient Mars; for Hestiæus Milesius speaks of Enyalius, which is Mars, his being in Sennaar of Babylonia. That the memory of Magog was preserved under Prometheus, these things make it probable, that Magog was the son of Japhet, as Prometheus of Iapetus; and that the posterity of Magog was placed Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 18. Bochart. Phaleg. l. i. c. 1, 2. Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 16.

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about Caucasus, where Prometheus is feigned to lie: and the eating of Prometheus's heart is only an interpretation of כמר; which, applied to the heart, signifies to *waste away*, and *be consumed*. Thus far Bochartus.

The Phœnician antiquities seem to have preserved the memory of Abraham's sacrificing his son Isaac, by that place which Eusebius produceth out of Porphyry's book concerning the Jews; where he relates, *how Saturn, whom the Phœnicians call Israel, when he reigned in those parts, and had an only son called Jeoud, of a nymph called Anobret, being under some great calamity, did sacrifice that son of his, being clothed with a royal habit.* Here we have a royal person called Israel; and that Abraham should be accounted a king in those elder times is nothing strange, considering his wealth, and what petty royalties there were in those times. But Grotius, and from him Vossius, do not think that Abraham was here called Israel, but that the transcriber of Eusebius meeting with Ἰλ, supposed it to be a contraction of Ἰσραὴλ, and so writ at length. It must be acknowledged that Ἰλ is used in the Phœnician theology for Saturn; but yet the circumstances of the story make the ordinary reading not improbable: neither is it strange that Abraham should be called by the name of the people which he was the progenitor of. That Isaac should be meant by his only son called Jeoud, is most likely; for when God bids Abraham go sacrifice him, he saith, *Take thy son*, יחיד, *thy only son*; Jehid is the same with the Phœnician Jeoud. That Sara is meant by Anobret, the original of the name implies; which is as Bochartus derives it חן־עוברת, Annoberet, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*; which the Apostle explains, *Through faith Sarah herself received strength to conceive seed.* Now all the difference is, that which was only designed and intended by Abraham, was believed by the Phœnicians as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their Ἀνθρωποθύσιαι, *sacrificing* of men; a thing so much in use among the Phœnicians, and all the colonies derived from them, as many learned men have at large shewed. But besides this, there are particular testimonies concerning Abraham, his age, wisdom, and knowledge; his coming out of Chaldæa, and the propagation of knowledge from him among the Chaldæans, Phœnicians, and Egyptians, are extant out of Berosus, Eupolemus, and others, in Josephus and Eusebius, and from thence transcribed by many learned men, which on that account I forbear transcribing, as being common and obvious.

V. Scaliger ad Frag. Græc.

Grot. in Deut. xviii. 10.

Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 18.

Gen. xxii. 2.

Bochart. de Phœn. Col. l. ii. c. 2.

Heb. xi. 11.

Joseph. Antiq. i. i. c. 8.

Eus. Præp. Evang. l. ix. c. 16.

Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of Jacob's long peregrination and service with his uncle Laban, was preserved under the story of Apollo's banishment, and being a shepherd under Admetus. For Callimachus reports, that love was the cause of Apollo's travels, as it was of Jacob's; and withal mentions a strange increase of cattle under Apollo's care, answerable to what the Scripture reports concerning Jacob. But it is more certain that the memory of Jacob's setting up the stone he had rested on for a pillar, and pouring oil upon it, and calling the place Bethel, was preserved under the anointed stones, which the Phœnicians from Bethel called Βαιτύλια, as hath been frequently observed by learned men; from whence came the custom of *anointing stones* among the Heathens, of which so very many have largely discoursed. Thence the proverb of a superstitious man, πάντα λίθον λιπαρὸν προσκυνεῖ, which Arnobius calls *lubricatum lapidem, et ex olivi unguine sordidatum.* It seems the anointing the stones with oil was then the symbol of the consecration of them. The name Βαίτυλος for such a stone occurs in Hesychius, the Greek etymologists, Damascius in Photius, and others. That the memory of Joseph in Egypt was preserved under the Egyptian Apis, hath been shewed with a great deal of probability by the learned Vossius, in his often-cited piece of idolatry, from the testimonies of Julius Maternus, Rufinus, and Suidas; and from these three arguments. 1. The greatness of the benefit which the Egyptians received by Joseph; which was of that nature that it could not easily be forgot, and that no symbol was so proper to set it out as the Egyptian Apis, because the famine was portended by lean kine, and the plenty by fat; and Minucius at Rome, for relieving the people in a time of famine, had a statue of a golden bull erected to his memory. 2. The Egyptians were not backward to testify their respect to Joseph, as appears by Pharaoh's rewarding him. Now it was the custom of the Egyptians to preserve the memories of their great benefactors by some symbols to posterity; which were at first intended only for a civil use, although they were after abused to superstition and idolatry. 3. From the names of Apis and Serapis. Apis he conceives to be the sacred name of Joseph among the Egyptians, and is as much as אב, *father;* so Joseph himself saith, he was as a father to Pharaoh. And Serapis, as Rufinus and Suidas both tell us, had a bushel upon his head; and Serapis is probably derived from שׁוֹר, *Sor*, which signifies a *bull*, and

Callimach. Hymn. in Apoll.

Gen. xxviii. 18. Scalig. Not. in Frag. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. ii. c. 2. Seld. de Diis Syris. V. Heins. in Clem. Al. Strom. 7. Casaubon. ad Theoph. p. 295. Herald. ad Arnob. l. i. Colvium ad Apul. Flor. Ouzel. et Elmenhorst. ad Minuc. de Idol. l. i. c. 29.

Gen. xlv. 8.

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Apis. So that by this means the story of Joseph is attested by the Egyptians' superstitions; of which they can give no account so likely as this is.

XI. Many things concerning Moses are preserved in the story of Bacchus; not that from thence we are to conclude that Moses was the Bacchus of the Greeks, as Vossius thinks; but they took several parts of the Eastern traditions concerning him, which they might have from the Phœnicians who came with Cadmus into Greece, while the memory of Moses was yet fresh among the Canaanites. In the story of Bacchus, as Vossius observes, it is expressly said that he was born in Egypt, and that soon after his birth he was put in an ark, and exposed to the river; which tradition was preserved among the Brasiatæ of Laconica: and Bacchus in Orpheus is called Μίσης, and by Plutarch *de Iside et Osiride*, Palæstinus; and he is called Βιμάτωρ, which agrees to Moses, who, besides his own mother, was adopted by Pharaoh's daughter. Bacchus was likewise commended for his beauty, as Moses was, and was said to be educated in a mount of Arabia called Nysa; which agrees with Moses's residence in Arabia forty years. So Plutarch mentions Φυγὰς Διονύσου, the *banishments* of Bacchus; and Nonnus mentions Bacchus's flight into the Red Sea; who likewise mentions his battles in Arabia, and with the neighbouring princes there. Diodorus saith, that Bacchus's army had not only men, but women in it; which is most true of the company which Moses led. Orpheus calls Bacchus Θεσμοφόρον, and attributes to him Δίπλακα Θεσμὸν: whereby we understand Moses's being a legislator, and that he delivered the laws in two tables. Moses's fetching water out of a rock with his rod, is preserved in the Orgia of Bacchus; in which Euripides relates, that Agave and the rest of the Bacchæ celebrating the Orgia, one of them touched a rock, and the water came out: and in the same Orgia Euripides reports how they were wont to crown their heads with serpents; probably in memory of the cure of the fiery serpents in the wilderness. A dog is made the companion of Bacchus; which is the signification of Caleb, who so faithfully adhered to Moses. To these and some other circumstances insisted on by Vossius, Bochartus adds two more very considerable ones; which are, that Nonnus reports of Bacchus, that he touched the two rivers, Orontes and Hydaspes, with his *thyrsus*, or rod, and that the rivers dried, and he passed through them; and that his ivy-staff being thrown upon the

Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 30.

Non. Dion. l. xx.

Diod. l. iv.

Bochart. Canaan. l. i. c. 18.

ground, crept up and down like a serpent; and that the Indians were in darkness while the Bacchæ enjoyed light: which circumstances considered, will make every one that hath judgment say as Bochartus doth, *Ex mirabili illo consensu vel cæcis apparebit priscos fabularum architectos a scriptoribus sacris multa esse mutuatos.* From this wonderful agreement of Heathen mythology with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of Joshua and Sampson was preserved under Hercules Tyrius, is made likewise very probable from several circumstances of the stories. Others have deduced the many rites of Heathen worship from those used in the Tabernacle among the Jews. Several others might be insisted on; as the parallel between Og and Typho, and between the old Silenus and Balaam; both noted for their skill in divination; both taken by water, Num. xxii. 5; both noted for riding on an ass: ἐπὶ ὄνου τὰ πολλὰ ὀχούμενος, saith Lucian of the old Silenus; and that which makes it more probable, is that of Pausanias, Ἐν γὰρ τῇ Ἑβραίων χώρᾳ Σιληνοῦ μνῆμα, which some learned men have been much puzzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture, which I here propound, may pass at least for a probable account of it. But I shall no longer insist on these things, having, I suppose, done what is sufficient to our purpose, which is, to make it appear what footsteps there are of the truth of Scripture-history amidst all the corruptions of Heathen mythology.

Vossius de Idol. l. i. c. 26. p. 118, 169.

Lucian. de Deor. Con.

Pausan. l. vi. p. 391. Ed. Xyland.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

I. *Concerning Matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the Terms of Salvation only contained therein. The Ground of the Disesteem of the Scripture is tacit Unbelief.* II. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifested as to the Matters which God hath revealed therein.* IV. *The Excellency of the Discoveries of God's Nature which are in Scripture.* V. *Of the Goodness and Love of God in Christ. The Suitableness of those Discoveries of God to our natural Notions of a Deity. The Necessity of God's making known himself to us, in order to the regulating our Conceptions of him.* VI. *The Scriptures give the fullest Account of the State of Men's Souls, and the Corruptions which are in them. The only Way of pleasing God discovered in the Scriptures.* VII. *The Scriptures contain Matters of greatest Mysteriousness, and most universal Satisfaction to Men's Minds.* VIII. *The Excellency of the Manner wherein Things are revealed in Scriptures, in regard of Clearness, Authority, Purity,* IX. *Uniformity, and Persuasiveness.* X. *The Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of Life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion, and the Reasonableness of them. The Greatness of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.* XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in Order to Man's Salvation.*

BOOK III. I. HAVING thus largely proved the truth of all those passages of sacred Scripture, which concern the history of the first ages of the world, by all those arguments which a subject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the divinity of the Scriptures, is the consideration of those matters contained in it, which are in an especial manner said to be of Divine revelation. For those historical passages, though we believe them, as contained in the Scripture, to have been divinely inspired, as well as others, yet they are such things as, supposing no Divine revelation, might have been known sufficiently to the world, had not men been wanting to themselves as to the care and means of preserving them. But those matters which I now come to discourse of, are of a more sublime and transcendent nature; such as it had been impossible for the minds of men to reach, had they not been immediately discovered

by God himself. And those are the terms and conditions on which the soul of man may upon good grounds expect an eternal happiness; which we assert the book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might, by the improvements of reason, and the sagacity of their minds, discover much, not only of the lapsed condition of their souls, and the necessity of a purgation of them, in order to their felicity, but might in the general know what things are pleasing and acceptable to the Divine nature, from those differences of good and evil, which are unalterably fixed in the things themselves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the remission of sins, to recover the grace and favour of God, to enjoy perfect tranquillity and peace of conscience, to be able to please God in things agreeable to his will, and by these to be assured of eternal bliss, had been impossible for men to have ever found, had not God himself been graciously pleased to reveal them to us. Men might still have bewildered themselves in following the *ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the world for a path which leads to heaven; but could have found none, unless God himself, taking pity of the wanderings of men, had been pleased to hang out a light from heaven, to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine revelation to direct them so to steer their course, as to escape splitting themselves on the rocks of open impieties, or being swallowed up in the quicksands of terrene delights. Neither doth he shew them only what shelves and rocks they must escape, but what particular course they must steer; what star they must have in their eye, what compass they must observe, what winds and gales they must expect and pray for, if they would arrive at last at eternal bliss. Eternal bliss! What more could a God of infinite goodness promise, or the soul of man wish for? A reward to such who are so far from deserving, that they are still provoking; glory to such who are more apt to be ashamed of their duties than of their offences. But that it should not only be a glorious reward, but eternal too, is that which, though it infinitely transcend the deserts of the receivers, yet it highly discovers the infinite goodness of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is so rich a mine of inestimable treasures, but if the owner of it undertakes to shew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full possession of it, how much are we in love with misery, and do we court our

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own ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his directions, and observe his commands!

This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the Scriptures; that these alone contain those sacred discoveries, by which the souls of men may come at last to enjoy a complete and eternal happiness. One would think there could be nothing more needless in the world than to bid men regard their own welfare, and to seek to be happy. Yet whoever casts his eye into the world, will find no counsel so little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally looked on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot arise but from one of these two grounds; that either they think it no great wisdom to let go their present hold as to the good things of this world, for that which they secretly question whether they shall ever live to see or no; or else that their minds are in suspense, whether they be not sent on a Guiana voyage to heaven, whether the certainty of it be yet fully discovered, or the instructions which are given be such as may infallibly conduct them thither. The first, though it hath the advantage of sense, fruition, delight, and further expectation, yet to a rational person, who seriously reflects on himself, and sums up what (after all his troubles and disquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his disappointments in his expectations, his fears of losing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation of spirit which attends all these) he hath gained of true contentment to his mind, can never certainly believe that ever these things were intended for his happiness. For is it possible that the soul of man should ever enjoy its full and complete happiness in this world, when nothing is able to make it happy but what is most suitable to its nature, able to fill up its large capacity, and commensurate with its duration? But in this life the matter of men's greatest delight is strangely unsuitable to the nature of our rational beings; the measure of them too short for our vast desires to stretch themselves upon; the proportion too scant and narrow to run parallel with immortality. It must be then only a supreme, infinite, and eternal Being, which, by the free communications of his bounty and goodness, can fix and satiate the soul's desires, and by the constant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted streams of favour will always keep up desire, and yet always satisfy it: one whose goodness can only be felt by some transient touches here; whose love can be seen but as through a lattice; whose constant presence

may be rather wished for than enjoyed; who hath reserved the full sight and fruition of himself to that future state, when all these dark veils shall be done away, and the soul shall be continually sunning herself under immediate beams of light and love. But how, or in what way the soul of man, in this degenerate condition, should come to be partaker of so great a happiness, by the enjoyment of that God our natures are now at such a distance from, is the greatest and most important enquiry of human nature; and we continually see how successless and unsatisfactory the endeavours of those have been to themselves at last, who have sought for this happiness in a way of their own finding out. The large volume of the creation, wherein God hath described so much of his wisdom and power, is yet too dark and obscure, too short and imperfect, to set forth to us the way which leads to eternal happiness. Unless then the same God who made men's souls at first do shew them the way for their recovery, as they are in a degenerate, so they will be in a desperate condition. But the same bounty and goodness of God, which did at first display itself in giving being to men's souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the discovery of itself, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his grace and favour again.

III. Which it now concerns us particularly to discover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greatest evidence it could come from no other author but God himself, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal happiness. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the sacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we consider the matters contained in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *matters of Divine revelation.* 2. As *a rule of life.* 3. As containing *that covenant of grace which relates to man's eternal happiness.*

1. Consider the Scripture generally, as containing in it matters of Divine revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The matters which are revealed.* 2. *The manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture may be considered these three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greatest weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greatest depth and mysteriousness.* 3. *As matters of the most universal satisfaction to the minds of men.*

1. *They are matters of the greatest moment and import-*

BOOK III. *ance for men to know.* The wisdom of men is most known by the weight of the things they speak; and therefore that wherein the wisdom of God is discovered cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they must be matters of the highest importance, which the supreme Ruler of the world vouchsafes to speak to men concerning. And such we shall find the matters which God hath revealed in his word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehensions of his nature, or making known to men their state and condition, or discovering the way whereby to avoid eternal misery. Now which is there of these three, which, supposing God to discover his mind to the world, it doth not highly become him to speak to men of?

IV. 1. What is there which it doth more highly concern men to know, than God himself? Or what more glorious and excellent object could he discover than himself to the world? There is nothing certainly, which should more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his nature and all his perfections, and many of the great reasons of his actings in the world. We may by them understand with safety what the eternal purposes of God were, as to the way of man's recovery by the death of his Son; we may there see and understand the great wisdom of God, not only in the contrivance of the world, and ordering of it, but in the gradual revelations of himself to his people; by what steps he trained up his Church till the *fulness of time was come;* what his aim was in laying such a load of ceremonies on his people of the Jews; by what steps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his will to the world, by speaking in these last days by his Son, after he had spoke *at sundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets, &c. unto the Fathers.* In the Scriptures we read the most rich and admirable discoveries of Divine goodness, and all the ways and methods he useth in alluring sinners to himself; with what majesty he commands, with what condescension he intreats, with what importunity he wooes men's souls to be reconciled to him, with what favour he embraceth, with what tenderness he chastiseth, with what bowels he pitieth those who have chosen him to be their God! With what power he supporteth, with what wisdom he directeth, with what cordials he refresheth the souls of such who are dejected under the sense of his displeasure, and yet their love is sincere towards him! With

what profound humility, what holy boldness, what becoming distance, and yet what restless importunity do we therein find the souls of God's people addressing themselves to him in prayer! With what cheerfulness do they serve him, with what confidence do they trust him, with what resolution do they adhere to him in all straits and difficulties, with what patience do they submit to his will in their greatest extremities! How fearful are they of sinning against God, how careful to please him; how regardless of suffering, when they must choose either that or sinning; how little apprehensive of men's displeasure, while they enjoy the favour of God! Now all these things, which are so fully and pathetically expressed in Scripture, do abundantly set forth to us the exuberancy and pleonasm of God's grace and goodness towards his people; which makes them delight so much in him, and be so sensible of his displeasure. But above all other discoveries of God's goodness, his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, is that which the Scripture sets forth with the greatest life and eloquence. By eloquence I mean not an artificial composure of words, but the gravity, weight, and persuasiveness of the matter contained in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's love through Jesus Christ upon us! Was there ever so great an expression of love heard of! Nay, was it possible to be imagined that that God, who perfectly hates sin, should himself offer the pardon of it, and send his Son into the world to secure it to the sinner, who doth so heartily repent of his sins, as to deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Christ! Well might the Apostle say, *This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners.* How dry and sapless are all the voluminous discourses of philosophers, compared with this sentence! How jejune and unsatisfactory are all the discoveries they had of God and his goodness, in comparison of what we have by the Gospel of Christ! Well might Paul then say, *That he determined to know nothing but Christ, and him crucified. Christ crucified* is the library which triumphant souls will be studying in to all eternity. This is the only library which is the true Ἰατρεῖον ψυχῆς, that which cures the soul of all its maladies and distempers. Other knowledge makes men's minds giddy and flatulent; this settles and composes them. Other knowledge is apt

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1 Tim. i. 15.

1 Cor. ii. 2.

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to swell men into high conceits and opinions of themselves; this brings them to the truest view of themselves, and thereby to humility and sobriety. Other knowledge leaves men's hearts as it found them; this alters them, and makes them better. So transcendent an excellency is there in the knowledge of Christ crucified, above the sublimest speculations in the world!

And is not this an inestimable benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converse with all these expressions of God's love and goodness, and that in his own language? Shall we admire and praise what we meet with in Heathen philosophers, which is generous and handsome; and shall we not adore the infinite fulness of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expressions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnify those *lean kine*, the notions of philosophers, and contemn the fat, the plenty and fulness of the Scriptures! If there be not far more valuable and excellent discoveries of the Divine nature and perfections; if there be not far more excellent directions and rules of practice in the sacred Scriptures than in the sublimest of all the philosophers, then let us leave our full ears, and feed upon the thin. But certainly no sober and rational spirit, that puts any value upon the knowledge of God, but on the same account that he doth praise the discourses of any philosophers concerning God, he cannot but set a value of a far higher nature on the word of God. And as the goodness of God is thus discovered in Scripture, so is his justice and holiness. We have therein recorded the most remarkable judgments of God upon contumacious sinners, the severest denunciations of a judgment to come against all that live in sin, the exactest precepts of holiness in the world; and what can be desired more to discover the holiness of God, than we find in Scripture concerning him? If therefore acquaintance with the nature, perfections, designs of so excellent a Being as God is, be a thing desirable to human nature, we have the greatest cause to admire the excellency, and adore the fulness of the Scriptures, which give us so large, rational, and complete account of the being and attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the Scriptures to us, those things which the Scripture doth most fully discover concerning God, do not at all contradict those prime and common notions which are in our natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the most to regulate our conceptions and apprehen-

sions of God, that we may not miscarry therein, as otherwise men are apt to do. For it being natural to men so far to love themselves, as to set the greatest value upon those excellencies which they think themselves most masters of; thence men came to be exceedingly mistaken in their apprehensions of a Deity; some attributing one thing as a perfection, another a different thing, according to their humours and inclinations. Thus imperious, self-willed men are apt to cry up God's absolute power and dominion as his greatest perfection; easy and soft-spirited men, his patience and goodness; severe and rigid men, his justice and severity: every one, according to his humour and temper, making his God of his own complexion; and not only so, but in things remote enough from being perfections at all; yet because they are such things as they prize and value, they suppose of necessity they must be in God; as is evident in the Epicureans' Ἀταραξία, by which they excluded Providence, as hath been already observed. And withal, considering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, just, and holy nature, and that he hath grievously offended him by his sins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance: it is thence necessary that God should make known himself to the world, to prevent our misconceptions of his nature, and to assure a suspicious, because guilty creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, transgression, and sin, to such as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himself. Though the light of nature may dictate much to us of the benignity and goodness of the Divine nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that should discover further than God's general goodness to such as please him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readiness to pardon offenders; which being an act of grace, must alone be discovered by his will. I cannot think the sun, moon, and stars, are such itinerant preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole counsel and will of God, in reference to man's acceptance with God upon repentance. It is not every star in the firmament can do that which the star once did to the wise men, lead them unto Christ. The sun in the heavens is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of righteousness*. The best astronomer will never find the *day-star from on high* in the rest of his number. What St. Austin said of Tully's works is true of the whole volume of the creation; There are admirable things to be found in

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them: but the name of Christ is not legible there. The work of redemption is not engraven on the works of Providence; if it had, a particular Divine revelation had been unnecessary, and the Apostles were sent on a needless errand, which the world had understood without their preaching, viz. *That God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; not imputing to men their trespasses, and hath committed to them the ministry of reconciliation.* How was the word of reconciliation committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the world? And the Apostle's quære elsewhere might have been easily answered, *How can men hear without a preacher?* For then they might have known the way of salvation, without any special messengers sent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-suffering* and *patience* is intended to lead men to repentance; and that some general collections might be made from Providence of the placability of God's nature, and that *God never left himself without a witness of his goodness* in the world, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful seasons.* But though these things might sufficiently discover to such who were apprehensive of the guilt of sin, that God did not act according to his greatest severity, and thereby did give men encouragement to hearken out and enquire after the true way of being reconciled to God, yet all this amounts not to a firm foundation for faith as to the remission of sin, which doth suppose God himself publishing an act of grace and indemnity to the world; wherein he assures the pardon of sin to such as truly repent, and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel. Now is not this an inestimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we understand what God himself hath discovered of his own nature and perfections, and of his readiness to pardon sin upon those gracious terms of faith and repentance, and that which necessarily follows from these two, hearty and sincere obedience?

2 Cor. v. 18, 19.

Rom. x. 14.

Acts xiv. 14. Luke vi. 35, 36.

V. 2. *The Scripture gives the most faithful representation of the state and condition of the soul of man.* The world was almost lost in disputes concerning the nature, condition, and immortality of the soul, before Divine revelation was made known to mankind by the Gospel of Christ; but *life and immortality* was *brought to light by the Gospel*, and the future state of the soul of man, not discovered in an uncertain Platonical way, but with the greatest light

and evidence from that God who hath the supreme disposal of souls, and therefore best knows and understands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a judgment to come, in which *God will judge the secrets of all hearts*, when *every one must give an account of himself unto God*; and God will call men to give *an account of their stewardship* here, of all the receipts they have had from him, and the expences they have been at, and the improvements they have made of the talents he put into their hands. So that the Gospel of Christ is the fullest instrument of discovery of the certainty of the future state of the soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being dislodged from the body. But this is not all which the Scripture discovers as to the state of the soul: for it is not only a prospective glass, reaching to its future state, but it is the most faithful looking-glass, to discover all the spots and deformities of the soul; and not only shews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true original of all that disorder and discomposure which is in the soul of man, is only fully and satisfactorily given us in the word of God, as hath been already proved. The nature and working of this corruption in man had never been so clearly manifested, had not the law and will of God been discovered to the world: that is the glass whereby we see the secret workings of those bees in our hearts, the corruptions of our natures; that sets forth the folly of our imaginations, the unruliness of our passions, the distempers of our wills, and the abundant deceitfulness of our hearts. And it is hard for the most elephantine sinner (one of the greatest magnitude) so to trouble these waters, as not therein to discover the greatness of his own deformities. But that which tends most to awaken the drowsy, senseless spirits of men, the Scripture doth most fully describe the tendency of corruption, that the wages of sin is death, and the issue of continuance in sin will be the everlasting misery of the soul, in a perpetual separation from the presence of God, and undergoing the lashes and severities of conscience to all eternity. What a great discovery is this of the faithfulness of God to the world, that he suffers not men to undo themselves, without letting them know of it beforehand, that they might avoid it! God seeks not to entrap men's souls, nor doth he rejoice in the misery and ruin of his creatures; but fully declares to them what the consequence and issue of their sinful practices will be; assures them of a judgment to come;

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declares his own future severity against contumacious sinners, that they might not think themselves surprised; and that if they had known there had been so great danger in sin, they would never have been such fools as, for the sake of it, to run into eternal misery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greatest plainness and faithfulness hath shewed men the nature and danger of all their sins, and asks them beforehand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his wrath, and wrestle with everlasting burnings? If not, he bids them bethink themselves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their lives, lest *iniquity prove their ruin*, and *destruction overtake them, and that without remedy*. Now if men have cause to prize and value a faithful monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin, we have cause exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the truest representation of the state and condition of our souls.

3. *The Scripture discovers to us the only way of pleasing God, and enjoying his favour.* That clearly reveals the way, (which man might have sought for to all eternity without particular revelation,) whereby sins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It shews us that the ground of our acceptance with God is through Christ, whom he hath made a *propitiation for the sins of the world*, and who alone is the *true and living way*, whereby we may *draw near to God with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience.* Through Christ we understand the terms on which God will shew favour and grace to the world; and by him we have ground of a παῤῥησία, *access with freedom and boldness unto God.* On his account we may hope not only for grace to subdue our sins, resist temptations, conquer the Devil and the world, but, having *fought this good fight, and finished our course by patient continuance in well-doing*, we may justly *look for glory, honour, and immortality*, and that *crown of righteousness which is laid up for those who wait* in faith, holiness, and humility, *for the appearance of Christ from heaven.* Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for men to know, or God to reveal, than the nature of God and ourselves, the state and condition of our souls, the only way to avoid eternal misery, and enjoy everlasting bliss?

VII. 2. The Scriptures discover not only matters of importance, but of the greatest depth and mysteriousness. There are

many *wonderful things in the law of God;* things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal purposes and decrees of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the operation of the Spirit of God on the souls of men; which are all things of great weight and moment for us to understand and believe that they are, and yet may be unsearchable to our reason as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our faith stands on as to these things hath been already shewed, and therefore I forbear insisting on them. CHAP. VI. B. ii. c. 8. sect. 5, 6, 7.

3. The Scripture comprehends matters of the most universal satisfaction to the minds of men; though many things do much exceed our apprehensions, yet others are most suitable to the dictates of our nature. As Origen bids Celsus see, Εἰ μὴ τὰ τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν, ταῖς κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις ἀρχῆθεν συναγορεύοντα, μετατίθησι τὰς εὐγνωμόνως ἀκούοντας τῶν λεγομένων, *Whether it was not the agreeableness of the principles of faith with the common notions of human nature, which prevailed most upon all candid and ingenuous auditors of them.* And therefore as Socrates said of Heraclitus's books, what he understood was excellent; and therefore he supposed that which he did not understand was so too: so ought we to say of the Scriptures, if those things which are within our capacity be so suitable to our natures and reasons, those cannot contradict our reason which yet are above them. There are many things which the minds of men were sufficiently assured that they were, yet were to seek for satisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine revelation. As the nature of true happiness, wherein it lay, and how to be obtained, which the philosophers were so puzzled with, the Scripture gives us full satisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of, and all the prescriptions of Heathen moralists fall as much short of, as the directions of an empyric do of a wise and skilful physician. *Avoiding the fears of death,* which can alone be through a grounded expectation of a state of happiness which death leads men to, which cannot be had but through the right understanding of the word of God. Thus we see the excellency of the matters themselves contained in this revelation of the mind of God to the world. Orig. cont. Cels. l. iii. p. 135. Ed. Spencer.

VIII. As the matters themselves are of an excellent nature,

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so is the manner wherein they are revealed in the Scriptures; and that,

2.

1. *In a clear and perspicuous manner;* not but there may be still some passages which are hard to be understood, as being either prophetical, or consisting of ambiguous phrases, or containing matters above our comprehension: but all those things which concern the terms of man's salvation, are delivered with the greatest evidence and perspicuity. Who cannot understand what these things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?* that *without faith it is impossible to please God;* that *without holiness none shall see the Lord;* that *unless we be born again, we can never enter into the kingdom of heaven.* These and such like things are so plain and clear, that it is nothing but men's shutting their eyes against the light can keep them from understanding them. God intended these things as directions to men; and is not he able to speak intelligibly when he pleases? He that made the tongue, shall he not speak so as to be understood without an infallible interpreter; especially when it is his design to make known to men the terms of their eternal happiness? Will God judge men at the great day for not believing those things which they could not understand? Strange, that ever men should judge the Scriptures obscure in matters necessary, when the Scripture accounts it so great a judgment for men not to understand them! *If our Gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ should shine unto them.* Sure Lot's door was visible enough, if it were a judgment for the men of Sodom not to see it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be so great a judgment not to understand them.

2 Cor. iv. 3, 4.

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner;* as the things contained in Scripture do not so much beg acceptance as command it; in that the expressions wherein our duty is concerned are such as awe men's consciences, and pierce to their hearts and to their secret thoughts. *All things are open and naked before this word of God; every secret of the mind, and thought of the heart, lies open to its stroke and force: it is quick and powerful, sharper than a two-edged sword, piercing to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of*

Heb. iv. 12, 13.

the thoughts and intents of the heart. The word is a telescope to discover the great luminaries of the world, the truths of highest concernment to the souls of men; and it is such a microscope as discovers to us the smallest atom of our thoughts, and discerns the most secret intent of the heart: and, as far as this light reacheth, it comes with power and authority, as it comes armed with the majesty of that God who reveals it, whose authority extends over the soul and conscience of man in its most secret and hidden recesses.

3. *In a pure and unmixed manner.* In all other writings, how good soever, we see a great mixture of dross and gold together; here is nothing but pure gold, diamonds without flaws, suns without spots. The most current coins of the world have their alloys of baser metals; there is no such mixture in Divine truths; as they all come from the same author, so they all have the same purity. There is a Urim and Thummim upon the whole Scripture; light and perfection in every part of it. In the philosophers we may meet, it may be, with some scattered fragments of purer metal, amidst abundance of dross and impure ore: here we have whole wedges of gold, the same vein of purity and holiness running through the whole book of Scriptures. Hence it is called the *form of sound words;* here have been no hucksters to corrupt and mix their own inventions with Divine truths. 2 Tim. i. 13.

IX. 4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner.* This I grant is not sufficient of itself to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, because all men do not contradict themselves in their writings: but yet there are some peculiar circumstances to be considered in the agreeableness of the parts of Scripture to each other, which are not to be found in mere human writings. 1. That this *doctrine was delivered by persons who lived in different ages and times from each other.* Usually one age corrects another's faults; and we are apt to pity the ignorance of our predecessors, when it may be our posterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the sacred Scripture we read not one age condemning another; we find light still increasing in the series of times in Scripture, but no reflections in any time upon the ignorance or weakness of the precedent; the dimmest light was sufficient for its age, and was a step to further discovery. Quintilian gives it as the reason of the great uncertainty of grammar rules, *Quia non analogia dimissa cælo formam loquendi dedit:* that which he wanted as to grammar, we have as to Divine truths; they are de- Quint. l. c. 6. Ed. Oxo.

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livered from heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other.

2. *By persons of different interests in the world.* God made choice of men of all ranks to be inditers of his oracles, to make it appear it was no matter of state-policy or particular interest, which was contained in his word, which persons of such different interests could not have agreed in as they do. We have Moses, David, Solomon, persons of royal rank and quality; and can it be any mean thing which these think it their glory to be penners of? We have Isaiah, Daniel, and other persons of the highest education and accomplishments; and can it be any trivial thing which these employ themselves in? We have Amos, and other prophets in the Old Testament, and the Apostles in the New, of the meaner sort of men in the world; yet all these join in consort together: when God tunes the spirits, all agree in the same strain of Divine truths, and give light and harmony to each other.

3. *By persons in different places and conditions;* some in prosperity in their own country, some under banishment and adversity, yet all agreeing in the same substance of doctrine; of which no alteration we see was made either for the flattery of those in power, or for avoiding miseries and calamities. And under all the different dispensations before, under and after the law, though the management of things was different, yet the doctrine and design was for substance the same in all. All the different dispensations agree in the same common principles of religion; the same ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty, was common to all; though the peculiar instances wherein God was served might be different, according to the ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity, considered in these circumstances, is an argument that these things came originally from the same spirit, though conveyed through different instruments to the knowledge of the world.

5. *In a persuasive and convincing manner;* and that these ways. 1. *Bringing Divine truths down to our capacity,* clothing spiritual matter in familiar expressions and similitudes, that so they might have the easier admission into our minds. 2. *Propounding things as our interest, which are our duty;* thence God so frequently in Scripture recommends our duties to us under all those motives which are wont to have the greatest force on

the minds of men, and annexeth gracious promises to our performance of them; and those of the most weighty and concerning things. *Of grace, favour, protection, deliverance, audience of prayers,* and *eternal happiness:* and if these will not prevail with men, what motives will? 3. *Courting us to obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but punish presently for disobedience.* Hence are all those most pathetical and affectionate strains we read in Scripture. *O that there was such a heart within them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might go well with them, and with their children after them! Woe unto thee, O Jerusalem! wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!* What majesty, and yet what sweetness and condescension is there in these expressions! What obstinacy and rebellion is it in men for them to stand out against God, when he thus comes down from his throne of majesty, and wooes rebellious sinners to return unto him, that they may be pardoned! Such a matchless and unparalleled strain of rhetoric is there in the Scripture, far above the art and insinuations of the most admired orators. Thus we see the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contained in Scripture are revealed to us: thus we have considered the excellency of the Scripture, as it is a discovery of God's mind to the world.

CHAP. VI.

Deut. v. 29. Jer. xiii. 27. Ezek. xxxiii. 11. Hos. xi. 8. Matth. xxiii. 37.

The Scriptures may be considered as a *rule of life,* or as a *law of God,* which is given for the government of the lives of men; and therein the excellency of it lies in the nature of the duties, and the encouragements to the practice of them.

X. 3.

1. In the nature of the duties required, which are *most becoming God to require,* most reasonable for us to perform.

1. *Most becoming God to require,* as they are most suitable and agreeable to the Divine nature; the imitation of which, in our actions, is the substance of our religion. Imitation of him in his goodness and holiness, by our constant endeavours of mortifying sin, and growing in grace and piety; in his grace and mercy, by our kindness

BOOK III.

to all men, forgiving the injuries men do unto us, *doing good to our greatest enemies;* in his justice and equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conscience void of offence towards God and towards men.* The first takes in the duties of the first, the other the duties of the second table. *All acts of piety towards God* are a part of justice; for, as Tully saith, *Quid aliud est pietas, nisi justitia adversus Deos?* And so *our loving God with our whole hearts, our entire and sincere obedience to his will,* is a part of natural justice; for thereby we do but render unto God that which is his due from us as we are his creatures. We see then the whole duty of man, *the fearing God, and keeping his commandments,* is as necessary a part of justice as the rendering to every man his own is.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 41.

2. They are most reasonable for us to perform, in that, 1. Religion is not only a service of the reasonable faculties, which are employed the most in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart most, and the service required being a spiritual service; not lying in meats and drinks, or any outward observations, but in a sanctified temper of heart and mind, which discovers itself in the course of a Christian's life; but, 2. The service itself of religion is reasonable; the commands of the Gospel are such as no man's reason which considers them can doubt of the excellency of them. All natural worship is founded on the dictates of nature, all instituted worship on God's revealed will; and it is one of the prime dictates of nature, that God must be universally obeyed. Besides, God requires nothing but what is apparently man's interest to do; God prohibits nothing but what will destroy him if he doth it; so that the commands of the Scriptures are very just and reasonable.

2. The encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of obedience. God's commands are in themselves easy, and most suitable to our natures. What more rational for a creature, than to obey his Maker? All the difficulty of religion ariseth from the corruption of nature. Now God, to encourage men to conquer the difficulties arising thence, hath propounded the strongest motives and most prevailing arguments to obedience. Such are the considerations of God's love and goodness manifested to the world, by sending his Son into it to die for sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readiness, through him, to pardon the sins, and accept the persons of such who *so receive him*

as to walk in him; and by his promises of grace to assist them in the wrestling with the enemies of their salvation. And to all these add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promised to all those who sincerely obey him; and by these things we see how much the encouragements overweigh the difficulties, and that none can make the least pretence that there is not motive sufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exercise of obedience to the will of God. Thus we see what a peculiar excellency there is in the Scriptures as a rule of life, above all the precepts of mere moralists; the foundation of obedience being laid deeper in man's obligation to serve his Maker, the practice of obedience being carried higher in those most holy precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of obedience being incomparably greater than what men are able to conceive, much less to promise or bestow. CHAP. VI.

XI. 3. The excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a covenant of grace, or the transactions between God and man, in order to his eternal happiness. The more memorable any transactions are, the more valuable are any authentic records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of heaven, an act of pardon with the royal assent of heaven, a proclamation of good-will from God towards men; and can we then set too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable passages between God and the souls of men, in order to their felicity, from the beginning of the world? Can we think, since there is a God in the world of infinite goodness, that he should suffer all mankind to perish inevitably, without his propounding any means for escaping of eternal misery? Is God so good to men as to this present life; and can we think, if man's soul be immortal, as we have proved it is, that he should wholly neglect any offer of good to men as to their eternal welfare? Or is it possible to imagine that man should be happy in another world without God's promising it, and prescribing conditions in order to it? If so, then this happiness is no free gift of God, unless he hath the bestowing and promising of it; and man is no rational agent, unless a reward suppose conditions to be performed in order to the obtaining it; or man may be bound to conditions which were never required him; or if they must be required, then there must be a revelation of God's will, whereby he doth require them: and if so, then there are some records extant of the transactions between God

BOOK III.

and man, in order to his eternal happiness. For what reason can we have to imagine that such records, if once extant, should not continue still; especially since the same goodness of God is engaged to preserve such records, which at first did cause them to be indited? Supposing then such records extant somewhere in the world of these grand transactions between God and men's souls, our business is brought to a period; for what other records are there in the world that can in the least vie with the Scriptures, as to the giving so just an account of all the transactions between God and men from the foundation of the world? Which gives us all the steps, methods, and ways, whereby God hath made known his mind and will to the world, in order to man's eternal salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnify the goodness of God in making known his will to us, and that we set a value and esteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentic instruments of that *grand charter of peace* which God hath revealed in order to man's eternal happiness.

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

OR, A

RATIONAL ACCOUNT

OF THE GROUNDS OF

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION:

WHEREIN

THE FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGION, AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES, ARE ASSERTED AND CLEARED.

WITH

AN ANSWER TO THE MODERN OBJECTIONS

OF

ATHEISTS AND DEISTS.

IN FIVE BOOKS.

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ORIGINES SACRÆ.

BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

The general Prejudices against Religion in our Age examined; and the old atheistical Hypotheses considered.

BEFORE I come to the particular vindication of the truth and authority of the holy Scriptures, which is my chief design, it will be necessary to remove, if possible, the common and general prejudices against religion in this age; as if it were only a cunning artifice of some crafty persons to support their own interest by deceiving the rest of mankind. If this were the truth of the case, none ought to be blamed for their contempt of religion, nor for their endeavours to set the minds of men free from the uneasiness and slavery of a superstitious and groundless fear; for this must be all that is implied in religion, if it were at first begun, and is still carried on by the craft of some men, and the folly of the rest. But such an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded, because it reflects on all mankind, (a very few excepted,) and ought in common justice to be proved by the most clear and convincing evidence; because no men have any reason to presume so far upon their own wit and capacity above all others, as to take it for granted that the rest of mankind are either fools or knaves. For this is the meaning of those who go about to persuade others that religion is nothing but an imposture, that hath appeared under several shapes and disguises; but still the machine is the same, and the same design carried on by

CHAP. I.

BOOK I. the different actors, according to the humour and inclination of several ages.

I could be glad that all this might justly be looked on as a feigned case, only for a better introduction to the following discourses; but none that live in our age, and understand the too great prevalency of scepticism and infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be so; and therefore I shall lay down the true state of the present case, with respect to religion in general. It cannot be denied, by the greatest enemies to it, that there is still a general belief of the truth of it among mankind, however they differ in their particular notions about it. For this cannot be looked on as a new thing, or an invention of the present age, since it is manifest, by the undoubted history of former times, that the same foundations of religion have been generally received by mankind; by which I understand the being of God and Providence, and the rewards and punishments of a future state; but yet not so, but that there have been in several ages such as have gone about to unsettle men's minds about them, and to represent them as an invention of politicians, to keep the world in greater awe. But they have not met with such success as they expected in their discoveries, for they have been opposed by the wisest and most thoughtful men in the several ages they appeared in; and the generality of mankind continued in the same belief which they had before. And yet they had then the same inclinations to ease and pleasure as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehensions of God and another world; they had the same value and esteem for themselves and their own interests, and hated all such as designed to cheat them; they fell into warm disputes and violent heats about some particular parts and modes of religion, which are apt to make them call all the rest into question. Yet under all these disadvantages, the foundations of religion have been preserved among them; and mankind cannot be brought to look on them as an imposture. But those who think so are forced in great measure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on disguises to the world, that they may appear to be of another mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to pass, that those who are averse to the practice of religion, yet cannot be brought to shake off the principles of it? that those who are otherwise so fond of their own ease and interest, should abhor those atheistical principles, which are said to be

very much for the advantage of both? that those nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ so much from one another in languages, customs, and modes of religion, yet agree in the same common sense of God, and a future state? CHAP. I.

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our religion to be an imposture, unless they can first give a just and satisfactory account of these things.

All that I can meet with to that purpose may be reduced to these three heads; which contain the great atheistical pretences of this age.

I. That the notions of religion were first started among rude and barbarous people by politicians, to keep the people in better awe; and that the priests found it their interest to support them, because they were supported by them.

II. That there are some *peculiar qualities in mankind*, which, joined with their ignorance and fear, tend to preserve *that seed of religion which is in man, and no other living creature.*

III. That the consent of mankind is not so great as is pretended; there being several nations now known, by the late discoveries, which have no sense or notion of God, or a future state.

These are the things which I shall now make it my business to enquire into, and thereby shew the vanity and folly of these general prejudices against religion.

I begin with the first, That religion was first invented and carried on by politicians and priests, who aimed only at keeping the world in better awe, and themselves in a better condition. This hath been suggested by atheistical persons in all ages, where they have dared to appear, and was thought the most plausible artifice to draw in the people to their party; for no men love to be imposed upon, especially in what concerns their ease and interest; but they were not able to make out the persons, times, or places, when the notions of religion were first spread among mankind. For they could never produce any instances of persons, who designed to impose upon mankind in matters of religion, but they found the general principles of religion were entertained among them before; as will appear by the following examples of the Egyptians and Greeks, which are most insisted upon.

Lucian. de Deâ Syriâ. Herodot. 2. 4. Plutarch. de Isid. et Osiride.

The Egyptians are said by Lucian to have been the first who set up religious worship; and Herodotus seems to be of the same opinion. Plutarch saith it was done

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by Osiris; and Diodorus Siculus saith, *it was directed by Hermes, who was a great politician,* and *chief counsellor to Osiris.* But all that Diodorus saith is, *that he brought the honours and services of the Gods into order;* which supposes that there was religion among them before, but he methodized it. And if we believe Sanchoniathon, who makes him first counsellor to Cronus, father to Misor or Osiris, he began the *symbolical images of the Gods,* which caused such confusion in their worship afterwards. Diodorus saith, *that Osiris built Thebes or Diospolis;* where there was a temple to *the immortal God that made the world,* as appears by the testimonies both of Plutarch and Porphyry. And the former observes, *that the most ancient, and universal, and most credible tradition, both of lawgivers and others, philosophers, as well as poets and divines, was, that the world was not made by chance, without a mind and reason to order and govern it.* From whence it follows, that, before such politicians took upon them to order matters of religion, there was a generally received tradition of a Divine Being, which made and governed the world, and was the true foundation on which religious worship was built. And the same Plutarch in that discourse affirms it to be *an impious and atheistical opinion to attribute the name of God to insensible matter;* and adds, *that there is one universal reason which governs the world.* Ammianus Marcellinus saith, *that the first beginnings of religion were in Egypt, long before they were in other parts.* Here therefore we must search out for the first laying this design by politicians; and here we find it fixed upon Hermes Trismegistus, who, by the accounts given of him, was a very great man, and that in the beginning of the Egyptian monarchy. Philo Byblius saith, he was called by the Egyptians Thoth; by the Phœnicians, Taautus; by the Greeks, Hermes. He flourished, he saith, *with great reputation for wisdom among the Phœnicians;* who, it seems, at that time were under the government of Cronus, father to Osiris, (or Misor, as they called him, from Misraim, the son of Ham, who first peopled those countries.) And so far there is nothing improbable in the story; for the same person, being of an extraordinary capacity, might be in favour both with Cronus in Phœnicia, and with Osiris afterwards in Egypt. But he goeth on, and saith, Πρῶτος τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θεοσέβειαν ἐκ τῆς τῶν χυδαίων ἀπειρίας, εἰς ἐπιστημονικὴν ἐμπειρίαν διέταξεν· that Taautus was *the first who took the matters of religious worship out of the hands of unskilful men, and brought*

Diod. Sic. l. i.

Euseb. Pr. Ev. l. i. c. 10.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osirid.

Euseb. Pr. Ev. l. iii. c. 11.

Plutarch. ib. c. 45. Ed. Oxon.

Ammian. Marc. l. xxii.

Euseb. Pr. Ev. l. i. c. 10. p. 40. Ed. Par.

Ibid.

them into due method and order. So that we find plainly there was religion among the people before; but this wise politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the rites of public worship so as to be most serviceable to government. And for that end he set up the worship of princes after their death, (especially of Osiris, after his being cut in pieces by his brother,) and joined their names with those of the stars, as visible deities; and of some animals, as so many living images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politic invention of Hermes Trismegistus; not in the first planting the principles of religion, but in turning them that way as he thought would serve best to the ends of government, by raising a high veneration for deceased monarchs, and deifying such things as they thought most useful to mankind. This was indeed playing the politician with religion. But that there was a sense of religion before among the people, not only appears by the former saying of Philo Byblius, but by another in his Proem to Sanchoniathon, where he saith, *That the Phœnicians and Egyptians agreed (from whom other nations took it up) to worship those as their chief Gods, which were most useful to mankind;* Καὶ εἰς τὸ χρεὼν καταζάντας ναοὺς μετασκευασάμενοι; *and to this purpose they turned the temples already standing, and erected pillars and statues to their memories, and made festivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were rites of public worship among them before, but that Hermes caused them to be employed this way; joining the worship of the stars and their kings together.

Euseb. Pr. Ev. l. i. Ed. Par.

But there are two very different accounts concerning that religion which was first settled by Hermes in Egypt. The one is of those who believe there are some remainders of the old Egyptian doctrine in the Trismegistic books, though with many additions and interpolations: and their opinion is, that, under all the popular disguises and superstitious ceremonies for amusing the common people, he did cover the true principles of natural religion, asserting the being and providence of God, and the immortality of souls. And for this they produce not only divers passages in those books of Hermes, which were known in the Egyptian times, while their priests were yet in being to have contradicted them, if they had published falsehoods under so great a name, but from the testimonies of Plutarch and Iamblichus, which cannot be suspected; to which the opinions of Pythagoras and

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Plato, who sojourned so long among the Egyptian priests to learn their doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended, that in those times this was the common and professed religion among the people; but that it was kept up as a secret, not to be communicated but only to such who were prepared for it. According to this opinion, the design of Hermes was not to establish any true religion among the people, but to entertain them with pomp, and sacrifices, and ceremonies; and (as some in Plutarch and Diodorus think) to keep up a difference among them about the sacred animals, to secure them from an universal conspiracy against the monarchy. But if the true notions of God and Providence, and another world, were preserved among the priests, especially at Diospolis, or the famous Thebes, where the chief of their residence was, then it appears that these were not scattered among the common people by priests and politicians, but were kept secret, as not so fit for their capacities; which would go no further than visible deities, and a pompous worship: so that the true principles of religion were not sowed by them to serve their ends, but the corruptions of it, in order to the pleasing and entertaining the senses and devotions of the common people, who they knew were most affected with what was most agreeable to their superstitious fancies. And there was much more of policy than religion, in keeping the best parts of it from the knowledge of the people; but the politicians knew very well those would not serve their turn so well as the fopperies of their superstition.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. c. 72. Ed. Oxon. Diod. Sic. l. i.

But there is another opinion which depends most upon the credit of Philo Byblius, who lived about Hadrian's time. This man, being learned, had a mind to make some noise in the world with the antiquities of his own country, (for Byblus was a Phœnician town.) He found the Jewish antiquities asserted by Josephus and others, and the Egyptian by Apion; and now he thought was a fit time to vie with them both. To that end he produces nine books of the Phœnician antiquities, written, as he pretended, long since by Sanchoniathon, and translated by him into Greek; which he pretends *to have found after a most diligent search into the Phœnician monuments.* And to make it appear how credible this account of Sanchoniathon was, he saith, *He took it out of the records of cities, and the monuments of temples, which were kept up in the sacred Ammonian letters.* And this man is very

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 9. Ed. Par.

CHAP. I.

much commended by Porphyry writing against the Christians, for his antiquity and veracity. What ground there is for these pretences, may be examined afterwards: I am now only to consider the scheme of religion, which is produced with so much pomp: and yet the author of it, whoever he was, was neither divine, philosopher, nor politician; for it is one of the rankest and most insipid pieces of atheism that is to be found in antiquity. And Porphyry could not but detest it, unless he had produced it in spite to the Christians; for he doth on all occasions declare not only his belief of God and Providence, but that he was the maker of the world, as Holstenius hath made it appear in his life, cap. 9. and it is well known that he was a professed Platonist. But let us now see what an account we have from this Phœnician scheme, about the making of the world. "At first there was a "dark, confused, restless chaos, which was agitated for a "long time, and nothing came of it. At length a mix- "ture happened, and this was the first principle of mak- "ing the universe; but it was ignorant of its own mak- "ing. From this mixture came *Mót*, or a slimy kind of "substance, out of which issued the generation of all "things. There were some animals which had no sense; "out of which came those which had understanding, and "were called *Zophasemin*, i. e. beholders of the heavens; "and were made in the figure of an egg: and the *Mót* "shined forth, and the sun and moon and great stars ap- "peared. But it seems those living creatures were fast "asleep, till they were awaked by dreadful thunders, and "then they began to bestir themselves." This is the short account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on Sanchoniathon's authority; *but he took it out of the records of Taautus himself.* And so we have the original of the world according to this ancient Hermes. And if this were his true doctrine, it is one of the most absurd and senseless pieces of atheism, and tends directly to overthrow all religion in the world. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to suppose that there was nothing originally in the world but stupid matter, which by its own motion, without a God to give and direct it, should produce the heavens and earth, and all living creatures; and that senseless creatures should beget those that had understanding; and these not capable of acting till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of thunder? Can we imagine this Taautus to have been any deep philosopher or politician, by setting down such extravagant

Euseb. l. x. c. 9.

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 10. Ed. Par.

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and unreasonable suppositions as these? But let us see how it was possible for him to advance any thing like religion upon these grounds: he must be a politician indeed that could do it. The first men, he saith, consecrated the fruits of the earth, by which they lived, and worshipped them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of religion, according to this admirable politician, for mankind to worship what they devoured. But Cotta in Cicero thought *no man could be so mad to worship what he did eat. Ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, credat Deum esse?* But he saith, *That these notions of worship were suitable to their weakness and pusillanimity.* This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine worship at all. What was there in the plants, which made them give such reverence and devotion to them? They saw how they grew out of the earth, and had no power to help themselves, when they made use of them for food. And how was it possible then to give Divine worship to them, which must suppose power at least in what is worshipped? Or else it is a most ridiculous folly in mankind to stoop to things so much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine worship to something or other, is that which argues that there is that which some call a natural seed of religion in human nature, and must come from some antecedent cause, since there could be nothing in these objects of worship which should move them to it, if it had been so, as Sanchoniathon represents it, from the ancient records of Taautus.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 16.

The two first mortals, he saith, *were* Æon and *Protogonus*; and *their children were* Genus and *Genea, who inhabited Phœnicia; and when they were scorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the sun, whom they believed to be the Lord of heaven, and called him Beelsamen; the same*, saith he, *whom the Greeks call* Ζεύς. But how came they to imagine any Lord of heaven, if they knew that the sun was made out of senseless matter, as well as themselves? It may be said, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it.* But how then came their posterity to know it, if the very first race of mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came Taautus to be so well informed? Revelation cannot be pretended; for that supposes what they deny, viz. a Supreme Being, above matter, which hath understanding, and gives it to mankind. But here mankind come to be understanding creatures, by being born of animals that had no sense; which is a most unreason-

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 10.

able supposition. They could not have it by original tradition; for that fails in the fountain-head, if the first pair of mortals knew nothing of it. Then they must find it out by reason; and how was that possible, if there was no maker of the world, that there should be *a Lord of heaven?* It is a remarkable saying of Aristotle, observed by Cicero, (who saw several of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to Rome by Sylla, and put into order by Andronicus Rhodius,) that if there were men bred under ground, and had there all conveniences of life, without coming upon the surface of the earth, but should only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards these persons should come out of their caves, and behold the earth, sea, and the heavens, the greatness of the clouds, the force of the wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the sun, with the orderly motions and courses of the heavenly bodies, they could not but think not only that there was a Divine Power, but that these things were the effects of it. And why should there not have been the same thoughts in this first race of mankind, unless we can suppose that they had never heard of any such thing as God, or a Divine Power in the world? But then I ask, how they should come to think of worshipping this Beelsamen, or Lord of the heavens? for so he confesses they did, and *lift up their hands to the sun.* What could the lifting up their hands signify to a senseless mass of fire, which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made mankind wholly devoid of religion, till they had been instructed in it by some crafty politician, it had been much more agreeable to this hypothesis: but to suppose them to pray to the heavenly bodies so early, and without any instructor, must imply some natural apprehension of a Deity, although they were so much mistaken in the object of Divine worship. But it is not reasonable to believe this should have been so early and so universal, but that they presumed the sun, moon, and stars, to have been the visible deities appointed to govern the visible world, and that the supreme Mind was to be worshipped in a way suitable to his own excellency, by acts of the mind; which was the opinion of many nations, and some of the greatest philosophers.

De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 37.

Then he proceeds to relate, how, after some of their posterity had found out some useful inventions as to the conveniences of life, after their death their children erected statues and pillars to their memories, and worshipped and

BOOK I. kept annual festivals at them; and that after the death of Uranus, and Cronus, and Dagon, and the rest, Taautus made symbolical images of them, being made king of Egypt by Cronus; and these things he saith, the Cabiri, by Taautus's own command, entered into records, from whence we are to believe that Sanchoniathon took them, and Philo Byblius translated them out of the Phœnician language. And Eusebius seems not to question the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and simple story far before the inventions of poets, or the allegories of the philosophers. If these things were recorded by the Cabiri, the sons of Sydyc, brother to Misor, the father of Taautus, they do not seem to have consulted the honour of Taautus; for they make him not barely to be chief counsellor to Cronus, in the design against his father Uranus, but that he made use of magical arts against him, (but they do not tell us who invented them, nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but matter in the world:) and besides this, he advised Cronus, having a suspicion of his brother, to bury him alive in the earth. And one would think so great a politician as Hermes would never have commanded the Cabiri to have preserved these stories of himself and his ancestors.

However, this is the account given by Philo Byblius, out of Sanchoniathon, about the first planting religion by Hermes, who was after worshipped himself as a God by the Egyptians. And now let any one consider whether this be a reasonable or tolerable account of the first *sowing the seeds of religion among mankind.* And yet this was the foundation of that sort of religion which came out of Phœnicia and Egypt into Greece. For they pretend to give an account of Uranus and Cronus, or Saturn, and his sons, and of Minerva at Athens, to whom Sanchoniathon saith, Saturn *gave the dominion of it;* but the Greeks, as Philo Byblius complains, *confounded all with their fables and allegories:* but this, he saith, is the true foundation which they raised their mythology upon.

It is evident, by what is said by Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, and others, that there were several colonies that went out of Egypt into Greece, in the times of Cecrops, Cadmus, Danaus, and Erectheus; and it is very probable that they carried the Egyptian superstitions along with them: but the person who is pretended to have settled religion among the Greeks, was Orpheus; who is said to have reduced them first from barbarism, and then to have

modelled religion among them, and to have brought out of Egypt the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments of a future state.

This must therefore be more particularly enquired into. Orpheus is reported to have been a man of quality in his own country of Thrace; his father having a command over a small territory there, called Sithonia, saith Pliny, near the mountain Rhodope, whence he had his title Rhodopeïus Orpheus. But Diodorus Siculus saith, *That when he had accomplished himself at home, he went into Egypt; and from thence brought the greatest part of the Egyptian mysteries into Greece, only changing the names from Osiris and Isis to Bacchus and Ceres;* and so he did *as to the state of the good and bad after death:* for, saith he, *The Elysian fields for the good, and the torments of Hades for the bad, were both of Egyptian original.* I do not question but the Egyptian superstition was in great measure the foundation of the Greek; but it is hard to determine any thing concerning Orpheus, since Aristotle, who was born in Macedonia, *knew nothing of him,* as Cicero informs us, and *that the verses under his name were written by a Pythagorean:* which is not at all improbable. But not only Diodorus speaks positively about him, but Strabo and Pausanias seem not at all to question him; and Diogenes Laertius mentions an epitaph upon him at Dios in Macedonia. But I lay no weight on the verses under his name; for Suidas mentions several ancient poets of that name: and it is allowed on all hands that there have been at least great additions and interpolations in the verses that bear the name of Orpheus. The Argonautics, Suidas saith, were written by one Orpheus of Crotone; one well acquainted with Pisistratus. Others say, the true author of the Orphic Poems was Onomacritus, who lived about that time; and the Descent into Hades was written by one Orpheus of Camarine, saith Suidas. The most probable opinion is that of Aristotle, that his sacred poems were written by a Pythagorean; and therefore the Platonists, Syrianus and Proclus, might well boast of the agreement of the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines. It is no objection, that there is no such thing now to be found in Aristotle; for I think Cicero may be trusted, who saw more of Aristotle than we now have. But I confess, if Diodorus were not deceived by the Egyptian Priests, their mentioning him with Pythagoras, Plato, Eudoxus, and Democritus, who were certainly in Egypt, makes it very credible that Orpheus had been there too,

Plin. l. iv. c. 11.

Diod. Sic. l. i. et iv.

Euseb. Pr. Evang. l. ii. c. 1. l. x. c. 8.

De Nat. Deor. l. i.

BOOK I. and carried many of the Egyptian superstitions with him: and he might the easier settle them in Greece, because, as Diodorus Siculus observes, he had a particular interest in the colony which Cadmus brought, and was much esteemed by them; and Cadmus himself was originally of Thebes or Diospolis; although Cadmus himself might call it after his own name, or at least the castle, which long continued it, when the city was called Thebes.

But that Orpheus did not find those parts so barbarous, as to be destitute of all religion before, will appear from the account Diodorus Siculus himself gives of him: Καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς Θεολογίας μυθολογούμενα μαθὼν, ἀπεδήμησε μὲν εἰς Αἴγυπτον, *That he was very well instructed in the theology of his country before he went into Egypt.* How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous people, without any sense of God and religion, till he returned and planted it among them? It is true, he calls it a mythology; and what else were the Egyptian doctrines about Osiris and Isis, or about Bacchus and Ceres, as Orpheus changed them? But whether it were a mythology or not, he calls it a theology; such as was then known and thought to be true doctrine, and, I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of religion, than the mysteries which Orpheus brought among them from the Egyptians. Some have observed, that the very name of religion among the Greeks was derived from the Thracians (Θρησκεία); and such religion they had among them before Orpheus was born, as Diodorus himself confesses. Whether Zamolxis had instructed them in religion before the time of Orpheus, we cannot determine, unless his time had been better fixed. The Greeks, who write Pythagoras's life in favour to themselves, make Zamolxis his servant; and that he went from them to instruct the Getæ, among whom he was honoured as a God. But Herodotus, who extols them *as the most valiant and just of the Thracians*, after he hath told the Greek story about Zamolxis being *servant to Pythagoras*, he concludes, *That he thought him long before Pythagoras.* And he saith, *that the Thracians had that opinion of his doctrine, that they despised death; saying, they only went to Zamolxis.* From whence it is plain, that the Thracians then believed the immortality of the soul: and Pomponius Mela saith, *That belief continued among them to his time.* But whereas Diodorus Siculus affirms, that *Orpheus brought all the mythology about Hades and the state of the dead out of Egypt, and the customs of burial there. For the body was*

Diod. Sic. l. iv. c. 25. Ed. Wess.

Herodot. l. iv. c. 93. Ed. Wess.

Mela, l. ii. c. 2.

Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 92, 96. Ed. Wess.

to be conveyed over the lake Acheron by Charon, where on one side were pleasant fields, and not far off the temple of Hecate, and Cocytus, and Lethe. I do not deny that Orpheus might add particular circumstances from what he had observed in Egypt; but that the whole tradition concerning a future state came from thence, is so far from being true, that the Thracians, the Getæ, and Hyperborei, had the like tradition among them, as appears by the Gothic Eddas, where we read *of the judgment* of another world; and that the good shall dwell with Odin in a happy state, and the bad go to Hellen and Thiffulheim: and a large account is given of the manner of judicature in the other world, from the brass tables of the Hyperborei in the island of Delos; which are mentioned in the dialogue Axiochus, in Plato's works. And however it be not genuine, it is sufficient to our purpose, that all this tradition came not out of Egypt. One would think, by the account given by Diodorus, that neither Orpheus nor the Egyptians believed any thing at all concerning a future state, but that only some ceremonies were used about burials, wherein the lives of men were enquired into, and judgment passed upon them; which the historian thinks more effectual for reforming mankind, than the Greek or poetical fables. But that the Egyptians had a real belief of another state, appears from Diodorus himself. For if any person were accused before the solemn judicature which sat upon him, if the matter were not proved, the accuser was severely punished; if it were, the body was deprived of burial; if there were no accusation, then the person's virtues were remembered, his piety, justice, chastity, &c. and they concluded with a prayer, that he might be admitted to the blessed society of the good; and the people applauded his happiness in that respect. But Porphyry, who cannot be suspected of forgery in this matter, gives a more particular account of this prayer; which he saith Euphantus translated out of the Egyptian language; and the substance of it is this. They first take out the bowels, and put them into a chest on purpose, and then lift it up towards heaven; and the person to whom it belongs makes a prayer in the name of the deceased, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give life to men, that they would receive him into the society of the immortal Gods. For he had piously worshipped the Gods his parents had taught him, as long as he lived; he had honoured those from whom he came into the world; he had not killed, nor injured or defrauded any one, nor

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

Porphyr. de Abstin. l. i. c. 10.

BOOK I.

had committed any horrible wickedness; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the sake of that which was in that chest; and so they took that, and threw it into the river, and entombed the rest of the body. By this we see a distinction is to be made between the general sense of another life, and some particular superstitions, such as those Orpheus carried into Greece; where they had a notion of another world before, as well as in Egypt: for it is not reasonable to presume that the Greeks should be worse in this respect than the most barbarous Northern people. For, besides those already mentioned, Cæsar, and Strabo, and Ammianus Marcellinus say, *that the Druids asserted the immortality of souls;* and neither Orpheus, nor any out of Egypt, ever conversed among them.

Cæs. l. vi. Strabo, l. iv. Ammian. Marcellin. l. xv.

But some in our age are so fond of the Egyptians, that they will by all means make the immortality of souls to be *a noble invention of theirs: Nobilissimum autem eorum inventum fuit immortalitas animæ.* What is the meaning of this *noble invention?* Is it that none ever thought of it before them; and all others derived it from them? That appears already to be otherwise; and that very distant and remote nations, who had no communication with these noble inventors, held the same opinions, as might, if it were needful, be proved by undoubted testimonies, both of the East and West Indies, where neither Orpheus nor the Egyptian Priests were ever heard of. And Pausanias long since observed, *That the Chaldæans and Indians held the same,* and before the Egyptians; for he *makes them the first.* But Herodotus saith, *That the Egyptians were the first who asserted the immortality of souls:* not absolutely, *but so as to pass from one body to another, till at last it came into a human body.* And of this noble invention let the Egyptians have the due honour, and not those Greeks, who, as he saith, *would deprive them of it.* It is great pity they should lose it; since Diodorus Siculus saith, *The soul of Osiris passed into a bull; and that is the reason why they give so much honour to it.* It cannot be denied, that some Greek philosophers of great reputation did assert the *transmigration of souls,* if their doctrine be not misrepresented; but neither Pythagoreans nor Platonists did hold it universally, nor in such a manner as is commonly understood. For they held no transmigration of the souls of good men, which were fit for happiness, but asserted that they went immediately to heaven, or a state of bliss; as may be

Canon. Chron. p. 217.

Pausan. in Mess.

Herodot. l. ii. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 85.

proved by the testimonies of Epicharmus, Empedocles, Plato, and many others. But the difficulty lay about impure souls: the Pythagoreans utterly rejected the poetical fables about the state of the dead; and therefore they were forced to think of some way of purifying them after death. They had no light to direct them but their own imagination; and they thought it best for the same soul to come into another human body, to try if it would behave itself better, that it might be happy: but for profligate and very wicked persons, they told them of going into such beasts as were most remarkable for those vices they were most addicted to; as the cruel into tigers and beasts of prey; the voluptuous into swine; the proud and vain into birds; the idle and soft into fishes. This is the account given, saith Bessarion, by Timæus, in his book *de Mundo et Anima*. And when Trapezuntius charged Plato with asserting that *brutes were informed by human souls*, Cardinal Bessarion, a very learned Greek, utterly denies it, and saith, *That Plato doth not make the soul of a man to become the soul of a brute; but only that it is confined to it as a prison for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper organs.* So that these philosophers' opinion was very different from the Egyptians. But whence came the most ancient philosophers to hold the immortality of souls? Had they it from the Egyptians? Plutarch saith, that Thales *was the first;* not that held the soul to be immortal; for so many did before him; but that maintained it as a philosopher by reason; that is, because it had the principle of motion within itself, and so could not be supposed to forsake itself, or to cease moving by the death of the body. Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ἀεικίνητον καὶ αὐτοκίνητον. For, as Cicero observes, a body is moved by impulse from another body, but the soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from itself; and therefore is immortal.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. Clement. Alex. Str. 5. Poësis Philos. p. 28.

Bessar. cont. Calumn. l. ii. c. 7.

Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. iv. c. 2. Ed. Xyland. Cic. Tusc. i. 23.

But Pythagoras is said *to have learnt this doctrine in Egypt.* He called the soul *a self-moving number*, saith Plutarch in the same place, *i. e.* as he well explains it, he puts *number*, after his mystical way, for *a mind:* and it seems very strange to me, that so great a man as Aristotle should think Pythagoras spake literally of numbers; as though any number could move itself. But Plutarch rightly interpreted him; and the latter Pythagoreans, from Moderatus Gaditanus, made no scruple of saying that Pythagoras *expressed his sense about immaterial beings by numbers and figures, as having nothing of matter in them.*

Porphyr. in Vit. Pythag. Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 354.

BOOK I.

And it is very probable he learnt this way from the symbols and hieroglyphics of the Egyptians. But Cicero saith, *That he had learnt the immortality of the soul from his master Pherecydes; which he confirmed very much.* And it is observable, that he first supposes *a general consent of mankind as to the immortality of souls, from a very ancient tradition;* and then proceeds to the philosophers, who offered to give reasons for asserting it; of which he gives an account. And if there were such a general consent *from all antiquity*, as he affirms, then this doctrine could not originally come out of Egypt by Orpheus into Greece.

Cic. Tusc. i. 16.

Cap. 13.

Cap. 12.

Let us now consider the sense of religion, or Divine worship among the Greeks, before Orpheus's time; whether they were such strangers to it as they must be supposed, if he brought it first among them. Plato was a very competent witness as to the old Greeks; and he affirms, *that the first inhabitants of Greece seemed to him to have worshipped no other Gods but the sun, moon, and earth, and stars, and the heavens; as most barbarous nations still do.* So that here we have the same religion in Greece, that was then common to the rest of the world, i. e. the worship of visible Deities, and such as they apprehended to have the greatest influence upon their affairs. The heavenly bodies did strike them with astonishment at their vastness and beauty, and orderly motion, and the benefits they continually received from them; and these they were most ready to pay their devotions to, as to those which appeared most to them; but that which did not appear, was to them that were so much governed by sense, as if it were not. As if we suppose a prince travelling with his chariot in the country, with the curtains drawn up on all sides, and a great retinue about him; the people are much surprised with so great an appearance, and flock about them to see to whom they must pay their respects; and seeing nobody in the chariot, they turn their eyes to the attendants, and especially to him that sits so high in the coach-box, and manages the horses, and immediately give him that profound reverence which was only due to the prince himself, if he had appeared. Much after this manner it was with the barbarous people, both in Greece and other parts of the world. There was something so great as to require devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could see nothing which they thought could deserve it better than the sun, moon, and stars, which were placed very high, and were

Plato in Cratyl. p. 273. Ed. Ficin.

the great movers which kept all things in their order, and made them so serviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no religion; it being rather a sign they had too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reasonable worship, than that which Orpheus or the old poets brought in among the Greeks; whose stories and ceremonies were so filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turned the stomachs of modest and virtuous men from any kind of worship, which had the tincture of so much obscenity going along with it. And it is really to be wondered at, that the Orphic mysteries and poetical fables received among the Greeks, did not quite overthrow all religion among them. For, as Plutarch well saith, *Absurd notions of God have very bad consequences both ways; for some are plunged into the depth of superstition, and others, to avoid that, run themselves into atheism.* And if there had not been some very great reason in nature to have kept the notion of a Deity in men's minds, it is hardly conceivable, that, under all the horrible superstitions of Greece, there should be any such thing as a sense of religion left among them. But the evidence of that was so great, as made all men of understanding to put any tolerable sense upon those vile superstitions, which were so prevailing in Greece, after the Egyptian fopperies were brought in among them. The rule they went by was this, that religion must be preserved in the world, not to serve politic ends, but to satisfy the reason and common sense of mankind; and that since such a way of worship was so generally received, they were willing to put the best constructions upon it, and to make it some way or other serve to keep up the sense of a Divine power in the management of the world. And of this we have a remarkable instance in Plutarch, with respect to the Egyptian mysteries, in his treatise of Isis and Osiris. He professes at first *a great desire to find out the truth of these things that concern the knowledge of God, it being the greatest blessing God can give, and mankind can receive; and that without it immortality is not life, but duration. And the end of all,* he saith, *is the knowledge of the first and principal and intellectual being.* Ὧν τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυρίου καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις. But he can make nothing at all of the *matters of fact* with relation to Osiris and Isis, which he looks on as very absurd; and so overthrows all *the Phœnician scheme of Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the same time under Trajan. But Plutarch saith, *To understand those things of*

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. c. 2. Ed. Oxon.

Ibid. c. 25.

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a Divine Being literally, is so absurd and impious, that they deserve to be spit at who offer them. And for those *who interpret these things of great princes in former times, who had Divine honour given them, this,* he saith, *is the way to overthrow the natural sense of a Divine Being, and so open the way to atheism, by confounding Gods and men together;* as he saith *Euhemerus Messenius had done.* And therefore he was fain to turn all into allegory, to avoid the mischief of absurd and impious opinions concerning that Divine Power which he owned to be in the world; and not only so, but he adds, (as is already observed,)

Ibid. c. 45. Ed. Oxon. Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν εἰς τε ποιητὰς, καὶ φιλοσόφες δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίςιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε τελεταῖς ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχῆ περιφερομένην, ὡς ὅτ' ἄνευ καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν· that *there was a very ancient tradition in the world among all sorts of men, and which had obtained a firm and unshaken belief in the world, not only in common talk, but in their greatest mysteries, and that both among Greeks and Barbarians, that the universe was not made by chance, or without reason, but that it was made and governed by it.* From whence it follows, that there was such a tradition among the old Greeks, which did not lose its authority when those mysteries were brought in; and that made the most intelligent persons to apply them that way. For it seems, by the account he gives of Euhemerus Messenius, that atheistical persons took great advantages from these stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that great men in former ages, that had found out some useful inventions, were deified after their deaths. Plutarch makes that a fabulous story, which he tells of his *golden inscriptions* in Panchæa, to prove the truth of his assertion, *which none ever saw besides himself;* and he affirms, that there were no such persons as the Panchæi: but others have shewed that there was such a place as Panchæa about Arabia Felix.

Diod. Sicul. l. v. c. 42. Ed. Wess. And Diodorus Siculus mentions it as a considerable island in the Arabian Sea, and that the inhabitants are called Panchæi; and that near the city Panara there is a temple to Jupiter Triphyllius, which was in great veneration for its antiquity and magnificence, which he describes at large: and upon the mountain there it is said that Uranus of old inhabited; and the people were called Triphyllii, from three different tribes which joined there, and were afterwards driven out by Ammon. And to make the

story of Euhemerus more probable, he saith, the inhabitants came first out of Crete in Jupiter's time; so that Plutarch was very much to seek, when he denied that there was any such place as Panchæa, or such a person as Jupiter Triphyllius. And Diodorus further saith, there was in it a golden pillar in the old Egyptian letters, wherein there were inscriptions, containing the acts of Uranus and Jupiter, and of Diana and Apollo, written by *Hermes*; which is a very different account of this matter from what Plutarch gives. Some are willing to excuse Euhemerus, as though he intended nothing more but to let the Greeks know that they worshipped such for Gods which had been men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his design, according to Plutarch; which was to prove *that there were no other Gods but these:* so Plutarch ranks him with Diagoras Melius and Theodorus, who said, *there were no Gods.* And the Epicurean in Tully said, *that Euhemerus destroyed all religion;* which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worshipped. Sextus Empiricus reckons him among the Atheists, and saith, he was *a conceited man;* but he charges him only with saying, *that some great men in former ages had been made Gods;* which was so evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an Atheist merely upon that account. But Jupiter of Crete had been advanced a long time to the highest divine honour; and consequently those who went about to disprove his worship, were thought to destroy the worship which belongs to the Supreme God. But Diodorus Siculus, in a fragment of his sixth book, preserved by Eusebius, gives a very different account of him, and that from Euhemerus's own words, viz. That the ancients had delivered to their posterity two different notions of Gods; one of those that were eternal and immortal, as the sun, moon, and stars, and other parts of the universe; but others were terrestrial Gods, that were so made, because they were benefactors to mankind; as Hercules, Bacchus, and others. And as to Euhemerus, he saith, *that he was a favourite of Cassander, king of Macedonia, by whose command he made a voyage into those parts,* where he found the things before mentioned. But some learned men are still of Plutarch's opinion, that Euhemerus's Panchæa is a mere figment of his; for which I do not see any reason sufficient, especially when the same persons do allow Sanchoniathon's Phœnician antiquities; and methinks Euhemerus's account of the inscriptions on pillars

Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. l. vii.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 42.

Sext. Emp. ad Math. p. 317.

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. ii. c. 2.

Bochart. Phaleg. l. ii. c. 8

BOOK I. of the acts of Uranus and Cronus, and Jupiter and Ammon, and *the Sacred Letters* by Hermes, comes so near to Philo Byblius, that one would think he had compared notes with Euhemerus and Diodorus Siculus. But their design was different in this respect, that Sanchoniathon justified the making men to be Gods, but Euhemerus went about to prove they were *not Gods*, because they had *been men*. It is possible that the common people might account him an Atheist for denying Jupiter of Crete to be God, or for saying that his sepulchre was to be found. But why should Plutarch charge him on this account, when he himself so much finds fault with those who made men to be Gods? He endeavoured, he saith, to avoid the extremes both of superstition and atheism; but he could but endeavour it, when he allowed the practices of the Greeks and Egyptians, and only offered at some forced interpretations of them, against the general sense of the Egyptian mysteries.

But however it appears from him, that the old Greeks did preserve the ancient tradition of *the world not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all religion.

Plato de LL. l. x. And Plato, when he enters upon the discourse against atheism, begins with two things, viz *That the sun, and moon, and stars, and the order of seasons, shewed there was a God and Providence; and the consent of all mankind, Greeks and Barbarians.* Now, how could Plato have said this of the old Greeks, if they had been without any religion till Orpheus came out of Egypt? And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine worship among them, from the Parian Chronicle; where it is said, *That Deucalion, after he had escaped the flood, went to Athens, and there offered a solemn sacrifice for his deliverance*; and Pausanias saith, *he there built a magnificent temple*: which are sufficient evidences of the religion of the old Greeks, even before they had the name of Hellens from the son of Deucalion. But I have not yet done with Diodorus Siculus, who lets fall several insinuations, as though he were of the mind of Euhemerus Messenius; and that the old religion, both in Egypt and elsewhere, was nothing but a politic contrivance. For in the beginning of his history he pretends to give an account of the beginning of all things: but it is such a one as plainly shews he was no friend to religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by supposing the world to be produced without any intellectual cause. He saith at first there were two opinions among the philosophers and

Marmor. Arundel.

Pausan. in Atticis.

historians: one was, that the world had been always just as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At first there was a chaos, or a confused mixture of heaven and earth and all together; then followed a separation of bodies from each other, and thence came the present frame of the world. The lighter bodies moved forward, as the air and fire, by which motion came the sun, moon, and stars: but the grosser and more heavy parts subsided together: the moister made the sea, and the dry the earth; which was very moist, but being quickened by the heat of the sun, swelled up in several tumors, with thin skins, containing the materials of living creatures; which having strength, brake through those skins, and thence came all sorts of animals. But the heat of the sun and the winds hardening the surface of the earth, no more of such swellings appeared; and so the animals are since continued by propagation. But the men which were thus born were very wild at first, but by degrees they came to understand one another, and to find out the conveniences of living. This is the short abstract of the account he gives: which is just the Epicurean hypothesis in other terms; which was much in vogue in the time of Diodorus Siculus, (which, saith Suidas, was that of Augustus,) especially after Lucretius's poem was in such reputation: for, he saith, he very well understood the Latin tongue, and had great helps to his history from Rome; and whosoever compares this with Lucretius, will scarce find any difference. And Eusebius observes, that he does not so much as once mention the name of God in it, but leaves all to chance and a fortuitous concourse; and as it is expressed in Plutarch, where the Epicurean opinion is delivered much to the same purpose, the world is said to have come together at first by a motion of atoms, without Providence. Where there must be something defective in the beginning, to shew this to have been the Epicurean hypothesis; for as it stands it seems to be Plutarch's own opinion, which is directly contrary to what he had said before in the foregoing chapter, where he blames Anaximander for leaving out the efficient cause; for, saith he, matter alone can do nothing without it. And the same he repeats against Anaximenes; and saith plainly, Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων, ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑπῆρξηναι· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι· οἷον, οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος· that it is

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Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 7. Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. i. c. 4.

Plutarch. de Plac. Phil. l. i. c. 3. Ed. Xyland.

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as impossible that matter alone should be the cause of things, as it is for metals to form themselves into pots and cups without an artist. So that Plutarch must be cleared from that opinion, which he so justly opposes; and he commends Anaxagoras in a particular manner, for adding mind as the efficient cause to matter; which brought it out of confusion into that order that appears in the world. Pliny saith of Diodorus, *Apud Græcos desiit nugari;* but he only applies it to the title of his book; and it is not true of the beginning of it. Pliny himself took the world to be an eternal Being, which he calls God; and so was against Diodorus's making of the world. But Diodorus quotes Euripides, the scholar of Anaxagoras, for his chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were such confusion at first, but how the world came out of it. It is certain that Anaxagoras did not only hold a chaos at first, but an Eternal Mind, which ordered the world, and brought things into that beauty and usefulness which they have. Diogenes Laertius saith, that Anaxagoras followed Linus, and he was before Orpheus: if it were only in that of the chaos, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that supposed the world to be made, asserted it: but if it were of the mind as the efficient cause, that is a considerable testimony of the antiquity of that opinion among the old Greeks. And Orpheus, as Suidas gives an account of his doctrine, saith, *That he held a chaos, and before that an æther of God's making; which was the great instrument in framing the world.*

Plin. Nat. Hist. l. i. c. 1. L. ii. c. 1.

Laert. in Proem.

But Eusebius charges *the most part of the Greek philosophers with being of Diodorus's mind in this matter:* but I hope to make it appear otherwise in the progress of this discourse; being now only to consider this assertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairness of it; for he represents it as if there had been but two opinions among the philosophers; that of *the eternity of the world*, and its *being made by chance;* as if he had never heard of an Eternal Mind among them; which it is impossible so inquisitive and learned a man should be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not so much as the inscriptions of Hermes, or the Commentaries of Taautus, which Sanchoniathon and Philo Byblius pretended to. He gave no manner of reason how the confused matter was put into motion, or how the separation of the lighter and heavier bodies was effected; how the heavenly bodies

Euseb. de Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 8.

came to have distinct vortices, without interfering with each other; how the moister and heavier parts came to be divided, so as to make two such great bodies as the earth and sea to be so distinguished and parted from one another; which are considerable difficulties, and ought to have been cleared. It may be said, *That he writes not like a philosopher, but as an historian; and only in general lays down the principles that had been received by philosophers.* But this doth not vindicate him; for then he should have set down all their opinions, which he doth not, but purposely avoids that which would have resolved these difficulties. For if an Eternal Mind be supposed to give and direct the motion of matter, then we may easily conceive not only whence motion itself came, but whence gravitation, or the tendency of bodies towards their centre; whence the several great bodies of the heavens came to have their distinct circumvolutions; and whence the earth and sea came to be so divided and parted from one another.

But Diodorus was sensible that there would be great objections made against *the production of animals out of the earth,* without any other cause than *the heat of the sun, and moisture and putrefaction of the slimy substance of the earth.* And therefore to answer them, *the Egyptians,* he saith, *produce this experiment among them, that about Thebes, when the earth is moistened by the Nile, by the intense heat of the sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of mice do spring out; which being done after the earth was so much hardened, and the first influences abated, much more might all kind of animals come out of the earth at first.* Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 10. Ed. Wess.

But, in the first place, we have nothing but the testimony of these Egyptians for the original truth of this; who brought it as an argument to justify their own hypothesis. And from them other writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it; as Ovid, Mela, Pliny, &c. Ælian goes farther, (who lived in Adrian's time;) for he saith, *in his way between Naples and Puteoli he saw such imperfect animals, half mud, and half living creatures; altera pars vivit, rudis est pars altera tellus,* as Ovid describes them. But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect animals, and only one part appear out of the mud or dirt, and the other be covered over with it. And this in all probability was the case in Egypt; for these were seen only *in the mud,* after the Nile was returned into its channel, as Mela Ovid. Metamorph. Plin. l. ix. c. 58.

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affirms, *Ubi sedavit diluvia et se sibi reddidit, per humentes campos quædam nondum perfecta animalia*, &c. Now this was a very ill time for any persons to go farther than as to what appeared to them at a distance; and because they saw but some parts, they concluded the rest to be nothing but slime. But this is a very slight and imperfect way of making experiments. Did any of the Egyptians take and dissect any of these imperfect animals, and shew how it was possible, in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but mud, when the rest had all the proper organs belonging to such animals? If the internal and vital parts be first formed, (as no doubt they are,) and the blood passing through the heart into the outward parts be the great instrument of perfecting the organs of sense and motion, how is it possible to conceive, that, where the inward parts are perfect in their kind, one main part of an animal should have nothing like organs, but merely be a mass of dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be joined with the other, to make up one perfect animal? It is agreed among the best observers, and most curious enquirers into these things, that the heart is the first of the solid parts, and the blood of the fluid: but whether it be by a dilatation of the *punctum salicns*, or red beating speck, into several parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extension of the several parts in little, as an *embryo*, (as it is in plants;) or by a fermentation raised in the fluid matter by an active fluid conveyed into it, upon the conjunction of male and female, (which are the several hypotheses of the most inquisitive persons in this philosophical age;) which way soever we take it, this Egyptian hypothesis of *imperfect animals* is repugnant to the most accurate observations which have been made about the generations of animals. And however such things might then pass among such who take all upon trust from the Egyptians, or others, who never examined them; yet it would be the only proof of imperfect animals, to find any in our age to defend those crude and absurd opinions. As though any thing were to be believed rather than the most reasonable things in the world, viz. God and Providence; which appear most conspicuously in the production of animals: insomuch that our sagacious Dr. Harvey, after all his diligent and exact enquiries, confesses, *that the power and presence of the Deity is no where more observable than in the formation of animals. Neque sane uspiam alibi, quam in animalis fo-*

Mela, l. i. c. 9.

Harveus de Generat. Animal. Exercitat. 49, 50.

brica, omnipotens Creator in operibus suis aut manifestius conspicitur, aut præsentius ejus Numen adest. And he could find no satisfaction in any hypotheses of the greatest naturalists, without taking in *the immediate power and providence of God. Quapropter rem recte pieque (mea quidem sententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium generationes ab eodem illo æterno atque omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cujus nutu rerum ipsarum universitas dependet. Quod ubique præsens, singulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adsit, quam toti universo, quod Numine suo sive Providentia, arte ac mente divina, cuncta animalia procreet.* And even Mr. Hobbes himself, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence as another, yet is forced to give up the cause in this matter; and freely confesses, *That if men examine the several machines in order to generation and nutrition, and think they were not ordered by an intelligent Being to their several offices, they must be said to be without understanding themselves. Qui si machinas omnes tum generationis tum nutritionis satis perspexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinatasque ad sua quasque officia viderint, ipsi profecto sine mente esse censendi sunt.* And yet he sets down the words of Diodorus Siculus in the beginning of that chapter; and thinks *that is as far as men can go by philosophy, without revelation.* How can these things consist? For men *without revelation* may find out all the *machines in the body*, and therefore may be convinced that there was an Eternal Mind, which gave a being to these things; which is more than Diodorus Siculus or his philosophers could find. For they affirmed, *that animals were formed by chance, out of mud and putrefaction, without any mind;* and therefore, according to him, they had none themselves. And some of our most experienced and skilful anatomists, after all their debates about the several mechanical hypotheses concerning the production of animals, have concluded that *it is impossible that mere matter and motion, of whatsoever figure the particles of matter be, should make up the body of an animal; but that we must have recourse to a most wise and omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it. Interea ratum maneat juxta normam optimæ philosophiæ fieri non posse, ut particulæ sive corpuscula quomodocunque figurata solo motu fortuito in corpus humanum aut belluinum sponte coalescant: sed necessario ad hoc opus omnino sapientissimum potentissimumque Architectum requiri, qui animalium machinas tam affabre et artificiose componat. Adeoque*

Hobb. de Homine, l. i. c. 1. ad fin.

Exercit. Anatomic. et Medic. Peiri et Hardeti, p. 146

BOOK I. *Deum solum formare cuncta animalia, et fœcunditatem ovis addere.*

Etmulleri Instit. Medica, c. 23.

And those who plead most for the motion of the particles of matter in forming the body, yet confess, that it is hardly possible to conceive how the kinds of animals can be preserved, unless there be something beyond that, to regulate and determine that motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any persons that have the use of understanding, consider whether this Egyptian hypothesis have the least credibility in it, since it is grounded on so little authority.

II. But that is not all: for we shall prove it to be repugnant to the most certain accounts we have of the *nature*, as well as the *production of animals;* both which are impossible to be conceived to be the mere result of a fortuitous motion of matter, by the heat of the sun upon the slime of the earth. As will appear by considering the most necessary and vital parts of animals themselves, and what relates to the several kinds, and the preservation of them: for the Egyptians argued from their mice to all other animals. The most necessary and vital parts of animals are such as the *course of the blood* and *respiration* depend upon; without which it is impossible for them to live. The *course of the blood* supposes *the heart*, as the great machine in the body; and the several arteries are as so many vessels to convey the blood into the several parts. But here is so much wisdom and contrivance in this, that unless the heart had been framed in such a manner, and the blood put into such a motion as it is, the preservation of life had been impossible. And life itself is something beyond the mere coalition of the particles of matter: for if that were sufficient, then there must be life in all parts of matter united together, (but neither stones nor plants are animals;) and they become animals by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the constant course of the blood, and the distribution of nourishment to the several parts of the body in order to their support; and when these are at an end, the life of an animal is gone. Now, in order to this course of the blood, the heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief seat of that which is called *the flame of life;* which is nothing else but that brisk and vigorous motion of the blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole body. But both the natural heat and motion of the blood are

unaccountable in the mechanical way. *Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enascatur, haud facile dixerim, siquidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium est, quoniam ipsamet sine calore nihil egerit.* To say the natural heat is caused by fermentation, can give no manner of satisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And so heat must be supposed in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in such kind of suppositions. And if the particles did of themselves give it, then it must be discerned as much at first as afterwards: but the contrary is observed in animals; for the blood is more fixed at first, and its heat rises by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be said, *There is a spiritus genitalis, which causes all that heat and motion;* I ask, whence that arises. Not from mere matter and motion. But it must be something of a higher nature, and from a superior cause. But if heat and mud can produce animals, there is no need of any such *spiritus genitalis* in nature; but all must arise from mere motion, and the continuation of animals might as well have been without any distinction of sexes. But how came matter of itself to form such a distinction, with parts suitable to such a design? How come the instincts of nature in animals to be so violent to such an end, when, if there be nothing but matter, there can be no such end designed? How come some animals (as mules) not capable of propagating their kind, when, upon anatomical searches, no kind of defect hath been found in them, as some imagined? How come the species of animals to be so determined and limited, that in the revolution of so many ages no new species have appeared, although they are so different in some countries from others? How comes the number of some animals so very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the beasts of prey to fall so much short of the most tractable and useful animals to mankind, as sheep and oxen? And those are observed to be most fruitful, which afford the best food for them. Can we suppose *the heat of the sun and slime of the earth* should regard so much the benefit of mankind? How comes the difference of animals as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come some to hatch their young ones within their own bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and so to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continued without alteration? Whence comes that difference in animals, that some do ruminate, and others do not? Did mud,

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Ent. Apologia, p. 204.

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. ii.

BOOK I. quickened by the sun, design to supply the want of teeth for mastication, by those several ventricles, and the muscles belonging to them? How come some animals to have their senses more exquisite than others, according to the nature of their food; as sight in some, and smelling in others? How come birds and fishes so very much to exceed mankind in the frame of those nerves which serve for smelling? Whence comes that wonderful sagacity in some animals, to pursue others merely from the scent left upon the ground at some distance of time, and to distinguish it from all others of the same kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tenderness of their young ones in the most cruel and fiercest animals? If heat and mud could produce the beasts themselves, yet what influence could they have upon their brood? How comes the change of the passage between the lungs and the heart, when a young animal is come into the open air, from what it had in the womb? What particles of matter close up the *foramen ovale*, and direct the passage of the blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper vessels of the breeding animal just at such a time, and to decay when there is no farther occasion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of birds in making their nests, and feeding and preserving their young? *Neque alia parte ingenia avium magis admiranda sunt.* What particles of matter disposed them to find out their proper food and physic? How come the seasons of bringing forth to be so settled, that there is a sufficient provision to support the young animals, when they come into the world, by the milk ready prepared for them, and such conveniences for the young to suck it? How come they to run so naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid such as would destroy them? What had the particles of matter to do in all this? If we go to insects; how came the silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the mulberry-trees are ready for their food? the bees to come forth in May, when there is most plenty of dew? the wasps near autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to support them? How come the several insects by that sagacity to find out the most proper places to lay their eggs in? It being observed of them, by those who have most curiously enquired about these matters, *That all the several sorts of insects lay their eggs in places most safe and agreeable to them; where they are seldom lost or miscarry; and where they have a supply of nourishment for their young, so soon as they are hatched and need it.*

Plin. N. H. l. x. c. 33. Ed. Par.

Mr. Ray of the Creation, p. 115.

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But there are some things yet further to be considered in the necessary vital parts of animals, which shew that they could not be the result of a fortuitous motion of matter. The main vitals of animals are the same; and where there is any observable difference, these two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the same kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of those kinds. As the position of the heart is higher in mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; because if the heart of mankind were in the centre of the body, and not in the upper part, there could not be so easy a passage of the blood from the heart to the head, which is so necessary for the support of life; but in those creatures which hold their heads downwards, although the passage may be longer in such which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, because of the easiness of the descent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of animals to cause such an agreement in the several parts of living creatures, that all have the same vitals, insects excepted, in which the heart is the whole body, (*tota cor sunt,*) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for respiration, nor the brain for sense and motion? (to name no more.) How comes a blind motion of matter to hit so exactly on all these, and to put them into such a convenient situation for the preservation of life? How comes the heart to be endued with such strong fibres, unless it were intended not merely to receive the blood in its passage, but to disperse it again by its contraction of itself? How come the coats of the arteries about the heart to be so much stronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greatest necessity of their being so, to receive the blood in its first heat and quickest motion? How come the veins to be so dispersed in all parts of the body, but to receive the blood in its return, and so to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of matter could frame the valves in the veins, so as to give free passage of the blood towards the heart, but oppose the passage of the venal blood the other way? (which gave the first occasion to the discovery of the circulation of the blood, as Mr. Boyle tells us from Dr. Harvey himself.) What is it which keeps the blood in its constant course for so many years, as some animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can see no reason, from their mechanical frame, why one should in an ordinary

Harv.

Boyle of Final Causes, p. 157.

BOOK I. course survive another for so great a compass of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a stag, to make it outlive an ox or a horse so many years; when Aristotle saith, *They seem to be less made for long life than other animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth:* but Pliny so long after him saith, *Vita cervis in confesso longa est; it was a thing taken for granted that they lived long.* But I meddle not with any improbable stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, viz. that there is a great diversity in the lives of animals; of which, I say, no account can be given from mere matter and motion.

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. vi. c. 29.

Plin. N. H. l. viii. c. 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of animals arising from putrefaction, which the Egyptians and Diodorus Siculus make their foundation. *After the inundation of the Nile, a sudden heat of the sun falling on the slime causes a putrefaction; and from thence an innumerable company of mice came.* But Theophrastus, a very great philosopher, in a fragment preserved in Photius, saith, *That the great number of mice is to be found in dry soils, and not in moist; for water is a great enemy to them, and they are certainly destroyed by it.* How comes Theophrastus to differ so much herein from Diodorus Siculus and the Egyptians? Or must we suppose that the water of Nile was quite of a different nature from all other waters to them? *Proventus eorum in siccitatibus*, saith Pliny; where he speaks of the great increase of them. How then came they to multiply in such moist places, where the Nile hath overflowed? *Rain-water kills them*, saith Aristotle; how then comes the Nile to produce them? If it be said, *that Aristotle speaks of great showers which drown them;* it is easily answered, that at their going off, upon these principles, they produce more; and so the greatest numbers would be after great rains. But what Theophrastus saith before of small frogs, will hold of these mice too: *They do not come from the water, but that discovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before.* And Pliny's words are remarkable, when he speaks of this matter, *Detegente eo (Nilo) mures, cuti reperiuntur*, &c. And so the late editor confesses it was in the best MSS. So that the going off of the Nile is that only which brings them to light. And before, Pliny saith, the *Gyrini* (the name given to these small frogs) do come from other frogs, and not from putrefaction; *Pariunt minimas ranas nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant,*

Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 7.

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H. l. x. c. 65. Ed. Par.

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. vi. c. 37.

Plin. N. H. l. ix. c. 58. c. 51.

oculis tantum et cauda insignes; mox pedes figurantur, &c. These are called *tadpoles*, and seem imperfect at first, but by degrees do come to all their parts. But as to animals arising from putrefaction, learned and inquisitive persons of our age have taken great pains to discover the truth of it in several countries, but with no success. In Italy, Franc. Redi undertook the discovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of experiments; but after all could not find *that any putrefied flesh would produce animals*, much less putrefied water or slime; *but that lesser animals hide themselves under dirt and slime, and therefore have been suspected to have come out of it; and if those who first broached this opinion had examined this matter more strictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at least some part of them, with that earth which they thought had brought them forth.* And *for the little frogs*, he saith, *that they are so much of the colour of the earth, that they might easily be mistaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their stomachs and intestines are full of food and excrements.* Which is a plain demonstration against their original from the earth; and he concludes it a thing *impossible for any such creatures, that are part mud and part animals, to be produced by the inundation of the Nile.* There is a remarkable passage in Olaus Wormius concerning the Norway mice, which seem to come out of the clouds; *that as soon as they are fallen, they have found green herbs in their bowels:* (and I do not think any grass grows in the clouds.) But he thinks Scaliger's opinion not improbable, *that they come from putrefied water in the clouds;* and he saith, *The seamen have found them fallen into their vessels, and that the clouds stink, and hinder their breathing:* but at last he thinks *they may be only carried by some violent storms from the mountains and islands, where they breed in great abundance.* And Etmullerus, a German physician, concludes all *equivocal generation to be impossible.* Some of our own most diligent enquirers, after all their searches, declare that they can find no such thing as a *spontaneous generation of animals;* and I remember I have formerly read a discourse in MS. of Mr. Boyle's to that purpose. Our ingenious and learned Mr. Ray positively affirms, *That there is no such thing in nature as equivocal or spontaneous generation; but that all animals, as well small as great, are generated by animal parents of the same species with themselves.* And because some were offended at it, he goes about to justify his assertion, not only from

Fr. Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 195, &c.

P. 208.

P. 209.

Museum Warmian. l. iii. c. 23. p. 326.

Exercit. 192, 193.

Etmuller. Instit. Med. c. 23.

Lister in Goedart. de Insect. p. 47.

Ray of the Creation, part ii. p. 71.

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reason, but from the authority of Malpighius, as well as Redi, Swammerdam, and Lewenhoek, and many others, who have examined this matter *carefully and circumspectly; and therefore their authority sways more with him, than the concurrent suffrages of a thousand others,* as he saith.

But there are some things not yet sufficiently cleared as to this matter, especially as to animals breeding in human bodies, of particular times, and in some diseases: but as to plants, and some insects about them, in which Redi himself gives up the cause, Malpighius contradicts him, and so do Swammerdam and others; particularly Mr. Hook saith, *He observed little eggs in the protuberances of plants, which became worms with legs, which eat through the womb which inclosed them. And in all galls,* he saith, *there be either holes, where the worm hath eat out its passage, or a place where it had been.* All which he attributes to the particular design of Providence, in taking care for the conveniences of the meanest animals. But there seems to be more difficulty in the *apiarium marinum* mentioned by Piso; for it is hard to understand how *those blue worms* came to the bottom of the sea, *which coming up with a spongy sort of shrub growing upon the rocks, and being exposed to the heat, turned to little animals like bees.* But this matter is not delivered distinctly enough to form any argument upon; as Mr. Hook hath well observed. I see no difficulty in the Ephemeron, or Hemerobion, as it is described by the authors at the end of Goedart, who give the best account of it; for it seems to be of the nature of other insects, and the only difficulty is, why so much pains for so short a life? for it is produced by such changes as other insects are. But it cannot be denied, that there have been among us two very learned men, who have asserted a kind of spontaneous generation of animals; I mean Dr. Harvey and his Apologist. For Dr. Harvey, Redi observes, *That although he asserts every animal to come of an egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that these eggs are not always contained in the bodies of animals, but are dispersed up and down by the air, and after become animals in an equivocal manner:* but he saith, *he hath not cleared the grounds of his opinion*; save only *that it comes from the omnipotent hand of God.* So that Dr. Harvey held a true spontaneous generation from mere matter and motion to have been impossible; as appears by what is said of him before. And so his Apologist supposes *a saline spirit to be dis-*

Micrograp. p. 189.

Piso Hist. Nat. Brasil. l. iv. c. 2.

Micrograp. c. 43.

Redi, p. 19.

Ent. Apol. c. 17. p. 379.

persed in nature, which meeting with proper matter and a moderate heat, may produce insects, and such kind of animals: but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a power far above matter and motion; which at first ordered the world, and all things in it. But he thinks *such insects come nearer to the nature of plants than animals, and live chiefly by the heat of the sun; and therefore in the winter they are torpid and without motion, and are revived at spring, when the heat increases.* P. 245. CHAP. I.

IV. Supposing it to be granted that there were such an equivocal generation of mice and frogs on the bank of the Nile, how doth it from thence follow that mankind had the same kind of original? It is a saying of Pliny, which hath been carried too far, *Cum rerum natura nusquam magis, quam in minimis, tota sit;* where he compares insects with the greater animals; and seems to admire the workmanship of one far beyond the other: his words are, *Nusquam alibi spectatiore naturæ rerum artificio.* And so he falls into admiration of the perfections of some insects, as to the quickness of sense and motion; and of others as to their peculiar properties. I think Aristotle was very much in the right when he held, *they were to be blamed who despised the least things in nature; for in all of them ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστὸν, there is something which deserves admiration.* And particularly in insects, the contexture of their parts, the manner of their transformations, the difference of their kinds, the variety of their food, and their time of taking it, have something in them, which cannot be accounted for by mere matter and motion: but yet there is a great difference in the inward make of these creatures from more perfect animals. For Redi affirms, that Steno and he opening some insects together, they could find no other inward parts, *but one long channel through the whole body, about which there were filaments in a confused series, which they thought might be instead of veins and arteries.* When all their inward parts were taken out, and the head taken off, *they still lived and moved, as other insects do, and laid their eggs.* And Pliny observes, *Nihil intus, nisi admodum paucis intestinum implicatum.* By which we see what a vast difference there is between the principles of life in mankind from those in these admirable insects. Jul. Scaliger extremely despises Cardan's way of reasoning; *Mus e putredine potest nasci, ergo et homo potest:* and saith, *That the woman in Esop's Fables, who was asked by her husband how the child came without him, and she answered, Out of the snow, might have made*

Plin. N. H. l. xi. c. 1.

Arist. de Par. Anim. l. i. c. i.

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 218.

Plin. l. xi. c. 4. Arist. Hist Anim. l. iv. c. 6.

Scaliger. Exercit. 193.

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a better answer from Cardan's philosophy, viz. *out of the mud*. And it is wittily said by Scaliger of him in another place, *They who stick in the dirt, while they lift up one foot to get out, set the other faster; and therefore it is best to keep out of it altogether.* But Cardan seemed to be so little concerned to get out of it, that he asserts, *That every putrefaction produces some animal or other; and that all animals come out of it; which*, saith Scaliger, *is a wicked and profane speech.* And yet Aïdr. Cæsalpinus undertakes to defend Cardan, chiefly from the generation of insects, without regarding the difference between them and more perfect animals, if his supposition had been true. Aristotle, who had all possible advantages for writing his Books of Animals, by the bounty of Philip or Alexander, or both, coming to speak of such *as had no blood*, (among which are all insects,) he saith, *They have no veins, nor bladder, nor respiration; but something that serves instead of a heart, without which they could have no life; but they have the parts which serve for nutrition:* and therefore their life differs little, according to Pliny himself, from that of plants and fruits; but he would have them *spirare sine visceribus*, breathe without lungs; and he grants they have neither them, *nor heart, nor liver.* And although there be some higher degree of life in such animals as Diodorus Siculus speaks of, yet those fall so far short of mankind, that it is a wonder men of sense could imagine the production of one could be an argument for the other. For if we go no farther than nutrition, mice and frogs are easily provided for; but how should mankind live that were produced out of slime and mud? But nothing can be more absurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the several ways of producing mankind by a spontaneous generation; as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Exercit. 180, 182.

Exercit. 190, 193. Andr. Cæsalpin. Qu. Peripat. l. v. c. 1.

De Partib. Anim. l. iv. c. 5.

France. Redi hath reckoned up the several hypotheses to our hands. The first is that of Democritus, *That mankind came into the world like worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and shape of men.* I wish we had more of Democritus's own writings left, that we might better judge what his true opinion was; but by what remains, it doth not appear that herein he differed from Epicurus. It is certain he did as to the first principles of all things being made of atoms; but whether he did as to the immediate production of animals, is not so clear. For they did not imagine that animals were formed immediately by atoms; which was too general and indefinite a princi-

Redi de Gen. Insect. p. 14.

ple; but that the atoms first came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of animals. And so it is said that Democritus held mankind to have appeared first in the fashion of worms. Petronius Arbiter saith, that Democritus spent his days in making experiments; *ætatem inter experimenta consumpsit;* and Columella particularly takes notice of his experiments about insects; and it is not improbable, that, from his observations about their transformations, he might form his hypothesis about mankind. His original notion was, as appears by Plutarch, *That there were infinite atoms dispersed in a void space, which had no kind of qualities inherent in them; but, as they casually hit upon each other, they produced water, and fire, and plants, and men; which were nothing but a congeries of atoms;* which, saith Plutarch, he called *Ideas.* And it appears, by another place in him, that Democritus only held bulk and figure in his atoms; but Epicurus added gravity; without which he found *his atoms could not move.* And although Epicurus derived the main of his principles from Democritus, yet it is plain by Plutarch, that his followers set themselves to lessen the credit of Democritus, as one that overthrew the certainty of our senses, and resolved all into reason. To which purpose there are several passages in Sextus Empiricus, of Democritus himself; wherein he affirms, *That the things we call qualities are only names imposed upon opinions,* (which he calls law;) *and so bitter and sweet, and hot and cold, are only fancies, and no realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not seen, but only apprehended by the mind,* as *atoms and vacuity;* and in several other places, that there is no *certain knowledge,* but *only opinion by our senses.* And he quotes Democritus's own words, to prove *that the knowledge we have by our senses is dark and obscure; but that which is genuine depends only upon reason.* The Epicureans, who followed their master as to the certainty of sense, could by no means brook this doctrine of Democritus, who saw far beyond Epicurus, and knew what blunders he must fall into by the judgment of sense, as about the bigness of the sun; which he positively said was *no greater than appeared to our senses,* i. e. *two feet over,* saith Cicero, or *a little more or less;* which was so notorious a blunder, that Democritus, he saith, *could not fall into, being skilled in geometry; but Epicurus not only despised it, but persuaded Polyænus it was false.* And his late great defender hath little to say for him, but that Socrates under-

Columel. l. xii. ad fin.

Plutarch. adv. Col.

De Placit. Philos. l. i. c. 3.

Sext. Emp. p. 163. Ed. Steph.

P. 164.

Cicero de Fin. l. i. c. 6.

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stood as little geometry as he; but Socrates was far enough from asserting such stupid paradoxes, and making geometry nothing but a piece of sophistry, as Epicurus did, and made a mathematician think so too; which shewed his authority swayed more than his reason. But the Epicurean in Plutarch rejects Democritus's doctrine, for that which Plutarch saith, *doth as well follow from that of Epicurus;* for if there be nothing but atoms, then qualities are only appearances; and when we judge by our senses, we cannot judge truly of things, but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, saith he, can be produced out of nothing, and no generation can be of that which already is, how can indivisible atoms, which cannot be changed, produce plants or animals? Either therefore Democritus should not have asserted such immutable principles, or he should not have overlooked the consequence, i. e. that there can be no generation. But Epicurus impudently holds the same principles, and yet would deny the consequence, and assert true generation; just as he denied Providence, and yet asserted piety; held friendship to be only for pleasure, and yet that a man must undergo any hardship for his friends; made an infinite space, and yet placed an upper and lower region in it. But he declares he can by no means understand how bodies endued with qualities should be produced by atoms that have none. There can be no generation without heat; how comes there to be heat, when the atoms themselves have no heat in them, nor become hot when they are joined together? For if they are capable of heat, then they are not impassible, nor without qualities. So that, according to the general principles of Democritus and Epicurus, there can be no such thing as a generation of animals.

Acad. Qu. l. iv. c. 33.

But Democritus observed strange alterations in the bodies of insects, from worms to flying animals; and why might not mankind have come into the world after the same manner? If this were his opinion, it is one of the wildest and most extravagant opinions that could have entered into the head of such a man; and would make one think that the people of Abdera were not out in their judgment of him, if those epistles about him were genuine between Hippocrates and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the bodies of insects, as appears beyond all contradiction by the many experiments of those who have applied themselves for many years to observe them. But what then? Do not all these insects

come out of eggs, which have been laid by other insects before them? And therefore mankind could not be worms first, but there must have been eggs before. And how should these eggs be transformed into the worms? What force was there in nature to make so strange a transformation as is continually observed in them? And the very same persons who have observed their transformations, have as well observed the incredible number of eggs that are laid by them, and the great and sudden increase of them from those eggs. Even in the Ephemeron, which was so great a rarity taken notice of by Aristotle, upon the river Hypanis (but is so frequent upon some rivers in France and the Low Countries, as is observed by Scaliger, Auger. Clutius, and others,) it is agreed, *That they come out of such a transformation as other insects do, with four wings and six feet; and are very careful where they lay their eggs, to keep them from the water; in which they die, after they have spent their short life in flying in great numbers together at sun-setting*, saith one from his own observation. Scaliger saith, those he observed *began to live at night, and died by morning.*

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. v. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clut. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey. Append. ad Goedart. Swammerdam. Anatom. de Ephem. apud Thevenot Amer. Sept.

But there are some things which deserve a particular observation about insects, which plainly shew that they were not formed by a casual coalition of atoms, but by a wise Providence. As, that those that have wings have them stronger or weaker, more or less, according to their business and occasion for using them; those that have feet, have an equal number on both sides, although the numbers differ so much according to their kinds; those which have neither wings nor feet, have repositories made for them, with proper food in the leaves of trees or plants. Concerning which there are several things very observable. 1. Their great niceness as to their food. Goedart, who made it his business to observe them forty years, (as Aristomachus Solensis did bees for fifty-eight years, saith Pliny,) found it very difficult sometimes to find the proper food for them; for they would eat no other, and expressed their joy when they had it. Dr. Lister adds, *That insects would rather die than eat any thing else, not from want of organs, but from a natural accuracy of taste.* And he ingeniously observes, that from hence may be found the best way of keeping ships from worms, by finding out that sort of wood which those worms will not touch. 2. The different sorts of food in their different states. While they are mere *eruca*, they eat a hard sort of food, as the leaves of plants; but when they come to

Plin. N. H. l. xi. c. 9. Goedart de Insectis, N. 5. Ed. Lister. p. 13, 33.

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N. 14. food. 3. That those which feed on leaves of plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying; which Goedart saith he observed both as to
N. 14. garden-herbs and grass. 4. That those flying insects which have very short feet, take their food out of flowers
N. 15. by the help of their tongues as they fly. 5. That those which are most afraid of birds eat only in the night, when they are most secure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own safety. There are many other observations to be made use of concerning the manner of their transformations; the change made by them in the very bodies of these insects; and the different times of continuance under them; and the ways to secure themselves from injuries of the weather in cold seasons: but these are sufficient to my purpose, which was to shew that Democritus made a very ill choice of worms, as the instance of a fortuitous production. But if they had been so, it was a very extravagant fancy, to think that mankind should undergo such transformations as worms do, before they come to their perfection. For these changes are evident to sense, to all that observe no more than silkworms; but mankind continue in one uniform state from an embryo to a perfect man; and, while he is an embryo, hath one sort of nourishment from the mother, which is wholly different from what all sorts of worms do live upon; and the parts of mankind are extremely remote from the shape, number, and use of all sorts of worms. Insomuch that Democritus might much better have fancied that mankind were at first a sort of trees set with their roots upwards: for the head to man is what the root is to the tree; and trees come from an embryo in the seed, and are preserved in the womb of the earth, and are fed with a dew from above, and have passages like lymphæducts in their several parts; only they happen to want the instruments of sense and motion, which are needless to them, since their food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the same uniform manner, without transformations, as mankind do.

The next hypothesis was that of Anaximander; and he makes them *to be bred up as embryos in the bowels of other creatures*: of which Plutarch gives the fullest account. In one place he only saith, *That the first animals were*

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. v. c. 19.

produced in moisture, covered over with a certain bark, like the rind of a chestnut, saith Redi; *and when it grew dry, it cracked, and the animals started out, but lived not long.* Was not this a hopeful beginning in the early days of philosophy? For Anaximander succeeded Thales, who was the first philosopher of Greece; and a much wiser man than his scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we must now pursue Anaximander. And Plutarch in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that mankind were first bred in the bellies of fishes; and when they were strong enough to help themselves, they very fairly cast them upon dry ground, and left them to shift for themselves.* Is not this a very good philosophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground *he dissuaded men from eating of fish,* lest they should be like Cannibals. It is a known saying, *That there is nothing so absurd, but it was said by one philosopher or other* think Anaximander may put in for the first, who broached his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philosophy. And yet Empedocles in this matter rather outwent him. For he saith, *Animals were not entire at first, but came into the world by pieces*; and so arms and legs, and all other parts happening to join together, made up one perfect animal. *Hæc non sunt philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia,* may be much better applied here, than it is by the Epicurean in Cicero to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think Empedocles' opinion is misrepresented, since the author of the book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not Aristotle's) gives another account of him, and saith, *He derived the forming of animals from God;* and his verses, as they are in Simplicius, do not deny it, but only shew *that all things, except God, came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympos. l. viii. c. 8. Ed. Xyland.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. v. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i.

But we are not deceived in the third hypothesis of Epicurus and his followers; which, as Redi represents it, is, *That mankind and other animals were inclosed in certain coats and membranes in the womb of the earth, which being broken in due time, they were all exposed naked, without any sense of heat or cold, and sucked the earth for nourishment; but the earth grew too old for such births, and therefore was contented ever since to bring forth nothing but insects.* This is so well known to be the Epicurean hypothesis, from Lucretius, Censorinus, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reasonable, is the thing now to be considered. And herein these two things are supposed. 1. That there

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How can they make it appear that there ever was any such disposition of the heavens and earth to produce animals, more than there is still? When they were told, *that if the earth could at first produce animals, why not still?* their answer was, *The seasons are changed, the heavens were more benign, and the earth more fruitful, than they have been since.*

Lucret. l. v. v. 816.

At novitas mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,
Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;
Omnia enim pariter crescunt, et robora sumunt.

And Lactantius sets down their opinion more distinctly, Lactant. l. ii. c. 11. Ed. Oxon. *That certain motions of the heavens are necessary to this production of animals, as well as the freshness of the earth; and that then there was no winter nor summer, but a perpetual spring.* But how came such a proper season for this purpose at that time, and never since? *Animals*, say they, *can never since propagate themselves.* But what is this to the season? Do the seasons alter as there is occasion? Then there is a superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural course of the heavens, which caused the earth to be then prolifical, that must return and put a new vigour into the earth, and make it young again. And this our modern atheistical philosophers in Italy, such as Cardan, Pomponatius, and others, saw very well; and therefore asserted, *that, upon certain conjunctions of the heavens, the same effects would follow.* So Berigardus; Berigard. Circul. x. p. 636. part v. who saith, that Cardan and Pomponatius laid much weight on this story in Diodorus Siculus, about *animals produced by the Nile;* and he adds another, very ridiculous, as he pretends out of Camerarius, *of several parts of human bodies which are seen to appear every year rising out of the earth about Grand Cairo:* and he thinks *they were like the Egyptian mice, part earth and part animals.* What will not such men be inclined to believe, rather than the truth! As when he adds, *of the two green boys in England, which came out of a wolf's den 500 years since; and the blue and red men out of the mountains of Armenia:* which are such incredible fictions, that it is a

wonder any one that pretends to common sense could repeat them. But as to the Egyptian story in Camerarius, it relates not at all to the first making of bodies, but *to the resurrection from the dead.* Camerarius neither pretends to have seen it himself, nor that his friend did; but that his friend heard one that had been a great traveller say, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to see the resurrection of the dead, as they called it; and then he said some part of the body seemed to come out of the earth; sometimes the head, sometimes the feet, and sometimes the greater part of the body; which were afterwards hid under the earth again.* And another friend of his shewed him an old Itinerary to the same purpose; *and that the place was two miles from the Nile, in an old burying-place; and that it lasted three days, and then no more were seen that year.* But he added, that *they were not seen rising up or walking;* and he saith, *that he saw it not himself.* But Camerarius himself censures it as a *superstitious folly.* Martinus à Baumgarten saith, *That at Cairo it was believed, in his time, that at a certain mosque near the Nile, the bodies of the dead do arise out of their graves at the time of prayers, and there stand, and disappear when they are over;* which he calls a diabolical illusion. But when our ingenious Mr. Sandys was in Egypt, the story was changed; for then it was affirmed, *That not far from the Nilus, upon Good-Friday, the arms and legs of a number of men did appear stretched forth of the earth, to the astonishment of the multitude.* Which he not improbably conjectures *to have been taken out of the mummies, not far off, by the watermen, (who gain very much by it,) and placed conveniently in the sand to be seen,* as they thought would raise the greatest admiration. Since his time Mons. Thevenot, who was upon the place, saith, *That at Grand Cairo it is generally believed that on three days in Passion-Week some part of the dead bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the earth. He had the curiosity to go and see, and there found some skulls and bones, which they say confidently came out of the earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what Berigardus brings it for, that mankind came first out of the earth, but that there shall be a resurrection of the dead: for he saith, *it was in a place where many dead bodies did lie buried,* and not far from the mummies; which was the most famous place for burials in all Egypt: an account whereof

Camerar. Operæ subcis. Cent. i. c. 73.

Martin. à Baumgart. Peregrin. l. i. c. 18.

Sandys's Travels, p. 99.

Thevenot, Voyage de Levant, part ii. ch. 12.

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is given by Bellonius, Peter della Valle, Buratine in Thevenot's Collection, Prince Radzivil, and several others. Prince Radzivil observed, *that there were vast numbers of skulls and bones scattered up and down, where the flesh had been taken off, and sold away for mummy.* But besides these mummies, (as they are called,) there was continued a place of solemn burial near to Grand Cairo by the Turks; so that there were always bodies ready, that were not proper mummies, to make this annual shew with, to deceive the simple. But Berigardus is aware of the difficulty *of assigning the manner how animals come out of the earth;* and therefore he thinks it sufficient to shew that the earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them nourishment when they are produced. This he thinks absolutely necessary: and he suspects that Lucretius's Folliculi will not do the business; *because it is impossible for children to subsist, if they did break the bags they were inclosed in, which were fastened to the earth.* But if there were such a milky substance in the earth for new-born children to suck, is that all that is necessary for their support, when they are so unable to help themselves? Of all things, one would not expect to find milk in the breasts of the earth; and it must be some very happy conjunction of the planets to make the earth to give suck. How much would those, who are friends to religion, have been despised and laughed at, if they had made such absurd and ridiculous hypotheses as these? If such a thing did arise from natural and necessary causes, it must continue; and since we are certain it hath never been since, we have no reason to think it ever was. If it were by chance, what hinders the same effect, unless chance were tied up to one certain time? And by what laws can chance be bounded? If it were by particular design at that time for the support of new-born animals, then there must be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpose to exclude Providence: which shews how weak and inconsistent this hypothesis is.

Bellon. l. ii. c. 47. Pietr. della Valle, Vol. I. Lett. xi. sect. 8. Thevenot, Relat. par. i. ad fin. Peregrin. Principis Radzivil, p. 187.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that, at the same time the child is formed in the womb of its mother, there should be so ample and suitable provision made for its nourishment in the mother's breasts against its coming into the world. Whether it be by turning the blood into milk, as was generally thought, or by a passage of the chyle from the ventricle thither, as some of late think, it cannot but be looked on as a work of design to turn the nourishment another way, on purpose

to serve the necessities of the new-born child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulness of the nurse is necessary to preserve it other ways, as well as by feeding it. But these unadvised and fanciful makers of mankind think they have done their business, if they can but imagine the earth to afford some milky substance, to support the poor helpless infants to a little suck from the earth. Why did they not as easily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is so much absurdity in the whole supposition, that Berigardus concludes, *that mankind must come full grown out of the earth, and able to shift for themselves; or else that some other animals must come out before them, to afford milk for them, as the wolf did to Romulus and Remus.* Such miserable shifts must those run into, who will not allow a wise Providence to have brought mankind into the world. CHAP. I.

But how came mankind, if they came into the world so by chance, to be so admirably provided in all parts of their bodies of such instruments of sense and motion, that look as like a design as any thing can possibly do? The bodies of men are not like mere lumps of dirt and water put together; for there is not the least part about them but is made up of such a wonderful mechanism, that there cannot be a discomposure in it, without a disorder in the whole. But, suppose the fleshly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering several particles of matter together, yet what can be imagined as to the muscles, and nerves, and fibres, which are so conveniently dispersed over the body? The heart itself is found to be a very strong muscle, consisting of abundance of nerves, and all kind of fibres complicated within each other, and a strong tendon at the basis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract itself, and so makes the blood to pass into the arteries, which convey it to all parts of the body. Now let any one think with himself how it is possible for a mere lump of earth, made in such a form as the heart is, to have such a force and power to contract itself to such a degree as to send out so much blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of itself. How comes this motion to begin in such a piece of clay, made with a basis and a cone? How came the inward cavities to be formed, and kept so distinct from each other? For if there were any stop of the passage, life is at an end. How comes such a motion to continue so long and so uniform? Those who have most narrowly searched into it, have found that no other u II.

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count can be given of it, but that the wise Creator that formed the heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other muscles of the body, if we consider their number, their position, the contexture of their parts, and their continual usefulness, we can never imagine that all these things could be the result of heat and mud, or a casual conflux of the dull particles of matter. Every muscle hath its proper fibres laid upon one another, and its opposite tendons, with an inward cavity, and the artery, veins, and nerves belonging to it, and a membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have several muscles peculiar to themselves, for distinct uses and different sort of motions; as may be seen at large in all that treat of these matters: who tell us generally, that the eyes have six, the nose four pair, the cheeks two pair, the lips four muscles, the nether mandible five, the ears six, the tongue seven, &c. I need go no further; and although there be some difference in the way of numbering them, yet they all agree there are so many as are impossible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the sun or earth. And what is it which makes all these muscles so serviceable to mankind, that, upon the least command, they move the parts they serve in what manner we direct them? The reason of *muscular motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *heart*. Some talk of *elastic spirits;* others of *the weight of the blood;* others of *a nervous liquor distending the carnous fibres*; others of *a succus nutritius from the nerves meeting with the animal spirits, and fermenting together, which being thrust into the carnous fibres, swells and dilates them, so as to make them contract themselves; from whence,* they say, *local motion proceeds.* But all these are but mere conjectures, and hardly answer to the most common appearances of muscular motion. And the mechanism of our own bodies, both as to sense and motion, baffles all the attempts of the most ingenious and subtle philosophers; who may easier teach us the way to talk about it, than to understand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be observed in this place concerning the muscles; which is the different figure of them, according to the use they serve for; as the muscle called *deltoides* on the shoulder, the circular muscles, where their use is to open and shut: if such things do not argue contrivance and design, it is not easy to imagine what doth. What can those who follow Diodorus Siculus make of the whole *system of nerves* which are in the body of man?

Lower de Corde, p. 85.

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Did these come out of slime with *the heat of the sun?* How came the different rise of the nerves, some within and others without the brain? What reason is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that same substance, that it comes to be so divided, so as part of it to continue within the brain, and the other to be continued down to the lowest part of the back, by several distinct vertebræ? How came matter of itself to form such a passage down from the brain, and to secure it in such a manner; and to compact the several parts together so firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet so flexibly as to serve best for motion? What made the perforation for the spinal marrow to pass in the middle and on the sides, for the several nerves to go from thence to the several parts of the body? Whence came that ligament, which joins the vertebræ of the back together, and covers the other membranes of the *spina dorsi?* There is a wonderful curiosity observed by our greatest anatomists, in the order and placing of the nerves, the arteries, the veins, and the hollow places belonging to it; which they found by opening the vertebræ in *embryos*, and taking out the spinal marrow, and injecting liquors into the several vessels. And still the farther any have gone in these searches, the more reason they have seen to admire the wisdom of Providence: and so it hath been in other parts. Aristotle mentions a strange saying of Empedocles, *That the reason why the back-bone appears as if it were made up of several pieces, was that it was at first broken, and then put together; and ever since it hath so continued.* But how came the vertebræ then to be so well fastened together, and to be so much more convenient for motion than an entire bone would have been? Besides in an embryo, that which is properly the *spina* doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its posture in the womb; which shews both the intention of Nature, and the design of Providence. How came the vertebræ to be in other animals as well as mankind? And even Aristotle himself was therein mistaken; for he affirms, *that a lion hath no vertebræ in his neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone.* But Borrichius, in his anatomy of one, declares, *that he found the several vertebræ in the neck plain and distinct.* And the same learned person observes, *that in a crocodile, which he dissected, he found in four feet length of the back sixty vertebræ, which were of a spongy nature, fit to receive nourishment;* and from *the different formation of some parts of them*, he concludes it most probable that

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Arist. de Partub. Anim. l. i. c. 1.

Arist. de Partub. Anim. l. iv. c. 10.

Hermet. Sapient. Vindic. c. 10. p. 245, 272.

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they grow so much longer than other animals. But Aristotle's mistakes, about *the lion's having no vertebræ in his neck*, had been discovered by Scaliger, and confirmed by several dissections since; so that the vertebræ are of the original design of nature. But to proceed. What made the several passages out of the skull, for the nerves which serve for the several senses of *smelling*, *seeing*, *hearing*, and *tasting*? How come the several branches of the *par vagum* to be so dispersed, and to make such knots with the *intercostal nerves*? These, and many more such questions might be asked relating to the wonderful system of nerves; but these are sufficient to my purpose, to shew that these wonderful contrivances for sense and motion could not come from mere fortuitous and unthinking causes. But let us look now upon the most obvious parts of the body, which lie to the view of all men; the eye, the ear, the mouth, and the hand: one would think it hardly possible for any men pretending to reason, to think these to be the result of chance. Let us well consider the structure of *the eye*, and we may well think Lucretius had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Exercit. 208.

Lucret. l. iv. v. 821.

Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer et istum
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Prospicere ut possimus.

That we must have a great care to avoid the mistake of those that say, that eyes were made for seeing. For could any man in his right senses think the eye could be formed for any other use but to see with? *But the use is after the thing is formed.* What then? May it not be designed for such a use by him that formed it? *But that which is formed for a particular use, must be later than that for whose use it is formed; as a bed for a man to sleep on, a cup to drink out of, armour to defend himself; but a man might sleep, and drink, and defend himself, before those things were found out.* What is the meaning of all this? No one is so senseless to question, whether men be not before they find some conveniencies for their particular uses; but the question here is, whether, when a thing is so formed as to serve only for such a use, it be not reasonable to conclude that it was made on purpose for that use? But saith Lucretius,

Lucret. l. iv. v. 832.

Nil ideo quoniam natum'st in corpore, ut uti
Possemus, sed, quod natum'st, id procreat usum.

Nothing is made in the body that we might use it, but when it is made, we find out the use of it. As though it had been possible for mankind to have found such an use of the eye, unless it had been purposely made for it. The act of seeing is, no doubt, subsequent to the making of the eye; for we cannot see without eyes; but if we could make no other use of eyes but to see with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a use we make of things which we alter the fashion of for our conveniencies. For we do not make our own eyes; they are very early formed in the body, and therefore were within the primary intention of nature; and as soon as we come into the world, we do not deliberate whether we should use eyes or not, for we presently see with them. And how can the eye being made teach us the use of it, when we presently make use of our eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the use of them if we please, by blinding ourselves; but we cannot turn them to any other use. If Lucretius, in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the use was arbitrary, then men might have heard with their eyes, or have seen with their ears, or have tasted with their noses, or smelt with their tongues: but this I suppose none can think that he meant. What was it then? that men could not use them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence, that they were not made designedly for such a use? How can we judge of that, but by examining the several parts? And if they were fitted for such a use and no other, we have reason to conclude they were so intended. Now what could the muscles, and tunicles, and several humours of the eye be made for, but for sight? How came that cavity to be formed in the forehead in which the eyes are placed? What motion of the particles of matter made two such hollow places in the skull? How came one not to be sufficient? How come the eyelids to be so placed? Could they be designed for any other use? How come the glands to be fixed in the corners of the eyes, and with the lymphatic vessels belonging to them? Could they have served for other uses? How comes the optic nerve to be continued to the three tunicles of the eyes; and that which partakes most of the substance of the brain to be the chief organ of sight, as fittest to transmit the images to the brain? What was the crystalline humour designed for, but to receive the impressions of outward objects? How comes the optic nerve to be so in-

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serted into the eye, not directly behind, but on one side, but only for the more entire transmitting the images received by the eye? Can now any one think that the eye could be ever made for any other use but for sight? And we do not therefore use it, because we find it ready prepared; but it was therefore so prepared, that we might use it to such a purpose. And as to his general saying, *That nothing in the body is made for use, but that the use follows the making of it*, let us apply it to other animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any man answer seriously to one that should say, that four-footed animals had not feet given them to go with; but that finding so many feet, they did go with them? And so for the wings of birds, and the fins of fishes; and the particular shapes of some animals for their particular use: as the long neck of the swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one say, that the swan, finding his neck so long, used it for that purpose? Or that shell-fish, finding their hard shells ready made as a defence against the rocks, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the muscles they move by are covered over with a hard bony substance; and so they are the necessary parts belonging to them. What can be said to the thick horny substance of an eagle's eye, which makes it bear the strongest beams of the sun? Was this only used for that purpose, but not intended by nature? Whence came that outward covering of the eye, not only in eagles, but in other greater birds, which they can draw over it as they please, and is so strong a defence against light, that anatomists tell us, by the help of it put to their open eyes, they could look on the sun without trouble, as Borrichius informs us? Steno, upon the observation of the wonderful mechanism of the eye both in mankind, and beasts, and birds, saith, *That if a man first understands mechanics, and then curiously examines the fabric of animals, he must either put off his reason, or he must admire the wisdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he understood the frame of these things far beyond what either Lucretius or Epicurus did.

Borrich. Hermet. Sap. p. 259. Act. Dan. l. ii. Obs. 127.

And so for the ear; *that was made, long before any sound was heard.*

Lucret. l. iv. v. 838.

Multoque creatæ sunt prius aures,
Quam sonus est auditus.

No doubt of it. For how should we hear without ears? But can any man imagine they could be made for any

other use but to hear with? How came they to be placed in the head, and not in any other part of the body? Were there any formed before with ears in other parts, which did not do so well? In other cases they say, *Nature was put to try divers experiments, because the imperfect animals could not subsist.* But this cannot hold here; for mankind might have lived without ears in other places, but the head is certainly the best for sounds being received and transmitted to the brain. How comes the outward part of the ear to be so framed as it is, but for the better gathering and more distinct conveyance of the sounds, as appears by the confused noise which those have who have lost that part? What made the inward passage so winding, and such an exquisite membrane at the end of it, and a cord behind it, but for the advantage of the sound? How come the three cavities behind; the first with little bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give passage to the air; the second called *the labyrinth*, and the third with *spiral windings* and *an internal air*, and all particularly serving the purpose of hearing, by the sound passing from one to another? Whence came all these subtle and intricate passages, if our bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our sense of hearing is prejudiced; which shews that this contrivance was necessary in order to it. And which is again observable, the greater discoveries have been made in these matters, the more reason we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this sense of hearing, the latest discoveries about the small bones of the first cavity, called *the hammer*, *the anvil*, and *the stirrup*, and another in the joining the two last, acquaint us with more than what the ancients knew; since there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other;* the drum moves the hammer, the hammer the anvil, that the stirrup, which opens the passage into the second cavity. 2. *That these bones are as big in an infant as in grown persons.* Now how comes this to pass in a way of mechanism? How come these bones not to increase as the other parts of the body do, since the most solid of them, the hammer and anvil, as well as the stirrup, have manifest pores in them to receive nourishment? But not only these, but the other small bones in the inner cavities, the semicircular passages and the *cochlea* only receive a greater firmness and hardness by age. These things I

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can only mention, and refer the reader to Mr. Du Verney and others, who have treated most exactly of them.

The frame of the mouth as it is, is necessary for respiration, and nourishment, and speech. For respiration, the mouth opened affords a passage to the air, and there are inward vessels fitted to convey it to the lungs; and without breathing it is impossible to live. But how came the two different passages for the air and food? How came the valve to secure the passage to the lungs from such things which may prejudice it, and pass the other way? As to nourishment, the mouth not only takes in the food, but the teeth are conveniently placed for the preparing it for its farther passage and alteration in the stomach, in order to nutrition; for which end there are vessels prepared with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come those channels into those hard bones in the mouth, which we call teeth, by which an artery, a vein, and a nerve spread themselves in branches to each particular tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their use, and to have stronger roots where the work is harder? And because speech is one of the peculiar excellencies of mankind, there is an instrument framed on purpose for it in the mouth, (which serves for tasting likewise;) and without this, all the communication of mankind with each other by words had been lost. And I cannot see how mere matter and motion could help mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others, without a tongue; nor how it could be framed by it.

The hand is so provided with joints, muscles, and tendons, for the great variety of necessary uses it serves mankind for, that he that can think it could be so contrived by chance, doth thereby shew that some can think only by chance without any reason; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I shall not need to insist on the curiosity of the contrivance of all the muscles of the hands; but it is impossible for any man to give an account of the perforation of those muscles which serve for the use of some of the fingers and toes, from mere matter and motion; nor the ligaments about the tendons of those muscles, for the greater easiness of their motion. Aristotle hath a discourse about the great use of a hand to mankind. *Anaxagoras*, he saith, *said that man was the wisest animal, because he alone had hands;* but, saith he, *therefore man had hands, because he was the wisest;*

Riolan. Anatom. l. v. c. 18.

Aristot. de Part. Anim. l. iv. c. 10.

being best able to make use of such an excellent instrument. For that is the wisdom of nature to do as a wise man would do, i. e. *to give the best instruments to the best workman. Now*, saith he, *the hand is the most useful instrument to him that is capable of making a good use of it.* And therefore he blames those that said, *Man was the worst provided for of any animals; for they have but one help afforded them by nature; but the hand is instead of all, for it can make use of all.* And for that reason he shews how very convenient the make and fashion of the hand is, and the division of it into five parts; on which he insists at large. So that Aristotle was fully satisfied that the production of mankind was no casual or spontaneous thing, but the effect of wisdom and understanding.

These things I have here laid together at first, because this hypothesis of Diodorus Siculus hath been thought by some in our age to be *the natural sense of mankind without revelation:* whereas in truth it is the foundation of irreligion, and the reproach of mankind; but not the sense of the wisest part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I shall now proceed to consider and compare the sense of the most ancient philosophers on both sides, as to this point, whether the world was the effect of chance, or of a wise Providence. For if the world were made by a wise and intelligent Being, it can never be suspected that religion is an imposture, or a contrivance of politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the truest reason. And I shall the more carefully enquire into the opinions of the eldest philosophers; because they were neither priests nor politicians, having no interest to carry on by the practice of religion. And some of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their estates, or neglected other business, the more freely to attend on their philosophical enquiries. And therefore we have the more reason to search into their opinions, so far as relates to these matters.

It cannot be denied, that, after men began to be inquisitive into the philosophical reasons of things, there were some who set up for material causes only, without an efficient. And there were two different sorts of these; and the other schemes may be well reduced to them.

The first was of those who were the immediate successors of Thales. For I see no reason to put him in the head of them, if what Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch report of him be true. For it is said in Cicero, *that Thales made God to be the mind that formed all things.* Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 11

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And to what purpose should Velleius say this, if this had not been then known to have been his opinion? For it had been better for his design to have made so great a man as Thales was esteemed, to have excluded God and Providence. Diogenes Laertius saith, *That he not only made God an eternal Being, but that the world was of his making.* And he was no more partial in this case, than the Epicurean in Tully. It is observable, that when Plutarch blames Anaximander and Anaximènes for *leaving out the efficient cause,* he takes no notice of Thales on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the head of that sect of philosophers called the Ionic, as himself acknowledges in that place. And Stobæus saith, *That Thales owned a Divine Power, which passed through and gave motion to the fluid matter, out of which he supposed all things to be made.* The great objection against this is, that several of the ancient writers say, *that Anaxagoras was the first philosopher who attributed the making of the world to an Infinite Mind;* and that Plutarch himself, in the Life of Pericles, saith the same. But the true answer to this is, that Anaxagoras was the first who owned this in writing; whose words are produced by so many; but Thales wrote nothing about it that appeared, and therefore his scholars going another way, there might be some presumption against him. For it is too evident that Anaximander, his disciple, did never mention a God in the making of the world; *but he mentions several Gods made out of the world, Dii nativi,* a sort of Phœnician Gods, which rose out of matter; and such as the poets had possessed the people with among the Greeks. I have already observed from Plato, *that the old Greeks worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, &c. as other barbarous nations did:* now herein lay the artifice of Anaximander, that he took care to assert the popular Deities, and so avoided the imputation of atheism among the people; who looked no farther than whether men owned the religion in vogue. But whether there were an Infinite Mind superior to those Gods they worshipped, they looked on as a speculation too deep for them, and therefore they let those alone who spake nothing against the Gods they solemnly worshipped. And this was the true reason of the different usage of Anaximander and Anaxagoras. The former asserted the beginning of all things to have been from infinite matter, without an efficient cause; the latter said this was impossible: but there must be an Eternal Mind to give motion to matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought

Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. i. c. 3.
Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 1.

that Anaxagoras should have been in favour with the people, who hated atheism, and Anaximander punished; but, on the contrary, Anaximander kept up his interest among the people where he lived, at Miletus in Asia, and at last carried a colony along with him to Apollonia. The reason was, the people of Miletus had a wonderful veneration for the *sun and moon*, under the names of Apollo and Diana; and as long as Anaximander complied with them as to these *Dii nativi*, they let him alone in his philosophy. Ælian. l. iii. c. 17. Strab. l. xiv. But Anaxagoras coming to Athens, and being there in favour with Pericles, a leading man in the city, but opposed violently by a different faction of Thucydides Milesius, who took all advantages they could against Pericles's party: they finding that Anaxagoras had shewed too much of his philosophy, when he called the sun a *mass of fire*, this set them all in a flame, and made such a disturbance about it, that Anaxagoras was accused of atheism; and Pericles, with all his interest and eloquence, could not save him from banishment, in which he died, as appears by Laertius and Ælian. Anaxagoras was very clear as to the main point of atheism; for he asserted an Eternal Mind which made the world: this Anaximander denied, but he asserted the common Deities: and although the Epicurean in Tully argues well against Anaximander's opinion, *Sed nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere quî possumus?* We can have no true notion of God not eternal: yet such philosophical reasons signified little; he allowed the same worship which they practised, and this was enough to satisfy them.

I am not ignorant that some have gone about to excuse Anaximander, as though he were so intent upon the material causes, that through incogitancy only *he left out the efficient*. A strange piece of incogitancy in a philosopher to leave out the main point. For the just fault which Anaxagoras found, was that he went about to make a world without an Eternal Mind before matter; and he knew very well what the sense of Anaximander and his scholar Anaximenes were, by whom he was instructed. And why should Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, &c. look on it as so extraordinary a thing in Anaxagoras to assert an Eternal Mind as the first cause, if his predecessors meant the same thing? But there is a passage in Aristotle, which seems most to favour Anaximander, viz. *that he owned an infinite first Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was immortal and incorruptible.* And this Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus, in his learned book De Perenni Philos. l. xi.

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de Perenni Philosophia, insists much upon; a book written with so good a design, and, bating some supposititious authorities, so well managed, that the elder Scaliger, as his son tells us, commended it particularly to a great friend of his, too inclinable to atheism, (as was too much the fashion then, as well as since, among some who would seem to have more wit than others;) and it had so great success therein, that he utterly renounced all principles tending that way. The passage which he produces is certainly in Aristotle; and it seems so capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus joined him with Anaxagoras in supposing an Infinite Being above the elements;* and it cannot be denied that the author of the book *de Mundo* (who, as I before observed, was very ancient, if not Aristotle) doth use the same expression concerning God, *that he doth contain and govern all things:* but yet, laying the passages in Aristotle together, there is too great reason to suspect that Anaximander did not assert an Eternal Mind, as Anaxagoras did. He is there giving an account of the different notions philosophers had concerning *the first Principle. Some asserted it to be infinite, as Anaxagoras and Democritus. The former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one first Principle of all, which he called Mind. The latter held no generation of things out of another; but that one common matter or body was the only principle of all things; and that the parts differed only by bulk and figure.* Thus far Aristotle is clear. Then he goes on to shew, *that the first Principle must be ingenite and incorruptible;* and then it *must contain and govern all things; as all do hold, who do not assert* other causes, *as mind* (as Anaxagoras) *or friendship* (as Empedocles). *And this is* the Τὸ Θεῖον, *the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible,* as was asserted by Anaximander, and the most of those he calls physiologists, i. e. who went no farther than the bare nature of things. Now here it is plain that he doth distinguish Anaximander and his followers from Anaxagoras, who asserted an Eternal Mind: and he distinguishes his opinion both from that of Democritus and Anaximander. It may be said, *that it is plain from hence that Anaximander did assert a Divine Being;* but at last it came to nothing but *infinite matter;* which was the original and mother-god to his *Dii geniti*, as he called them. In another place he speaks yet more plainly, viz. *that those philosophers before Anaxagoras went no farther than matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be dissolved into it again; being itself one and*

Jos. Scalig. de Vit. Julii Scaligeri, p. 50.

Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 43. c. 5. Ed. Oxon.

Arist. Nat. Aus. l. iii. c. 4.

Id. Metaphys. l. i. c. 3.

immutable under all the variety of changes. He saith, *they differed about the first material principle:* Thales, and one Hippon, called *the Atheist,* (the first of that order that we read of,) *held it to be water;* but Aristotle bestows a very severe character upon him, viz. Διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας, *that he did not deserve to be mentioned for the meanness of his capacity.* (It seems wit and atheism did not begin together.) Anaximander would go no farther than infinite matter in general; but Anaximenes was for air; and so was Diogenes Apolloniates, who lived in the time of Anaxagoras; but it seems by Demetrius Phalereus's apology for Socrates, (now lost,) *that he fell into some danger at Athens,* (possibly for being against the worship of fire, as Anaxagoras was.) But upon the whole matter I do not see how Anaximander can be excused, although he left the popular Gods, and bestowed the name of Divinity upon his infinite matter.

But there was another succession of philosophers derived from Xenophanes, who lived in Sicily, saith Laertius, and was contemporary with Anaximander: and he was neither a follower of Thales nor of Pythagoras; but from a town near the sea in Italy, whence his chief followers came, it was called the Eleatic sect. He was a great enemy to *the poetical fictions about the Gods,* as he had reason; for they strangely corrupted the minds of the people, and took away all inward reverence towards the Deity. And although Aristotle speaks with some contempt of him, yet others have shewed that he misunderstood him, and that he asserted *one Infinite and Eternal Mind;* and the same Simplicius saith of Parmenides and Melissus. But since the learned author of the *Intellectual System of the Universe* hath very well cleared that matter, I intend not to transcribe him, but to refer my reader to him, and proceed to those who changed the first notions of the Eleatic sect, and set up for the making a world without a Deity. And those were Leucippus and Democritus; and yet Stobæus saith, *that Leucippus wrote a book about mind;* wherein he hath this saying, *That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from reason and necessity.* How these two things came to be so put together, is hard for us now to conjecture, unless that book of his had been preserved. Plutarch saith, that Democritus held that God *was an intellectual fire, and the soul of the world.* But it appears by Cicero, that Democritus did not stick at making some very subtle effluvia of

Bessarion cont. Calumn. Plat. l. ii. c. 10, 11.

Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 8.

Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. l. i. c. 7. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. i.

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his atoms to be Gods, both those without us, and those within us, viz. those which make up our intellectual faculties. It is very hard to say what his true notion of Divinity was, unless we could have seen his books about Mind and Providence, which Laertius saith that he wrote. But whatever he might write for the amusing the world, (as Epicurus did afterwards,) if he made the origin of all things to have been *without mind or providence*, no titles of books will be a sufficient excuse for him.

And I confess it is all one to me, whether those who framed the atheistical hypotheses proceeded in the way of forms and qualities, or of atoms and vacuity; because I think the one way as impossible as the other. For as Aristotle hath well observed, the great difficulties as to the first principles lay in two things; *the beginning of motion, and the order of the world:* and in both these the different hypotheses of Anaximander and Democritus were equally defective. But whether the world were made by *the circumvolution of infinite matter, endued with contrary qualities*, or *by the motion of atoms, which had nothing but bulk and figure*, signifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one hypothesis may in some respects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of body and mind: but there are still difficulties on both sides. Some things may be taken for real qualities, which are not; and the many experiments of this age have fully proved it: but then there are other things, especially relating to animals, which can never be explained in the mechanical way, to the satisfaction of any reasonable man.

But although Anaximander and Democritus started these two different hypotheses about the origin of the world, yet those who asserted an Eternal Mind to be the first cause, had in common reason very much the advantage of either; since it was impossible for them to give an account how the motion of matter began, or how it fell into that order, and beauty, and usefulness, which we find in those parts which make up the visible world. All that we can learn of Anaximander's hypothesis is, *that the heavens and infinite worlds* (for why should they stop, when they could make worlds so easily?) *were produced by an infinite circumvolution of all things; that these had in them very different qualities from each other, some hot, some cold, some dry, some moist, &c. that these being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and accord-*

Plutarch. apud Eus. Præp. Ev. l. i. c. 8.

ing to the different mixtures of qualities, the several sorts of things did arise. This, as far as I can apprehend, was his scheme of the production of things. CHAP. I.

There is little difference between the two hypotheses of Anaximander and Democritus, but only in the point of mixture; which one attributes to qualities, and the other to the bulk and figure of atoms. They both assert the production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of matter; both held infinite worlds; and that the things of this world came together of themselves, without any superior cause.

But were not all the philosophers of their mind? No; so far from it, that the best and greatest of them utterly rejected this doctrine, as unsatisfactory to human reason: of which we have an evident proof from Aristotle, who cannot be suspected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his Metaphysics, he gives an account of the opinions of *philosophers before him about the first principles of things.* I know that he is hardly thought of by many for misrepresenting the opinions of those before him, and that he endeavoured to lessen their reputation, to advance his own: but I can see no manner of reason for it in this case. It is possible as to the Pythagorean and Eleatic sect, he might not represent their opinions so fairly as they were capable of: but as to these physiologists, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them but what they owned; only he makes Thales *the head of them;* for which I have offered reasons to the contrary. But in general he saith, *That those who began first to philosophize looked upon matter as the only principle out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the substance remaining the same, and the affections only changed: as Socrates is the same man, although his inward habits were changed.* But what this material principle was, they were not agreed. Thales, *the first of them, thought it to be water;* Anaximenes and Diogenes, *air;* Hippasus and Heraclitus, *fire;* Empedocles *to them added earth.* Hitherto, saith he, we find nothing but the material cause; but, saith he, Προϊόντων δ' ὕτως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν· when they had gone so far, the very nature of things carried them farther in their enquiries. For whatever change be made in generation and corruption, there must be some cause why it so happened. For mere matter doth not change itself. As wood doth not make itself into a bed, nor brass into a statue; but some artificer doth it. *But the seeking this*

Arist. Metaphys. l. 1. c. 3.

Ibid.

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is looking after another principle, which he calls *the principle of motion. Which those who asserted from the beginning, ran themselves into difficulties, although they asserted matter to be one; but those who went no farther than matter, whether water, or fire, or earth, were never able to clear the production of things, and therefore were forced by truth itself* (ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας) *to seek for another principle.* Where it is very considerable that Aristotle saith, that there were some from the beginning, who asserted both principles; and that those who asserted only a material principle, ran themselves into such difficulties, which they could never see their way through; but were forced at last, by the mere power of truth, to seek for another principle. Which not only shews his own opinion, but that others, upon consideration, were fain to set up a new hypothesis against these Materialists; not wholly new, as he shews, but new in opposition to them, who thought at first, by pretending to skill in philosophy, to have run down the ancient opinion of mankind, founded on such a tradition of which none could trace the original. Of which I have already produced the testimonies of Plato and Plutarch. But now the humour of philosophizing coming among the Greeks, the first setters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on tradition; for that gave no reason of things, which it was their business to do. In some things, then unknown as to the natural causes of them, they wonderfully surprised the common sort; who thereupon admired them as men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own skill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the world; and finding out what they thought the main principle of which things were composed, they had no more to do but to suppose them all reduced to a mass or chaos; and then they fancied, that, by the motion of these several parts of matter, things would fall into that state we now see them in the world. But as much as they pleased themselves with these speculations, those who came after them found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this motion, and the order of it. For they found matter to be a dull inactive thing of itself, and that no matter could form itself without an agent; and therefore they saw it necessary to add a supreme efficient Cause, which should both put the parts of matter, however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the course of it. For otherwise it was impossible to conceive that there should be such distinct

systems or bodies of matter as there are in the world. For how come the several vortices not to interfere with each other? What made the centres of them to be distinct from one another, so as that the matter within such circumference should move about that alone? And without this it is impossible to conceive there should be such bodies as the sun, moon, and stars are; so great, and yet so distinct from each other. But what cause then was found so necessary to be superadded? Aristotle saith, that the order and fitness of things, which he calls Εὖ καὶ Καλῶς, must proceed from an intelligent Cause; for these things could never come either from mere material causes, as fire, earth, &c. or only by chance. And therefore he saith Anaxagoras wrote like a man in his senses, in comparison of those before him; which shews that he looked on the other speculations as dreams and idle fancies. And he will not allow Anaxagoras to have been the first that asserted this; but he did it φανερῶς, openly and plainly, in opposition to such as had set up another hypothesis. For before him, he saith, Hermotinus Clazomenius had said the same thing as to a superior Cause: and so, no doubt, had many others; but he mentions him as a philosopher of the same city from whence Anaxagoras came. But it seems the reputation of Thales and his scholars had obtained so much in the Greek colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name of others; although Clazomenæ were a city of Ionia too.

But that Anaxagoras was a person of a just esteem, appears by the great value which Pericles set upon him, Τῆτον ὑπερφυῶς τὸν ἄνδρα θαυμάσας ὁ Περικλῆς, who not only had him for his counsellor, but ventured his interest to preserve him: and although he was overruled by the contrary faction as to his banishment, yet he took care of him in it. And as Plutarch saith, he obtained the name of Νοῦς; he cannot tell whether it was for his opinion, or the reputation of his wisdom. And after he was buried at Lampsacus, a city of Asia Minor near the Hellespont, there were two inscriptions on the altar erected to his memory, which testified the very great esteem of him in two words; the one was Νοῦς, and the other Ἀλήθεια. And what can be said greater of a philosopher, than that understanding and truth belonged to him? Timon, who was not very civil to the memories of most philosophers, gives him a high character in Laertius: who saith likewise, *That he was born to a considerable estate; but he had a mind above riches.* And Sextus Empiricus saith, *he was*

Plutarch. in Pericle, p. 154. Ed. Xyland.

Ælian. [illegible]

Sext. Empir. p. [illegible]

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the most skilful in natural philosophy; and he was blamed both by Socrates and Aristotle for running too far into natural causes; as though he made use of his supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing else would. But therein he shewed that it was not for want of understanding natural causes, that he asserted *an Eternal Mind, pure and unmixed,* which was the first cause of things; but it was his true skill in philosophy, which brought him to it. For he fixed on the principle of gravitation as the main foundation of union and composition; but the other hypotheses of vortices, or circumlations without it, he looked on as weak and insufficient. So vain is that saying of Lucretius, and a modern philosopher, that *ignorance of causes inclined men to religion;* especially as to the heavenly bodies:

Plato in Phædr. Arist. Metaph. l. iv. Plutarch. in Pericle. Ibid. Leviathan, ch. 12.

Lucret. l. v. v. 1182.

Præterea cæli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis;
Ergo perfugium sibi habebant omnia divis
Tradere, et illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

For the truest and exactest searcher into natural causes, we see, was the most firm and steady assertor of a God. Lucretius magnifies his hero, *that neither the common fame, nor the thunder and lightning had frighted him into any sense of religion; but that he had gone beyond the clouds by the strength of his wit, and had settled all the bounds of nature.*

Id. l. i. v. 69.

Quem nec fama Deûm, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compressit cœlum, &c.

Which was all becoming the more than poetic fury of Lucretius to say. But Plutarch, in the Life of Pericles, saith, that Anaxagoras explained to him the natural causes of those meteors which are so apt to terrify mankind, and thereby took away an ignorant superstition; but instead of that he settled in his mind τὴν ἀσφαλῆ μετ' ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εὐσέβειαν, *a firm devotion, accompanied with good hopes.* And is not this far beyond the utmost Lucretius attributes to his hero? supposing he had such success, as he imagined, which we have only the poet's word for.

Ibid. v. 79.

Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cœlo.

But we can find no such victory that he ever obtained

over religion, by his foolish and precarious hypothesis, which the more learned pretenders to atheism in our age are ashamed of, because of its vanity and inconsistency; and therefore there is now less need of insisting upon it. But what reason had Lucretius to make such extravagant boasting of Epicurus's success against the principles of religion, when Cicero, of the same age and time, and a friend to Lucretius, had so very mean an opinion of it, and hath exposed it so much to contempt in more places than one? But possibly he may mean, *it had so at Athens:* nothing like it. For it was observed, that none were more forward to comply with the popular superstitions, none more reserved as to their real opinions about the Deity, than Epicurus and his followers. What need all this mean compliance, this caution and reserve, if they were such conquerors as he represents them? They never opposed the common sentiments, as Anaxagoras did, and suffered for it; but, instead of it, they industriously laboured to persuade the people that they were *for piety and veneration of the Gods;* and Epicurus wrote about it: whether in earnest or not, I dispute not; but he was in earnest concerned for his own security. Are these the marks of a conqueror? And yet in his time the *fear of the Areopagus,* after the time of Ephialtes, was in great measure removed. It is observed by Josephus, *That by the laws of Athens it was death without mercy to speak against the established religion;* and we find with what difficulty Anaxagoras escaped. But in Epicurus's time the government was sunk, and the Macedonian empire was continually growing upon them; and all people took greater liberty to speak their minds, and without any such opposition as the philosophers before him met with, when their laws were observed more strictly; as when Protagoras and Diagoras were forced to abscond for fear of their lives; and Aristotle, upon a suspicion of a profane hymn, to withdraw to Chalcis. But in the time of Epicurus the state of the city was altered, and the government was in the hands of Alexander's successors; for Epicurus lived with his scholars in Athens, when it was so closely besieged by Demetrius, as Plutarch informs us, who soon after had the possession of it delivered to him. Now, in busy and disordered times, such as Epicurus might be far more secure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any distaste, as to his opinions about religion; and still asserted his owning *the anticipation of a Deity,* although not consistent with his

Plut. adv. Colot.

Jos. cont. Appion. l. ii. c. 37. Ed. Oxon.

Plut. Vit. Demetrii.

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own grounds of certainty. But where was *the victory the meanwhile over religion*, which Lucretius boasts of? His defenders say, *It was over the ill effects of superstition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The world was not made one jot the better, but a great deal the worse, for his principles; for the very name of a philosopher went a great way with persons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themselves by any reason; but when they can bring an authority of a person of any reputation, they enquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge ignorance and superstition on those that contradict them. I do not deny but some of the defenders of Epicurus in our age have been persons of wit and learning, and they have utterly disowned his irreligious principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the author of so much impiety, hath done unspeakable mischief to the age we live in; and all the discoveries of natural philosophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the notions of Epicurus and Anaxagoras as to religion; and that method which Plutarch tells us Anaxagoras took, as to the freeing the mind of Pericles from superstition, was far better than that of Epicurus. For Anaxagoras satisfied him that there were natural causes of thunder and lightning; but these were the effects of a Divine Providence, which ordered the affairs of mankind for the best, as well as the meteors in the air; and therefore there was no reason why any wise and good man should not entertain a comfortable hope of Divine protection: but in the way of Epicurus there is a bare account of natural causes, which, whether true or false, can give no satisfaction to a thinking man. For the utmost comes to this; such and such effects do naturally follow such causes. And what then? *Then if such things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of Epicurus's enquiry into causes? To understand this better, I will put a case, which lately happened in the place where I live at present, to a man working in his garden, near a great river. While he was there busy, a violent shower of rain fell of a sudden; and the man thinking to divert it, the rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his garden, and took away the man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the river, which made him stupid and senseless: but it pleased God he was taken up, and recovered. Now let us consider

what would tend most to the satisfaction of this man's mind, when he was in that deplorable state, if he had been then sensible of his case. What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that, as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being such a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he must be contented to suffer? But would it not be far greater satisfaction to be told, there were those above who saw him fall, and pitied his case, and would be sure to help him out, and give him what was necessary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the case of Necessity and Providence: the one gives only that heavy comfort, *things must be so, and we cannot help it;* the other still keeps up reasonable hope, and the expectation of something better. So that no one can deny, that, upon mere principles of natural reason, this is the more desirable hypothesis; and nothing but invincible arguments should remove mankind from it: but neither Democritus nor Epicurus could offer any thing but a very precarious hypothesis against it.

From Anaxagoras I now come to Socrates, (for Acheloüs pursued his principles at Athens, where Socrates was his disciple.) He was a person of great vogue at Athens, for the *natural sharpness of his wit*, and *the freedom he used in conversation with all sorts*, without regard to his own interest. And for this he appealed to his judges, and to the whole city, that he was far from any design to enrich himself, as they all knew. He did not deny but that he had great presents offered him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the cases of the king of Macedonia and Alcibiades: and none could blame him for being refractory to their laws about religion; for he declared that to be his principle, *That God ought to be worshipped according to the laws of the city where a man lived.* And for this, Xenophon saith, *he trusted to the Pythian oracle;* which was thought of good authority among them: however some in our time have represented it as *so gross an imposture*, that it is hardly credible any men of common sense could be deceived by it, much less the Athenians; who, for all that we can perceive, had as good an opinion of it as the Bœotians themselves.

Plato in Apol. Soci.

Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 3.

Van Dalen Dissert. de Orac. Ethn.

This was a very hard point at that time among men of better understanding, and who had a true sense of God and Providence, how they should behave themselves with respect to the popular superstitions. There was no difficulty as to such as had no religion at all; for their princi

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ple was to keep fair, and to secure themselves; and they looked on such as Protagoras and Diagoras as persons who deserved to be punished for their folly. But for men who truly believed a wise God to govern the world, as Socrates and his two excellent scholars, Plato and Xenophon, did, the case was very difficult: for if they did not comply, they were sure to be prosecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this seemed to justify all their superstition.

The way which Socrates took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their public worship. Nay, Xenophon saith, he was so far from any impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no man ever heard him say or do any thing that tended to the dishonour of religion; so that from the whole course of his life he might be well concluded to be εὐσεβέστατος, *a very devout man.* Cicero had a very particular esteem of Socrates, not only *propter ejus magnitudinem ingenii, for the greatness of his wit,* but *for his wisdom and goodness; qui quum omnium sapientissimus esset, sanctissimeque vixisset;* and from him we learn what the grounds were which such men went upon. They found the world horribly corrupted with superstition, which was to be removed in the best way they could; but there was great danger, lest, under that pretence, all religion should be destroyed. And they saw an absolute necessity of keeping up that: *Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri,* since *the beauty and order of the world was sufficient to convince mankind that there was an excellent and eternal Being, which was to be adored and worshipped by mankind.* This was their fundamental principle; and they rather chose to comply with the follies of their superstitions, than not keep the solemn worship of the Deity. And, to satisfy themselves, they put such interpretations upon the public rites, as made them serve to some part or other of natural worship, with respect to the benefits God bestows on the world; and thus even the Eleusinian mysteries were understood by them.

Cicero de Orat. l. i. c. 54.

Cicero de Div. l. ii. c. 72.

But how then came Socrates to be so severely prosecuted at Athens? It is true that his enemies charged him with impiety and atheism, as appears both by Plato and Xenophon. In Plato's Apology we find that Melitus downright accused him, *that he thought there were no*

Gods. Socrates, being much surprised at this charge, asked him what ground he had for it? And all the proof he offered was, that he was of Anaxagoras's opinion, that the sun and moon were not Gods: which Socrates denied; and said his charge was inconsistent, for he both accused him of bringing in new Deities, and asserting that there were none at all. But in the conclusion of his Apology, he fully owned *a Divine Providence taking care of good men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a man, he thought God alone knew.*

But to shew more plainly what Socrates's judgment was as to the production of the world, Xenophon gives this account of it: Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα ἃ δυνατὸν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς μέγιστον φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ τούτων λέγειν οὐ ταῦτα δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· *That he looked on it as a great piece of folly in mankind to attempt it from material causes; and he wondered that they did not find out that these things were above their reach.* And he thinks those *philosophers argued like madmen; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for some said that it consisted of one thing; others, of infinite: some said all things were in motion; others said there was no motion at all: some said that all things were generated and corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was.* Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 1.

Plato in his Phædo let us know how he came to be unsatisfied even with Anaxagoras himself, although he mightily approved his fundamental notion of *all things being produced by an Eternal Mind.* When he was a young man, he saith, he was a great admirer of natural philosophy, and endeavoured to find out the causes of things; but at last *he found they were too hard for him,* and so fell into a kind of scepticism: but he had heard of a book of Anaxagoras, wherein he asserted, that Mind ordered all things. This pleased him well: but he expected that from hence he would have shewed how that Eternal Mind did frame every thing for the best, τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον; but finding him to faulter there, and to run to mere natural causes as others had done, he gave over his pursuit of natural philosophy, and applied himself to matters of morality, as more certainly known, and of greater use to mankind.

But as to Providence, Xenophon is very particular in it, *That it extended to all things said or done, although in never so great silence; and that God was present in all places.* To the same purpose Diogenes Laertius mentions Xenoph. l. i. ad fin. l. ii. ad fin.

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a saying of Thales. *Being asked whether a man could do an unjust action without God's knowing it; No*, saith he, *not if he only thinks to do it.* Which, saith Valerius Maximus, was intended to keep men's minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the atheistical club at Athens, in Socrates's time, turned this another way. For they said, *This was only a contrivance of some cunning man, to keep mankind more in awe.* And that this was their sense, appears by the verses still preserved in Sextus Empiricus; and part in Plutarch and others; but by the former they are attributed to Critias, and by the latter to Euripides, both of Socrates's time. But there seems to be far greater probability as to the former, because such a saying was very agreeable to the character of the man. For Critias was one of the thirty tyrants set up by Lysander at Athens; a man of wit, and addicted to poetry; as Socrates himself owns in Plato's Charmides, that he derived it from Solon. He and Alcibiades had been both under Socrates's care, as Xenophon tells us; but they both forsook him, and changed their manners upon it. Critias went into Thessaly, and there fell into lewd and debauched company; and from thence came to hate Socrates, whom he had admired before: and when he was one of the thirty tyrants, he and Charicles shewed a particular displeasure against him; for Socrates had spoken too freely against their government. He was the head of the number, as appeared by Theramenes drinking a health to Critias, when he took off his poison; and when Thrasybulus came to deliver Athens, upon his being killed, the whole faction sunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the character of such a man, than to make him look on all religion as an imposture and contrivance of some crafty politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of Euripides, who was scholar to Anaxagoras, a friend to Socrates; and on all occasions wrote decently with respect to piety and virtue. But Plutarch saith, *He wrote the verses in the name of Sisyphus, for fear of the Areopagus.* It cannot be denied, that author (whether Plutarch or not, for some question it) doth say so. But if Plutarch had said it on good ground, how came Sextus, after him, so positively to give them to Critias? And which is more to the purpose, the same author had but a little before quoted a passage of Euripides, very agreeable to a scholar of Anaxagoras, *that the heavens were* καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφῦ, *the beautiful workmanship of a wise Architect;* and from thence we

Valer. Max. l. vii. c. 2. sect. 8. Ed. Leid.

Sext. Emp. p. 264. Ed. Par. 1569. Poesis Phil. p. 75.

P. Petit. Miscell. l. i. c. 1.

Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. l. i. c. 6.

come to the notion of God. How different is this from the sense of those atheistical verses! But it is no easy matter to judge what the true sense of a poet is, when it is his design to personate others. And so Euripides might introduce Sisyphus as speaking agreeable to his own character, who is represented as *an ill man, and given to fraud;* and therefore it is no wonder such a man should look on religion as such a contrivance. For either Sisyphus or Critias might be well supposed to utter such things: but the question is, how far Euripides is to be charged with them; and whether he spoke his own sense under the name of Sisyphus, for fear of the Areopagus? This ought certainly to be proved some other way: and if not, it seems to be a very unjust imputation; especially since Socrates expressed such an esteem for Euripides; which he would never have done, if he had suspected that, under the person of Sisyphus, he had overthrown the foundations of religion. Ælian. l. ii. c. 13. Ed. Lugd.

But what the true sense of Socrates was, may be seen by his discourse with Aristodemus; of which Xenophon hath preserved the remembrance. This Aristodemus was one of those that not only neglected religion himself, but despised and laughed at those that regarded it. Socrates finding what sort of man he was, takes him to task after his dry manner. And are there no persons, Aristodemus, said he, that you have any esteem of for being wiser than others? Yes, said he briskly, and like a man of wit, *I admire Homer for an epic poem, Melanippides in dithyrambics, Sophocles in tragedy, Polycletus in the art of making statues, and Phidias in painting.* The man, we see, was a kind of *Virtuoso* in other things, but without any sense of God or religion. *Well!* said Socrates, *and would you not admire those more who make living and moving statues, than such only as have neither sense nor motion?* No doubt the former, Aristodemus replied, if they are made by design, and not by chance. Of that, said Socrates, we may best judge by the use they are intended for: for those things which are for a manifest use, are most agreeable to design. As for instance, the senses of men are so plainly given them for particular uses, that we cannot reasonably think but that he that made mankind at first gave them them for that purpose; as he particularly instances in the fabric of the eye, and the care of nature to preserve it, (which he calls a work of Providence;) and so for the ears, nose, and mouth, which are so framed as to be προνοητικῶς πεπραγμένα, done by a Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 4.

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wise design, and not by chance. And I cannot, saith Socrates, look upon them otherwise than as the workmanship Σοφῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου, of a wise contriver, and a lover of his own workmanship. The same he shews in the propagation of animals, and the love and care of their young, &c. But as to mankind, he saith, there is φρόνιμόν τι, a reach beyond other animals; and they have not only a body made out of earth, but a mind which we perceive within ourselves. And can these great and wonderful things come to pass δι' ἀφροσύνην τινά, without mind or understanding? To which our Virtuoso had nothing to say, *but that he could not see the artificer here, as he did in other cases.* Well! and do not you contrive and design things in your own mind? And yet you can no more see that, than the wise contriver of these things. All that Aristodemus had to say, was, that he did not disown or despise a Divine Being, but he thought it too great to regard his service. Hold a little, said Socrates; for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honoured by mankind. Then he questioned whether there were such a thing as Providence, with respect to human affairs. For that, Socrates again bade him look to the frame of human nature, and the several parts of man's body, and he could not but see a Providence in the contrivance of the several parts of the body; but especially the mind, which he hath inspired into men. Τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε: not *blowing some subtle air into man*, as some modern philosophers would translate it, or giving *a mere vital motion.* But Socrates was far from thinking *an incorporeal substance* within us to be *a contradiction*; nor that it was any absurdity to take a metaphor from air, to express the infusion of an immaterial soul. And he shews the excellency of the human soul above others, because it alone apprehends the being of God, who made and contrived the greatest, best things, and alone is capable of doing him service: besides, that it hath prudence and memory above all others. So that mankind are as so many gods among inferior creatures. If a man had the body of an ox, and the mind of man together, he could not do what he would; nor if brutes had hands, and wanted minds, could they do much with them. But you, said he to Aristodemus, have both; and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, said he, that the Gods (as he speaks) should plant in men's minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and punish, if it were not so? and that mankind should

Xenoph. Mem. l. i. c. 4.

Ibid.

be always deceived in this matter, and not be sensible of it? Do not you see, saith Socrates, *that the most ancient and wisest cities, and nations, and ages, have always shewed the greatest regard to religion?* This is a very remarkable testimony of Socrates concerning the sense of former ages about the foundations of religion; and that the atheistical temper some were then fallen into was a late innovation, and in probability occasioned by that smattering in philosophy which was crept in among the Greeks, from the principles of Anaximander and Democritus. But Socrates assures us, *the best and wisest ages* had a very different sense of these matters. And this Xenophon tells us he had from Socrates's *own mouth; and that he heard this discourse between them.* Ibid.

And what now is to be said to such a testimony as this, concerning the sense of mankind about religion? Have we any reason to mistrust such a testimony as that of Socrates, who was so much valued for his integrity, and lost his life because he could not flatter nor dissemble? For any one that will carefully examine the circumstances of his trial will find, the true reason of his prosecution was, that he had disobliged so many sorts of people by his plain dealing. For, as he told his judges, his way was, when he heard any man had a great opinion for his own wisdom and skill above other men, to talk with him, on purpose to see whether there were any sufficient ground for such an opinion: which was one of the most disobliging courses in the world, considering how fond men are apt to be of themselves, and to think themselves wiser than others, at least in that which they most pretend to. By which means he disobliged the politicians, who hate any man that would pretend to find them out; the sophists, whom on all occasions he exposed, and in the most public manner: and the men of wit and the poets were enraged against him, because he slighted their way, as tending only to entertain the fancy, and not to make men wiser; and in their happiest strains there was only a natural enthusiasm; and although they said many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiser men. The artificers he found had many pretty knacks; but, because of their skill in such little things, they presumed wonderfully at Athens upon their understandings, and would never bear long any great men among them, when things went by majority of votes: as Socrates found, when sentence came to be passed; for although he had many good friends, yet, when it came to the numbering of votes, he Platon. Apolog. Socr.

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was cast by a great majority. But as the people of Athens were so opinionated of themselves, that they could not bear any man whose reputation lessened theirs; so when they had done such things which made them ill spoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honour, either by recalling them from banishment, if living; or, if dead, by punishing the instruments made use of in the prosecution. So it happened in the case of Socrates: when they found his death brought an odium upon the city, one of his accusers was *put to death*, another *banished*; and Plutarch saith, *some of the rest were so weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themselves.* And, to shew their great esteem of him, they caused a statue, made by Lysippus, to be set up in a public place in the city, as a perpetual monument of his wisdom, and their own folly. And his carriage at his death was with so much courage, and constancy, and evenness of mind, that they were all satisfied as to his integrity, and freedom from any ill design. What reason can there be then to suspect his testimony in this point of religion, when there was not the least constraint or bias upon him; and this attested by so unexceptionable a witness as Xenophon: a person of great honour and judgment; and whose writings are such as could hardly be counterfeited by any since him, by reason of their unaffected sweetness; for which the ancient critics so much admired him; even Cicero, as well as Dionysius Halicarnasseus and Quintilian.

Plutarch. de Odio et Invid.

Cicero de Orat. l. ii. Dionys. Halicarn. ad Pomp. Quint. X. Cicero ad Quint. l. i.

From Socrates I go on to Plato, who, in Cicero's opinion, (and he was a very good judge,) was *princeps ingenii et doctrinæ*, the *top of ancient wit and learning*; and to the same purpose Quintilian, whom Valla esteemed above all other critics. But I need not go about to set up the reputation of Plato. He was descended from Solon by his mother, and by his father from Codrus; he was nearly related to Critias, the first of the thirty tyrants, and head of the atheistical club at Athens; and therefore it will be worth our while to find out his true sense and opinion about these matters. To which I shall confine my discourse concerning him. And in his tenth Book of Laws he gives an account of three opinions then in vogue among the looser sort of people at Athens. *One was, that there was no God at all; the second, that though there was a God, yet there was no Providence; the third, that if both were allowed, yet that God would accept of gifts and sacrifices, as a compensation for their faults.*

As to the atheistical hypothesis, it is observable, what character he gives of the persons who were for it, *that they were the looser and more dissolute sort of men among them; and especially in the heat of their youth. And that he never knew any man who continued in it from his youth to his old age;* and he calls it *the plague of young men.* The hypothesis, as he lays it down, is much the same with Anaximander's, viz. *that nature and chance produced all things out of a strange chaos, wherein were all sorts of qualities, jumbled and confounded together, and at last, by mixture, came to that we call the world. But that religion, and the differences of just and unjust, depended upon human laws and contrivances, for the better government of mankind.*

This is the substance of their hypothesis, which Plato, in a long discourse, sets himself to refute, by shewing that these things could not come together by mere nature and chance; but were, according to *right reason, the product of a superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to skill in natural causes, this opinion did proceed from *great ignorance about them*, and that their reasonings were both impious and incoherent: that their fundamental mistake lay in supposing such motion and mixtures in matter, before any principle to begin or to direct it. For the first motion must be from that which hath a power to move itself, as well as other things; and therefore there must be a mind antecedent to matter, in order to the production of things. This is the force of his reasoning. Then he shews how unreasonable it is to suppose a God without Providence, because it must argue either weakness or neglect; which were both inconsistent with *the Divine perfections:* and so he proves was the last opinion, and that it tended to overthrow *the practice of virtue.*

In his Epinomis (which I see no reason to mistrust) he undertakes to prove *religion to be the truest wisdom of mankind;* the first principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all matter;* and then saith, *that there is no greater virtue belonging to mankind than piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on religion as an imposture, or trick put upon mankind in order to their better government. Epinom. p. 1013. Ed. Ficin.

But Aristotle may be more suspected for this, who wanted no wit, but is generally thought to have been of no religion; and he was by no means fond of Plato's notions, especially those he took from the Pythagoric school: but yet I hope to shew, that in the main foun-

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dation of all, as to the being of God, and the happiness of mankind, he agreed with him at last: I do not mean at his death, according to the story in Cælius Rhodiginus, that then he said, *Causa causarum miserere mei*; and which Suarez quotes Laertius for; but there is nothing like it in him; and Cælius had it out of a trifling book *de Pomo*: but I go upon the principles delivered by him in his best considered books. In his Politics, indeed, he recommends religion to a prince, *in order to his esteem among the people, that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.* Now this Aristotle is charged to have utterly denied himself; and Atticus the Platonist in Eusebius makes him worse than Epicurus, *because he put his Gods quite out of the world, which Aristotle did not; but,* said he, *he overthrew all religion by denying Providence.* And Lactantius is very sharp upon him, and makes him *a contemner of God and religion:* but to do him right, he saith at other times, *That he placed one mind over the world*; and *that Aristotle and his followers were of the same mind with Antisthenes, that there was but one God in nature, and many popular Gods. But was not Aristotle charged with impiety at Athens, and forced on that account to withdraw to Chalcis, where he died, or, as some say, was poisoned?* So Eumelus, and the anonymous author of his Life, published by Menagius. It cannot be denied that there was a prosecution against him by Eurymedon and Demophilus; but so there was against Anaxagoras and Socrates; but the pretence against Aristotle was not for *impiety in his doctrine,* but for a *profane hymn,* which he was said to have made on his friend Hermias; such as were wont to be made to Apollo. This Athenæus denies; and Aristotle sent an apology for himself to Athens; but it was not received. The truth was, Aristotle found it was time for him to be gone, lest, as he told his friends, *that city should offend twice against philosophy:* for, as he said in his letter to Antipater, *he found the city abounded with sycophants*; and he was fallen under Alexander's displeasure, on the account of Calisthenes his kinsman; and in a letter of his to Antipater he had said, *he would be revenged on the Sophister*; and he publicly affronted him by the great present he sent to Xenocrates, and none to him: which was sufficient intimation to his enemies, which he never wanted, saith Aristocles, *because of the interest he had in princes.* And if Pliny's story be true (which Plutarch and Appian intimate too) as to Antipater's design, Alexander had cause

Cæl. Rhod. l. xvii. c. 34.

Arist. Polit. l. v. c. 11. Ed. Par.

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. xv. c. 5. Ed. Par.

Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. 19. Ed. Oxon.

Id. de Fals. Rel. l. v.

Id. de Ira Dei, c. 11.

Bessarion c. Calumn.

Athen. l. xv. p. 696. Ed. Lugd.

Suid. in Arist.

Ælian. lii. c. 36.

Plin. N. H. l. xxx. c. 16.

for his displeasure. But Aristocles saith, *That Apellicon (to whom his books came) wrote so full a vindication of him, that those who read that, need no more.* But they are his principles which we enquire after, and not his practices. Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who is thought to have understood Aristotle's mind as well as any commentator, owns, *that Aristotle, without doubt, asserted, that there was one Eternal Mind which gave the first motion to matter; and that thereby things were put into such an order, not by chance, but from the first Mover, so as to produce the variety of species in the world, and to make them useful to each other, and for the good of the whole; and such an universal Providence,* he saith, *Aristotle did hold.* So much then is confessed by one who was thought his most judicious interpreter. But let us see whether Aristotle may not be reasonably presumed to go beyond this: for, 1. he blamed Anaxagoras for making *no more use of his Eternal Mind, than merely to set things in order at first.* Then it follows, that, according to him, God must be more than a mere first Mover. 2. He makes this famous conclusion of his Metaphysics, *That things are best governed by one head;* which signified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clausulam hanc tam insignem amplector et laudo,* said one of his most bitter enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares *the government of the world* with *that of an army or family, wherein there are several ranks and orders of men for different purposes; which must suppose a particular inspection and care.* 3. He makes the complete happiness of mankind to be Θεῖόν τι, *a Divine thing;* and must suppose Providence, as I shall now make it to appear. He affirms, that a man's complete happiness depends *upon something divine in him, in the exercise whereof his happiness consists.* And therefore he advises those that study to be happy Ἀπαθανατίζειν, *to draw themselves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the best thing in us,* viz. *our minds; which although they do not so appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater, and of more value than other things.* By which he plainly owns such a principle in mankind as is capable of a greater happiness than the things of this world can give him; because his mind is of a higher nature than they. But then the question arises, whether mankind can make themselves happy by this Divine principle within them? He grants in one place, *that if there be any gift from God, it is most reasonable it should be that which is best for*

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. xv. c. 2.

Alexand. Aphrodis. in Arist. Physic.

Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. 4.

Ibid. l. xiv. ult.

P. Rami Schol. Metaphys. l. xiv. c. 10.

Aristot. Eth. l. i. c. 10. Ed. Par.

Ibid. l. x. c. 7.

Ibid. l. i. c. 10.

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them; but he avoids the dispute there, because his business was to put men upon using their own endeavours to be happy: but in his last book, where he speaks of this divine happiness, he saith, Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων ᾗ διακείμενος ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι· Εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ Θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἰκὸς ἂν εἴη εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτὰς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ· τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ Νοῦς, *That he that acts according to his mind, and is disposed to do the best things, is the most likely to be beloved of God: for if there be any care above of human affairs, as there seems to be, it is most reasonable to suppose that the Gods love what is best and nearest to them; which is our mind.* But doth he not seem to speak very doubtfully in this matter? It is observed by his Commentator, that his manner of expression is such as he uses when there is no manner of doubt. But we must take Aristotle as a philosopher, and consider on what grounds he went. He had no revelation to direct him, and so was to judge according to what he thought most reasonable; and this he declares he took to be so. And in his following words he saith, Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας, ἀντευποιεῖν· ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελομένους· καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας, *That those who did most esteem and value their own minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and such as did the best actions.* That word ἀντευποιεῖν is very emphatical in this case; for it implies a *retribution of a reward* for doing good. So that here we have the complacency which God takes in those that are good, and do good; and the reasonableness of expecting a recompence for it. Aristotle was no fool, but was especially admired by very great men; particularly by Cicero, and Quintilian, and Pliny, for *the greatness of his wit and subtlety: Aristoteles vir summo ingenio, scientiæ copia. Singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles, et pænè divino:* and such a person would never have been guilty of so great impertinency to set down such expressions as these, if he had not thought them fit to be believed; but he would have set some mark upon them, that they were the opinions of other men, and not his own: and in this case he had more particular reason to have done it; for any one that compares these expressions with those in Plato, *de Rep.* would think that Aristotle had taken them from thence. For Plato there saith the same thing; *That a good man is* Θεοφιλής, *one in favour with God; and whosoever is so, shall receive the best things from him. And we cannot suppose that he that designs to be good, and minds the practice of virtue, will be neglected*

Eth. l. x. c. 9.

Tusc. l. i. 4, 10. Acad. l. i. 4. De Div. l. i. 25. Quint. x. 1. Plin. N. H. l. viii. 16, 18, 34.

Plato de Rep. l. x. p. 760. Ed. Ficin.

above, when he makes it his business to be as like God as he can. And Plato, who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes use of the same kind of expression. Εἰκός γ' ἔφη τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶ ὁμοίω. *It is not probable that he should be neglected of one so like him.* And Aristotle in the foregoing chapter saith, Ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει, *The Gods are in a state of perpetual bliss, and mankind are capable of happiness, as they come nearer to a resemblance of them.* Can any expressions come nearer than these do? We find Aristotle, on other occasions, not very shy of expressing his dissent from Plato, even in these books of morals. How warmly doth he dispute against Plato's notion of ideas! He saith, *there are three kinds of men pretend to happiness; the sensual and voluptuous; which,* he saith, *is the happiness of slaves and brutes: the busy and active men place it in honour; which is not in their power.* But besides these, *there are those who place it in contemplation; which is most agreeable to the most perfect faculty we have.* But then he saith, *Some friends of his had introduced ideas to this purpose; however he was resolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we see he sticks not at contradicting Plato, as to his ideas; but is so far from doing it in the present case, that he takes his very expressions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to truth and reason. He did not like Plato's ideas, nor his poetical fictions about a future state; which made him more reserved in discoursing about it; but he was satisfied in these three things. 1. That the mind of man was capable of a real happiness distinct from the body. 2. That this happiness lies in a similitude to God, as the most perfect Being. 3. That it was reasonable to suppose God should make the best to be most happy.

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Ibid.

Aristot. Ethic. l. x. c. 8.

Ibid. l. i. c. 3, 4.

In his Great Morals, he declares it *not to be courage, but madness, not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reason can there be for fear?

Id. Mag. Mor. l. i.

In the conclusion of his Eudemian Morals, he makes it *the best end of a man to contemplate God; and said, that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his worship and service, and the best temper of mind to be little affected with sensual inclinations; and this,* saith he, *is the great end of virtue and goodness.*

Id. Eudem. l. vii. c. 15.

These are not the expressions of a man that despised God and Providence; and we are as certain these were his, as we are that we have any books of his. For even Fr. Patritius himself makes very slight objections against

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them; and the author of the ancient Paraphrase upon his *Ethics ad Nicomachum* (supposed to be Andronicus Rhodius) is a far better evidence for them; who is said to have paraphrased upon Aristotle's writings, and not upon any other man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt; for he thus paraphrases his words: *If God doth take care of mankind,* καθάπερ πᾶσι δοκεῖ καὶ εἴη γε, *as it seems to all, and is true.* And not only Plutarch in the Life of Sylla, but Porphyry in that of Plotinus, say, *that Andronicus Rhodius took great care in digesting and explaining Aristotle's works.*

Discuss. Peripatet. tom. i. l. iii.

Paraphr. Ethic. l. x. c. 10.

Let us now compare these sayings with the objections taken out of him against Providence. Alex. Aphrodisiensis is of opinion that Aristotle meant no more by Providence, but *an universal care to preserve the species of things, and the order of the world; but he doth not deny, that so far it extends even to sublunary things.* But if he did allow such an universal Providence as to the good of the world, I ask then, whether God did know and intend this good and order that is in the world? If he did, then his great argument against particular Providence is taken off; which was, *that it was below the Divine perfections to take notice of such mean things.* For if it were not below it at first to appoint and order these things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And since they cannot deny such an universal Providence, they cannot for this reason reject a particular; for it is no more unbecoming God to regard the good of his creatures, than it was at first to make them. But Aristotle utterly rejects their opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind necessity or chance; and then God must have a power and will to make and order these things as they are, and with a design for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence, that regards the good of the whole, is agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a particular Providence for the same end? If the same power and wisdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to particular events, why should that be rejected, and the other allowed?

Aristot. Metaphys. l. xiv. c. 9.

Id. Ethic. l. x. c. 8.

All that is pleaded from Aristotle, is this: *That the knowledge and care of particular things is troublesome and uneasy; that the Eternal Being is happy in itself; and it is better not to see and know some things, than to see and know them.* But I urge from Aristotle himself, that he yields that the Divine happiness doth not lie in *an unactive state,* or such *a perpetual sleep, as they fancied of En-*

dymion. And what can be more agreeable to Infinite Goodness, than such an activity as employs itself in the care of his creatures? CHAP. I.

But, saith Aristotle, *How can God understand any thing below himself? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation; and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine happiness to consist in the knowledge of his creatures, they were extremely mistaken; but I do not find that Socrates or Plato, who were hearty assertors of Providence, say any thing like it. All that they say is, that God, being infinitely good and wise, takes care of the good of the whole, and especially of those that are good; and if he did not, it must be either from want of power or will; neither of which can be supposed in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of these, why is it not done? It cannot be said, *that Aristotle absolutely denied God's knowledge of all things;* for in one place he saith, *It is the character of a bad man to suppose any thing hidden from God;* and in another, *that we attribute to God the knowledge of all things.* But it is possible he might be to seek as to the manner of God's knowing all things; as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow that he denied it. *If God*, saith he, *understands nothing, then he is like one that sleeps; which is not consistent with that veneration which we owe to God. If he doth understand, and the principal object be without himself, then he is not the best substance himself.* But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his understanding could be without himself. But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledge to comprehend all things? And so if there be things without himself, he must know them, or his knowledge cannot be infinite. Could Aristotle imagine that the world, and the order of it, were of his making and contriving, and yet he know nothing beyond himself? Are the several species of things of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impossible. But Aristotle saith, *That his essence, as most perfect, is the most proper object of Divine contemplation; and his understanding is nothing but the understanding of himself:* and so, as he expresses it, *his understanding is the understanding of his understanding.* Wherein, as Scaliger saith, he did apprehend things *supra humanum captum;* and I am apt to think so too. But our business is not to unfold the mystery of Divine knowledge with respect to itself, but

Metaphys. l. xii. c. 5.

Id. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.

Id. de Poet. c. 15.

Scaliger. Exercit. 365. n. 5.

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to consider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things. *If so,* saith Aristotle, *there must be a change and motion, but the Divine Essence is always the same.* As though an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things without a change in itself, or such trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things; which arises from our weakness and imperfection. The objection from the meanness of things is very inconsiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the order of the world, why are they below Divine Knowledge and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preserve them?

Yes, say they, *as to the species he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them.* The schoolmen distinguish in Providence the *ratio ordinis* from the *executio ordinis:* the first, they say, is wholly immediate, the other is by subordinate causes, which we call the course of nature, which is no more than the common order which God hath appointed in the world; which generally obtains, but yet so as that there must be a due subordination to the first agent, if he sees cause for particular ends to order things otherwise. And I cannot see any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in such a supposition, because it answers the same ends which the original intention and design of universal Providence doth: as that in the ordinary course of nature, fire burns, i. e. dissolves that contexture of bodies which it meets with; and this it doth, by virtue of that order of causes and effects which is established by universal Providence. But suppose that there be a stop put to this method by an extraordinary act, for great and wise ends becoming the supreme Governor of the world; why should not this be as agreeable to the design of Providence, as the first appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at some times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times? But we must still suppose the ends to be wise, and great, and good, for otherwise they do not reach the general design of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but such as answers the same general ends which an universal Providence is designed for.

Arist. Mag. Moral.

But, saith Aristotle, *If we suppose a particular Providence with respect to mankind, then he must give to men here according to their deserts; which cannot be, since bad men often meet with good fortune; and therefore God, being Lord over these things, would deal unjustly as a judge, which is not becoming him to do.* Here it cannot

be denied that Aristotle doth exclude a judicial disposal of these things; for if it were such, his argument must hold: but we distinguish between that and a providential management, in order to the real good of mankind. And I need no other than Aristotle's own arguments in this case: for if a man's real happiness lies in a similitude of the mind to God, how can that be inconsistent with Divine Justice to exercise good men here in such a manner as tends most to draw off their minds from these transitory and decaying pleasures? And if these things cannot make a man really happy without virtue, which is the great design of his Morals to prove, how is it inconsistent with his justice to let bad men meet with good fortune? For these things can be no demonstrations of the favour or displeasure of God, which himself grants relates most to the inward temper of men's minds. But the real difficulty in this case is a supposition that there is no future state. I confess that Plato clears this matter easily and plainly. *A good man*, saith he, *if he be under poverty, diseases, or other difficulties here, will find these things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no question of such a one's happiness in another state.* But Aristotle is upon a great reserve as to a future state; and although he asserts the possibility of it sufficiently, from what he saith of the nature of the mind of man, as distinct from the principle of life; yet I am afraid Plato's giving too much way to such poetical fictions as that of Herus Pamphilius, made Aristotle more cautious as to what he said concerning it, unless he could go upon surer grounds. He grants, that *the mind is of a nature distinct from the body, and separable from it*; that *it comes from without*; that *it is capable of pleasures more divine* than the body can enjoy or apprehend: but when he had gone thus far, the mere light of reason would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to say any thing, than affirm what he could not prove. As Socrates said in the case of prayer, in the second Alcibiades; *They must stay till they were better informed.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine revelation. But of that afterwards.

Plato de Rep. l. x. p. 760.

Aristot. de Anim. l. i. c. 5. Ibid. l. iii. c. 5. De Part. Anim. l. i. c. 1. De Gen. Anim. l. ii. c. 3. De Part. Anim. l. iv. c. 10. Eth. l. x. c. 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have considered the persons of greatest reputation in Greece, and compared their opinions, and the grounds they went upon; and I shall proceed no farther there, because the following sects were derived from these, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another; which I have no occasion at present to consider. And therefore I shall now give an account of

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another set of philosophers, who settled in that part of Italy which lay towards Sicily, and was called Magna Græcia; and this was called the Pythagorean sect; which I shall enquire into with respect to the present subject. Pythagoras was a man of wonderful esteem for his wisdom, not only in those parts, but at Rome too. For Pliny and Plutarch tell us, *that the Roman senate erected a statue to him, as to the wisest man:* but Pliny wonders that Socrates *was not preferred before him.* But the Romans had a particular veneration for Pythagoras, from the tradition that Numa, the wisest of their kings, was instructed by him. It is true that this is contradicted by Cicero and Livy, (two great men;) but Plutarch thinks, *that they had no certain measure of times to direct them to judge by,* as he shews from Clodius's Index. And there are other odd circumstances as to Numa, which favour the correspondence; as his laws about worship and sacrifices, mentioned by Plutarch; and especially the Greek books found in his tomb, distinct from those of the Pontifical Rites; for which Pliny produces unexceptionable authorities. Even Livy himself, who thought it a mistake about Pythagoras, yet confesses *the books contained the wisdom of the Greeks at that time.* If Pythagoras was contemporary with Thales, (as we are told he took his advice about going into Egypt,) what wisdom of the Greeks was there before Thales? But Varro's testimony is plain as well as the rest, *that these books contained the Greek philosophy.* And what Greek philosophy could come to Numa, but that of Pythagoras? And therefore Ovid makes no scruple of saying, that Numa did consult him. But if Pythagoras was in such esteem at Rome, *how came these books to be so solemnly burnt by order of the Senate, after they were discovered?* Livy saith, *because they tended to dissolve their religion:* which Lactantius carries too far, when he saith, *that they tended to overthrow all religion.* A most improbable story! That Numa should take such care that posterity should believe him to have been a notorious impostor. Do men that deceive the world, write books on purpose to let others see they have deceived mankind? No; they take all possible care to prevent any suspicion of that kind. But Numa could not think otherwise but these books would in time come to light. And it is a wonder that they were so long concealed: and so Pliny saith; for they lay there 535 years; Plutarch saith but about 400 years; which others say is a great mistake. However, it was a long

Plin. N. H. l. xxxiv. c. 12. Ed. Harduin. Plutarch. in Numâ.

Cic. Tusc. l. i. c. 16. et l. iv. c. 1. Plut. Num.

Plin. N. H. l. xiii. c. 27. Liv. l. xl. c. 29.

Ovid. Met. l. xv.

Lact. i. 22.

time before they were discovered; by a great shower, saith Plutarch; by ploughing, saith Pliny and others. CHAP. I.

But still, why were these books burnt? The true account I take to be this. Numa's religion was very different from what then obtained among them. And Q. Petilius, the prætor, having got a sight of them, saith Livy, from his kinsman L. Petilius, in whose ground they were found, very officiously informed the Senate that they were books of dangerous consequence to their religion; and upon his oath they ordered the burning of them. Now Numa, as Plutarch saith, had expressly forbidden any images in Divine worship; which, he saith, continued for 160 years among the Romans; and the reason he gives was, *that the first or supreme Being, according to Numa, was not sensible or visible, but was invisible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the mind;* which, saith he, was very agreeable to the doctrine of Pythagoras; and the sacrifices he appointed were unbloody; *of meal and wine, and other easy things.* But these things were soon changed; for Plutarch saith that Tullus Hostilius, his immediate successor, *changed the devotion which Numa had set up into great superstition;* which daily increasing, it was no wonder that they should then order Numa's books to be burnt, which upbraided them with their superstitious folly. But by this we see what Pythagoras's notion of God and his worship was. Ovid admires him *for his skill in divinity and philosophy; for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things.*

——*Isque, licet cæli regione remotos,* Ovid. Met.
Mente Deos adiit, et quæ natura negabat l. xv. v. 62.
Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit.

So that, if we may trust a poet, (and surely his authority is as good as that of Lucretius,) Pythagoras asserted *the being of God, and the beginning of the world.*

——*Magni primordia mundi,* Ibid. v. 67.
Et rerum causas, et quid natura docebat;
Quid Deus, unde nives, quæ fulminis esset origo.

There is a large description of God extant in St. Cyril against Julian, according to Pythagoras; wherein God is said to be *intimately present in the world, the beginning of all things, the mind, and soul, and motion of the universe.* Cyril. cont. Jul. l. i.

And so Velleius in Cicero saith, that, according to Pythagoras, *God was a mind diffused through the world.* Which is likewise expressed by Virgil in his known Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 11.

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verses, *Mens agitat molem*, &c. Philolaus, a noted scholar of Pythagoras, (whose books brought the Pythagorean learning into esteem in Greece,) gives this description of God, Ἐστὶ γὰρ, φησὶν, Ἡγεμὼν καὶ Ἄρχων ἁπάντων Θεὸς, εἷς ἀεὶ ὢν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων, *That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all; being one and the same always, and different from all others.* Which we find in Philo, and have no reason to mistrust his testimony, considering what the other Pythagoreans said concerning the Divine nature. They made God to be *one eternal, perfect Being, and that the happiness of mankind lay in a similitude to him*, as appears by the Pythagorean fragments in Stobæus, and elsewhere, which I need not repeat: but I shall only set down the passages of Zaleucus and Charondas, who were known Pythagoreans, as appears by Porphyry, Iamblichus, Laertius, &c. in the excellent prefaces to their laws. Zaleucus saith, *That in the first place all persons ought to own and acknowledge the Gods; which*, saith he, *is manifest by seeing the heaven and the world, and the order that is therein; for these are not the work of fortune, or of men's hands; and they ought to be worshipped and honoured as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their souls pure from evil; for God is not honoured by bad men, nor by costly sacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and just actions.* Charondas saith, *That men ought to begin their actions with piety. For God is the cause of all; and they must abstain from evil actions, for the sake of their respect to God: for God hath no regard to wicked persons.* These were men of great and just esteem in their cities; and their memory is preserved by all that speak of them with great veneration.

Philo de Mundi Opific. p. 23, 24. Ed. Mangey.

Stob. Serm. xlii. p. 279.

P. 289.

I might pursue this matter much farther; but if this be not sufficient to my purpose, more will be less regarded: for mankind are better pleased with choice, than a heap; and I have only pitched upon persons of great esteem in the world. Only Pythagoras did not go down well with some of the Greeks, because of his mystical and symbolical ways of instruction; which the Greeks were by no means fond of, as appears by Xenophon's Epistle to Æschines, (if it be genuine, and I see little reason to question it;) for he upbraids Plato with mixing the Pythagoric extravagancies with the plain doctrine of Socrates, which Xenophon kept strictly to. But as to Pythagoras himself, Cicero extols him *for his wisdom and quality*; and he saith, *the Pythagoreans for a great while*

Tusc. l. iv. i. De Leg. l. ii. 9. Tusc. l. i. 16.

were accounted the only learned men. Pliny admires him for *his sagacity;* Apuleius for *the greatness of his wit;* and the people of Crotone and Metapontum, *as more than a man.* His greatest fault was, that he was too wise; for he locked up his secrets so close, that the greatest part of mankind were not much the better for them; only the cities of Magna Græcia were wonderfully reformed by his means, (if the Pythagoreans may be believed;) but at last the prevalent faction of Cylon, and his brutish party at Crotone, destroyed many of the disciples of Pythagoras, and dispersed the rest. And Pythagoras himself ended his days either by violence, or the discontent he had to find his good designs disappointed in such a manner. The reputation of his school was for some time kept up by Archytas and Philolaus; and some that escaped the common danger, as Lysis, (who went to Epaminondas in Greece, and is supposed to have published the Golden Verses,) and several others, are mentioned by Porphyry and Iamblichus. But Porphyry observes, that *they only preserved some dark and obscure notions of the Pythagoric doctrine, and made wonderful secrets of them;* which he thinks did not contain the true doctrine of Pythagoras, but only some sparks of it, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the Pythagorean doctrine he doth not only impute to the violence of the faction raised against the Pythagorean society in those cities of Italy where they flourished, but to their enigmatical way of expressing their minds by numbers and figures; and to the Doric dialect, which was almost sacred among them: and after their books were come into Greece, he saith, *Plato and others took out the best, and put it into smoother language,* which made the rest be slighted. And he thinks some *invented things on purpose, in their names, to expose them the more.* So that it is no easy matter to judge now what was the genuine Pythagorean doctrine, except what we find mixed with Plato; who had the best opportunities of understanding their doctrine by going among them himself, and afterwards getting the books of Philolaus into his hands. And Porphyry, in the Life of Photinus, doth particularly commend him for *joining the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato together, beyond any that had gone before him.* From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them as to the first cause and the production of things.

But what shall we say to Ocellus Lucanus, who is mentioned as a disciple of Pythagoras by Iamblichus;

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Plin. N. H. l. ii. c. 19. Apul. Flor. Iambl. Vit. Pyth. c. 6, 10.

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and Archytas, in his Epistle to Plato, mentions a book of his of the Generation of Things; which hath been often published out of MSS. and doth plainly assert the *world's eternity, and being from itself;* and so overthrows the Pythagorean doctrine, of God's being the beginning of all.

In answer. That there is something genuine of Ocellus extant, I do not question. For Stobæus produces a fragment out of his Book of Law, written in the Doric dialect, according to their custom, and the precept of Pythagoras, wherein he doth positively assert, *that God was the cause of the world,* αὐτᾶς δὲ αἴτιος ὁ Θεός: but that is not all; for he saith, *the world consists of two parts; of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called passive, and is governed. The first,* he saith, *is active and divine, having reason and understanding; the other is made unreasonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the principles of the other book? And yet Vizzanius, who compared it with several MSS. and published it, hath printed this fragment at the end of the other. As to *the different dialect,* he supposes *it was first written in Doric, but after turned into the Attic:* but of this he offers no proof; only he saith, *it was done as words are translated out of Portuguese into Castilian;* or, which answers more to the Doric, out of Scotch into English. No one questions but such things have been done, and may be so again. But how doth it appear that the whole book was so? For there are some fragments of this very piece in Stobæus, in the Doric dialect, which is the conclusion of the first chapter, and some parts of the second and third, which I suppose to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the rest; which some unknown philosopher built more upon, and turned these fragments into the Attic Greek, to make them all of a piece. The Pythagoreans did assert, that the world was incorruptible, as appears by the fragments of Philolaus, and others, in Stobæus; but that which is asserted in this piece is, that the world was self-originated, which was contrary to their doctrine, and of Ocellus Lucanus himself. There can be no dispute about the fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *that God is the cause of all,* and that *the first Cause is a wise and intelligent Being.* Let us now compare this with the doctrine of this book, wherein he asserts, Οὕτως ἓν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον γινόμενον τῆς αὐτοτελείας, αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτᾶ αὐτοτελὲς, *That the world is the cause of perfection to other*

Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 16. p. 32.

Stob. Eclog. Phys. c. 24. p. 44. Ed. Canter.

Ocell. Lucan. c. 1. sect. 8. Ed. Bon.

things, and therefore is perfect from itself. Vizzanius would have it believed that this was the Peripatetic doctrine. If he means that of Aristotle, I have already shewed how false it is; since he so plainly derives the being and perfection of the world from God, and not from itself. But that which will give the greatest light into this matter is, that Nogarola, who published Ocellus in Italy, with notes, observes, that Critolaus, the Peripatetic in Philo, used the same argument, *that the world must be eternal, because it is the cause of its own being, and of other things in it.* Now this Critolaus succeeded in the Peripatetic school at Athens, after the doctrine of it, about the beginning of things, had been altered by Strato Lampsacenus, who, as Cicero tells us, *attributed all to nature, and nothing to God; supposing that nature had all causes within itself.* And so Plutarch saith, that Strato the Peripatetic *supposed nature alone to give a being to all things from itself.* Here we have found the very principle of this book, which goes under the name of Ocellus Lucanus, which is repugnant to what himself had expressly declared; but some one of these atheistic Peripatetics at Athens finding that Ocellus Lucanus had said something that might be turned to their purpose, takes what was ancient of Ocellus, and puts it out of the Doric into the Attic dialect, and makes a short System of the Universe; which they thought would better pass in the world under the name of ancient Pythagorean. And this seems to me the truest account of this matter. As for the arguments themselves, such as they are, I shall consider them in a more proper place.

Phil. Oper. p. 946. Vol. ii. Ed. Mangey.

Acad. Qu. l. iv. c. 38. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 13. Plut. adv. Colot.

Thus I have gone through the opinions of the eldest philosophers of greatest esteem, about *God and Providence, and the production of the world.* But, before I proceed farther, it will be necessary to make some reflections on the foregoing discourse, which may be very serviceable to my following designs.

1. That those philosophers who asserted *the being of God and Providence*, were persons of the greatest reputation for wisdom and knowledge, and did not hold these things merely from tradition, but from the strongest evidence of reason; which appeared by this: that, after the atheistical hypotheses of Anaximander and Democritus were started, they were not in the least moved by them; but saw an absolute necessity, in point of reason, of holding a first Cause, which not only gave a beginning to the world, but continued to govern it: even Aristotle owning

BOOK I. an universal Providence from such reasons, as will hold much farther.

2. That these philosophers, who followed their natural reason, were very far from looking on the universe as made up *only of bodies*, or that *an incorporeal substance implied a contradiction*. These were persons who understood very well what a contradiction meant; and if there had been any such repugnancy in the notion of mind or spirit as distinct from body, they would have found it out. But Anaxagoras asserted a superior Mind antecedent to matter or body; so did Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle too; who expressly asserts God to be *an essence without bulk and indivisible, or without any parts;* but this can never agree to a body, although never so fine and subtle. And Cicero tells us, *Nec vero Deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno: That they could have no other notion of God but as a free mind, remote from any composition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things.* Even the Stoics, who blundered most in this matter, yet yielded God to be *Numen præstantissimæ mentis*, as Balbus in Tully calls him; and Zeno in Laertius describes God to be *an immortal, rational, and most happy Being, uncapable of evil, and taking care of the world.* Seneca saith, *The world was framed by God, or by incorporeal reason.* If at other times they seem to contradict this, we are not here concerned to clear or vindicate them; because my enquiry is confined to those who were elder, and not so given to paradoxes and innovation in terms, as the Stoics were.

Metaphys. l. xiv. c. 7.

Cic. Tusc. l. i. c. 27.

Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. ii.

Laert. Vit. Zenon.

Sen. Consol. ad Hel. c. 8.

3. That the true and complete happiness of mankind lay in a similitude to God: herein Socrates and Pythagoras, and their scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the Pythagorean Fragments; and that the way to be like God, is to be *virtuous, and good, and wise;* and that all other things, which mankind are apt to value so much, fall infinitely short of this. And I have shewed that Aristotle himself came to this at last; for which I have produced unquestionable authorities from his works.

4. That religion and piety are very great and commendable virtues in mankind. Plato said the greatest. Pythagoras gave very good rules about Divine worship; that it should be performed *seriously, and with great attention of mind;* and not *by the bye, and by chance.* That *our minds were most affected with religion and piety in the due wor-*

Plut. in Numâ.

Cic. de Leg. l. ii. c. 11.

ship of God; that we should undertake nothing without prayer; wherein Socrates and Plato agree with him. And Aristotle looked on it as *madness to despise God and religion.* CHAP. I. Pyth. Aur. Carm. 49.

That good men are to bear the troubles of this world as well as they can, and to look for happiness in a future state. This appeared by the carriage of Socrates at his death, and his discourses then; and the courage and constancy of Pythagoras and his disciples, when they were so miserably handled by their inveterate enemies; setting fire in the house where they met, banishing some, and famishing others, and dispersing the rest. 5.

That there was a common consent of mankind as to the being of God, and immortality of souls. Which appears not only by express testimonies of philosophers, but by their appeals to the sense of former ages and distant nations about them. 6.

That, notwithstanding that light of reason which they had, yet they found it so defective in many things, that they thought nothing more desirable than a clear revelation about such things which were of great importance to mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appeared by the confession of Socrates, and the silence of Aristotle about a future state, when his reason could only go to the possibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have shewed that Aristotle hath asserted so much concerning the nature and properties of the soul, or rather the mind of man, that it cannot be destroyed by death; but yet he was so far to seek concerning a future state after death, by reason of the poetical fictions about it, that he rather chose to say nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain. 7.

And now, I hope, I have sufficiently cleared the first thing which I undertook; which was to shew, that it was a most unreasonable prejudice against religion, *that it was only a contrivance of priests and politicians for their own ends.*

I come now to consider, in the next place, what account is given by such men of that impression of religion, which hath been upon the minds of men in all ages. And the cause must be as general as the effect. Since then we find this effect of religion in all kinds of men, some universal and common reason must be assigned for it: which is the thing I am now to consider. And since no person hath undertaken this matter in such a manner as Mr. Hobbes hath done, I shall particularly examine II.

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Leviathan, ch. 12.

what he hath said concerning it. *Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only, there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of religion is also only in man, and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other living creatures.*

But what is this *peculiar quality in mankind?* For therein the difficulty lies. How come men of all sorts to be possessed with it? not merely the unthinking multitude, but men of the deepest sense and greatest capacity, and who have taken the most pains to enquire into these matters.

And first, saith he, *it is peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into causes of the events they see, some more, some less; but all men so much as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune. To be inquisitive into the causes of events,* is very proper for rational beings; but we do not mean such as relate merely *to their own good or evil fortune,* which is no commendable curiosity; but into the nature and reason of things which they see in the world; and this we say leads men to a first cause, which is God. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning, to think also it had a cause to determine the same to begin when it did, rather than sooner or later.

And was not this a very reasonable thought? For what hath a beginning, must certainly have a cause which produced it; which determined its being at that time. And if this be such a peculiar quality in mankind, then there is something in reason which carries them to the owning a God, which gave a being to the world, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembereth in them antecedence and consequence; and if he cannot find out the true causes of things, he supposes causes of them rather from his own fancy, or authority of others whom he esteems.

But how come mankind not *to find out the true causes of things?* For this is here very slily supposed, without giving the least reason for it; and withal, the things that men search for the causes of, are supposed to be only such as relate to their good and evil fortune, (which are said to be for the most part invisible;) but is it not possible for men to enquire into the causes of other things, which we plainly see? Do we not see our own bodies, and those of other animals, as well as the heavens and

earth? And is it not as proper and reasonable for mankind to enquire into the causes of these, as well as into their good and evil fortune? What strange stuff is this, to suppose all mankind only to run after fortune-tellers, and never to concern themselves about the causes of the visible world! Could any one, that in the least pretended to philosophy, ever think so meanly of the rest of mankind? But these are the causes which we search for; and we hope natural reason will conduct men in this enquiry to their satisfaction, so that they need not to have recourse to fancy or authority.

But he goes on: *The two first make anxiety*, i. e. a man's *inquisitiveness into causes* in general, and *thinking that what had a beginning must have a cause.* For *being assured that there be causes of all things, this fills him with solicitude for the time to come; and so his heart is gnawed on perpetually by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and hath no repose or pause of his anxiety but in sleep.* What! Do men think of nothing but what calamities may befall them? And must they needs perpetually perplex themselves with the fear of future evils? Those who were called philosophers in former times, thought it possible, for such who believed God and Providence, not to live under such perpetual anxiety. But what follows? *This perpetual fear always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something; and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible. Thence the poets said, that the Gods were first created by human fear; which being spoken of the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true.* But how come we from the qualities of human nature to fall upon the Gods of the Gentiles? The question was, what it is in mankind which inclines them to believe a God? The answer is, that fear made the Gods of the Gentiles. What is that to all mankind? Suppose there had been no such saying among the poets, nor such Gods among the Gentiles, the question still remains, whence comes mankind to apprehend a Deity? Doth it all come from a vain superstitious fear, such as men have in the dark, of they know not what; and because they see nothing, they imagine some invisible power? Is this the true ground of the seed of religion in men's minds? If so, then there is no ground in reason to believe a God, but only an ignorant superstitious fear.

Not so, saith Mr. Hobbes. *But the acknowledgment of*

BOOK I. *one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of one God may be more easily derived,* &c. If he had meant sincerely, he would not have said, *that it may be more easily derived*, but that no tolerable account can be given of those things any other way. But we are to observe, that he makes ignorance and fear to be the general seeds of religion in mankind: so that this acknowledgment of one God doth not come from the seed of religion, but only from men's being puzzled about a series of causes. *For*, as he goes on, *he that, from any effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this (even as the Heathen philosophers confessed) one first Mover; that is, a first and an eternal Cause of all things, which is that which men mean by the name of God.* This seems a plain confession, that reason must carry men to the owning *a first and an eternal Cause of all things.* And is not reason a *peculiar quality in mankind?* How then come *the seeds of religion* not to be placed therein, but *in ignorance and fear?* And he after saith, *that the natural seed of religion lies in these four things; opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking things casual for prognostics.* How comes the natural reason of mankind to be left out? If by that men may be convinced of a *first and eternal Cause of things*, doth not that dispose men to a fear and reverence towards a Divine Majesty? And is not that religion? Then the best and truest seed of religion lies in that which most disposeth the mind to fear God. What is the meaning then that *the seed of religion* is placed by him in things without reason? If men by reason are brought to own or *acknowledge one God, eternal, infinite, omnipotent*, doth not the same reason oblige them to pay him that reverence, and fear, and duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this seed of religion, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to superstition. And to this purpose he speaks in the conclusion of the foregoing chapter. *And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that fear or worship that power otherwise than they do, superstition.* Here is a notable distinction found out be-

tween religion and superstition; the former is the good word a man gives to himself, the other the nickname he bestows on those who differ from him. But, in general, religion and superstition are the same thing to him; unless a difference be found out from the allowance of one, and not of the other. So he saith in another place: *Fear of power invisible feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, is religion; not allowed, superstition.* So that what is feigned and allowed is religion; and what is not allowed is superstition. So that the worship of the Heathen Gods, being from tales publicly allowed, was religion, and not superstition; and the Christian worship under the persecution, was superstition and not religion. No, saith Mr. Hobbes. *When the power imagined is such as we imagine, that is true religion.* How can it be true religion, if religion be *a fear of a power imagined by the mind, or from tales publicly allowed?* For if this be religion in general, true religion must be a true fiction; a real chimera, an allowed piece of nonsense. *But when the power is such as we imagine it, then,* saith he, *it is true religion.* But if it were *a power imagined to be such as the law makes it,* is not that true religion? And if it contradicts what is so established, can this be according to Mr. Hobbes's true religion? Then it follows, that the distinction doth not arise from the public allowance or disallowance. For if it be possible for the civil power to disallow the worship of the true God, (as we know it hath too frequently happened,) is such worship, being disallowed, true religion? If it be, then it is impossible the other should be true, that religion is taken from the public allowance, and superstition from the disallowance. But they who put in some expressions only for a disguise and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themselves; and they know their friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be understood by them: and the safest way of instilling atheism, is by writing contradictions, i. e. by seeming at some times to own a God, but by the whole series of the discourse to overthrow his being; as a mere fancy of an invisible power raised by a predominant fear. But hereby we see that fear prevails so much on such men, that they dare not speak consistently; which is very unbecoming philosophers. As the gross hypocrisy of Vaninus before his discovery, and the most servile flatteries and importunities of Theophile in France, did shew how much the power of fear may sway in those who have no religion, (which

Leviathan, ch. vi. p. 26.

Lescaloper in Cic. de N. D. l. p. 127. Ed. Par.

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may be allowed in them.) But how comes fear to be made out to be *the seed of religion in mankind?* This a true disciple to the Leviathan, in the preface to his book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. Hobbes had done; and therefore ought to be considered in this place. *When men,* saith he, *are under any great distress, and see not the way out of it, their anxiety and fear makes them act like men distracted, and ask any one's help, which at another time they would despise: so we find it as to religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their prayers; and when they are over, their devotion is soon cooled; as he instances in Alexander, and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main point? That men are too prone to superstition, especially under calamities, there is no question. But it is a most unreasonable supposition, that all religion is nothing else but superstition, which men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a God and Providence, as we find both the best philosophers asserted, and the strongest reason prove it, then whatever men's condition be as to this world, there is the same ground in reason for a due reverence and worship to be paid to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing against all religion, because of some men's extravagant superstition. *Some men have run mad with superstition.* What follows? Therefore all religion is madness? Where lies any colour in the argument? Some have been mad through an excess of love; therefore all love is madness? No; but we must enquire into the proper objects and degrees of love; whereof some are allowable, and some not. So here in the passion of fear; there is a violent, foolish, ungovernable fear; but may there not be a prudent, wise, and reasonable fear? It is madness and folly in great distresses to run to what cannot help us: but is it so to make our addresses to a Being infinitely wise and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental mistake of these men: they would have it taken for granted that there is no God nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the foolish fear and superstition of mankind: but they cannot deny, that, if our foundations be true, religion is a wise and reasonable thing in mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a solemn submission to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his providence. Let any man in his wits (let his condition as to this world be what it will) deny that it is reasonable for him to be governed by one infinitely wiser and better

than himself. If his condition be prosperous, he hath more reason to be thankful; if it be troublesome, he hath more reason to be patient; because God knows best both how to support him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no God nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miserable comfort of necessity. *But did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile world come from their ignorant and superstitious fear, as Mr. Hobbes hath at large shewed?* Truly he needed not to have taken so much pains to prove a thing which nobody denies. But what then? The Gentiles feigned a great many Gods from their superstitious fear; therefore there is no God but what is the effect of fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied powers invisible, which were only in their own imaginations.* Therefore there is no invisible power but what depends upon imagination. Can such men pretend to reason, who talk at this rate? *But those invisible powers they took to be spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory signification.* This is news, and ought to have been proved in some measure, since the best philosophers, who understood contradictions, never thought so, as I have shewed already. *But those who, by their meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any, that believe God to be an immaterial substance, confess this to be unintelligible? I rather believe that they think a material God to be unintelligible, as being inconsistent with the Divine perfections. And although they acknowledge that what is infinite is so far incomprehensible, yet they may have clear and distinct conceptions of *a first and eternal Cause*, which is endued with infinite perfections. And this is not only attributed to him *as a title of honour with a pious intention*; but from the true sense of their minds, as to such attributes which are proper to God.

"When Mr. Hobbes was charged with introducing atheism, *by denying immaterial or incorporeal substances*, he undertook to defend himself; not only because we say *God is incomprehensible, but because the notion of an incorporeal substance came from Plato and Aristotle, who mistook those thin inhabitants of the brain they see in sleep for so many incorporeal men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things corporeal.* Before he seemed only to say, that the ignorant superstitious people en-

Mr. Hobbes considered, &c. p. 10.

p. 11.

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tertained this notion of *spirits or invisible powers being only creatures of the brain like the images in sleep:* but now it seems Plato and Aristotle were no wiser, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of mind and matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible reason; because otherwise there could be no such thing as the motion and disposition of matter in such a manner as we see it in the world. And this was the ground which those philosophers went upon; who were as little given to be imposed upon by their dreams, as any before or since their time. And it is a strange confidence in any man to think to bear down the general sense of the most philosophical part of mankind, with bare saying, that an immaterial substance implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it after an extraordinary manner; *For,* saith he, *it is in English something that without a body stands under—— Stands under what? Will you say, under accidents?* Ridiculous! Did Plato or Aristotle use the word substance? And when it came to be used, the word signified the same with being; and so the jest is quite lost. Such pitiful things as these must pass for wit and philosophy with some men.

P. 33.

But to proceed with Mr. Hobbes. After he hath reckoned up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their superstitious fear, he concludes in this manner. *So easy are men to be drawn to believe any thing from such as have got credit with them, and can with gentleness and dexterity take hold of their ignorance and fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the result of ignorance and fear in the Gentile world. We do not deny that religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of religion were kept up among men of understanding; as fully appears by the discourses of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, &c. Why are their reasons never so much as mentioned, and nothing thought worth insisting upon, but only the gross superstitions and follies of the people? This doth not look like fair dealing with mankind; to represent only the meanest and most deformed parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honour of them, and of religion. Cicero dealt with mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the people or of the philosophers about their Gods; but then he sets down all the arguments for God and Providence, and urges them with all his force. And

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

in other places he owns the *general consent of mankind*, as to the esteem and worship of a Divine nature: which he is far from imputing to *men's ignorance and fear*; but he saith *it is the voice of nature itself*. Nay, he goes so far as to say, *Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod Numen præstantissimæ mentis quo hæc regantur? That there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the heavens, than that there is a most excellent Mind, by which these things are governed. Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius? And he questions whether it be more evident that the sun shines.* At what another rate doth that excellent orator speak of human nature with respect to religion, than our modern pretenders to philosophy? Nay, Sextus Empiricus himself sets down the arguments fairly which prove the being of God, viz. *the consent of mankind; the order of the world; the absurdities of atheism, and the weakness of the arguments for it.* Which he doth largely insist upon; and distinguishes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *natural arguments of mankind*, with the consent of the wisest and sharpest men among them; as Pythagoras, Empedocles, the Ionic philosophers, (from Anaxagoras,) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. *And*, saith he, *if we enquired after an object of sight, we would rely most on those who saw best; or, after a sound, on those of the quickest hearing: so in matters of speculation, the opinion of philosophers ought most to be regarded.* Which he never answers when he sets down the arguments on the other side; which are chiefly those of Carneades against the Stoics, who laid themselves open by some hypotheses of their own.

Cicero de Leg. i. c. 8. Tusc. l. i. c. 13, 16. De Nat. Deor. l. ii. c. 2.

Ibid.

Sext. Emp. ad Mathem. p. 257. Ed. Par.

But Mr. Hobbes tells us, *that the first founders and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the people in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to revelation for their laws; and prescribed ceremonies, and supplications, and sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeased. And thus the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.* Who goes about to deny this, or to justify the vain pretences to revelation among some of the ancient legislators, besides Numa Pompilius, whom Diodorus Siculus takes care to preserve the memory of? as of Mneves, as he calls him, the first legislator in Egypt, who pretended to have his laws from the God Hermes:

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but this seems to have been a mistake for Menes, whose counsellor Hermes was. His others are, Minos of Crete, Lycurgus at Sparta, Zathamustes (as he calls him) among the Arimaspi, Zamolxis among the Getæ; and among the rest he reckons Moses, who had his laws from the God Iäo. No question Diodorus Siculus believed all alike; but I hope to shew the mighty difference between Moses and the rest in the following discourses. But here I am only to consider the force of the argument. *These Gentile legislators did pretend revelation when they had it not, only with a design to deceive the people.* Doth it hence follow, that there is no such thing as religion; but that it is only a trick made use of by cunning legislators, to draw the people the better to obedience? Now I think the argument holds the other way; for if the people were not before well persuaded of the truth of religion in general, this argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us suppose a people altogether unacquainted with religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with by some cunning legislator, and he comes and tells them he had brought them an excellent body of laws, which he had by revelation from God; what would this signify to a people that were possessed with Mr. Hobbes's notion of invisible powers, that were only *fancies, such as appear in a dream or a glass;* would they be at all persuaded by such an argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an impostor, that went about to deceive them in the grossest manner; which would raise an invincible prejudice against them. *But,* saith Mr. Hobbes, *they had the original seeds of religion,* viz. *ignorance and fear; and upon these such legislators did work.* But he can never make it out that ever there was a people possessed with such ignorance and fear, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before such legislators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from such an antecedent belief of a God: then indeed it was no hard matter for such legislators to impose upon them; but without it the supposition is unreasonable. But Mr. Hobbes saith, *that men in the dark are afraid of invisible powers.* As though there were no more to be said for the being of God and Providence, than for stories of hobgoblins; and this lies at the bottom of all his discourse. Wherein he contradicts the common sense and reason of mankind, who have agreed in the notion and belief of a Deity, and that as I have shewed from Socrates and Xenophon, as well as others in *the eldest and*

Diod. Sic. l. i. c. 59, et 93.

best ages even of the Gentile world. But Mr. Hobbes saith, where he speaks his mind more freely, *that there is no argument from natural reason doth prove that the world had its beginning from God*; and yet he saith, *there is no argument to prove a Deity but from the creation.* So that all proof of a God, in point of reason, must be destroyed by him. This he knew was objected against him; and the answer he gives is, *That there are no arguments from natural reason, except the creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before;* and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the law to determine.* A very philosophical answer! But why doth not the argument from the creation hold, when himself had said, *that from the series of causes there must be one first Mover*, i. e. *a first and an eternal Cause of all things?* But that came in by the bye, to avoid odium in a book for all persons reading; but in his Philosophical Discourses he doth not allow this argument to hold. For what reason? *Because*, saith he, *it only proves that a man's mind cannot go on in infinitum, but he must stop somewhere; and at last he grows weary, and knows not whether he should go on farther or not.* And is this all the force of the argument from the creation? What becomes now of the argument from the *mechanical contrivance of the human body, which*, he said, *was so clear a proof of a wise Maker, that he must be said to be without a mind, that did not assert that it was made by one?* And this is in one of his Philosophical Treatises, published after the other; but in his vindication of himself, he justifies the former passage; only he saith, *except the creation.* So that he knew not well what to say in this matter; but only, to keep himself out of danger, he was resolved to submit to the law. But that is not our point: and why did he not go about to take off the argument from *the wise contrivance of things*, which ought to go along with the other? But he knew it was far easier to darken an argument, wherein eternity and infinity is concerned; and so from thence would infer, that in the series of causes mankind are only puzzled, and not convinced. But why, I pray, must a man's mind *give over in the search of causes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reason, than that in the order of causes a man must go on till he arrive at a first Cause? What should make a man to stop here? for he sees he must go on till he comes at a first. *No*, saith Mr. Hobbes, *a first Cause is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our*

CHAP. I.

Phys. c. 26. n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes considered, p. 34.

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conception, and so we are lost. But that is running from the order of causes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another consideration.

But he saith yet farther, *that the argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal first Mover;* because as nothing can be moved from itself, so whatsoever gives motion must be first moved. But all this depends upon the supposition that there is nothing in the universe but body; and if that be granted, his argument holds: but if there be mind distinct from body, and can give motion to it, there is not so much as the colour of reason in this argument. And so much in answer to the second atheistical pretence.

The third atheistical pretence to be considered, is, *that there is no such common consent of mankind, as to God and Providence, as was asserted by the ancients, and is still by the defenders of religion; for, upon the late discoveries, whole nations have been found without any sense of God or religion.* This is a thing very fit to be enquired into, with more care than hath been yet used about it: for although we do not ground the truth of religion merely upon such a general consent, but upon those arguments which the wiser part of mankind hath insisted upon, of which I have given some account in the foregoing discourse; yet such an universal consent doth manifestly shew that there is nothing repugnant to the common sense of mankind in it; nothing that looks like a trick or imposture, which could never so universally prevail as this hath done, especially among the more sensible and civilized part of mankind.

But, for our better understanding this matter, it will be necessary to lay down some general observations.

1. That we have reason to distinguish the more brutish and savage people, from the more tractable and reasonable; because it is possible for mankind, by an affected and universal neglect of all kind of instruction, to degenerate almost to the nature of brutes. But surely such are not fit to be brought in for the instances of what naturally belongs to mankind; which we ought to judge of by a due measure, *i. e.* by such as neither want natural capacity, nor are professed savages, nor have the improvements of the most civilized people. There are two sorts of brutish people in the world, whose sense in these matters is not much to be regarded. 1. Such as have very little of common humanity left among them; such as Acosta describes the Uros, who were such *dull and brutish people, that they did not think themselves men;* and

Acosta of the Indies, l. iii. c. 6.

such are the Caffres, or Hottentots, at the Cape of Good Hope, who, by the last account we have of them, remain as bestial and sordid as ever; insomuch that the author who was among them saith, *That if there be any medium between men and beasts, they lay in the fairest claim to that species.* And such are the Caiguæ of Paraquaria (of whom afterwards.) 2. Such as express open contempt and defiance of laws as well as religion, as the Chichimecæ in the northern part of America, who are said *to have lived without any government as well as religion (unless that they offer the first wild beast they catch to the Sun:)* and so Acosta describes some other savages among them, viz. *without king, law, God, or reason.* Those of Brasil are said to be *without faith, without law, without a king;* and the savages of Canada are described after the same manner. So that if any argument can be drawn from such against religion, it will as well hold against law and civil government.

Voyage to Surat, an. 1689, p. 489.

De Laet Descript. Ind. Occid. l. v. c. 25.

De Orig. Gent. Am. p. 27.

Acosta of the West Indies, l. vii. c. 3.

Du Val Observations sur le Voyage de Pirard, p. 132.

We must not judge by light informations of mere strangers, and persons looked on as enemies; which is the case of the inhabitants of the Southern Islands, which we have only from seamen who landed upon them, and were supposed to come with an ill design; whose accounts must be very imperfect and partial. But in Le Mair's account we only read, *that they could observe no offices of religion among them:* and Schouten to the same purpose of the inhabitants of Horn Island, (as they call it,) not far from New Guinea; *but they seemed*, he saith, *to live like the birds of the air, without any care, upon the fruits of the earth.* But no certainty can be grounded upon such observations: nor can we build any thing upon the want of religion in places not yet fully discovered; as what is said by some of the people of Yedso or Jesso: for the first account given of it was from the Jesuit Fronius, who lived long in Japan; and he describes it as a country of savages; and he saith, *that they have no other religion but the worship of the heavens.* And so Diodorus Siculus saith, *The sight of the heavens was that which brought men first to Divine worship;* and he doth not attribute it to ignorance and fear, but to admiration, and therefore fixed *on the Sun and Moon as their chief Gods;* which was the most prevailing idolatry in the world. But from hence we are not to infer that they believed no God above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their service: but their visible worship they thought ought to be paid to these visible

De Laet Ind. Occid. l. ii. c. 12.

2. Diarium Schouten. p. 47. Ed. Amst. Descript. Navig. Jac. Le Mair, 31 Maii.

Maff. Epist. l. iv. Apr. 28, 1565.

Diod. Sic. l. i. p. 7.

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Gods, as hath been already observed of the old Greeks; and Diodorus Siculus saith the same of the Egyptians. But as to these people of Yedso, we find the first account of them was, that they were a very savage people, but had such kind of religion as most ancient idolaters had: since that time there hath been no exact account given of them. The best we have is from the Dutch. Caron, who was resident in Japan, saith only, *that this people are brutish; and that the Japonese could never make a full discovery of the country, which is parted from Japan by an arm of the sea, where it bounds on vast mountains and deserts, so that the common passage is by ferrying over.* If this be true, there is a passage by land beyond that arm of the sea, and so Japan is one continent with it, which extends in probability to the northern parts of America: for in the account of the Dutch embassy to Japan, A. D. 1641, we are told, that in the treaty between the Japonese agent Syvoan and the Dutch, he produced a map of those parts agreeable to what Caron had said; and they observe that *Jesso was in it of a vast extent, and reached to North America, without any streight of Anian.* Martinius makes no doubt that Japan *was inhabited from East Tartary, as well as by a colony from China*, which he proves from their customs and language; but he thinks *they came over the water, or at least over the ice;* for he saith *there are severe winters there.* But he saith withal, *that the Chinese do make Jesso a part of Tartary, and that it is joined with the province of Niuhan and Yupi.* F. Couplet agrees with Martinius, that Japan was peopled from Tartary; and he saith they have a chronology of their kings for 660 years before Christ; and long before that the northern Tartars took possession of Japan: so that the people of Yesso and Japan are of the same original. In the Dutch account of Yedso, printed by Thevenot in the second part of his collections, (which was taken from a ship which went upon the coasts of that country and people,) we have a more favourable description both of the country and people; only it is said, *that they do not love to take pains, have little government or religion;* but they observed some superstitious practices among them. And what exact account could be expected from such, who went not thither to acquaint themselves either with the country or their religion, but to find a passage farther that way?

Ambassade Memorable, &c. p. 27.

Martin. Atlas Extrem. Asiæ, p. 170.

Martin. Atlas, p. 21.

Couplet Dissert. Procem. ad Confuc. Oper. p. 71. Ed. Par. 1587.

3. That it is no certain rule that the people have no religion, because strangers cannot find any set times and

places of worship among them. For this was a principle among many nations, that the supreme God was to be worshipped only by acts of the mind; and that external worship was only for lesser Deities. And Trigautius (or rather Riccius, who lived a long time in China) gives this account of the religion of that ancient and famous kingdom: *That at first they owned the supreme God, Lord of heaven, but afterwards they came to worship inferior Deities; and this,* he saith, *he took out of their most ancient annals and books of wisdom, which,* he saith, *did not, in respect to religion and morality, come short of the best philosophers of Greece.* He affirms, *that the sect of the learned,* as he calls them, *did still worship one God, because all inferior things are preserved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior worship to spirits under him. They are silent about the beginning of things, as out of their knowledge; but there are some of no such reputation, that talk their own vain dreams, to which little regard is given.* But Martinius hath given some account of these notions among them: *Some would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the world.* He saith, *that their ancient books speak of the supreme Governor of heaven and earth;* and although they have not *a proper name for God,* yet he confesses *they have such as express his authority and government of the world.* Bartoli saith they are extremely mistaken, who charge this learned sect with atheism, *because they have no temples, nor public ceremonies of worship for him; because they apprehend that the supreme God is to be solemnly worshipped only by him that is supreme among them.* And Magaillans, who was well acquainted with the court of China, and died there about twenty years since, gives this account of Divine worship: *That at Pekin there is a temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large cupola supported by eighty-two pillars, wherein the Emperor himself offers sacrifice, on the day of the winter solstice, with great solemnity and humility; and another, wherein he doth the same at the summer solstice; before which,* he saith, *they observe a strict fast for three days. He enquired of one of their learned men, what they meant by this solemn worship of heaven; whether it was directed to the material heaven? He answered, that they took heaven not only for the visible heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four seasons of the year their Emperor did offer sacrifice in temples on purpose, not to the creatures, but to the spiritual Heaven.* F.

Trigaut. de Christian. Exped. ap. Sinas, l. i. c. 10. Ed. Lugd.

Martin. Hist. Sinic. init.

Bartoli Hist. Asiat. part. iii. l. i. p. 73.

Magaillans Novel. Rel. de la Chine, ch. 21. Lond. 1688.

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Couplet saith, *That by the ancient custom of China the Emperor only sacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occasion for it; and that, if he were in a progress, he did it upon the hills and mountains.* And by the last account we have from China, we find *the same custom is kept up at Pekin by the present Emperors, since the conquest of China.* Now it were very unreasonable to infer, that there is no religion or worship of the supreme Being in China, because it is not commonly practised; since, according to their notion of ceremonies, wherein they are the nicest people in the world, they think none ought to perform worship to the Supreme in heaven, but he who is their supreme upon earth.

Couplet Decl. Procem. ad Confuc. p. 73. Le Compte, part. ii. lett. ii. London, 1697.

4. Another thing we are to observe in passing our judgment whether nations have any religion among them, is to have a care of trusting too much to the sayings of known and professed enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the opinion of the most free and disinterested persons, who have conversed among them on the account of religion. This I intend chiefly with respect to the Spaniards' accounts of the West Indies, when their design was to enslave the poor Indians; for then they made it their business to blacken them as much as possible, by representing them as a people without any *sense of God or religion, or any virtues belonging to human nature.* But the contrary appears from the first, the most impartial and the latest accounts we have of them, from such as have been conversant among them upon the account of religion.

In the first account we have of the discoveries of the West Indies, we find that when Columbus came to the islands of Hispaniola and Cuba, he soon found *that they worshipped the Sun and Moon, and the heavens, but could not then discover what other Deities they worshipped;* which Peter Martyr Anglerius understands both of the natives and of the Caribbians, who were savages, and very troublesome to them: and he tells a remarkable story of one of the natives coming to Columbus at Cuba, being a man of eighty years of age, and desired to discourse with him by an interpreter. The substance of it was, that he understood *that he, with his ship, had given a great disturbance to the natives, and bade him to consider, that, after death, there were two passages for souls; the one dark and dreadful, for those who were troublesome to mankind; the other pleasant and delightful, for those who promote the peace and welfare of people: and if he considered that*

Columbi Navigat. c. 5. Basil. 1537.

Pet. Mart. Dec. i. c. 1.

every man was to receive according to his actions after death, he would give over being so uneasy to them. Columbus took the advice very well, and pretended that they only came to assist them against the savages and cannibals, *and would hurt none of them;* which the old man was so pleased with, that, as old as he was, he said he was ready to go with him in so good a design. Was there any thing that savoured of barbarism or irreligion in this discourse, or what would not become a good Christian to say? Besides, the same author commends their way of living far beyond what the Spaniards brought among them, (as appeared by Columbus's own suffering for checking their enormities.) *They enjoyed the profits of the earth in common, without any division or property, having enough for every family; and none suffered but such as injured others; and without laws and judges they did what was right.* This was a great character from one who was particularly entrusted in the affairs and council of the Indies, and had all the accounts sent to him, out of which he framed his Decades. *They thought,* as he saith, *that contentment lay in a little compass; and they had more than they knew what to do with.* To the same purpose Lerius gives an account of a conference he had with a Brasilian old man, about trade. *I pray,* said he, *why do your countrymen take so much pains to come hither for our wood? Have they not enough for fuel? Yes,* said Lerius; *but your Brasil wood is of great advantage to them in trade; by which they grow very rich. Very well,* saith he; *and when they are so rich, do they not die as other men do? And whither then go all these riches? To their children or relations. Then,* said the poor Brasilian, *your countrymen are a company of great fools, (insigniter fatui:) for why should they undergo so much toil and danger by sea and land, to get that which they must part with when they die; and for the sake of those children, who might live as contentedly without those riches? Do not you think that we love our children as well as you? But we are contented that the same earth which nourished us, will do as much for them. These barbarous Brasilians,* saith Lerius, *will rise up in judgment against too many Christians.* To the same purpose, he saith, one of the natives of Peru discoursed the Spaniards, who took so much pains to get their gold; and said, *They were the froth of the sea, restless and uneasy; who might with far less trouble get a subsistence at home.* These things I mention to shew that these people were far enough from wanting sense and

Ler. Hist. Navig. in Brasil. c. 12. Ed. Francof.

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capacity, when the Spaniards came among them, and seemed to have a much truer notion of the happiness of human life than they had.

But to shew how far they were from being without religion at that time, we have an account by Benzo (who lived a great while in the West Indies upon their first discovery) of an oracle among them, which foretold the Spaniards a considerable time before. For the Cachiqui and Bohitii (i. e. their *great men and priests*) told Columbus, *That in the time of the father of their present king, he and another king had a great mind to understand what would happen after their time; and to that end resolved to apply themselves to their Zemes* (the Gods they worshipped) *in an extraordinary manner, by fasting five days together in a most sad and mournful condition.* And then they received that oracle: upon which they made a most doleful song, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happened to them just as they were foretold. The same Benzo informs us, that, after Columbus discovered the continent, the islands were soon left by the Spaniards in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the nations as they desired, they sent persons on purpose to make the worst representation possible of them, that they might have an edict to condemn them to perpetual slavery. And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to religion, they only accuse them of idolatry: but if they had found any such thing as atheism and irreligion among them, they would have been sure not to have concealed that.

Benzo Hist. Novi Orbis, l. i. c. 8. Ed. Francof.

Cap. 17.

Joh. de Laet, in his description of the isle of Cuba, saith, *That the inhabitants there had no temple, no sacrifices, no religion*; which I could not but wonder at, the account being so different from that of the first discoverers, who must certainly know best what religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later Spaniards, who give the worst accounts of them, to justify the most inhuman cruelties which were used against them. For Benzo saith, *That of two millions of natives in Hispaniola, there were left not above* 150 *in his time*; and the like desolation was made *in Cuba, Jamaica, Porto Rico, and other places*; and De Laet confesses, *that they were all long since destroyed.* But if we take the account given of these people upon the first discovery, we shall find it was very different; for Peter Martyr, who was employed by the king of Spain, as himself tells us, to

Descript. Ind. Occid. l. i. c. 10.

Benzo, l. i. c. 25.

Pet. Mart. Dec. i. c. 9.

take the best intelligence he could meet with from the Indies, saith, *That at first they could find no other worship among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the heavens; but, upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their religion;* which, he said, *he received from one who was employed by Columbus himself in instructing them. They had little images, which they called Zemes;* which they supposed to be inhabited by spirits, which gave answers to them: but which is considerable, he saith, *That they looked on them only as a kind of messengers between them and the only eternal, omnipotent, invisible God.* This was extant long before De Laet wrote his pompous Description of the West Indies. Was Peter Martyr unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence. How then comes he to differ so much from him in his account of their religion? And he there mentions the same Oracle which Benzo had done; and adds, *That the natives understood it at first of the Caribbians or Cannibals; but at last found it too true of the Spaniards.* In another place he gives an account of Hispaniola, from Andreas Morales's own mouth, who was employed by the Governor to search out what he could find concerning the island and the natives. *And he found that they came from another island, and built a house at the place of their landing, which they after consecrated and enriched, and reverenced to the time of the Spaniards' coming: and he makes it to have been in as much esteem among them as Jerusalem to the Christians, Mecca to the Mahumetans, and Tyrena in the Grand Canaries;* which, he saith, *was in such esteem among the natives, that persons would with singing leap off from that holy rock, in hopes their souls should be made happy by it.* But although this were a great argument of superstitious folly in them, yet it shews the falseness of that saying, in the first relation of Columbus's Voyage, *That there was no such thing as religion in the Canaries.* But those who pretend to give a more exact account, say, *That the natives did believe one God, who punished the evil, and rewarded the good.*

Decad. ii. c. 9.

Columbi Navigat. c. 2.

Conquest de Canaries, par. ii. p. 208.

The next we are to consider, are the savages which disturbed the natives before the Spaniards; who were called the Caribbians, or the inhabitants of the Caribbee Islands. These were a wild sort of people, and a great terror to their neighbours, whom they were wont to eat in triumph after they had taken them; which was not

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the general practice of the Indians, but only of the most brutish and savage people among them, as the Caribbians, and those of Brasil; but the other natives, both of the islands and continent, abhorred it, as is found by the latest discoveries. This appears by Christ. d'Acunna, who was employed A. D. 1659. to discover the people about the river of Amazons; and there he found a considerable people called Aguæ (the Spaniards call them Omaguæ;) and they were represented to be *eaters of the flesh of their enemies:* but he saith that it was very false, and only a malicious calumny of the Portugueze; and there he saith, *It was a particular custom of the Caribbees, and not used by other Indians.* And Dampier saith, *That in all his adventures among the Indians, both East and West, he never met with any such people as eat man's flesh, and that he knew some of the Cannibal stories to be false.* But, on the other side, it cannot be denied that there had been such a barbarous practice not only among the Caribbians, but the savages of Brasil and elsewhere, as appears by the particular accounts of such as lived among them, and saw their manner of doing it; as in Joh. Lerius, Pet. Carder, Ant. Knivet; but especially in Claud. d'Abbeville's relation of Maragnan, who is most particular in it: and he saith that it arose from the hatred and revenge they express thereby to their greatest enemies; and he adds, that their stomachs cannot bear or digest it, but notwithstanding it had been continued among them, because their enemies did so by them: but they confessed it to be cruel and barbarous; but having been long used, they could not lay it aside without a general consent. Some say, that the Tapuiæ eat the bodies of their friends: but those who have lived most among them say nothing about it; which they would not have omitted, and they are most to be relied upon. The Caribbee Islands were discovered by Columbus in his second voyage: but the Caribbians would have no communication with them, *flying into their woods.* De Laet saith only, *that they are a very brutish sort of people, of no shame or fidelity.* Not a word of their religion; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the satisfying their brutish passions of cruelty and revenge; which were the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time they have lived more quietly, being so much overpowered by the plantations upon the Caribbee Islands; by which means they have been brought to some kind of humanity and conver-

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.

Dampier's Voyage, p. 485.

Ler. Hist. Navig. in Brasil. c. 14. Purchas's Pilgr. part iv. p. 1188. 1217. Hist. de la Mission en l'Isle de Maragnan, ch. 49. Barlæ Hist. Brasil. Piso Hist. Brasil.

L. i. c. 17.

sation. And there have been two understanding persons conversant among them, who have given the best account we have of them; and those are Mons. Rochefort and F. Du Tertre; who both agree that they have some knowledge of one supreme God in heaven, who is of infinite goodness, and hurts nobody; but as Du Tertre, who lived longer among them, saith, they account the service of him a needless thing, being so far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the Mabogas, or evil spirits, which they think design to do them mischief: and, to appease them, they have their Boyez, who are a kind of sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the soul; and that the principal soul, which is that in the heart, goes to heaven. And Rochefort from hence concludes the truth of Cicero's saying, *That the knowledge of a Divinity is planted in the hearts of men.*

Rochefort Histoire des Caribb. l. iv. c. 13. Du Tertre Hist. Nat. des Antil. par. vii. sect. 3.

But De Laet represents the northern Indians to have been as much without religion as the natives of Cuba and Hispaniola, and from no good grounds; although herein he did not rely upon the Spanish reports. So he saith of the natives of Newfoundland, of New France, of the Souriquosii, and other people of Canada, and the parts thereabouts, and of Virginia, &c. But I shall make it appear that he took up with very slight informations in this matter; which are contradicted by those who lived longer among them, and understood their sense and language better. It is true, which I suppose gave occasion to the mistake, that the savages had no set and constant ways of devotion; but at certain seasons of the year, or in time of war and calamities, they had: or however, to persons that discoursed with them, they did by no means deny a God, but thought it was no great matter whether they served him or not in such a manner; so that their chief fault lay in a gross neglect of religion, and not in any settled principles of irreligion. So the Sieur de Champlain saith, he discoursed with the savages of Canada, and found they wanted no capacity; and he asked one of them, why they did not pray to God? He answered, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own mind. So, saith he, for want of a law for Divine worship, they lived like brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their savage way of living upon hunting; whereas if the land were cultivated, it might be much easier to reduce them to civility and religion. Mr. Winslow, one of the first planters in New-England, had some

Laet Desc. l. ii. c. 2, 12, 16.

L. iii. c. 18.

Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain, l. iii. ch. 5.

Purchas, tom. iv. l. x. ch. 5.

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discourse with the Indian savages about religion, and God's being the author of all our blessings; which they agreed to, and said, *that they owned God, and called him Kirtitan:* upon which I observe, that he ingenuously retracts the accounts he had given before of the natives, viz. *That they had no religion or knowledge of God; for,* saith he, *we find that they do own one supreme Being, who was Creator of heaven and earth; but they likewise owned many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore Acosta, speaking of the Indian savages, saith, *It is no hard matter to persuade them of a supreme God, be they never so barbarous and brutish.*

Acosta Hist. of the Indies, l. v. c. 2.

But I must do that right to Joh. de Laet, as to shew, that, after he had received better information, he did speak more favourably of the religion of the Indians: for in his book against Grotius, ten years after the other, he hath an observation on purpose to clear this matter. Father Sagard had published an account of his voyage to the Hurons, a people of New France or Canada, near the lake called *Mare Dulce*, where he learnt their language, and so was better able to judge of their opinions; and he saith, their general sense was, that there was one Creator, who made the world; and that in their language he was called Ataouacan. Which is since confirmed by the account of the French Missions into those parts; especially of Paulus Juvenæus, who spent a winter among them, to converse with them in their own language. And when he preached to them about God, they all asked him what he meant by it. He told them, he meant such a Being who had infinite power, and made heaven and earth. Upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out, Ataouacan. Sagard saith, *They believe the immortality of the soul;* and the later accounts say, *That he was told that the Souriquosii did truly believe one God, that created all things.* Which is very different from De Laet's former account of them. But De Laet goes on, that he understood by Davis and Baffin, that *the natives of those parts where they had been* (*i. e.* about Fretum Davis and Groen-land) *were idolaters, and worshipped the Sun.* Davis, in the account of his voyage, saith, *That they were a very tractable people, void of craft or double dealings, and easy to be brought to any civility or good order; but they judged them to be idolaters, and to worship the Sun.* This is quite another thing from being mere savages, *and having no religion among them.* Farther, he owns Hariot's account of the people of Virgi-

Jo. de Laet de Origin. Gent. American. p. 187.

Le Grand Voyage du Pays des Hurons, c. 18.

Hist. Canada, l. i. p. 78.

P. 87.

Hackluit, tom. iii. p. 100.

nia, *that they believed many Gods of different degrees, but one supreme God, who was from eternity.* But he had published to the world in his description, *That their only religion was to worship every thing they were afraid of; as fire, water, thunder, guns, horses,* &c. *and the Devil, whom they called Okie.* Hariot, who conversed among them, saith no such thing; but he saith expressly, *That they owned that God made the world, and that souls are immortal; and that they shall receive in another world according to their actions in this.* What a different account is this concerning the same people! And if Lederer may be believed, who went among the Indian natives not far from Virginia, he saith, *Okæe was the name of the Creator of all things among them: to him the High Priest alone offers sacrifice; but their ordinary devotion is performed to lesser Deities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed.* Denton, who lived among the Indian savages about New York, saith, *That their solemn worship was not above once or twice a year, unless upon extraordinary occasions, as making war,* &c.

Hariot of Virginia, part iii.

Lederer's Discovery, p. 4.

Denton of New York, p. 8.

I shall not need to pursue this matter any farther, since he owns the religion that was practised not only in Peru and Mexico, but in other parts of the West-Indies. Only as to Chili he saith, *That we have no certainty, but only that they have solemn oaths by one they call Enonamon.* But Marcgravius, in the account he gives of Chili, saith at first, *That they know not God, nor his worship,* &c. But this must be understood of a clear and distinct knowledge of him; for he saith afterwards, *That they have some knowledge of a supreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call Pillan.*

G. Marcgravius de Regione Chili, c. 3. apud Elzev.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the West Indies, is as to the people of Paraquaria and Brasil; for it is affirmed, *That there are whole nations there, who know nothing of God or religion.* Which must be more strictly enquired into.

As to Paraquaria, it is said, that Nicholas del Techo, in his Letters from thence, saith, that *the Caiguæ* (a people of that country) *had no name for God, or the soul of man: and no public worship, nor idols.* But the same Nicholas del Techo hath published a full relation of all the proceedings in Paraquaria, and thereabouts, on the account of religion; and therein he hath acquainted the world with the several nations that inhabit those parts between Brasil and Peru, &c. which were scarce heard of before.

Hist. Prov. Paraquar. Auth. Nicolao del Techo, Leodii 1673.

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The Diaigritæ, (who rather belong to Tucumania, between Paraquaria and Chili,) he saith, *were worshippers of the*
L. ii. c. 18. *Sun, after a particular manner; and they believed the immortality of souls, and that the souls of their great men went into the greater stars, and of ordinary people into the*
L. iv. c. 16. *lesser.* The *Guaicuræi worshipped the Moon and Bootes.*
L. v. c. 7. Cap. 23. The *Guarani* were *a very superstitious people, but they could not tell what God they worshipped; but they were mightily addicted to sorcery.* The *Calchaquini worshipped*
L. iii. c. 12. *the Sun, and thunder, and lightning.* In the plains between Rio del Plata and Tucumania, he saith, *are a very large people, who have little regard to religion; but they believe that, after death, their souls return to their Creator.*
L. ii. c. 26. In Chili, he saith, *when one God the Creator was preached to them, one of their Casiques (or great men) stood up and said, that they would not bear that the power of creating should belong to any but their God Pillan; and that he placed the souls of their great men, after death, about*
L. ix. c. 24. *the Sun.* After all these he mentions the Caiguæ, *as the smallest, and most inconsiderable, and brutish people among them.* They were a most savage sort of creatures, that could hardly speak so as to be understood. He saith, *They were much more like to apes than men, and lived upon mice, and ants, and vipers,* &c. *Utrique sexui,* saith he, *tenuissimus rationis usus est:* they are harder to be tamed than wild beasts: and if they are put in chains, they starve themselves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and saith not a word of their religion; and it were very unreasonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the soul among them; for they were not able to speak sense, at least so as to be understood by strangers.

Hist. Navi. in Brasil. c. 15. p. 223, 224. Come we now to the people of Brasil, *who are said to be without any notion of God.* But those who have been best acquainted among them, assure us, that they believe the immortality of souls, and rewards and punishments after death. And from hence Lerius himself argues against the atheistical persons of his time; and that although they will not in words own God, yet he saith they shew the inward conviction they have of him, especially when it thunders; which De Laet confesses they

Laet de Orig. Gen. Americ. p. 193. call *Tupá cunanga*, a noise made by the supreme Excellence; for *Tupá*, he saith, signifies so much in their language. And he adds, *That they are very apprehensive of evil spirits; that they do own a God of the mountains,*

and of the highways: and although they differ in their idolatry and superstition, yet, he confesses, *it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable people who live on both sides the vast river de la Plata.* Marcgravius, a learned man, who lived in Brasil, and understood their language so far as to write a grammar of it, saith expressly, *That they call God Tupa and Tupana;* and in the short Dictionary of Emmanuel Moraes, *Tupana* is rendered *Deus.* But the great argument to Lerius was, *that they had no public exercise of religion;* which was the common case of the savages in all parts, who lived under no laws; not that they believed no God, but they would not be at the trouble to serve him. Ludolphus saith of the Gallani, a savage people who had almost overrun Abyssinia, that they had no public worship; but if any asked them about a supreme God, they would answer, Heaven. So Dellon saith of the inhabitants of Madagascar, *That they did not question a supreme Being that governs all; but with a strange obstinacy denied that there was any necessity of praying to him.* Francis Cauche, who sojourned a long time among them, saith, *he could observe no public exercise of religion among them; but they did not deny a God to be the Creator of all, and asserted the immortality of the soul, but good and bad went to heaven.* Flacurt lived five years among them, and he agrees in the same, as to *no public exercise of religion:* but he saith, *they believe one God, of whom they speak with honour and respect.* P. Gillet, in the account of his voyage to Goyane 1674, saith, that the Nouragues, and Acoquas, and Galibis, *all agree in owning one God in heaven; but they give no worship to him.*

Marcgrav. de Brasil. Reg. c. 9.

Ludolph. Hist. Æthiopiæ, l. i.

Dellon Relation d'un Voyage, par. i. c. 8.

Relation du Voyage de F. Cauche, p. 119. Paris, 1651.

Histoire de l'Isle de Madagascar, ch. 17.

Journal du Voyage dans la Goyane, p. 81.

Joh. dos Santos saith of some of the Caffres, (with whom he conversed,) *That they are the most brutish and barbarous people in the world; but they hold the immortality of the soul, and have a confused knowledge that there is a great God from a natural instinct; but they pray not to him.* But for those Caffres at the Cape of Good Hope, they may vie with any for brutishness; but by the last accounts given of them, by those who lived among them, and published by F. Tachard, we find that *they do worship one God, although they have a confused knowledge of him; but they seem to have little regard to another life, but sacrifice for rain and good seasons.* By which it appears, that the account given of them in Thevenot's Collections is not true, viz. *That they have no knowledge of God;* although it were not much to be wondered at,

Histoire de l'Ethiope Orientale, ch. 7. Purchas, tom. ii. p. 1039.

Voyage de Siam, l. ii. p. 84.

Thevenot, Roe, p. 4.

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since the same author saith, *they are the most barbarous people in the world.* But that was a hasty observation by strangers, who could not understand one word they spake: for Sir James Lancaster said, *That in seven weeks time the sharpest wit among them could not learn one word of their language, their speech being uttered only in the throat,* like the Caiguæ in Paraquaria. And so Pliny mentions a people of Africa, who *made a noise without any articulate pronunciation; Stridorque non vox; adeo sermonis commercio carent;* who were surely the ancestors of those Hottentots, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unless they have learnt lately to express themselves better. As it seems they have done by Mons. de la Loubere's account of them; for he saith, *That they have some kind of worship at new and full moons; and he thinks they own a good God, to whom they need not to pray; but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them.* And in the Journal of Mons. de Chaumont, we read, *That they have no great regard to religion; but when they want rain, they pray to a certain Being, whom they know not, but that lives above, and offer milk, the best thing they have; and that the Dutch secretary had seen them at this sacrifice, with eyes lifted up to heaven, and in a profound silence.*

Purchas, tom. i. l. iii. c. 3. sect. 1.

Plin. N. H. l. v. c. 8.

Du Royaume de Siam, tom. ii. p. 112.

Journal du Voyage de Siam, p. 78.

Thus I have gone through all the nations I have met with, who have been said to be *without any notion of God or religion.* There remains only one objection to be taken off, which relates to a sect in the East-Indies, which is said to be atheistical in their principles, having an external doctrine for the people, and an internal, which they keep from them.

To give the best account I can of this matter: All the late writers of China do agree, that, besides the original doctrine of the country, there was brought in long since (they generally say 65 years after Christ) a new sect from Indostan, which they call *Xekiao.* The author is supposed to be one Xekia, or Xaca, (as the Japonese call him,) who lived long before. Matt. Riccius (or Trigautius) saith, *This sect was at first received with great applause, because it set forth the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments of another life, but not eternal;* because it introduced the doctrine of transmigration of souls. In order to the happiness after death, it required particular devotions to idols, which by that means spread over all China and Japan, as well as other parts of the Indies; and abstinence from flesh, as well as from

Trigaut. l. i. ...

murder, stealing, &c. and austerities, celibate, retirement from the world, and great liberalities to the Tapoins and Bonzes. Wherein Bertoli, Marini, and the rest agree. But there was a secret under all this, viz. *That this was but an external doctrine for the people, but the internal doctrine was another thing; that the supreme felicity lay in eternal nothing*; or, as they rather called it, *an eternal quiet; and that souls are to pass from body to body*, saith Martinius, *till they are fit for it*. F. Couplet, who hath given the fullest account of this matter, saith, *That when Xaca came to die, he sent for some of his choicest disciples, and told them, that the doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a shew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing*, as the late author Le Compte expresses it; *and that is the abyss where all our hopes must end*. But Couplet saith, *That his disciples take great care that this come not among the people; and only those*, he saith, *even among the Bonzes and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of such a secret. The eternal doctrine they look on*, as he saith, *as the wooden account which is raised to support the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the people*. But it is not clear what they understand by returning to nothing; for Mons. de la Loubere saith, *They do not understand proper annihilation by it, but in a mystical sense*; and two things are implied by it. 1. *That such souls as arrive to it, are past all fears of returning to the body*. 2. *That they live in perfect ease and quiet, without any kind of action*. And so Couplet explains it by *acting, understanding, and desiring nothing*; so that this is the highest degree of quietism; and so Mons. Gervaise, who was among those of Siam, and endeavoured to understand their doctrine, saith, *That annihilation is to be mystically understood, and not in a physical sense*. As appears by what Couplet saith, *That one of Xaca's posterity spent nine years with his face to the wall thinking of nothing, and so became perfect*. But from hence he sadly laments the spreading of atheism among the Chinese, who were willing to understand it in the grossest sense.

Martin. Atlas, p. 8. Couplet Prooem. Declar. ad Confuc. paragr. 4. p. 28.

Le Compte, Memoires, par. ii. lett. ii. p. 325.

Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. i. part. iii. c. 22.

Hist. Nat. et Polit. du Siam, part. iii. p. 161.

And suppose it to be so taken, what imaginable ground can it be for men of sense (as the Chinese would be thought above others) to take this for granted, because such an impostor said it; concerning whom so many incredible things are said by them, that some have questioned whether there ever were such a person or not: and Loubere seems to think this story *a fiction of the Chinese*,

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for he can find nothing of him among the Talapoins of Siam, with whose traditions he was very conversant. But what reason or demonstration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one, who had been an impostor all his days, should speak truth at last?

But all this signifies nothing to the consent of mankind. *For this was to be kept up as a secret,* and only to be communicated to such as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be discovered? Was it because the people were still to be kept up in the common persuasion about religion? And was this for the sake of the Bonzes? of whom the wise people of China had a very mean opinion, as they all agree. Therefore it could not be for their sakes. *But the people might grow more unruly, if this were known.* If the Bonzes were so bad as they make them, they might rather think the people would be better without them; and the best service they could do, was to lay open the fraud and imposture of these men, as those who preached Christianity in China and Japan, after they understood their languages, did very freely. And yet they did assert God and Providence, and the *rewards and punishments of another life,* against all the doctrines of Xaca, both as to the external and internal part. Matth. Riccius, having attained to good skill in the language of China, published an account of the Christian doctrine at Pekin A. D. 1603, wherein he asserted the being of God, not only from natural reason, but from their own most ancient books; of which Couplet gives a large account, and how the interpreters of latter times had perverted the sense of them. We have in Kircher a *summary of the Christian faith,* as it was published in China; and therein we find on what grounds they asserted the being of God, against the atheistical sense of Xaca's doctrine, *that all things came out of nothing;* for, *if nothing were first, how came things into being? Therefore to bring them into being, there must be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call God.* This was plain and true reasoning, and impossible to be answered by the subtilest of these atheistical wits of China. For nothing can produce nothing. So that if Xaca's interior doctrine were true, *that all things came out of nothing,* it must necessarily follow, that there must be nothing before any thing; and what possible imagination can any man of sense have, how any thing should by itself come out of nothing? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving

Couplet Declar. Proœm.

Kircher China illustrata, par. ii. c. 10.

that an infinite Power should give a being to that which had it not before; for although the difference between *not being and being* be so great, yet where we suppose a Power infinite in the cause, that may command the terms of that distance, by giving a being to that which had it not before. To say that *nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of itself result out of nothing, where there is no superior Cause; but to say that by no cause whatsoever any thing can be put into being which had it not before, is to take away all possibility of an infinite Power without any reason, when the very being of things is an impregnable reason for it. For since we are certain things are, we must be certain that they came into being; and that must be either out of nothing by themselves, which is impossible, or it must be from such a Power which can give being where it was not, which must be infinite.

Thus far I have considered the general prejudices against religion, and the atheistical pretences of this age; and have shewed how very little they signify to any persons that will take the pains to examine them.

DISCOURSE II.

The modern atheistical Hypotheses examined, and the Unreasonableness of them shewed.

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I NOW come to consider the atheistical hypotheses of this age; which I shall rank under these two heads:

1. Such as have a tendency towards atheism.
2. Such as are plainly atheistical.

As to the former, I shall insist upon these two:

1. Such as weaken the known and generally received proofs of God and Providence.
2. Such as attribute too much to the mechanical powers of matter and motion.

I begin with those who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received arguments for God and Providence; which I have at large shewed were those taken from the manifest effects of wisdom and design in the parts of animals, and in the frame of the world. I am far from intending to lay the charge of atheism on any who have weakened some arguments to prove a God, when they have industriously set themselves to do it from any other, although not so firm, nor so generally received. For I consider the fondness men have for their own inventions, and how apt therefore they are to slight other arguments in comparison with them. And this I take to have been the case of a modern philosopher of great and deserved reputation: for he, designing to do something beyond other men, thought he did nothing, unless he produced arguments which he thought had not been pursued by others. To this end he set aside the argument from final causes, for two reasons. 1. *Because in physical enquiries we ought to make use of none but the strongest reasons.* 2. *Because all God's ends are unsearchable by us, being kept close in the abyss of his infinite wisdom.* But when he was smartly urged by his learned adversary, that although upon another occasion he might set aside final causes, yet he ought not when the honour of God, as the maker of the soul, is concerned; for by these means the argument from the light of nature, as to the wisdom, providence, power, and existence of God, would be cast off; which he looks on as the chief argument, (which is taken from the parts of the visible world, the heavens, earth, plants, animals, and especially man-

Des Cartes Medit. iv. Princip. Phil. par. i. p. 22.

Resp. ad 5. Object.

kind;) he had no other answer to make, but *that what was brought for a final cause, ought to be referred to the efficient*, i. e. *that from those things we ought to know and honour God as the Maker, but not to guess for what end he made them.* Which is a strange answer to be made by one of so much sagacity. For, as Gassendus well urges, how can we honour God for the excellent use of these things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between the use and the end in this case? For he that adores God for the use, must do it for the end he designed those things for.

But, saith Des Cartes, *in moral considerations, wherein it is a pious thing to make use of conjectures, we may consider God's end; but not in physical speculations, wherein we must only make use of the strongest reasons.*

To which Gassendus very well answers, That if he takes away the final cause, he weakens the argument for the efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare sight of the visible world, which makes us own God to be the maker of it; because it is possible for men to think that these things were so from eternity, or came by chance: but when we observe the wisdom of God in the design and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the efficient cause, and to adore him for the workmanship of his hands. As, saith he, if a man sees a passage for water between stones on each side with an arch over, that doth not presently convince him that it is a bridge; because pieces of rocks might happen so as to afford such a passage: but when he comes to consider the order in which they are framed and hold together, and the convenience of mankind for passing over, he cannot then but acknowledge there was a skilful artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by chance.

To the other argument, *that God's ends are unsearchable*, he answers, That it is not to be denied that God may have ends above our reach: but, on the other side, there are ends which lie open to our view; as, saith he, particularly in the body of man, as the frame of the mouth for respiration and nourishment, and all other passages so exactly fitted for those ends; and so the bones, muscles, nerves, and other parts of the body: but there are three especially which strike him with admiration. 1. The umbilical vessels, the fitness of them for distribution of nourishment to the *embryo*, and the alteration after the child is born. 2. The valves of the heart, and the several vessels for receiving and distributing the

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blood. 3. The perforation of the tendons, which serve to draw the fingers into the hollow of the hand. These were close and pressing instances; of which Gassendus professeth, *that neither himself nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their business to search into the causes of things, were able to give any other account of them, but from the wisdom and power of God.* And he challenges Des Cartes to shew him *what mechanical cause could produce such valves about the heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have such a temper, consistence, flexibility, bigness, figure, situation,* &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any answer to it; but, by a letter to Mersennus, it seems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the several parts of animals in a mechanical way, supposing God to have established those laws of mechanism, which he supposes in the same manner as he had explained the grains of salt, and figures of snow in his meteors.* But however he might please himself in his opinion, he hath given the world no manner of satisfaction about it; insomuch that his posthumous piece to that purpose is charged with great and fundamental mistakes. However his disciples run on upon the same ground, that *final causes are to be considered only in morals;* and they must overthrow the argument to prove a Deity from the wisdom and contrivance in the works of creation; which, according to them, are only occasion of our meditation and praise. But how can men of sense satisfy themselves with this answer? For can we give thanks to God for the use of our senses, without knowing that God gave us eyes to see with, with such admirable contrivance for that purpose; and so for all the variety of organs for our hearing, unless we are satisfied that God did really give them for those ends? Otherwise all that we have to do, is to thank God for putting matter into motion, and for establishing those laws of mechanism from whence these organs resulted. With what devotion can we praise God for the benefits we have from the influences of heaven and the fruits of the earth, if these things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the laws of mechanism, that we have these advantages by them? So that all natural religion, according to this hypothesis, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of God to be the efficient Cause of the world, although we have no reason from his works to conclude him to be so. *Yes,* say they, *from them as the effects of a first Cause, which put matter into motion,*

Epist. par. ii. ep. 98.

Regis Metaphys. l. ii. part. i.

Nittich. in Meditat. Metaph. iv. p. 97.

we may; but not from the ends which God intended by them, which are above our capacity. But this falls short of Aristotle's divinity; for he asserted, that not only the first motion was from God, but the order of the universe; and that God did design the mutual benefits which one part of it hath from others: but, according to these laws of mechanism, God only put the matter into motion with such laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any design of Providence. Which takes away all life and spirit in religion, which depends upon God's managing the affairs of the world; and without that men may own a first Mover, and yet live as *without God in the world.* What reason can we imagine why we ought to give God thanks for fruitful seasons, or to pray to him in time of drought and scarcity, if he hath left all these things to the natural course, which he hath established in the world? But it is not denied by Des Cartes, *that God may reveal to us his own ends, and then we are to believe them, and to serve him accordingly; but that without such revelation we cannot find them out.* Now this, I say, is contrary to the general sense of mankind, where there hath been the most confused notion of a God. For I have already observed, that even the Caffres of Soldania (or at the Cape of Good Hope) do pray solemnly to God in their distresses for want of rain; and the Savages of the northern parts of America do the same at some seasons of the year above others; so that if the consent of mankind signify any thing as to the being of God, it will do as much as to his providential care of the world; and if such a confused idea did carry along with it the notion of his providence, much more the clear and distinct idea of him. For Des Cartes proves the being of God from the idea of him in our minds: now what is there in that idea, which doth not equally imply providence, as well as his existence? For why should not a Being absolutely perfect as well regard the well-being, as the being of his creatures? By the name of God in this idea, he saith he understands *a certain Substance, infinite, independent, most intelligent, and most powerful, by which himself and all other things were created.* But this is not all; for he acknowledges soon after, and in other places, *that, because there is no necessary connection between the several moments of existence in a contingent being, we most evidently know our dependence on this superior Being for our conservation;* which he therefore owns to be a continued creation. From hence I infer, that Des Cartes's own idea of God

Medit. iii.

Princip. part. i. sect. 21.

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doth imply a particular Providence. For if we depend upon him for every moment of our subsistence, and conservation differ only by an act of our mind from creation, as he affirms, then there is as immediate an act of Providence in our daily subsistence, as in our first being. But how is this consistent with leaving all to the mechanical laws of motion? If it be said, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preserving things in that state he hath put them into*, I demand farther, whether those very laws of motion be not the effect of a wise Providence? and whether we cannot from them infer, that these laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am sure it certainly follows, that we may know some ends which God hath; whereas Des Cartes said, *That all God's ends are unknown to us, being kept secret in the abyss of his infinite wisdom.* But the ends of appointing the laws of motion may be known; and if these, why not as well the particular ends of those works of his which we find so useful to mankind? especially when his Providence is implied in that very idea from whence he infers his existence.

I can by no means suspect that Des Cartes designed to take away the force of other arguments for a Deity, that he might secretly undermine the belief of a God, by introducing his argument from the idea, which he knew would not hold, (as some have suggested;) for I am satisfied that he thought this argument beyond any other: for, in a letter to a friend, he saith, *He had found out such an argument as gave him full satisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a God, than the truth of any geometrical proposition; but he doubted whether he could make others understand it so well as he himself did.* To the same purpose he speaks in a letter to Mersennus. And in another letter to Mersennus he saith, *That he thought himself bound in conscience to publish his arguments to prove the existence of God.* Which being written to his intimate friends, shew sufficiently his own apprehension of the strength of them. But what opinion soever he had of it himself, they have not met with such a reception among thinking men, as a geometrical demonstration would have done; although he hath endeavoured to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an idea in the mind can prove the real existence of that object out of the mind. He grants, that it doth not hold in other ideas; but that there is something so peculiar to this

Ren. Des Cartes Ep. part. ii. ep. 103.

Ep. 104. Epist. part. ii. ep. 37.

Post Resp. ad 2 Object. p. 85.

idea, that the mind could not frame it, if it had not a real existence. Now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this idea, distinct from all others, which so exceeds the capacity of human understanding, that we could not have such an idea, unless the object were in being.

The force of his argument, as himself hath put it in the mathematical way, prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our ideas must have some cause, in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have such an idea within us, which is not within us either of those ways; and therefore there must be some other cause of it, which can be none but God; and therefore he is. Now here the difficulty returns, viz. to shew what necessary connection there is between the objective reality in the idea, and the real existence of the thing out of the idea. For that he saith, by axiom 5. *That this is the true principle of knowledge; for,* saith he, *we do not know that there is such a thing as the visible heaven, barely because we see it; for that goes no farther than our sense: but our knowledge is an act of the mind from the idea, which arises from hence, that the objective reality of the idea in our minds doth come from the thing itself as the true cause; and the more of objective reality there is, by axiom 6. in substance than accident, and in an infinite substance than a finite, so much more doth it prove the existence of the thing represented by the idea.*

But the case still seems different between an idea raised in our minds from an object of sense, and that which the mind raises within itself about an infinite substance. For although it be impossible for the mind to make an objective reality, which is infinite, by its own power, yet it doth not appear but that it may frame an idea within itself, to which it sets no bounds, and so is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the mistake. If our idea were infinitely perfect, as God himself is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that idea, with its objective reality, must be God: if it be not God, it must be finite; and if it be finite, it is within the power of our minds to frame it. For although our conceptions of God be not merely negative, yet whatsoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect, and so come within the reach of our capacities.

When the learned Mons. Huet urged this argument against Des Cartes, *That the idea in us must be finite, be-*

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cause it wants something to make it perfect, being not adequate, Mons. Regis, who undertook to defend Des Cartes, answers, *That if the idea be taken formally, as it is in us, so it is finite; but if we take it with its objective reality, so it is infinite, and above our power: and as to its not being adequate,* he saith, *it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally;* because *it represents an infinite object, and it is sufficient to make it infinite, because it represents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that, if it reaches as far as our capacity will go, it may be said to be infinite in regard of its object, although it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but still the main difficulty returns, viz. how a finite idea in us can prove the existence of an infinite object. For the question is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which must be according to our capacities; but whether such a finite idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our idea can represent to us an object to which we can set no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it must be an infinite object really existing, and that such an idea must proceed from an infinite Cause? Although these things be not so clear as were to be wished, yet we must not dissemble the force of this argument so far as it goes, viz. that we cannot form an idea of nothing; and that we have no ideas in our minds, but what have a proper cause for them; either from without us by sense, or from within by the acts of our own minds. As if a man hath an idea of a rare piece of workmanship, either he hath seen it, or else hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from sense, and no man can find within himself a power to frame such an object as God; therefore either he must have it from others, or else God himself hath imprinted it in our minds. Now if the idea of God had been alike in all, viz. of a Being infinitely wise, powerful, and good, there might have been great reason to have believed it to have been planted in our minds; but the general idea of God among mankind was too dark and confused to form any argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and some kind of goodness; but not so as to exclude any other beings from being honoured as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the consent of mankind in this idea: but if it be only said, *That this is a true and just idea of him,* and that there are other arguments to prove it from his works, so far it may and ought to be allowed. But the

Censur. Philosoph. Cartes. c. 4. sect. 3. Réponse à la Censure de Mons. Huet, p. 192. P. 198.

metaphysical subtlety of this argument, as it was managed by Des Cartes, was so great, that not merely persons of common capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himself, *that the mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonstrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a sharp reflection, *That the mathematics did rather hinder than further men in metaphysical speculations.* Des Cartes, Epist. part. ii. ep. 33.

But my business is not to lay open the weakness of these arguments, but only to shew that there is no cause to lay aside those which have been always used, and approved by the most sincere and intelligent persons in all ages. And this I shall make appear from his second argument in his Meditations; but the first in his Principles, where he briefly lays it down after this manner: That among the several ideas of our minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in wisdom and power, which hath not a contingent, but a necessary existence; which being contained in the idea, it follows that such a Being actually exists. Des Cartes, in his fifth Meditation, confesses, That at first appearance this looks like a piece of sophistry; but he saith, that, upon consideration, necessary existence doth as much belong to an infinite, perfect Being, as three angles do to a triangle. But he objects against his own argument, that our thoughts put no necessity upon things; as if I conceive a mountain, I must likewise conceive a valley; but it doth not follow that there is a mountain existing. But, saith he, the difference is, that in this case there is no necessity of a mountain's existing, but only that a mountain and valley cannot be separated; but in the other, it is not our thought makes necessary existence to belong to God, but the nature of the thing makes that thought necessary. For, saith he, I can frame no other idea that hath necessary existence besides, nor can I make more than one God who hath it; which shews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious idea. But Gassendus and others say, that all this is a paralogism, because it supposes that which it should prove, viz. that God exists, which was the thing in question; and withal they say, it is a piece of sophistry to argue from the idea in the mind to the existence of the thing out of the mind. And this is the main thing which Mons. Huet insists upon; for he saith, *This argument proves no more, than that a most perfect Being must necessarily exist in that way in which it doth exist: if it relates to the idea, then it necessarily exists only in the mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exists out of the mind; but the argument doth*

Princip. part. i. sect. 14.

Huet. Censur. Philosoph. Cartes. c. 4. n. 8.

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not hold from one to the other. To this Mons. Regis answers, That those things which are said only to exist in the mind, have their foundation out of the mind; as a Syren, from the ideas of a fish and a woman joined together: and so other chimeras are formed from joining things in the mind, which nature hath not joined; for a man cannot have an idea of nothing. But in the idea of a perfect Being he cannot distinguish that which is in the mind, and that which is out of the mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not first supposing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have necessary existence, as of the nature of a triangle to have three angles.

Réponse à la Cens. ch. iv. p. 233, &c.

And thus the matter stands as to this argument; so that whatsoever force there is in it, we plainly see that persons of great sagacity and judgment suspect that there is something in it of the nature of a paralogism. And therefore there can be no reason why we should quit the former arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for such a metaphysical demonstration, which those who are most versed in demonstrations will not allow. Let the followers of Des Cartes magnify and defend this argument as well as they can; but let them not despise and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all ages, and the wisest persons in them; and that upon such frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine wisdom.*

Boyle of Final Causes, p. 36.

But Des Cartes, in an Epistle mentioned by Mr. Boyle, saith, *That it is a childish and absurd thing to affirm in metaphysics, that God, like a proud man, had no other end in building the world but to be praised by men; or in making the sun, which is so much bigger than the earth, but only to give light to mankind, who take up so small a part of it.* Which is an expression not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the world, from any one that doth acknowledge him truly to be so. For the objection, if it be any, lies against his making the world at all: since it may as well be said to be *like a proud prince, only to shew the greatness of his power and wisdom.* But what is it which such men would have? Can they imagine the world should be made without any ends at all? Is that becoming the wisdom of the Maker? Or would they not have these ends to be known? To what purpose are great and noble ends designed, if they are not to be

understood? And by whom can they be understood, but by rational and intelligent beings? It is a great presumption in mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wise Creator had in the vast fabric of the universe; for some of the great parts of it are almost wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fixed stars, every one of which, of the first magnitude, is said to be above a hundred times in bigness beyond the globe of the earth; and yet how small do they appear to us! And in those other celestial bodies, which we can hardly discern without the help of glasses of a late invention: and we are told by skilful astronomers, that there are many stars not visible even with the help of telescopes; and that they rather lessen than add to the greatness of the fixed stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagine that God's great ends could depend upon such way of discovery. If all his design had been to be admired by mankind for the greatness of his work, it would have been placed more within our reach, and the earth we live upon would have borne some bigger proportion to the celestial bodies, which is concluded to be but a point in comparison of the starry heaven; and the very orb of the sun is thought to be no more in respect of the whole firmament. So that the main parts of the universe cannot be said to be made for our view. We grant, therefore, that the infinitely wise and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judge of? For even in those things which we discern at so great a distance, we see enough to admire the infinite Majesty of him that made them; and consequently to adore and fear him: and whatever other ends he may have which we cannot see into, yet this is the best and most proper end for us with respect to him. Other ends might satisfy our curiosity more; but this tends most to promote our true happiness. As I have shewed in the precedent discourse, that the wisest philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Pythagoreans, all agreed, upon principles of natural reason, that the true happiness of mankind lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatness and power, but in goodness and true wisdom; which lay in the knowledge of God, and a temper of mind suitable to our apprehensions of him. Now if those ends be attainable by such discoveries, which God hath made of himself in the works of creation, it is to little purpose for any to pretend that we

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cannot know the particular ends which he had in making such a number of vast bodies of light in the heavens, nor why they are placed in such a manner, and at so great a distance from us; nor whether the space between be wholly void, or filled up with an ethereal matter; nor of what use those several bodies of the stars are with respect to themselves, or the rest of the universe. Supposing that we are to seek as to these, and many other things relating to the visible frame of the world, must we therefore cease to admire and praise the great God, the Maker of all, lest we should seem to flatter him for his greatness and power? There is doubtless a just veneration due to an infinite Majesty, in what way soever he shews himself: but it is too mean a thing to imagine that these things were done by him only to be admired and praised by his own creatures: but if such an admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper sense of his wisdom, power, and goodness, and that be the best and most effectual means to bring mankind to a constant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future happiness, can any man of sense think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the world?

But these are said *to be good moral ends; but not proper for physical speculations.* I answer, That those are truly the most philosophical contemplations, which lead us to the best and most noble ends of our being; for this was of old looked on as the truest end of philosophy, and the first occasion of it. For it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from Pythagoras: and it is very well observed by St. Augustin, *that the doctrine of the soul's immortality gave the first occasion to the Greeks to apply themselves to philosophy: and from hence Pythagoras began it:* who was instructed therein by his masters Thales and Pherecydes; and after long travels into several countries for his own satisfaction, he at last fixed at Crotone in Italy, and there took upon him to instruct others in the way to immortality: but finding great reason to mistrust many who came to be his scholars, he set up a very severe discipline in his school, (which proved his ruin at last,) and would admit none but such as he had sufficiently tried. But when he was asked by one of the great men of those parts, *what it was he professed*, he said, nothing but philosophy, or a love of wisdom; which he made to consist in two things, *a search after truth, and a pursuit of virtue.* But by truth he did not understand the physical causes of things, but abstracted and meta-

Aug. ad Volus. Ep. tom. ii. p. 407. Ed. Par.

physical speculations; for his notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere sensible things, which rather perplexed and confounded men's minds, which were apt to judge by the impressions of sense; (and his opinion was, that the sense only transmitted the objects, but *it was the mind which saw and heard*, &c.) therefore, to prevent false judgments, he thought it necessary to draw off their minds from sensible objects: to this end he bethought himself of the way of reasoning by figures and numbers, (as before observed,) which were so soon and so grossly misunderstood. *He had learnt*, saith Porphyry, *from the Eastern Magi, that God was light and truth;* and therefore he looked on a search after truth as one way of assimilation to God. But the main thing was in the practice of virtue; of which there is a short abstract in the Golden Verses; and Hierocles declares in the beginning, *The design of them all was to bring mankind to a likeness to the Divine nature.* And in this, saith Eudorus in Stobæus, Socrates and Plato agreed with Pythagoras, *That this was the chief end of philosophy;* but Plato added, κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, *as far as mankind could attain to it.* And so Alcinous expresses the sense of Plato: but he tells us, *That Plato sometimes set it forth by being wise, and just, and holy; sometimes by following God; because, according to the ancient saying, God is the beginning and end of all things. This*, saith Hierocles, *is the end of the Pythagorean philosophy, to give wings to our souls, that, when death comes, we may leave a mortal body behind us, and fly to the immortal mansions above, and partake of a Divine nature, as far as we are capable of it.* And Simplicius, in the beginning of his Commentaries on Aristotle, saith, *The end of philosophy is to attain to our most perfect happiness; and if a man arrived to the top of philosophy, he might be a God, and not a man.* These things I mention to shew that philosophy, as it was understood by the ancients, was far from excluding final causes, or moral considerations of things; since its great end was to bring men to a likeness to God.

Stob. Eclog. l. ii. c. 3. Ed. Cant.

Alcin. c. 27. Ed. Oxon.

Simplic. in Categor.

This being then the true original end of philosophy, to improve men's minds in order to their happiness, how came the consideration of the great ends of God in the world to be thought unbecoming philosophical speculations? The reason was, that the immortality of the soul hath been excluded too. For although, according to the doctrine of Des Cartes, its distinction from the body be asserted and proved, yet its immortality is passed over, un-

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der this pretence, *that God may fix its duration by his will*; and therefore, unless we know the will of God in it, we can determine nothing in philosophy about it. But the ancient philosophers made the immortality of the soul the foundation of all their enquiries, and therefore took in all such considerations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the minds of men. For which end moral considerations are most proper: and therefore it cannot but seem strange to any thinking man, to observe these to be so industriously set aside, on pretence *that we cannot find out the ends that God had in framing the world, and the several parts of it*; and yet at the same time they pretend to have found all the mechanical powers of matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now consider final causes. And have we not reason to conclude, from the present frame of the world with respect to mankind, that the Maker of it intended to dispose things for their advantage? Let men consider the faculties of their minds, together with the materials about them, and the organs God hath given them to make use of them; and can they think otherwise but that God hath abundantly made up to them what other creatures seem to exceed them in? Their understanding, and contrivance, and artificial inventions, go far beyond the natural strength and sagacity of brutes, as to the comfortable way of subsistence. They can make the brutes to be very serviceable to them, as to diet, clothing, journeying, habitations, &c. They can find out ways to communicate their thoughts to each other at a great distance, and entertain commerce in the remotest parts, by the help of their own inventions as to navigation. So that if one country be not sufficiently furnished, they can bring home the products of others. And so all the benefit of trading (which in these later ages is grown to so mighty a reputation above what it had in elder ages) is owing to the happy invention of the use of the magnet. But set aside these modern improvements, and consider mankind as mere natives of their several countries, take all together, and the inhabitants of the earth have no cause to complain of Providence; which makes up what is wanting in one thing, by such advantages another way, that most nations are fond of their own countries, and would not change them. The ancient geographers indeed mention people *who cursed the rising and setting sun, because his heat was intolerable to them*; and the philosophers thought they had great reason to conclude the tor-

Herod. l. i. Mela, l. i. c. 8. Plin. l. v. c. 8.

rid zone uninhabitable. But the experience of these latter times has found it quite otherwise, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in some respects pleasant to them; as to the fruitfulness of land, and numbers of rivers, and plenty of commodities. And as to heat, that is very much qualified by the constant breezes in the day-time, and coolness of the nights; and the particular situation of some places, which at a very little distance have winter and summer; which shews that the seasons do not merely depend upon the sun, but upon the motion of the air; for where that is stopt by the height of mountains, there is winter on one side, and summer on the other; as Is. Vossius observes on the coast of Malabar, and about the mountains of Arabia, Congo, and Bengala, and other places: and Ludolphus confirms it concerning the mountains of Malabar; insomuch that, he saith, *the king there may keep a perpetual summer, only by crossing the mountains.* Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, that the Chersonese, between the rivers of Indus and Ganges, is divided in the middle by a ridge of high hills, which they call the Gate: on the one side is Malabar, and on the other Coromandel; and that it is winter on one side from April to September, and summer on the other, and that not above twenty leagues distance in crossing the mountains. And the same is said to be at Cape Razalgate in Arabia, and in Jamaica; which is imputed to the mountains stopping the current of vapours, wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of rain; and so the seasons depend upon the monsoons or fixed winds in those parts; the north-east blowing on one side from November to April, and the southerly on the other from April to November. Sir H. Middleton speaks of *so great cold on the mountains of Arabia, that he could not have believed it, unless he had felt it himself;* for he despised their information at Mecca, who knew the country far better. But he thought he went according to reason, as the ancients did; but experience hath plainly discovered their mistakes. For heat and cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearness or distance of the sun; for other things, we find, may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was least expected. Acosta tells us, that the old philosophers went upon principles of common reason, when they supposed *the torrid zone was uninhabitable:* but notwithstanding he found it so far from being so, that *he thought it pleasant and agree-*

Is. Voss. de Nilo, c. 12. Ludolph. Comment. ad Hist. Æthiop. p. 101. Francof.

Philosoph. Transac. n. 175.

Purchas, Pil. tom. i. p. 555.

Acosta of the Indies, l. ii. c. 3, 5.

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able, and saw it full of people: and he saith, *that the air is clearest when the sun is farthest off, and fullest of clouds and rain when the sun is nearest:* as he shews at large from the experience himself had in those parts. Some places of the torrid zone he observes to be temperate, as in Quito, and the plains of Peru; some very cold, as at Potosi; some very hot, as in some parts of Æthiopia, Brasil, and the Moluccas. The temperateness of it he imputes to the rains, to the shortness of the days, the nearness to the ocean, the height of lands and mountains, but especially to the winds. For he saith, *The providence of God hath so ordered it, that the fresh and cool winds do qualify the excessive heat of the sun.* But he observes, *That, besides the breezes from the sea by day, there are land winds by night, which serve very much to temper the heat of the air.*

C. 9. C. 10. C. 13. L. iii. c. 8.

It looked like an objection against Providence, when men concluded, that, by the nearness of the sun within the tropics, so great a part of the earth as the torrid zone should be scorched by the sun, as not to be capable of habitation by mankind: but when the contrary is now found most certainly true, and such reasons are given for it, which mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer, that Providence had certainly such an end as the good of mankind to order things so, as by several means to make those habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we see how vain those old arguments against Providence were, which were grounded on this supposition, that so great a part of the earth was useless to mankind by the intolerable heat of the sun. Yet how confidently doth Lucretius argue upon this supposition; as though he could demonstrate against Providence from heaven and earth:

Lucret. l. v. ver. 197.

Hoc tamen ex ipsis cœli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta stat prædita culpa.
Principio, quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, sylvæque ferarum
Possedere, tenent rupes, vastæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras.
Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert.

So much room taken up by the heavens, so much by mountains, woods, rocks, marshes, and seas; and two parts of the

earth useless for mankind by intolerable heat and cold; that he could never imagine this earth was framed with design for the good of mankind. And yet at the same time there were philosophers, who thought the conveniencies for mankind were so great in this world, that from thence they inferred that there was a Providence which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any revelation from God of those ends which he designed. The Stoics knew, as well as Epicurus, the compass of the heavens, the greatness of the mountains, woods, rocks, and seas; and they believed as much that some parts of the earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded that there was a design of Providence in all with respect to mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the space which the heavens took up, but of the great beauty, and order, and usefulness of the celestial bodies; and particularly the convenient distance of the sun to make the earth fruitful and pleasant, and to distinguish days and nights for works and rest; and that the mountains were large storehouses for metals and rivers, which could not otherwise be supplied; and that the seas afforded plenty of fish, and large conveniencies for commerce; and the woods were furnished with timber to make vessels out of, to pass over those seas, and so preserve a correspondence among mankind, at the greatest distance, for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the earth, that only shewed that God did not give these things to make mankind lazy and idle, but to exercise those abilities both of body and mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the earth being wholly unserviceable to mankind, by reason of excessive heat or cold, that is found, by experience of later ages, to have been a great mistake. But Aristotle is positive in it, *That the places near the sun have no waters nor pastures; and that the remote northern parts are not to be inhabited for the cold.* But both these assertions are found to be false: however his authority was followed, insomuch that Pliny saith, *Of five zones two are useless by extremity of cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual mist and a shining frost; and that within the tropics all is burnt up by the heat of the sun, which is so intense, that,* he saith, *there is no passage from one temperate zone to the other.* This is a strange account to us now, and given by a man who had read all authors then extant about these matters; and it is the stranger, because in the chapter before he saith,

Arist. Meteor. l. ii. c. 5.

Plin. l. ii. c. 68. Ed. Harduin.

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That Hanno passed from Cadiz to the end of Arabia, (which is much doubted,) *and that Eudoxus came to Cadiz from the Arabian Gulph; and that another went from Spain to Ethiopia on the account of trade; and that some Indians trading abroad were cast by storms on the northern coasts, who were presented to the proconsul of Gaul.* How could these things be, and yet they such strangers to the torrid zone, through which they must pass? But he seemed to take it for granted, *that those regions were unpassable, and uninhabitable,* although himself mentions several nations which lived within the torrid zone; as the Negroes on both sides the river Niger, the Garamantes, Troglodytæ, (whom Ludolphus makes to be the same with the Hottentots,) and several others. Now if all these countries were burnt up, how came so many people to be then known to live here? and so they were from the time of Herodotus, who mentions them. But how different are the best accounts we now have of these places, from what the ancients imagined! The country of the Negroes, through which the Niger runs (which is supposed to be of the same nature (if not original) with the Nile, and overflows the country of the Negroes in the same manner, and at the same time that the Nile doth Egypt,) is, according to a late author, *a populous and fertile country;* who saith, *That the natives endure the heat with ease, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who spent some time in that country, saith, *That the heat is more supportable by the cool wind which blows; and that for six months it is as pleasant as France.* Andrew Battel, who lived about eighteen years in Angola and thereabouts, speaks enough of the populousness of those parts; and Lopez, who was at Congo, commends the *temperature of the air* there. Ludolphus, in his account of Ethiopia, which he had chiefly from a native, saith, *That it is as temperate as Portugal.* The same we have already produced from Acosta of Peru. Many more such instances might be produced; but these are sufficient to shew what a wonderful mistake the ancients were under as to the torrid zone, and how very weak Lucretius's argument against Providence from thence is. But the argument for it is much stronger from these discoveries; because, according to the ordinary effects of the heat of the sun, they reasoned truly: but there is a concurrence of several other things which temper the air, which they could not understand. It is true, there are some things that abate the heat which arises from the sun's nearness; as the

Id. l. v. c. 8.

Herodot. l. iv. c. 183. Plin. l. v. c. 8. Solin. c. 43. Ed. Basil.

Voyage to Surat, p. 61, 71. Relation de la Nigritie, 1689, p. 85. Purchas, tom. ii. l. vii. c. 3. Id. c. 4.

Ludolph. Comment. l. i. c. 5. n. 36.

equality of nights to days, and the abundance of rains which fall at that time; of which the most probable account is, that although in our parts the distance of the sun causes cold and rain, and the nearness heat and drought, yet it is quite otherwise there; for the sun raises up the vapours more there by rarefying the air, and that to a great height; which joining together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a wind as well as water, both which cool and refresh the air; and where the vapours do not produce rain, yet they make a dew, as in some parts of Peru, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But these things are not sufficient; for were all the country in the torrid zone a flat, with those advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the mountains was necessary for this purpose. Which shews that these are so far from being botches or ruins, that they are great instances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be serviceable to this purpose. Scaliger saith, that those do *pie delirare, who impute the mountains to the fractures made in the earth by the flood; and that it is impossible that the earth which fell in should ever make a surface equal with the height of the mountains:* but he asserts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the world, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for water: and he observes, that the highest mountains are under the torrid zone; where they serve likewise for tempering the air. For Acosta gives that reason of the temper of the air in the West-Indies, that *it is a high country, having many mountains, which afford a great refreshment to the neighbour-countries:* and he observes, that *the sea-coast in Peru and New Spain is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwise in the higher parts.* Piso, a learned physician, who lived in Brasil, and hath given a natural history of that country, imputes the healthfulness of the maritime coasts there, which he thinks compares with Europe, to two things. 1. *The constant breeze from the sea lying on the east of it, which,* he saith, *very much defends them from the excessive heat of the sun.* 2. *A ridge of mountains between that and Peru, which keep off the noisome vapours of the moorish grounds on the other side of them. In the night,* he saith, *the cold is so great,* (even in the torrid zone,) *that they are forced to keep fires to prevent the ill effects of it.* Nichol. de Tecko, who was in Tucumania, saith, *That the part of it which is within the torrid zone is very cold, by reason of the moun-*

Scaliger. Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acosta Hist. of the Indies, l. ii. c. 12.

Pison. Hist. Nat. et Medic. Brasiliæ. l. i. c. 1. Apud Flz.

Hist. Paraquar. l. i. c. 19.

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tains there; which, he saith, *evidently confutes the ancients' opinion concerning it.* Andrew Battel mentions *the high mountains about Angola, over which he marched, and found the air very cold.* Ludolphus saith, *The providence of God is much to be admired in the mountains of Ethiopia; for the height of their mountains makes that country habitable, and their air more temperate; and affords them rivers, which the flats in the torrid zone do want;* unless they be such as come out of the mountainous part. And which seems very strange, he affirms from Tellez, *That the heats in some parts of Ethiopia are more tolerable than in Portugal, which lies so many degrees more to the north.*

Purchas, tom. ii. l. vii. c. 3. sect. 3. Ludolph. Hist. Æthiop. l. i. c. 6.

C. 5.

The force of what I have said comes to this. It was supposed to be an argument against Providence, that so great a part of the earth was useless to mankind; which is so far from being true, that undoubted experience hath convinced the world that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable subsistence of mankind there hath been concurrence of several things, which could not be the result of chance, or of the mechanical laws of the motion of matter: and therefore we ought to conclude these things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the use and benefit of mankind.

There is yet one thing to be observed, before I end this part of my discourse; which is to shew the pernicious use that hath been made of Des Cartes's laying aside the consideration of final causes. For there was lately a person too well known in the world, (and whom I intend to consider at large afterwards,) who at first professed himself a strict follower of Des Cartes's notions in his Metaphysical Meditations. But he made use of the argument from the idea to prove *the world to be God:* and Des Cartes cannot be excused from giving too great advantage to Spinoza, by supposing *the idea of extended matter to be infinite and necessary;* which overthrows the force of his own argument from the idea; for if it agrees to matter, it cannot prove the being of a substance distinct from matter, and gave occasion to the other to think that nothing but infinite matter was implied in this idea. And, to carry on his design the better, he kept close to Des Cartes in excluding the consideration of final causes. For in his Mathematical Ethics (as he calls them) he hath an appendix to his first part, where he doth purposely set himself to overthrow all final causes, *as mere fictions of men's brains.* But the comfort is, that they are no late fictions, but the wisest men in all ages, as

Des Cartes Prin. par. 2. n. 21.

B. D. Spinos. Opera Post. p. 36.

I have already shewed, did assert them; and it is not a mere mathematical appearance will fright men now out of the principles of reason. But let us examine what the grounds are on which final causes are thus peremptorily condemned. He saith, *That they arise from the common prejudice of mankind, who have so much fondness for themselves as to think that all things are done for their sakes: that God made all things for man, and mankind to serve him.* But this is not a just and fair representation of the matter. We do not say, that God had no other end in the frame of the universe, but merely for the sake of the inhabitants of the earth; for we do not pretend to give an account of the great ends which the Almighty had in those vast and numerous bodies of the fixed stars, which are so very remote from us: but that which we say, is, that God hath placed mankind in such a station here upon earth, that they cannot but look about them; and when they do so, they cannot but admire to find so great and so wise a Being order all things so, as to see not only the wisdom but the goodness of their Maker. And how doth this appear to be *a mere fiction of men's brains?* Are there not such just causes for our admiration? Are there not such conveniences for human life? Do not all men see the wonderful contrivance and usefulness of the parts of their bodies? And are there not great discoveries of the like wisdom in plants and animals, and the earth and sea? Are all these mere phantasms and fictions of men's brains? Why are not the mistakes about these things discovered in a mathematical manner? This might have signified something: but to go about to confute mankind, by telling them *that final causes are mere fictions of their brains,* is far from being a geometrical way of demonstration. Let us examine, however, the method he takes to make it out. 1. In the first place, he undertakes to shew how mankind came to think so much of final causes; and then, 2. how repugnant they are to the nature of things: 3. how men came to take up the notions of good and evil, and of rewards and punishments from this opinion about final causes: all which I shall briefly consider. As to the first, he supposes *that all men are born ignorant of causes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conscious to themselves of.* And what follows? *First, that they suppose themselves free, because they know their own desires.* And why should they not, as well as know that they think; for they have the like inward perception as to both? *But they are ig-*

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norant of the causes which determine their desires. How doth it appear that there are such causes, which they are thus ignorant of? If any man undertakes to assign causes which mankind are not at all sensible of, he ought not to take it for granted that there are such causes, but to prove it in such a manner as to overbalance the evidence of their inward perceptions. For mankind are conscious to themselves of no such causes: if therefore any one will prove that however they are not free, certainly that evidence ought to be clearer than the argument from our own perception to the contrary. I think I move my eye freely to this or that object, and am fully satisfied from that inward perception I have of the voluntary motion of the muscles belonging to the eye: now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceived herein, and that there were other causes which determined the motion of my eye, is it not reason I should have evidence greater than what I have from my own sensation? But here we have no causes at all assigned; therefore we must go on. *Secondly*, saith he, *mankind do all things for some end*, viz. *for their own profit; and therefore desire only to know final causes; and if they find these, they are satisfied.* Is not this well said by a man that pretends to demonstration, and that in a geometrical manner? Could no other ends be thought of but profit? I begin to be of Des Cartes's mind, *that geometry spoils men's reasonings in other matters.* For, how was it possible for a man of common sense to argue in such a manner; *men aim at their own profit, therefore they desire only to know final causes?* What profit was it which this author aimed at in making this work of his? He had, without doubt, some end in it; for I hardly think he could take so much pains for no end at all. Was it a good or a bad end? For mankind are still apt to be inquisitive into final causes. A good end, no doubt, his friends will say. What was this good end? Was it mere profit? No, certainly, they will say, his mind was above it; *for he devoted himself wholly* (as they tell us in the preface to his works) *to philosophy*; and *retired on purpose for the prosecution of his studies.* It is then more than possible for a man to aim at some other end than mere profit. And what was the end he proposed in philosophy? Still we enquire after the end, although profit be set aside; and we cannot have a better account of it than from himself. He tells us, *his mind was set upon finding out the true good of mankind.* This was a noble end indeed, and fit for a person that designed

Ibid. de Intel. Emend. p. 357.

to improve his understanding. But was this true good nothing but profit? So far from it, that he saith, *He was soon satisfied that what things mankind generally pursued, were a hindrance to the end he aimed at; and therefore he saw it necessary to give over the pursuit of riches, honours, and sensual pleasures, and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give satisfaction to the mind, and therefore ought to be pursued with all our might.* This one would think were spoken like a true Christian philosopher: but his way is to use our expressions, and to couch his own meaning under very plausible terms: but he speaks his mind more afterwards, when he saith, *This chief good of man is to understand the union between the mind and nature.* What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he saith, *That this is the end to which our studies and endeavours are to be directed.* Which is sufficient to my present purpose. For here it is confessed, that they are only vulgar minds that aim at mere profit as their end; but that there is a higher and more certain and agreeable end for the minds of men to search after; and that their happiness lies in the attaining of that end. Which being allowed, if we suppose a wise and intelligent Being to have created mankind, there is no incongruity at all in man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief end, nor in pursuing after it with all his endeavours; nor can there be any in supposing that this God should order things in this world with that design, that they should be serviceable to him here as to his present subsistence, in order to his main end. For he allows his philosopher to do many things with that design to serve his end, viz. *to speak as other men do, whatever he thinks; to use sensual pleasures, as they serve for health; to get as much wealth as will make his condition easy.* Thus far then we find that mankind may propose ends to themselves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming in them to use those means in order to their ends. Why then may not the wise Creator of the world appoint proper ends and means to mankind, as to their conveniencies and future happiness? What repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former case? All that he can say is, *That mankind finding something very useful to them, as eyes for seeing, teeth for eating, herbs and animals for nourishment, the sun to give light, the sea to breed fish, &c. and because they are so useful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepared all these things*

Ibid. p. 361.

Ibid. Ethic. par. i. p. 14

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for them. And what absurdity is there in so doing? What geometrical demonstration is there that these things all came together so of themselves, without any intelligent Agent? All that he saith is, *That they, considering them as means, could not believe that they made themselves; but because they were wont to provide things for their own use, they supposed or believed some free Agent, which ordered all these things for them. And from hence they, judging all by themselves, concluded that God ordered all these things for their use, to oblige mankind to him, that they might honour and serve him; and so, under a pretence of doing honour to God, they fell into superstition, and were so bent upon final causes, till at last they made God no wiser than themselves.* Is not all this demonstration? They must think very meanly indeed of the understandings of men, that can think they will be satisfied with such accounts as these. We find he grants *eyes fitted for sight, teeth for eating*, &c. And why, I pray, may we not in reason conclude that they were designed for that use? He finds some things to cavil at, about *unseasonable weather, earthquakes, diseases*, &c. (which are consistent with the general ends of Providence;) but he hath nothing to say, as to his former instances, why we should not believe *we had eyes to see with, or ears to hear with, or teeth to eat with*. But if these things were given for those uses and no other, doth not this prove particular ends of Providence with respect to mankind? What, *if men do provide means for their ends*, is it an argument of folly or wisdom so to do? If it be wisdom to act for an end, and folly to act for none, why may we not suppose an infinitely wise Being to act for ends agreeable to himself? Not for mean, foolish, sordid ends, but such as become the great Creator, and wise Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to mankind. And what is there unbecoming our idea of God in these relations? Is it then unfit for a wise Creator, and Governor, and Benefactor, to bestow on mankind such things as tend to the use and good of his creatures, or to take care of their welfare, so as to furnish us with such organs of our senses, such faculties of our minds, as may make use of the many conveniencies which we have about us for our comfortable subsistence, and our cheerful service of so great, and so good, and so liberal a benefactor? Can this be called superstition, to serve and adore him? Is this *making God like to ourselves*, when we acknowledge the infinite distance between him and us, and serve

him with devout reverence and godly fear? Far be it from us to think so meanly of him, as to attribute the least degree of our passions and weaknesses to him. We know he could not be God, if he were not infinitely above our thoughts as well as our services; but if he please to be so kind to us, to give us so many reasons to love and serve him, is it fit for his creatures to despise his service, on pretence that he is above it? Superstition is a foolish thing, because it comes from mean apprehensions of God; but true religion is a wise and agreeable thing, because it flows from a due sense of a Divine Majesty, and a tender regard to his honour. And whatever men pretend as to philosophy and demonstration, there are none that really want sense and understanding so much, as those who despise religion under the name of superstition. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the world; but as God remains the same notwithstanding the follies of mankind, so religion is as just and reasonable a thing as ever, although superstition hath brought so much dishonour upon it.

The next thing is to shew, *that final causes are repugnant to the nature of things*. This is to the purpose indeed, if he can make it out. As to his argument *from the necessity of all things*, that must be referred to its due time; because it is not proved, but supposed. But here we are to consider how final causes do so lamentably pervert the order of nature. *They make*, saith he, *the cause to be the effect, and the effect to be the cause; and that which was first in nature to be the last; and make the most perfect Being to be the most imperfect*. These are sad consequences, if they hold. The two former he passes over, as he had reason, and fixes on the last, *that they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If God works for an end, then he must want that which he works for*. Is this the *demonstrating ethics in a geometrical way?* A father, out of kindness to his son, designs to advance him in the world, and furnishes him with all necessary means to that end. Doth this argue weakness and indigency, or only kindness and good-will to his son? If there may be a design of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means used to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from abundant goodness; and the more perfect any being is, the greater is the beneficence and readiness to do good to others: and one would think men did not want geometry to know this.

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But, saith he, *God did not do this for their sakes, but his own; his own glory is the end of all.* But if the glory of God be most advanced by the good of his creatures, how can these two be separated from each other? Men may make a distinction by metaphysical speculation: but if his glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real distinction between them; for both are carried on by the same thing.

After these faint attempts, our geometrician falls *to ignorance of causes*, (of which I have said so much already;) *and from thence*, he saith, *comes men's admiration of the fabric of man's body, because they know not the causes of it.* And did our philosopher know the mechanical causes of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not seen them, instead of these loose and idle discourses; for I can call them no other, when there is so much blustering talk about geometry, and so very little appearance of true reason. But, saith he, very sensibly, *The world looks upon a man as a very dangerous heretic, and impious person, if he gives an account of natural causes, and takes away their ignorance.* I see no such great danger from his knowledge, whatever there be from his impiety; for he hath shewed much more cause for us to wonder at one than at the other. But the impiety of his system must be considered in its proper place.

The last thing he saith as to causes is, *That mankind being persuaded that all things were made for them, they set an esteem upon such things as they found most useful, and measured the value of things by their agreeableness to themselves. From hence came the difference of good and evil, orderly and confused, hot and cold, beautiful and deformed; and, because they imagined themselves free, thence came praise and dishonour, fault and merit. And what tended to health or the worship of God, they called good, and the contrary evil; what suited to their imagination they called order; what did not, confusion. What was agreeable to their senses they called beautiful, sweet, pleasant; and the contrary to what was not; and attributed their modes of sensation to the things themselves. And men judge of things by their different imaginations; and from thence come such great differences among mankind about good and evil, order and confusion; all which come from men's following imagination, and not reason.* This is the substance of what he saith: which in short takes away all the real difference between good and evil, and makes good to be a mere effect of men's imaginations, from re-

spect to their own conveniency, or what they call *the honour of God*; and evil what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from final causes? *Yes*, saith he, *since all things are made for them, therefore good and evil are to be taken with respect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this doctrine upon. For things are not therefore said to be morally good, because they are useful to mankind; but that implies only a natural fitness for such purposes, which is quite another thing from moral goodness; and it is strange our philosophers should not discern the difference. For is there no measure of good and evil among mankind with respect to one another? If the good and evil of things did depend upon final causes, with respect to mankind in general, then there could be no such thing in regard to each other; for these final causes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they respect the whole kind. But we say upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between man and man. *Yes*, it may be said, *with respect to society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be so, then it follows, that it doth not depend upon mere imagination, but that there is a true and just measure in things; for if human society cannot be preserved without justice, and keeping faith and obedience to government, conjugal fidelity, &c. then there is a real tendency in these things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if so, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon men's fancies or humours, any more than the taking away fuel doth for lessening a fire, or the adding it doth to the increase of it. For men's indulging their own passions against reason and a common interest, doth as much tend to a civil combustion, as the other to a natural; and men's due government of themselves and actions doth as naturally tend to peace and tranquillity, as withdrawing fuel, or casting water, doth to quench the violence of fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to mankind, which are the measures of good and evil with respect to society. But, besides this, mankind cannot be supposed to subsist without the relations of parents and children: and can any man in his right senses imagine that the duties of these to each other depend only upon fancy? Is there no natural regard due from children to parents? no natural affection and tenderness in parents to children? Is all this only the product of imagination? So as to the difference of sexes; chastity, modesty, and a decent regard to each other, are things

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BOOK I. founded in nature, and do not arise from custom or fancy. But in all these things, although there be a just regulation of them by laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and respects of things to one another. As to our own bodies, health is not the only measure of good and evil; for it is so uncertain, that those excesses do little prejudice to some, which are mischievous to others: but there is a just proportion of things to be observed with respect to their use; and so intemperance may be consistent with a healthful body. As to the condition of others, who, by reason of poverty or sickness, stand in need of our help, it is a thing in itself good to afford them our assistance; and so liberality, charity, and doing good, are so far from being good only from imagination, that no man can imagine them to be otherwise than good. But, besides all these, there are duties which are owing to that infinite Being from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and serve, and love, and honour him? He confesses, mankind allow *that to be good which respects the honour of God;* but he means, *that it is because we suppose that he made all things for men.* But although his goodness and providence be very great reasons for our serving him, yet, if he had been less bountiful to mankind, they had been bound to serve him as their Creator. And it is impossible to suppose that he should discharge his creatures from so necessary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a fault. For it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the best Being in the world not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, should require what is in itself evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of good and evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary fancies and opinions of men, but upon the nature of things, the reason of mankind, and the respects they stand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our philosopher himself makes it the same case as to good and evil, as it is with respect to order and confusion, and beauty and deformity, and harmony and discord. For although there may be a variety of fancies as to some degrees of these things, and that may please some which doth not others, yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them; and none can have so little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but fancy, which puts a difference between a well digested discourse and a confused heap of thoughts; or between an exact beauty

and the picture of deformity; or the most ravishing music and the noise of a pair of tongs. So that the extremes must be allowed to be really different from one another, what difference soever there be in persons' fancies as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the idea of the thing itself is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality, and the farther off, it doth so much more depend upon fancy.

But, saith he, *in our objects of sense we imagine the qualities to be real things without us; whereas they are only the different impressions made upon our senses, and so conveyed to our imaginations.* And is this an argument that there is no real difference between *bitter and sweet, savoury and unsavoury, or that all sounds are alike?* Or that because some have fancied the music of the spheres, therefore there is no such thing as harmony? But such kind of arguing deserves no farther consideration.

I now come to the second hypothesis, which tends towards atheism; and that is of those who *attribute too much to the mechanical powers of matter and motion.* It cannot be denied by any ingenuous man, that in our age a great improvement hath been made in natural and experimental philosophy. But there is a great difference to be made between those who have proceeded in the way of experiments, which do great service as they go, and such as have formed mechanical theories of the system of the universe, and have undertaken to give an account how the world was framed, and what the immediate causes are of those things which appear in the world. I do not go about to dispute whether many things are not better resolved by the new than by the old philosophy; I am not concerned in the doctrines of *antiperistasis, fuga vacui, occult qualities, intentional species*, and such like: and I confess, that the particular histories and experiments relating to things of nature, as to the bodies of animals, the vegetation of plants, and particular qualities, tend much more to the true knowledge of nature, than the mere nice and dry general speculations about forms and qualities; which have been handled in such a manner, that they have been like some of Aristotle's books, *set forth, but not to be understood.* If therefore several qualities of bodies be explained mechanically, *i. e.* by virtue of the known affections of matter, viz. *size, figure, motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produced by changing the texture or motion, or some other mechanical affection of

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matter, it is far from my design to oppose them, or any such discourses, which tend only to give us more light into the occult nature (though not qualities) of things. For to say that things proceed from occult qualities, is in other words to say that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good answer, from one that pretends to give the reason of a thing.

But to proceed more distinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing these following principles, as to the nature and qualities of natural bodies; which are most insisted upon by a late excellent philosopher, and a truly Christian virtuoso among us. 1. That there is one universal matter of bodies; that is, a substance extended, divisible, and impenetrable. 2. That there is a diversity of motion in several parts of matter; so it be not said to be in matter from itself as essential to it; for then it must always move, and there could be no rest, and so no composition. 3. That by virtue of this motion matter is divided into greater and lesser parts, which have their determination, size, and figure. 4. That, besides these, their situation is to be considered; that is, their posture and order with respect to one another: and when the several parts join together to make up one body, that is called the texture of them. 5. That there is a different texture both in our organs of sense, and in the objects which make impressions upon them, with a different motion, figure, and size; from whence arise our different sensations, and our apprehensions of different sensible qualities in things. 6. That, by a coalition of the smaller particles of matter into one body, there are different substances in the world of distinct denominations; but by a change of texture or motion, or other properties of matter, that compound body may be put into a different state, which may be called its alteration or corruption; and if the change be so made as to offend our senses, it is then called putrefaction. 7. That there may be an incomprehensible variety in the coalition and texture of the minute particles of matter, which may be so different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with distinct qualities; as the twenty-four letters make up an inconceivable number of words, by the different placing of them.

Mr. Boyle of the Origin of Forms and Qualities.

But when I have allowed these, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other qualities in bodies but what relate to our senses. It is true, we could not be sensible of heat and cold, but from the impressions made on our senses: but, supposing we were not sensible

of the different agitation of particles without us, it doth not at all follow that there is not a real alteration in the objects themselves; as that the fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that disposition in matter, which is apt to produce such a sense in us, may not be called an inherent quality, is not so easy to apprehend. But if there be such a real difference in bodies, as that one will make such an impression on our senses, and another will not, we cannot in reason say that there is no quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our apprehension. It is granted, *That snow hath a greater disposition to reflect light outwards, than a coal or soot, when the sun shines upon all three.* Now why this disposition should be called a distinct quality from what is in the other two, seems to me a dispute of no consequence. So, if an echo be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is disposed to reflect the sound back to the place from whence it came, although it must not be called the quality of the place which makes the echo, yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar figure and disposition of the parts which make it. So that, if men will allow such inherent dispositions in things to produce what we call qualities in us, the difference will not be found worth the disputing. And I have wondered persons of judgment and skill in these matters lay so much weight upon it; as though the quality must be said to be only in us, when it is confessed to arise from a different disposition in the parts without us.

2. That there are no other qualities in bodies, but such as an account may be given of by the foregoing principles: for I do not find it possible for any person, by virtue of these principles, to give an account either of the make or composition of the bodies of animals, or of the disposition and relation of the inward parts, or of the instruments of nature for preservation of the individual or species; or of the diseases they are subject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any person searches into all the mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unsatisfied he will find himself about them; and will see reason to conclude, as a learned physician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do; but that the secret causes are so hidden from us, as we have reason to admire the supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.* Sydenham de Hydrope, p. 160.

These things being premised, I come to the main point; which is, whether matter, being put into motion,

BOOK I. can in a mechanical manner produce that frame of the universe which we see, and the several things which are in the heavens, and in this globe of earth and sea.

To make this matter as clear as we can, we must first consider the general principles, and then proceed to the account given of the several phænomena, as they are commonly called.

I. I begin with the general principles; which are these:

Cart. Princip. part. ii. n. 23. That the matter of the universe is one and the same extended substance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is divisible, and capable of motion in its parts.

II. That this matter is without bounds, and that the idea

Ibid. n. 21. of extension is the same with that of corporeal substance.

III. That it is capable of division into so many parts, as we

N. 34. cannot comprehend the utmost bounds of its divisibility.

IV. That God alone is the first and universal Cause of the

N. 36. motion of matter; which continues the same in the whole, although it vary in the several parts.

V. That there are certain laws of motion, whereof these are the chief:

N. 37. 1. That every part continues in the state it was in, unless moved by an external cause.

N. 39. 2. That all motion of itself is in a right line, but by other bodies it becomes oblique; and all matter being in motion, it becomes circular.

N. 40. 3. That when two bodies meet, the weaker loses not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the stronger loses so much as it gives to the weaker.

VI. That the parts of matter were at first divided into many

Cart. Princip. part. iii. n. 46. parcels of an equal and indifferent size, and had among them all that motion which is now in the world.

VII. That these particles of matter could not at first be spher-

N. 48. ical, because then there must be a void space between them; but by force of motion and natural attrition they became so.

VIII. That those lesser particles, which came off from the

N. 49, &c. angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty spaces between them, and have a quicker motion.

IX. That, besides these, there are some particles which are

N. 88. large and slower than the rest, being full of angles, and so more apt to stick to one another; which, by reason of their passage through the triangular spaces between the globular particles, become wreathed.

And these are the three elements out of which he supposes all bodies to be made; and accordingly the ingeni-

ous author hath framed *a system of the universe* with great art and appearance of reason; but at some times he is content to let it pass as a bare hypothesis, *agreeing with the phænomena of the world;* but withal he saith, *that he makes use of no principles but such as are most evident, and deduces nothing from them but by mathematical consequences.* And in an Epistle to Mersennus, to whom he opened his mind more freely, he saith, *That he should think he knew nothing in physics, if he could only tell how things might be; if he could not demonstrate that they could be no otherwise.* But to another person he calls it his *romance of the world;* which he confesses *he was very well pleased with.*

Part. iii. n. 44.

N. 43, 44.

Ep. tom. ii. Ep. 37. Ep. 103.

But so have not others been, who have taken great pains both in philosophy and mathematics; and although they cannot deny this hypothesis to be very consistent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and satisfactory account of the nature and formation of the world. But it is not my business to lay together the objections of others against the Cartesian hypothesis, but to shew the tendency of it to atheism in these two points.

1. In setting up a notion of matter, or corporeal substance, independent upon the power of God.

2. In undertaking to give an account of the *phænomena* of the *universe from the mechanical laws of motion, without a particular Providence.*

As to the former; his first principle is, *That matter is one and the same through the universe; and is every where known by its essential property, which is extension:* and therein he places *the essence of a corporeal substance,* (as will presently appear.) If then the very essence of matter be independent upon God's power, so that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the creation of the world, according to this hypothesis?

Cart. Princip. part. ii. n. 23.

Some object against his notion of matter, and say, that he hath confounded mathematical and physical bodies with one another. For, say they, the strength of his whole hypothesis depends upon the supposition *that matter is nothing but extension, and therefore there can be no vacuity, because all space is extended, and therefore matter is infinite,* or, as he calls it, *indefinite;* but so, as he positively saith, *that the idea of space is the same with that of corporeal substance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but extension.* Which they say is true, if we speak of *mathematical quantity,* but not of *real and physical.*

Du Hamel de Consensu vet. et nov. Philosoph. l. i. c. 9. n. 9. P. Petiti Dissert. de Principiis Cart. p. 28. Huet. Cens. Philosoph. Cartes. c. 5. n. 4.

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But, saith Des Cartes, *men may pretend to distinguish corporeal substance from quantity; but they utter that in words which they cannot comprehend in their minds; for either they mean nothing by substance, or attribute a confused notion of an incorporeal substance to a corporeal, and leave the true idea of corporeal substance to extension.* But this is very far from clearing this matter; for himself lays it down as a fundamental principle, *That it is capable of division into parts, and was actually divided by God himself.* Now I desire to know what that was which was so divided. It must be something; and that not *an incorporeal*, but *a corporeal substance:* not *pure extension*, but *a body that was extended;* and of which the substantial parts of the universe are composed. Nay, his whole hypothesis depends upon *the actual division of matter into parts that are equal, or very near it;* without which his three elements could not be made, which arise from the motion and mutual attrition of those particles; and yet he affirms, in the conclusion of the second part of his Principles, *That he owns no other corporeal matter but such as geometricians call quantity; and is the thing which their demonstrations are conversant about.* But is there no difference between geometrical and physical quantity? It is true, that in mathematical quantity there is nothing but extension; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a real and physical body? How can we imagine that God should create mere extension in the world, and that out of that all the bodies in the universe are framed? Nay, upon Des Cartes's principles it is impossible that matter should either be created or annihilated; for, according to him, *the idea of matter and extension are the same.* But he saith positively, *That the idea of extension and space are the same;* therefore if space can neither be created nor annihilated, neither can matter. And it seemed strange to me, that a person so sagacious should not lay these things better together; but his mathematical notions ran so much in his mind, that his endeavour to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into such inextricable difficulties. It is well observed by Mons. Du Hamel, that the great mistakes in natural philosophy have risen from men's applying their *former notions to it. Thus*, saith he, *the common philosophers confounded natural things with metaphysical speculations. On the other side, Des Cartes, being a great mathematician, endeavoured to reduce nature to geometry, and so considered nothing in body but extension. Extension,*

Princ. Phil. part. ii. n. 9.

Part. iii. n. 46.

Part. ii. n. 64.

DeConsens. vet. et nov. Philosoph. l. i. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. ii. n. 10.

saith he, *which constitutes space, is the same which constitutes bodies; but we consider it more particularly in bodies and more generally in space, which is not changed, as the other is.* But is there then nothing to make a body but mere extension? I mean not a mathematical, but a real physical body. No, saith he, *in the idea of a body we may cast off other qualities; as hardness, colour, gravity, heat and cold, and yet a body remains; to which then nothing belongs but extension, which is common to body and space.* This is not so deep reasoning as might have been expected from so great a master of it. For although the particular qualities may be cast off, yet the capacity of them can no more than extension; as is plain in figure and size, as well as hardness, &c. any one particular figure and size may be abstracted from body; but it is impossible to conceive a body, but it must be capable of one or other. Besides, all this proves no more but that extension is the *inseparable property of body.* And what then? Must the whole essence of a body consist in one inseparable property? *But this is all the idea we have of body.* Then, I say, our ideas of things are short and imperfect, and there is no forming worlds upon such ideas. And this was the fundamental mistake of Des Cartes. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; *or that we cannot take falsehood for truth, if we only give assent to such things as we clearly and distinctly perceive.* Then he goes on, *That the things which fall under our perception are either things and their properties, or eternal truths. Of things, the most general are substance, duration, order, number, and such like, which extend to all kinds of things.* And he saith, *They may all be comprehended under those two: Of intellectual or thinking substances; or of material,* i. e. *of bodily and extended substances.* Thus far all is clear and distinct. Then, as to the notion of substance, he saith, *By that we can understand nothing but a thing which so exists, as to need nothing else to support it. There is but one substance in the world which needs no support, and that is God. All created substances need his support; and the notion of them is, that they are things which only stand in need of God's concourse to support them.* Hitherto we find nothing to stick at. *But how come we to have an idea of created substances? Not from the bare existence, for that doth not affect us: but it must be from some properties, attributes, or qualities; because nothing can be attributed to nothing. From whence we conclude from any real attribute, that there must be a thing or substance to which it belongs.* All this appears very well

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N. 11.

Princip. p. i. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

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still; only we must take notice, that all properties do assure us of a real substance under them: which is very true, relating to physical bodies. But it is possible he may from hence aim at proving, *that there must be a corporeal substance in imaginary space, because there is an extension there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there must be a real body there.* But I think it may be truly answered, that the extension is no more real than the space is, and implies no more but a capacity of having bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create bodies beyond this world; and if he did so, then there would be a real extension: but as we conceive it, the imaginary space is no more but a possibility for bodies existing out of the compass of this universe. And therefore I deny this to be any real extension; and that it can be no real substance, because Des Cartes himself, but just before, owned *that a created substance was that which stood in need of God to support it.* Now is it possible to imagine that space needs a Divine concourse? Therefore he must distinguish it from substance, or else he must affirm it to be an uncreated substance; which overthrows his distinction here between *created and uncreated substances.* As to his maxim, that *nothing can have no properties,* it certainly relates to substance, and not to a mere space; which, by the common sense of mankind, must be distinguished from bodily substance; and there can be no greater prejudice to philosophy than to go against that. Now let us proceed. *From every attribute a substance is known; but there is one chief property which constitutes the essence and nature, to which the rest are referred.* So, saith he, *extension makes the nature of a corporeal substance, and cogitation of a thinking substance. For every thing which we attribute to body supposes extension, which is only the mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our minds are different modes of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and distinct notions or ideas; one of a thinking substance, and the other of a corporeal; if we distinguish between the attributes of thinking and extension.* After this he saith, *That cogitation and extension may be considered as constituting the natures of a thinking and corporeal substance; and so their clear ideas are, a substance which thinks, and a substance which is extended: but then these properties,* he saith, *may be considered likewise only as modes belonging to those substances; and so they make a distinct idea of themselves, not without the substances, but as modes belonging to them.*

N. 53.

N. 54.

N. 63.

N. 64.

Thus I have carefully laid down his own notions about these matters. And now arises the main difficulty, viz. how, upon these grounds, *the idea of space, and of corporeal substance, should be the same?* All that I can find is, that extension is really *corporeal nature, although it be called an accident.* But did not himself distinguish it as *a mode of matter*, and as *a substance extended?* And was not this looked on *as such a property of matter, as thinking is of a mind?* But can any man say that thinking by itself is *an intellectual substance?* How then can extension by itself be *a corporeal substance?* And yet if it be not, as I can see no reason from his own grounds why it should be, then his supposition of the *infiniteness of matter*, of *the plenarty of the world*, and *the circular motion of his particles of matter*, on which his whole hypothesis depends, comes to nothing. And what a strange foundation is Des Cartes's world built upon? I could hardly believe that so thinking a man should not discern the weakness of his own grounds: but instead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it; for when a learned man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, objected to him, *that he extended the notion of corporeal matter too far, but he thought it of no great consequence to the main of his principles*, Des Cartes takes him up smartly for it; for he saith, *he looked on it as one of the chief and most certain principles of his philosophy.* And in the fragment of his last answer, which he lived not to finish, he persisted in his opinion, *That the empty space was a real body, because nothing can have no properties.* But there is a difference between real properties and imaginary: if there be any bodies in that space, there will be extension, distance, &c. but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment should so much contend to the last, *That there was a difference of parts in such a space, where there was nothing but space*; i. e. that there must be something where there is nothing. And therefore Bernier observes, *That those who confound space and body, run themselves into strange absurdities, by a corporeal substance to fill all possible space, or rather to be space itself; and that God cannot annihilate the least part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither substance nor accident, but a mere capacity.* And it was not an improbable conjecture of that learned person who wrote to Des Cartes upon this argument, that this doctrine of his, as he explained it, laid the foundation of Spinoza's opinion of the

Part. ii. N. 9.

Epist. Des Cartes, tom. i. ep. 87.

Ep. 88.

Ep. 93.

Bernier Abrégé de Gassend. tom. i. p. 25.

H. More Oper. Phil. tom. ii. p. 242.

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infinite extent and *power of matter:* but I cannot think that Des Cartes himself intended it so, however the other understood it. And it is great pity one of so clear a capacity in other things, should so stiffly adhere to so unreasonable an opinion. And yet we find his disciples go on to defend him in this matter. For when Mons. Huet had objected, *That Des Cartes had made extension, which was an accident, to be a substance*, Mons. Regis answers, *That he confounded extension which was of the essence of body, with the extension which belonged to quantity; whereof the one is considered in itself, and the other with respect to magnitude.* But let it be considered how he pleases, it is still but a mode belonging to a substance, and not the substance itself. However, he refers us to his book of Physics for the clearing of this matter. And there we find, indeed, that he distinguishes three sorts of bodies; physical, mechanical, and mathematical. *A physical body is one composed of many insensible parts in its due order and figure; from whence result the physical properties. A mechanical body is one composed of gross and sensible parts; which by their figure and situation are proper for particular motions. A mathematical body is a body considered with its proper extension under a regular figure, as a cube or a cylinder.* But this doth not shew that Des Cartes did not confound a mathematical and physical body: for it is an easy thing to find out distinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be agreeable to the general sense of those terms. But here a mathematical body is confined to regular figures; whereas the general notion of it is such a body as Des Cartes himself means, when he calls it *geometrical quantity, such as is the object of mathematical demonstrations*, i. e. of any kind of figures abstract from physical bodies; *and this*, he saith, *is that matter he treated of.* And to such a body extension alone belongs, and to none else, either physical or mechanical.

Censur. Cartes. l. v. n. 1. Regis Réponse à la Censure, ch. 5. art. i. p. 255.

La Physiq. Regis, tom. i. p. 273.

Here then lies the difficulty as to Des Cartes's principles: he considers matter geometrically, i. e. abstractedly, with respect to bare extension, and yet supposes the effects of physical bodies; such as *division of parts of matter one from another*, and *a motion of those parts* in order to the composition of things. But mathematical extension is capable of no division but in the mind; for no man imagines the earth really divided by the parallels and meridians, &c. and the division of the parts of an empty

space is nothing but a mathematical division, which implies nothing really in that space, but a mere act of the mind in conceiving the distance between the several parts of it.

But Des Cartes proves it impossible *there should be a vacuum in nature, because the extension of space and body are all one.* But may not God annihilate that air which is between the sides of a vessel; and would there not be a vacuum between? No; he saith *it is impossible to conceive such a cavity without extension, or such an extension without matter; and if the middle substance were annihilated, the sides must come together, because there would be nothing between.* By which we see, that this notion of the identity of extension and corporeal substance had sunk so deep into his mind, that he makes annihilation of the substance of matter impossible to Divine power; for there can be no such vacuity, but there must remain extension, and consequently a corporeal substance. This hath been objected to the followers of Des Cartes, and lately by Du Hamel, in his censure of Regis's Cartesian philosophy; and it is worth the while to see what answer he makes to it. He saith, *That his objection about the annihilation of the air between the heaven and earth, can be of no force to prove a vacuum; because if there be no space, they must touch one another; and if they do not, there must be space, and consequently a corporeal substance.* But, saith Du Hamel, may not God, by the same power by which he preserves the bodies between heaven and earth, destroy them, and then there must be a vacuum? He answers plainly, *That an annihilation of the substance of matter is impossible, even to the power of God, because his will is immutable. He grants that God may destroy the air, and all other bodies, as to their form or present modification; but he cannot destroy their matter,* i. e. *their extension, which is a true substance, and substances are indefectible.* Where we plainly see that the Cartesians assert the necessary existence of matter, and that it is not in the power of God to destroy it; and whatever they may talk of the will of God, they deny any power to exercise it with respect to matter.

Cart. Prin. part. ii. n. 16.

N. 18.

Répons. aux Reflex. de M. Du Hamel, part. ii. ch. 4.

But Du Hamel proceeds. How can those bodies touch one another, when God can create another body between? *No,* saith Regis, *that still supposes a space between; and if there be a space, there must be a body; and so a vacuum is a repugnancy in itself.* But this space, saith Du Hamel, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the mind; and there is no arguing from thence to the nature of

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things. Regis replies, *That their ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the idea of space or extension is one of their primitive ideas; and that it represents substance, and all substance is incorruptible.* Still we see the necessary existence of matter is looked on by them as a fundamental principle, and depending on primitive ideas.

Abrégé, tom. i. p. 13.

Mons. Bernier puts the case of air being annihilated between two walls; and he desires to know of the Cartesians, whether these two walls will come together or not? They say, *They must, if there be nothing between.* True, saith he, there is nothing corporeal, or that touches our senses, no substance or accidents; but there is a true distance remaining. Suppose a chamber twenty feet long, fifteen feet broad, and ten feet high; and these dimensions to be measured, and one wall twenty feet distant from the other: it cannot be said that it is the air that makes the distance between them; how then comes this distance to be quite lost, if the air be destroyed? They have no answer, he saith, but to say, it is an impossible supposition; and they will rather deny God's omnipotency in annihilating the air, than let go their opinion. Mons. Regis, in his Physics, takes notice of Bernier's doubts; and, in answer to them, he resolves it at last into this: *That it is impossible there should be an annihilation, so as to make a vacuum, because substances cannot cease; not from the nature of things, but from the immutable will of God.* And, after all possible objections, here they stick, and seem resolved to maintain, that extension and matter are the same.

Reg. Phys. part. i. ch. 3. n. 3.

Rohault, Tr. Phys. l. i. c. 7. n. 9.

Even Mons. Rohault himself, although in some things he saw it necessary to leave Des Cartes, yet in this he persists, *That the essence of matter consists in extension, and that space and matter are the same; and therefore a vacuum is impossible* And to the objection about the walls of a chamber standing, when the air is annihilated, he avoids answering *as to God's omnipotency;* but, he saith, *according to our understanding the walls must come together.* And to that about the walls' distance not depending on the air, he answers, *That the being of the walls does not depend upon the air within, but the state or disposition of them doth upon the extension between them;* which he supposes impossible to be taken away, and that the substance of matter hath a necessary existence.

C. 8. 1, 2, 3.

The substance of this argument comes to this. Des

Cartes makes *all the matter of the world to be one and the same:* but he asserts *the essence of matter to be extension*, and that extension can neither be created nor annihilated; and therefore it is impossible, upon his principles, to make out the dependence of matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be said, that Des Cartes expressly saith, *That it seemed manifest to him that there is no other general cause which created matter with motion and rest but God;* and that in the fragment of his last answer to Dr. H. M. he saith, *That if matter were left to itself, it would not move, but that it was first moved by God;* I answer, That according to his principles the substance of matter must be before, because there must be space; and *space and matter are the same.* And I can see no possible way of clearing him, but by saying, that he held two sorts of matter: one part is physical matter, which God gave motion to at first when he created it, and out of which the world was framed; and the other mathematical, which consists in mere extension: but how to reconcile these two to his asserting *one and the same matter in the world*, is a thing above my understanding.

CHAP. II.

Cart. Prin. p. ii. n. 36.

Id. Epist. tom. i. ep. 93.

II. The next thing to be considered, is, Des Cartes's undertaking to give an account of the phænomena of the universe from the *mechanical laws of motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by some, who have been very conversant with the atheistical persons of our age, *That they despise the Epicurean hypothesis, of the world's being made by a fortuitous concourse of atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think Moses's account more probable than that*, (which is a great favour indeed.) So that it is to little purpose now to spend time in shewing how precarious and unsatisfactory the principles of Epicurus were, who supposed motion in matter without the least ground for it; but Des Cartes was a man of too great sense and judgment to commit such blunders as Epicurus was guilty of (whom one of his sharpest adversaries allows to have been *of a great and searching wit, well skilled in geometry, to which he endeavoured to reduce natural philosophy, (although he failed in his attempt:) that he had a faculty of expressing his mind clearly in few words, above any either ancient or modern writer*). Therefore it will be necessary to consider what Des Cartes yields, that we may not mistake or misrepresent his design.

Fr. Cuperi Arcan. Atheism. l. ii. c. 3.

Huet. Cens. Phil. Cart. c. 8. n. 4.

1. He grants that God did at first create matter, which was capable of rest or motion.

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2. That matter, left to itself, would be without any motion; and therefore the first motion was from God.

3. That God, by his ordinary providence, doth preserve as much motion in the world as was given at first.

4. That we have no reason to suppose any other alteration in the ordinary course of things, according to the laws of motion, than what we are certain of by experience or revelation.

And now the main point is, whether matter, being thus put into motion, can produce the phænomena of the world, without any farther interposition of Providence, than only to preserve the motion of matter? For which we must consider, that he doth not give a satisfactory account, 1. of the *nature* and *laws of motion*, nor, 2. of the *phænomena of the universe*.

As to the former, I shall enquire into his notion of motion, and then of the laws of it.

I. Cart. Princ. part. ii. n. 25.

1. He asserts, that motion, according to his principles, is barely *a mode of matter*, without any inward principle of motion. For motion, he saith, is the change of the situation of bodies with respect to one another, or *a removing a body from the vicinity of some bodies to the neighbourhood of others*; and he places it in such a translation, on purpose that it may be understood to be only *a mode of the matter moved, as figure is of a thing figured*. But it is not so easy to understand that motion, which imports an action, should be only *a mode of the matter moved*, as it is that figure belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not possible for the figure to be any where else but in that body which hath it; but it is possible to apprehend motion to come either from an external agent or an internal principle; and so it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the nature of motion in this case, some greater evidence ought to have been given how motion, being once given to matter as a mode of it, must always continue, when the resistance of bodies doth certainly weaken it so as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter must be by a violent impulse, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things, (which is to overthrow the due laws of motion,) or else there must be a proportion in the force of the mover to the resistance of the body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion, (or else the smallest body might move the greatest,) then there must be a resistance in that body which is

moved: but every resistance gives a check to the motion of that body which moved it, and every check lessens the impulse; and so from a gradual resistance there must come a gradual decay, till at last all motion must cease; as it is in all machines whose motion depends upon external force. Des Cartes, indeed, saith, *That whatever motion is lost by one body, is communicated to the next, and so the first motion is still preserved.* But it is hardly possible to make it appear that motion is not so much weakened by resistance, but that it can preserve itself in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulse lessens the power of reflection; and it appears in light, and sounds, and other things, that whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that resistance must gradually weaken motion. And in the *motion of projected bodies*, Des Cartes himself grants, *That the motion continues till it be hindered by the resistance it meets with;* and he saith, *It is manifest that the motion is retarded by the air, and other ambient fluids, and so it cannot continue long.* But is that an argument *that bodies do continue motion till they be hindered, and that motion is only a mode of the body moved?* Whatever mode it is, it comes from the force of the immediate agent, and not from the motion at first given to matter; and here we see the resistance it meets with soon gives a stop to it. Therefore it seems unconceivable that all the motion in the world, considering the continual resistance of bodies, should be the same mode of matter which was at first given to it. And as to his definition of motion, some have undertaken to demonstrate it to be false, by shewing how one body may come nearer to another, without changing the situation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no such reciprocal motion as he asserts, although there be a reciprocal change of situation, which is unavoidable. But Mons. Rohault saith, *That motion is to be taken with respect to the next, and not to any remote bodies.* However Mons. Regis thought fit to quit that definition of Des Cartes for another, which Du Hamel saith is not at all better; but he thought it necessary to take in *the efficient cause of motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the authority of mathematicians and philosophers, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be said *to be moved, because it doth not change the situation as to the next bodies about it;* as that the kernel of a nut is not moved, because it is thrown

Id. part. ii. n. 38.

H. Mori Enchirid. Metaphys. par. i. c. 7.

Rohault, Tr. Phys. c. 10. n. 1. Regis Réponse aux Reflexions Critiques de M. Du Hamel, ch. 7.

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with the shell upon it; or that the wine is not moved in a ship at sea, because it keeps within the vessel. So, if the earth be carried about with the force of the vortex wherein it is, it is as certainly moved as a pendulum is with the motion of the ship, although it hath a proper motion of its own.

Des Cartes Prin. par. ii. n. 45, &c.

But Des Cartes undertakes to give an account of the proportion of the increase and lessening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard bodies, and he lays down *seven rules* to determine it; but it falls out very unhappily, *that six of them* are denied *to be true, and that the first doth not answer the end it was brought for.* This was a bold charge on so great a mathematician; but all that Regis

Réponse, &c. part. ii. ch. 12.

saith in answer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all Des Cartes's rules of motion, because they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the particular rules of motion be no better fixed nor understood, how come they to be so certain that the same quantity of motion is still

Cart. Prin. part. ii. n. 36.

preserved in the world? For that Des Cartes hath recourse *to the immutable will of God, which hath determined it.* No doubt if God hath determined it, so it must be. But from whence comes Des Cartes to know this to be the *immutable will of God?* What antecedent reason is there to satisfy any man's mind that God, *by his immutable will*, must keep up the same proportion of motion in the world? Why may not God alter or suspend the laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the Divine nature in so doing? So that these arguments *à priori* (as they call them) have no kind of evidence as to such matters, which may be or not be, as God pleases. Besides, what necessity was there that motion must be only *a mode of matter;* and that mode to be preserved by such laws of motion, which are so very uncertain? A very skilful and ingenious philosopher of our own saith, *That this rule, which he saith is the most useful of all Des Cartes's, is very metaphysical, and not very cogent to him. And he doth not see how it can be demonstrated; and he questions whether it be agreeable to experience.* And he was a person very favourable to Des Cartes, as far as he could, as appears on all occasions in his writings; but here we see he gives up his fundamental rule. Du Hamel saith, *The argument from God's immutability is of no force, because it holds not as to extrinsical actions.* Regis, to defend this, runs into that absurdity to make God a necessary agent, because God's will and his

Mr. Boyle of the high Veneration Man's Intellect owes to God, sect. 20.

Réponse aux Reflexions, par. ii. c. 13.

essence are the same; which overthrows all religion in the consequence of it. CHAP. II.

But Des Cartes himself excepts *such mutations as are made in matter, by evident experience or Divine revelation.* What is the meaning of this? Can that be *an immutable will of God* which is contradicted by evident experience and Divine revelation? Or were these words only put in to avoid censure? As the world was said to be indefinite, lest he should be charged with making the world infinite; and the definition of motion was altered, to avoid Galileo's fate. But there is no dissembling in this matter: if it be contradicted by evident experience, it can be no fixed and immutable rule; if it can be altered in case of miracles, the argument from God's immutability signifies nothing. For, if it be no repugnancy to the Divine nature to alter or suspend the laws of motion as he sees cause, then we can have no assurance as to God's will, any farther than himself hath declared it; and consequently they must prove that God hath manifested this to be his will. *But*, saith Rohault, *it is unbecoming philosophers on all occasions to run to miracles and Divine power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary course of Providence, as to causes and effects, without asserting these notions of Des Cartes; but this is a pleasant way of taking it for granted that none but his principles are fit for philosophers. Prin. part. ii. n. 36. Rohault, part. i. c. 10. n. 13.

II.

Come we now to examine his *catholic laws of motion:* and of all things those ought to be very clear and certain, because so much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we shall hardly find one of them to be so.

The first of them is, *That every thing remains in the same state it was in, unless it be changed by external causes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to rest which is contrary to the laws of nature, because rest is contrary to motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own destruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to assert the continuance of motion in the parts of the universe, upon their being once put into it; so that rest is a state of violence to a body once moved, because rest and motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak foundation to build so much upon: for we are not to consider rest and motion abstractly, but physically, together with the bodies in which they are: and I think it will be very hard to persuade any body endued with sense and motion, that, after Cart. Princip. part. ii. n. 37.

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wearisome motion, he doth aim at his own destruction by seeking for rest. This is a sort of reasoning would not be expected from philosophers; that because motion and rest are contrary motions, therefore no body in motion can tend to rest. *But every thing continues in the state it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion must continue to move.* This is not clearly expressed: for if it be meant, that every thing from itself continues in its original state, then it is not true. For matter, he confesses, would rest, if God did not give motion to it; and so it must continue to rest, and there could be no motion at all. If it be meant that every thing continues in the state God put it into, unless he appointed several causes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not serve his purpose. For if God hath appointed both motion and rest for some bodies, it can never be said that such tend to their own destruction, when they tend to that rest which God and nature appointed for them. If God hath appointed them for continual motion, as the great bodies of the universe, then they must continue in it; not by virtue of any inherent law of motion, but by the immutable will of God. Des Cartes saw it necessary for God to put matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the laws of this motion himself; whereas he had acted more respectfully towards his Maker, and more like a philosopher, i. e. more consonantly to his own principles, to have left God, that made the world, and gave motion to matter, to have settled those laws of motion, which were agreeable to his infinite wisdom. For these notions are unbecoming philosophers, to make motion a mere mode of matter; and this mode to be supported by Divine concourse; but so, that motion and rest being contraries, whatever is in motion must continue in it; because motion and rest being contraries, nothing can tend to its own destruction.

Cart. Princip. part. ii. n. 39. Part. iii. n. 55.

Besides, I know not how to reconcile this with another law of nature, as he calls it, *That all bodies in a circular motion endeavour what in them lies to recede from the centre of their motion.* Is not a body put into a circular motion, in a state belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that state, but to endeavour all it can to get out of it? And yet all the phænomena of light depend upon this law: *That the round particles of the second element endeavour to recede from their centres; not from any cogitation,* (no doubt of it,) *but because they are so*

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placed and incited to that motion. Is that possible, and yet *all bodies continue in the state they are in,* when they endeavour what they can to get out of it? Are not these more contrary than motion and rest? I do not meddle with external hindrances, but the natural endeavours of bodies. But it may be said, *That Des Cartes intends his rule only of primary and simple motions, and not of circular, which are violent and unnatural.* So indeed his words seem to run at first, that this rule relates to *simple and undivided bodies;* but then, I say, it is of no use as to the present phænomena; and he speaks of *the laws of such motion as we may observe in bodies:* which words signify nothing, unless his law reaches to the bodies now in being; and I see no reason for him to suppose circular motion to be any more repugnant to the nature of matter, than any other. Regis, to avoid this, saith, *That circular motion is not unnatural, but accidental; and the state of the body is to be taken from what it would be if external causes were removed,* i. e. *in a right line.* But he doth not attend to the consequences of this; for then the circular motion of the heavens must be accidental, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable will of God. *For God's will,* he saith, *is, that every body be preserved in its own state; now,* saith he, *the state of a body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavour of nature is to keep to that.* Then, say I, whatever motion is against the state wherein nature designs it, must be not only accidental but violent, because it is against the course of nature: and if it be violent, it cannot be supposed to be under God's immutable will; but if it be not violent, then a body in circular motion must endeavour to preserve itself in that state, and not to recede from it, as Des Cartes supposes.

Réponse, &c. part. ii. ch. 10.

Mons. Du Hamel objects against this law, that permanent beings do indeed endeavour to preserve themselves in the state they are in: but it doth not hold in beings that are successive; because the former are in their full state at first, but it is otherwise in successive. *But,* saith Regis, *this doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their destruction.* So that it is a plain case no body in motion can tend to rest, *because motion and rest are contrary;* and this is a fundamental law of nature, for this weighty reason.

Réponse aux Reflex. part. ii. c. 9.

The second law is, *That all motion, according to nature, is in a right line, and that oblique and circular motion arises from the motion and interposition of other bo-*

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dies; and whatever body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the centre of the circle it describes.

Now, if this rule had that evidence which is necessary to make it a fundamental law of motion, it must be proved either from the nature of matter and motion, or from the immutable will of God. The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and simplicity of the operation whereby God doth preserve motion in matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that motion, which extends to more moments, should be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the motion be in a right line, it must be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that God preserves motion* only in a point: but Des Cartes owns, *that it cannot be conceived in an instant, although in a right line.* How then comes motion in a right line to come from God's immutability, and not in a circle? *Because it is determined in every instant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident than from the instance of the sling: for the falling down of the stone to the earth is certainly from another cause, viz. from the principle of gravitation, and not from the inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be said to come from the nature of matter, or motion; for a circular motion hath as much the nature and definition of motion, according to Des Cartes, as the other: and matter is of itself indifferent which way it moves; and some have thought circular motion more perfect, because they observed the motion of the heavens to be so. But if it arises from the impediments of other bodies, they must shew that matter was first put into motion in a straight line; and if God put all the parts of matter at first into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preserves motion as he gave it: he first gave it in right lines, and *his will is immutable*, therefore it must always so continue; and so circular motion will be impossible.

But let us suppose circular motion, how comes it to be so evident as to be made a law of nature, *that a body in that motion always endeavours to recede from the centre?* How is this consistent with the principle of gravitation and attraction, which depends upon mathematical demonstration, if it be in the nature of bodies to tend to the

centre, and to recede from it at the same time? And it is a very improbable thing that gravity should be nothing else, but some particles being not so quick in their motion from the centre as others are, these being left in the lurch, and pressed by the motion of the other, do sink under them, and so come nearer to the centre; which is all that Des Cartes means by gravity. But of this afterwards. CHAP. II.

The last fundamental law of motion is, *That when a body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aside, but loseth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loseth itself as much as it gives.* The reason given of this is, *because it is the immutable will of God, that the same quantity of motion shall be always preserved:* of which I have spoken already. And as to the whole matter of these laws of motion, Mr. Boyle saith, *That they have been received by learned men, rather upon the authority of so famous a mathematician, than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the rules themselves.* N. 40. Mr. Boyle of Veneration, &c. sect. 20.

The next thing we are to do is, to see whether, from these laws of motion, he gives a satisfactory account of the making of the universe.

And here we must consider the elements out of which he supposeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

As to the elements, this, in short, is his account of them. *The particles of matter into which it was first divided, could not at first be round, because then there must be a vacuum between them; but they must by succession of time become round, because they had various circular motions,* (although the *natural motion* be in a *right line*, and *God's immutable will be that every thing should be preserved in its natural state:*) *But that force which put them into these motions was great enough to wear off their angles, and so they become round: which being joined together, must leave some intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the angles; which were very small, and of a figure fit to fill up all interstices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two elements; one of the round particles, and another of the subtle ethereal matter, which came by the attrition of the first particles. But besides these, there are others more gross and unapt for motion by their figure, and which make the third element; and out of these all the bodies of the vi-* Cart. Principia part. iii. n. 48. N. 49. N. 52.

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sible world are composed; the sun and fixed stars out of the first; the heavens out of the second; and the earth, with comets and planets, out of the last.

The main thing which makes this hypothesis unsatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundless as the Epicurean, and they differ only as to the beginning of motion; which the Epicureans suppose to belong to matter: and Des Cartes saith, it comes from an infinite agent distinct from it; because he supposes that it would not move of itself, unless it were put into motion. Which being set aside, there is no more of the wisdom or providence of God to be found in his making of the world than the others, nor any more evidence as to the production of his elements: for he first supposes that there can be no *vacuum* in nature, which he proves only from his mathematical notion of body consisting only in extension; and from hence he undertakes to give an account, not of God's creating the matter of the world at once, nor of his production of things within six days, but how, in process of time, particles of matter being divided, would come to make up his several elements. And for this he makes use of several suppositions, without any ground of reason why it must be so, and no otherwise; which was the thing which he undertook to Mersennus to do. For what reason doth he give that matter must be divided at first, in order to the production of the elements? When there can be no division, but there must be intervals between the parts; and if all matter be *one and the same*, and the space of the intervals be necessarily filled up with extended matter, what division of parts could there be? And how can that extension be divided into solid bodies? Des Cartes grants, *That by reason we cannot find out how big the parts of matter were at first, how quick their motion, nor what kind of circles they described*, then it is impossible to find out by reason how the world was made. *For if God*, as he confesses, *might use innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*, what a vain thing is it in any man to undertake to give an account how the world came to be formed? And therefore Robault, with great judgment, pretends not to give an account how matter was formed by God at the first creation, but only to shew a possibility how it might be framed, so as to solve the appearances of the world. But neither he nor Des Cartes can reconcile this primitive division of matter into parts with their original notion of matter; which is nothing but extension. *But if mat-*

Part. iii. n. 46.

Tract. Physic. c. 21. n. 6.

ter be so divided, as Des Cartes supposes, *may we not reasonably conclude that there were three such elements as he speaks of?* The question is not, whether there be not a distinction of the particles of matter answerable to these three elements, viz. a more subtle and ethereal substance, as in fire; a less subtle and globular, as in air; a grosser, as in earth; which are most made according to these principles out of such different particles: but the point is, whether these elements can be produced in such a manner by the mere motion of matter? And Des Cartes will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *vacuum*, which would spoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round; nay, they must become round; Eas non potuisse successu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to shew how these must become round by his own laws of motion, i. e. by a motion in a right line; for he saith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the original matter of itself to deviate from the fundamental law of motion? That is, from whence came these circular motions, without which the elements could not be formed? And if the first particles were so solid as is supposed, how came the angles to be worn off? For, when two solid bodies meet, according to his own laws of motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loses of its own; which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the collision; but this doth by no means shew how these bodies come to wear off each other's angles: and therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very necessary to his purpose. But let us suppose, that by frequent collisions some alterations would be made in the figure of these bodies, what a long time must it be before they become spherical! Too long to be consistent with such a thing as creation; which at the same time is pretended to be believed. But the only agreeable supposition to this is, the existence of matter from eternity, which having, we know not how many ages since, been put into motion then by a casual concourse, (for it was not by the laws of motion,) these particles justling one against another, at last rubbed off the uneven particles, so as to make them round. But what quantity was there of such particles, in proportion to what was left? For it may easily be too great, and so the first element be too powerful for the second, as some have undertaken to demonstrate that it must be, upon Des Cartes's own grounds. And the answer given is

N. 48.

Enchirid. Metaphys. c. 16. Huet. Cens. Philosoph. Cartes. c. 6.

BOOK I.

insufficient; because the proportion of the first element will still be too great, notwithstanding all the uses found out for it; and therefore Rohault more wisely avoided these attempts of forming the world out of the first chaos of confused matter, which he found could give no satisfaction.

Regis Réponse, ch. 6. art. 2.

Let us now, in the last place, come to the account he gives of the *phænomena of the universe*, according to these principles. And because it would be too large a task to run through all, I shall confine myself to these following: 1. The formation of the sun and stars. 2. The motion of the air. 3. The placing of the earth. 4. The mechanism of animals.

I. As to the formation of the sun and stars; which Des Cartes saith was in this manner: *That the matter of the first element increased by the attrition of the particles of the second; and there being greater quantity of it than was necessary to fill up the interstices between the round particles of the second element, the remainder went to the centres of the several vortices.* But here arises a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of satisfaction in this matter; which is, that Des Cartes owns, *that in this matter of the first element there are some parcels which are less divided and slower moved, having many angles, and therefore unfit for motion.* Now why should not these take up the centre of the vortex, and not those which have a quicker motion, and endeavour to recede from it? For we must observe, that Des Cartes supposes *that these bigger fragments are mixed with the lesser, and that they transfer their motion to them: according to the laws of nature* (which serve his turn as he pleases) *greater bodies do easier transfer their motion to lesser, than receive motion from them.* So that here we have these bigger fragments of the first element mixed with the lesser, and communicating their motion to them. Now who could expect any other than that these should have fixed in the centre of the vortex? But if this be supposed, his whole hypothesis is lost; for then the sun and stars must be opaque, and not luminous bodies. But Des Cartes hath found out a notable invention to send them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the poles towards the middle of the heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little masses; some from the north, and others from the south. But when they are in the body of the sun or a star, then they make those spots which hinder their light, and are thrown off like a thick scum from*

Cart. Princip. par. iii. n. 54.

N. 88.

N. 89.

N. 91.

N. 94.

heated liquors. But when he assigns the reason of gravity, he saith, *It comes from hence, that those particles which have a quicker motion press down those which are not so fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the centre.* How comes it then to be so much otherwise in these parts of the third element? How come they not to be pressed down in the same vortex towards the centre? Especially when himself there saith, *That the particles of the first element have more power to depress the earthy particles than of the second, because they have more agitation;* and here he speaks of the motion within the vortex: so that, according to his principles, the matter of the third element ought to subside and be near the centre, being least apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole theory about the sun and stars, and about light, and the spots of the sun, and of magnetic particles, &c. so that these particles of the third element must be disposed of as he thinks fit, lest they put all out of order. And it is strange he should parallel the scum made by the fermenting of liquors, with the natural motion of the matter of his elements. And if this principle were true, that the matter of the third element might get above, and leave the thinner and more subtle matter nearest the centre, I do not see how the earth could be habitable; for then we could breathe nothing but thin and ethereal air, which we could not bear: as appears by the famous instance of Acosta, who speaks by his own sad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his life, by going over one of the highest mountains of Peru. From whence it is observed, that the most subtle air is too thin for respiration. But how comes it to pass, according to these principles, that the heavier part of the air is most towards the centre, and the lighter ascends highest? For air, according to Des Cartes, is *a congeries of the particles of the third element, very thin and disjoined;* and yet we find this come nearer the centre, according to its gravity, and the lighter air goes higher, and hath very different effects on men's bodies, though the motion of it be not strong nor violent. For Acosta saith, That air which is so fatal to passengers on those mountains of Peru, (which are so high, that he saith, the Alps and Pyrenees were but as ordinary houses to lofty towers,) is so still, that it is but *as a small breath, neither strong nor violent,* and yet it pierces so, that it often kills men without feeling, and makes their hands and toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledge.

Id. Princip. part. iv. n. 23.

N. 25.

Acosta of the Indies, l. iii. c. 9. Boyle's Experiments of Air, p. 182.

Cart. Princip. part. iv. n. 45.

BOOK I.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in Des Cartes, to keep these particles of his third element from being nearer to the centre, although they are more weighty and indisposed to motion than others are.

But his whole hypothesis is overturned concerning the celestial bodies, if there be a principle of gravitation in matter, which makes a natural tendency towards the centre, according to the quantity and distance of it. The opinion of Des Cartes's great skill in geometry hath gone much farther towards persuading the world of the truth of his theory, than any evidences that appeared in his principles themselves; for men who are not deeply skilled in those matters, are very apt to be swayed by the authority of those that are. But, as it falls out in this case, we have this theory of gravitation fully demonstrated by a very learned and judicious mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the reader, who hath given a mathematical account of the celestial bodies, not only of *the sun and stars, but of comets, and the moon, from the principle of gravitation*; not inherent and essential to matter, but by a force given and directed by Divine power and wisdom: which being granted, we have no reason to be displeased with the clearest account which can be given, in a mathematical manner, of the chief phænomena of the universe. And the same person saith, *He hath many reasons to suspect that the rest may depend upon some secret powers, by which the particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledge whereof, philosophers have hitherto blundered in natural philosophy.* But we proceed in Des Cartes's account of his celestial vortices.

Is. Newton Philosoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.

Præfat.

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END OF ORIGINES SACRÆ.

A

LETTER TO A DEIST,

IN ANSWER TO

SEVERAL OBJECTIONS

AGAINST

THE TRUTH AND AUTHORITY

OF

THE SCRIPTURES.

THE

PREFACE.

THIS following Discourse was written for the satisfaction of a particular person, who owned the Being and Providence of God, but expressed a mean esteem of the Scriptures and the Christian religion: which is become so common a theme among the Sceptics of this age, that the Author of this Discourse thought it worth his time and care to consider the force of the objections that were made against them; especially being written in a grave and serious manner, and not with that raillery and buffoonery which the rude persons of this age commonly bestow upon religion. It might be justly expected from such who pretend to breeding and civility, that they would at least shew more respect to a thing which hath prevailed so much among men of the best understanding and education, and who have had no interest to carry on by it. For it is against the ordinary rules of conversation, to affront that which others think they have great reason to esteem and love; and they would not endure that scorn and contempt of their meanest servant, which they too often shew towards religion, and the things belonging to it. If they are not in earnest when they scoff and mock at sacred things, their own consciences will tell them it is an horrible impiety: if they are in earnest, let them debate these things

Tractat. Theol. Politic.

calmly and seriously, and let the stronger reason prevail. Men may speak sharply and wittily against the clearest things in the world, as the Sceptics of old did against all certainty of sense and reason: but we should think that man out of his senses, that would now dispute the being of the sun, or the colour of the snow. We do not say, the matters of religion are capable of the same evidence with that of sense; but it is a great part of judgment and understanding, to know the proportion and fitness of evidence to the nature of the thing to be proved. They would not have the eye to judge of tastes, nor the nose of metaphysics; and yet these would be as proper, as to have the senses judge of immaterial beings. If we do not give as good reason for the principles of our religion, as, the nature of religion considered, can be given for it, let us then be blamed for our weakness in defending it; but let not religion suffer, till they are sure nothing more can be said for it.

There is a late Author, I hear, mightily in vogue among many, who cry up any thing on the atheistical side, though never so weak and trifling. It were no difficult task to lay open the false reasonings and inconsistent hypotheses of his book; which hath been sufficiently done already in that language wherein it was written. But if, for the advancement of irreligion among us, that book be, as it is talked, translated into our tongue, there will not, I hope, want those who will be as ready to defend religion and morality, as others are to decry and despise them.

A

LETTER OF RESOLUTION

TO A

PERSON UNSATISFIED ABOUT THE TRUTH AND AUTHORITY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH I do not pretend to any skill in the depths of theology, yet I am heartily concerned for the truth and honour of the Christian religion, which it is the design of your papers to undermine. When I first looked them over, I could not think them so considerable as to deserve a particular answer, especially from one in my circumstances, who have so much other business lying upon me, and so little leisure and health to perform it: but I found at the conclusion of your papers so earnest and vehement a desire expressed by you that I would return an answer, in order to the settlement of your mind, that I could not refuse an office of so great charity, as you represent it to be. I confess, when I considered the nature of your objections, and the manner of managing them, I could hardly believe that they proceeded from a doubtful mind, that was desirous of any satisfaction: but since you tell me so, I will first shew my charity in believing it, and then in endeavouring to give you my poor assistance, and impartial advice, in order to your satisfaction. And in truth I think impartial advice will contribute more to that end, than spending time and paper in running through all the difficulties which it is possible for a cavilling mind to raise against the plainest truths in the world. For there is nothing so clear and evident, but a sophistical wit will always find something to say against it; and if you be the person I take you for, you very well know that there have been some, who wanted neither wit nor eloquence, who have gone about to prove, *That there was nothing in the world; and that if there were any thing, it could not be understood by men; that if it were understood by one man, it could not be expressed to*

another. And besides such extravagant undertakers as these, how many have there been, who, with plausible and subtle arguments, have endeavoured to overthrow all manner of certainty, either by sense or reason! Must we therefore quit all pretences to certainty, because we cannot, it may be, answer all the subtleties of the Sceptics? And therefore I am by no means satisfied with your manner of proceeding, *desiring all particular difficulties to be answered, before we consider the main evidences of the Christian faith.* For the only reasonable way of proceeding in this matter, is to consider, first, whether there be sufficient motives to persuade you to embrace the Christian faith, and then to weigh the difficulties, and to compare them with the reasons and arguments for believing; and if those do not appear great enough to overthrow the force of the other, you may rest satisfied in the Christian faith, although you cannot answer every difficulty that may be raised against the books wherein our religion is contained. I pray, Sir, consider with yourself; do not you think it possible for any man to have faith enough to save him, unless he can solve all the difficulties in chronology that are in the Bible, unless he can give an account of every particular law and custom among the Jews, unless he can make out all the prophetic schemes, and can tell what the number of the beast in the Apocalypse means? If a man may believe and be saved without these things, to what purpose are they objected for the overthrow of the Christian faith? Do you think a man hath not reason enough to believe there is extended matter in the world, unless he can solve all the difficulties that arise from the extension or divisibility of matter? Or that he hath a soul, unless he can make it clear how an immaterial and material substance can be so united as our soul and body are? Or that the sun shines, unless he can demonstrate whether the sun or the earth moves? Or that we have any certainty of things, unless he can assign the undoubted criterion of truth and falsehood in all things? These things I mention, on purpose to let you see that the most certain things have difficulties about them, which no one thinks it necessary for him to answer in order to his assurance of the truth of the things; but as long as the evidence for them is much more considerable than the objections against them, we may safely acquiesce in our assent to them, and leave the unfolding these difficulties to *the disputers of this world*, or the knowledge of another. Is it not far more reasonable for

us to think, that, in books of so great antiquity as those of Moses are, written in a language whose idiotisms are so different from ours, there may be some difficulty in the phrases, or computation of times or customs of the people, that we cannot well understand, than that all the miracles wrought by Moses should have been impostures; and that law which was preserved so constantly, maintained with that resolution by the wisest of the people of the Jews, who chose to die rather than disown it, should be all a cheat? Is it not more reasonable for us to suspect our own understandings, as to the speeches and actions of some of the prophets, than to think that men who designed so much the advancing virtue, and discouraging vice, should be a pack of hypocrites and deceivers? Can any man of common sense suspect the Christian religion to be a fourb or an imposture, because he cannot understand the number of the beast, or interpret the Apocalyptic Visions? I could hardly have believed any man, pretending to reason, could object these things, unless I saw them, and were called upon to answer them.

Therefore, Sir, my serious and impartial advice to you is, in the first place, to consider and debate the main point, i. e. the proofs of the Christian doctrine, and not to hunt up and down the Scriptures for every thing that seems a difficulty to you, and then, by heaping all these together, to make the Scriptures seem a confused heap of indigested stuff; which being taken in pieces, and considered with that modesty, diligence, and care, that doth become us, will appear to contain nothing unbecoming that sacred and venerable name which the Scriptures do bear among us.

If, therefore, you design not cavilling, but satisfaction, you will join issue with me upon the most material point, viz. *Whether the Christian religion were from God, or from men?* For if this be proved to have been from God, all the other things will easily fall off of themselves, or be removed with a little industry.

In the debate of this, I shall consider, first, what things are agreed upon between us, and then, wherein the difference lies.

1. *You grant an absolutely perfect and independent Being, whom we call God.*

2. *That the world was at first created, and is still governed by him.*

3. *That he is so holy as to be the author of no sin, although he doth not hinder men from sinning.*

4. *That this God is to receive from us all worship proper to him, of prayers, praises,* &c.

5. *That it is the will of this God that we should lead holy, peaceable, and innocent lives.*

6. *That God will accept men's sincere repentance, and hearty endeavours to do his will, although they do not perfectly obey it.*

7. *That there is a state of rewards and punishments in another world, according to the course of men's lives here.*

8. *That there are many excellent precepts in the writings of the New Testament, inducing to humility and self-denial, and to the honour of God, and civil duty and honesty of life; and these in a more plentiful manner than is to be found in any other profession of religion publicly known.*

The questions then remaining are, 1. *Whether the matters of fact are true, which are reported in the writings of the New Testament?* 2. Supposing them true, *Whether they do sufficiently prove the doctrine to have been from God?*

1. *Whether the matters of fact were true or no?* And as to this point, I wish you had set down the reasons of your doubting more clearly and distinctly than you have done. What I can pick up, amounts to these things. 1. *That there can be no certainty of a matter done at such a distance of time, there having been many fictitious histories in the world.* 2. *That it is probable that these things might be written when there was no one living to detect the falsehood of them; and thus you say, the Grecians, Romans, Egyptians, and other nations, were at first imposed upon by some men, who pretended to deliver to them the history of their gods and heroes, and the wonders wrought by them.* 3. *That these things might more easily be done before printing was used; and that there is reason to suspect the more, because of the pious frauds of the primitive Christians, and the legends of the Papists.* 4. *That there may have been many more deceptions and impostures in the way of propagating false revelations and miracles, than we can now discover.* 5. *That we ought not to take the testimony of Scripture, or the Christian writers in this case, because they may be suspected of partiality; and that the testimony of Josephus is suspected by divers learned men to be fraudulently put in by Christians.* 6. *That there are sufficient grounds from the story itself, and the objections of enemies, to suspect the truth of it; because of the contradiction and inconsistency of the parts of it; the want of accomplishment of the promises and prophecies of it; the obscurity and un-*

intelligibleness of other parts; the defects of the persons mentioned therein; St. Paul's ostentation; the jars between Peter and Paul, and Paul and Barnabas. 7. That from these things you have just cause to doubt the Apostles' sincerity, and you think they might have indirect ends in divulging the miracles recorded in Scripture; and that men might be contented to suffer, to make themselves heads of a new sect of religion, and to rule over the consciences of men; and that they had time enough to make a considerable interest before the persecutions began.

This is the force of all I can find out, in the several parts of your papers, towards the invalidating the testimony concerning the matters of fact reported in the writings of the New Testament.

In answer to all these things, I shall shew, 1. That matters of fact, done at such a distance of time, may have sufficient evidence to oblige men to believe them. 2. That there is no reason to suspect the truth of those matters of fact which are contained in the history of the New Testament. 3. That the Apostles gave the greatest testimonies of their sincerity, that could be expected from them; and that no matters of fact were ever better attested than those which are reported by them: from whence it will follow, that it is not reason, but unreasonable suspicion and scepticism, if not wilfulness and obstinacy, which makes men to continue to doubt after so great evidence.

1. That we may have such evidence of matters of fact done at such a distance of time, as may oblige us to believe the truth of them. This we are first to make out, because several of your objections seem to imply *that we can have no certainty of such things, because we cannot know what tricks may have been played in former times, when it was far more easy to deceive; and that it is confessed there have been several frauds of this kind, which have a long time prevailed in the world.* But have not the very same arguments been used against all religion by Atheists? And if the cheats that have been in religion have no force against the being of God, why should they have any against the Christian religion? And if the common consent of mankind signify any thing as to the acknowledgment of a Deity, why should not the testimony of the Christian Church, so circumstantiated as it is, be of sufficient strength to receive the matters of fact delivered by it? Which is all I at present desire. Do we question any of the stories delivered by the common consent of Greek or

Latin historians, although we have only the bare testimony of those historians for them? And yet your objections would lie against every one of them. How do we know the great prevalency of the Roman empire? Was it not delivered by those who belonged to it, and were concerned to make the best of it? What know we but thousands of histories have been lost, that confuted all that we now have concerning the greatness of Rome? What know we but that Rome was destroyed by Carthage, or that Hannibal quite overthrew the Roman empire? or that Catiline was one of the best men in the world, because all our present histories were written by men of the other side? How can we tell but that the Persians destroyed the Macedonians, because all our accounts of Alexander's expedition are originally from the Greeks? And why might not we suspect greater partiality in all these cases, when the writers did not give a thousandth part of that evidence for their fidelity, that the first Christians did? And yet what should we think of such a person, who should call in question the best histories of all nations, because they are written by those of the same country? By which, it seems, you will never allow any competent testimony at all; for if such things be written by enemies and strangers, we have reason to suspect both their knowledge and integrity; if written by friends, then, though they might know the truth, yet they would write partially of their own side: so that upon this principle no history at all, ancient or modern, is to be believed; for they are all reported either by friends or enemies; and so not only divine, but all human faith will be destroyed. I am by no means a friend to unreasonable credulity; but I am as little to unreasonable distrust and suspicion: if the one be folly, the other is madness. No prudent man believes any thing because it is possible to be true, nor rejects any thing merely because it is possible to be false: but it is the prudence of every man to weigh and consider all circumstances, and according to them to assent or dissent. We all know it is possible for men to deceive, or to be deceived; but we know there is no necessity of either; and that there is such a thing as truth in the world; and though men may deceive, yet they do not always so; and that men may know they are not deceived. For else there could be no such thing as society among mankind; no friendship, or trust, or confidence in the word of another person. Because it is possible that the best friend I have may deceive me, and

the world is full of dissimulation, must I therefore believe nobody? This is the just consequence of this way of arguing, *that we have reason to suspect the truth of these matters of fact, because there have been many frauds in the world, and might have been many more than we can now discover:* for if this principle be pursued, it will destroy all society among men, which is built on the supposition of mutual trust and confidence that men have in each other; and although it be possible for all men to deceive, because we cannot know one another's hearts, yet there are such characters of honesty and fidelity in some persons, that others dare venture their lives and fortunes upon their words. And is any man thought a fool for doing so? Nay, have not the most prudent and sagacious men reposed a mighty confidence in the integrity of others? And without this no great affairs can be carried on in the world; for since the greatest persons need the help of others to manage their business, they must trust other men continually; and every man puts his life into the hands of others, to whom he gives any freedom of access, and especially his servants. Must a man therefore live in continual suspicion and jealousy, because it is possible he may be deceived? But if this be thought unreasonable, then we gain thus much, that, notwithstanding the possibility of deception, men may be trusted in some cases, and their fidelity safely relied upon. This being granted, we are to enquire what that assurance is which makes us trust any one; and wherever we find a concurrence of the same circumstances, or equal evidence of fidelity, we may repose the same trust or confidence in them. And we may soon find that it is not any one's bare word that makes us trust him, but either the reputation of his integrity among discerning men, or our long experience and observation of him: this latter is only confined to our own trial; but the former is more general, and reaches beyond our own age, since we may have the testimony of discerning persons conveyed down to us in as certain a manner as we can know the mind of a friend at a hundred miles distance, viz. by writing. And in this case we desire no more than to be satisfied that those things were written by them; and that they deserved to be believed in what they writ. Thus, if any one would be satisfied about the passages of the Peloponnesian war, and hath heard that Thucydides hath accurately written it, he hath no more to do than to enquire whether this Thucydides were capable of giving a

good account of it, and for that he hears that he was a great and inquisitive person that lived in that age, and knew all the occurrences of it; and when he is satisfied of that, his next enquiry is, whether he may be trusted or no? And for this he can expect no better satisfaction, than that his history hath been in great reputation for its integrity among the most knowing persons. But how shall he be sure this was the history written by Thucydides, since there have been many counterfeit writings obtruded upon the world? Besides the consent of learned men in all ages since, we may compare the testimonies cited out of it with the history we have, and the style with the character given of Thucydides, and the narrations with other credible histories of those times; and if all these agree, what reason can there be not to rely upon the history of Thucydides? All learned men do acknowledge that there have been multitudes of fictitious writings; but do they therefore question whether there are any genuine? Or whether we have not the true Herodotus, Strabo, or Pausanias, because there is a counterfeit Berosus, Manetho, and Philo, set forth by Annius of Viterbo? Do any suspect whether we have any of the genuine works of Cicero, because an Italian counterfeited a book, De Consolatione, in his name? Or whether Cæsar's Commentaries were his own, because it is uncertain who writ the Alexandrian War that is joined with them? By which we see, that we may not only be certain of the fidelity of persons we converse with, but of all things necessary to our belief of what was done at a great distance of time from the testimony of writers, notwithstanding the many supposititious writings that have been in the world.

But it may be said, *that all this only relates to mere matters of history, wherein a man is not much concerned whether they be true or false: but the things we are about are matters that men's salvation or damnation are said to depend upon, and therefore greater evidence should be given of these, to oblige men to believe them.*

To this I answer, 1. That my design herein was to prove, that, notwithstanding the possibility of deception, there may be sufficient ground for a prudent and firm assent to the truth of things done at as great a distance of time, and conveyed after the same manner, that the matters of fact reported in the New Testament are; and hereby those general prejudices are shewed to be unreasonable. And all that I desire from this discourse is,

that you would give an assent of the same nature to the history of the Gospel, that you do to Cæsar, or Livy, or Tacitus, or any other ancient historian. 2. As to the greater obligation to assent, I say it depends upon the evidence of Divine revelation, which is given by the matters of fact which are delivered to us. And here give me leave to ask you, 1. Whether it be any ways repugnant to any conception you have of God, for him to make use of fallible men to make known his will to the world? 2. Whether those men, though supposed to be in themselves fallible, can either deceive or be deceived, when God makes known his mind to them? 3. Whether, on supposition that God hath made use of such persons for this end, those are not obliged to believe them, who do not live in the same age with them? If not, then God must either make no revelation at all, or he must make a new one every age: if they are, then the obligation lies as much on us now to believe, as if we had lived and conversed with those inspired persons.

2. That there is no reason to suspect the truth of those matters of fact which are reported in the New Testament; for since it is universally agreed among men, that human testimony is a sufficient ground for assent, where there is no positive ground for suspicion, because deceiving and being deceived is not the common interest of mankind, therefore we are to consider what the general grounds of suspicion are, and whether any of them do reach the Apostles' testimony, concerning the matters of fact reported by them. And the just grounds of suspicion are these: 1. If the persons be otherwise known to be men of artifice and cunning, full of tricks and dissimulation, and that make no conscience of speaking truth, so a lie tends to their greatest advantage; which is too much the Papists' case in their legends and stories of miracles. 2. If they temper and suit their story and doctrine to the humour and genius of the people they hope to prevail upon, as Mahomet did, in encouraging war and lasciviousness. 3. If they lay the scene of their story at a mighty distance from themselves, at such an age wherein it is impossible to prove or disprove, which is the case of the Brachmans as to their Brahmà and their Veda; and was of the Heathens as to their fabulous deities. 4. If there be any thing contained in the story which is repugnant to the most authentic histories of those times; by which means the impostures of Annius have been discovered. 5. If there be evident contradiction in the story

itself, or any thing repugnant to, or unbecoming the majesty, holiness, sincerity, and consistency of a Divine revelation; on which account we reject fanatic pretences to revelations. If there were any thing of this nature in the writings of the New Testament, we might then allow there were some ground to suspect the truth of what is contained therein: but I shall undertake, by the grace of God, to defend that there is not any foundation for suspicion as to any one of these.

1. As to the persons, such who go about to deceive others, must be men that are versed in business, and know how to deal with men; and that have some interest already that they have gained by other means, before they can carry on such a design as to abuse mankind, by lies and impostures in religion. Therefore the Atheists lay the deceiving the world by religion to the charge of politicians and lawgivers, to men versed in the practice of fraud, such as Numa, or Lycurgus, or Xaca, or Mahomet, such as understood the ways of cajoling the people; or to subtle priests, that know how to suit the hopes and fears of the superstitious multitude; whence came the multitude of frauds in the Heathen temples and oracles. But would any man in the world have pitched upon a few fishermen, and illiterate persons, to carry on such an intrigue as this? Men that were rude and unexperienced in the world, and uncapable of dealing in the way of artifice with one of the common citizens of Jerusalem. When was it ever heard that such men made such an alteration in the religion of the world, as the primitive Christians did, against the most violent persecutions? And when they prevailed so much, the common charge still against them was, that they were a company of *rude, mean, obscure, illiterate, simple men*; and yet, in spite of all the cunning, and malice, and learning, and strength of their adversaries, they gained ground upon them, and prevailed over the obstinacy of the Jews, and wisdom of the Greeks. If the Christian religion had been a mere design of the Apostles to make themselves heads of a new sect, what had this been but to have set the cunning of twelve or thirteen men, of no interest, or reputation, against the wisdom and power of the whole world? If they had any wisdom, they would never have undertaken such an impossible design as this must appear to them at first view; and if they had none, how could they ever hope to manage it? If their aim were only at reputation, they might have thought of thousands of ways more probable

and more advantageous than this. If we suppose men should be willing to hazard their lives for their reputations, we may suppose withal such men to have so much cunning as not to do it till they cannot help it; but if they can have reputation and ease together, they had rather have it. I will therefore put the case concerning the only person that had the advantage of a learned education among the Apostles, viz. St. Paul, and whom you seem to strike at more than the rest. Is it reasonable to believe, that, when he was in favour with the Sanhedrin, and was likely to advance himself by his opposition to Christianity, and had a fair prospect of ease and honour together, he should quit all this, to join with such an inconsiderable and hated company as the Christians were, only to be one of the heads of a very small number of men, and to purchase it at so dear a rate as the loss of his friends and interest, and running on continual troubles and persecutions, to the hazard of his life? Is it possible for men that are deceived, and mean honestly, to do this? But it is scarce supposable of a man in his senses, that should know and believe all this to be a cheat, and yet own and embrace it to so great disadvantage to himself, when he could not make himself so considerable by it as he might have been without it. Men must love cheating the world at a strange rate, that will let go fair hopes of preferment and ease, and lead a life of perpetual trouble, and expose themselves to the utmost hazards; only for the sake of deluding others. If the Apostles knew all they said to be false, and made it so necessary for all men to believe what they said to be true, they were some of the greatest deceivers which the world had ever known. But men that take pleasure in deceiving, make use of many artifices on purpose to catch the silly multitude. They have all the arts of insinuation and fawning speeches, fit to draw in the weakest, and such as love to be flattered. But what is there tending this way in all the Apostles' writings? How sharply do they speak to the Jewish Sanhedrin upon the murder of Christ! With what plainness and simplicity do they go about to persuade men to be Christians! They barely tell the matters of fact concerning the resurrection of Christ, and say *they were eye-witnesses of it*; and upon the credit of this testimony of theirs, they preach faith and repentance to Jews and Gentiles. Was ever any thing farther from the appearance of artifice than this was? So that if they were deceivers, they were some of the subtlest that ever

were in the world, because there seems to be so little ground for any suspicion of fraud; and we cannot easily imagine persons of their education capable of so profound dissimulation and so artificial a cheat. Besides all this, we are to consider how far such persons do allow the liberty of dissimulation and artificial jugglings, especially in religion. We see the Papists could not practise these things without being forced to defend them, by shewing how convenient it is for the people to be told strange stories of saints, on purpose to nourish devotion in them: to which end, they say, *it signifies not much whether they were true or no.* And withal they assert the *lawfulness of equivocations, and mental reservations, and doing things not otherwise justifiable, for the honour of their church and religion.* And I shall freely confess to you, if I found any countenance to such things as these, from the doctrine or practice of the Apostles, it would give me too just a ground for suspicion as to what they delivered. For if they allowed equivocations or mental reservations, how could I possibly know what they meant by any thing they said? For that which was necessary to make the proposition true, lay without my reach in the mind of another; and while they so firmly attested that *Christ was risen from the dead*, they might understand it of a spiritual or mystical resurrection; but if they should be found to allow *lying or cheating for the cause of religion*, their credit would be gone with me; for how could I be any longer sure of the truth of one word they said? I should be so far from thinking them infallible, that I could not but suspect them to have a design to deceive me. The first thing therefore we are to look at in persons who require our belief, is the strictest veracity; if they falter in this, they expose themselves to the suspicion of all but credulous fools. But we nowhere find greater plainness and sincerity required, nowhere more strict and severe prohibitions of dissimulation in religion, nor more general precepts about speaking truth, than in the writings of the New Testament. *But might not all this be done with the greater artifice, to prevent suspicion?* Suspicion is a thing, which *he that set bounds to the sea*, can set no bounds to: if men will give way to it without reason, there can be no end of it; for the most effectual ways to prevent it will still afford new matter and occasion for it. If men do use the utmost means that are possible to assure others of their sincerity, and they will not believe them, but still suspect the design to be so much deeper

laid, there is no way left possible to satisfy such men; their suspicion is a disease incurable by rational means, and such persons deserve to be given over as past all remedy. If men act like prudent men, they will judge according to the reason of things; but if they entertain a jealousy of all mankind, and the most of those who give them the greatest assurance they have no intention to deceive them, it is to no purpose to go about to satisfy such persons; for that very undertaking makes them more suspicious. If the Apostles therefore gave as much ground as ever any persons did, or could do, that they had no design to impose upon the world, but proceeding with all the fairness and openness, with the greatest evidence of their sincerity, there can be no reason to fasten upon them the imputation of cunning men, who made it their business to deceive others.

2. This will more appear if we consider the matters delivered by them, and the nature of their doctrine. For if the Christian religion were only a contrivance of the first preachers of it, it must by the event be supposed that they were very subtle men, who in so little time, and against so great opposition, could prevail over both Jews and Gentiles: but if we reflect on the nature of their doctrine, we can never imagine that these men did proceed by the same methods that men of subtlety do make use of. If it were their own contrivance, it was in their power to have framed it as they thought fit themselves, and in all probability they would have done it in a way most likely to be successful: but the Christian religion was so far from it, as though they had industriously designed to advance a religion against the genius and inclination of all mankind. For it neither gratifies the voluptuous in their pleasures, nor the ambitious in their desires of external pomp and greatness, nor the covetous in their thirst after riches, but lays a severe restraint on all those common and prevailing passions of mankind; which Mahomet well understood, when he suited his religion to them. Christianity was neither accommodated to the temper and genius either of Jews or Gentiles. The Jews were in great expectation of a temporal prince at that time, to deliver them from the Roman slavery; and every one that would have set up for such a Messias, might have had followers enough among them, as we find afterwards by the attempts of Barcochebas and others. But the Messias of the Christians was so directly contrary to their hopes and expectations, being a poor and suffering prince, that

this set them the more against his followers, because they were hereby frustrated of their greatest hopes, and defeated in their most pleasing expectations. But besides, if they would have taken in the Mosaic law, it might in probability have succeeded better; but this St. Paul would by no means hear of. *But if they rejected Jews, methinks they should have been willing to have had some assistance from the Gentiles.* No, they charged them with idolatry wherever they came, and would not join in any parts of their worship with them, nor so much as eat of the remainder of their sacrifices. But supposing they had a mind to set up wholly a new sect of their own, yet we should think they should have framed it after the most plausible manner, and left out all things that were most liable to reproach and infamy: but this they were so far from, that the most contemptible part of the Christian religion, viz. a crucified Saviour, they insist the most upon, and preach it on all occasions, and, in comparison of it, strangely despise all the wisdom and philosophy of the Greeks. What did these men mean, if Christianity had been only a contrivance of theirs? If they had but left out this one circumstance, in all human probability the excellent moral precepts in Christianity would have been highly magnified among all those who had been bred up under the instructions of philosophers. Nay, they would not make use of the most commendable methods of human wisdom, nor do as the Jesuits have done in China, make men have a better opinion of the religion they brought, for their skill in mathematics and astronomy; but as much as it was possible, to let the world see it was no contrivance of human wisdom, they shunned all the ways of shewing it in the manner of its propagation. Nay, when the people would have given the Apostles divine worship, never were vain men more concerned to have it, than they to oppose it. And do these things look like the actions of men that designed only to make themselves great, by being the heads of a new sect of religion?

3. Men that made it their design to deceive the world, if they had thought it necessary to bring in any matter of story concerning the author of their religion, would have placed it at such *a distance of time*, that it was not capable of being disproved: as it is apparent in the Heathen mythology; for the stories were such, as no person could ever pretend to confute them, otherwise than by the inconsistency of them with the common principles of

religion. But if we suppose Christianity to have been a mere device, would the Apostles have been so senseless to have laid the main proof of their religion on a thing which was but newly acted, and which they were very capable of enquiring into all the circumstances that related to it, viz. the *resurrection of Christ from the dead.* We may see, by the whole design of the New Testament, the great stress of Christianity was laid upon the truth of this. To this Christ himself appealed beforehand; to this all the Apostles refer as the mighty confirmation of their religion; and this they deliver as a thing which themselves had seen, and had conversed with him for forty days together, with all the demonstrations imaginable of a true and real body; and that not to one or two credulous persons, but so many of them who were hard to be satisfied, and one not without the most sensible evidence: but besides these, they tell us of five hundred *at once who saw him, whereof many were then living* when those things were written. Now, I pray, tell me what religion in the world ever put itself upon so fair a trial as this? Of a plain matter of fact, as capable of being attested as any could be. Why did not Amida, or Brahma, or Xaca, or any other of the authors of the present religions of the East-Indies; why did not Orpheus, or Numa, or any other introducers of religious customs among the Greeks or Romans; or Mahomet, among the Arabians, put the issue of the truth of their religion on such a plain and easy trial as this? If you say, *that Christ appeared only to his friends, who were ready to believe such things, and not among his enemies;* I answer, that though they were his friends, yet they were very hard to be persuaded of the truth of it at first; and afterwards gave larger testimonies of their fidelity, than the testimony of the greatest enemies would have been; for we should have had only their bare words for it, (if they would have given that, which is very questionable, considering their dealing with the other miracles of Christ.) But the Apostles manifested their sincerity by all real proofs that could be thought sufficient to satisfy mankind; appealing to the very persons who were concerned the most in it, having a hand in the death of Christ, declaring their greatest readiness to suffer any thing rather than deny the truth of it, and laying down their lives at last for it. If all this had been a mere fiction, how unlikely is it, that, among so many as were conscious of it, no one person, by hopes or fears, by flatteries or threatenings, could ever

be prevailed upon to deny the truth of it! If there had been any such thing, what triumphing had there been among the Jews! And no doubt his name had been recorded to posterity among the writers both of Jews and Gentiles, that were professed enemies of Christianity. But they are all wonderfully silent in this matter; and instead of saying enough to overthrow the truth of Christianity, as you seem to suggest, I do assure you I am mightily confirmed in the belief of the truth of it, by carefully observing the slightness of the objections that were made against it by its most professed enemies.

But you seem to imply, *that all this story concerning Christ was invented long after the pretended time of his being in the world.* Why may not you as well suspect that Julius Cæsar lived before Romulus, or that Augustus lived at the siege of Troy? For you might as well reject all history upon such grounds as those you assign; and think Mahomet as right in his chronology as the Bible. It is time for us to burn all our books, if we have lived in such a cheat all this while. Methinks you might as well ask, whether Lucretia were not Pope Joan? Or Alexander the Sixth one of the Roman emperors? Or whether Luther were not the emperor of Turkey? For there is no greater evidence of any history in the world, than there is that all the things reported in the New Testament were done at that time when they are pretended to be.

4. Therefore we offer this story of the New Testament to be compared with all the *circumstances of that age,* delivered by any other historians, to try if any inconsistencies can be found therein; which is the most reasonable way that can be taken to disprove any history. If it could be proved that there could be no such taxation of the empire as is mentioned in the time of Augustus, that Herod did not live in that age, or that the Jews were not under the Roman government, or that there were no high priests at that time, nor the sects of Pharisees and Sadducees, or that there were any other remarkable characters of time set down in the history of the New Testament, which could be manifestly disproved, there were some pretence to call in question the truth of the story; but there is not the least foundation for any scruple on this account; all things agreeing so well with the truest accounts we have of that age, both from Josephus and the Roman history. I shall not insist on the particular testimony of Josephus concerning Christ, because we need it not; and if those who question it would proceed with the same severity

against many other particular passages in good authors, they might as well call them in question as they do that; since it is confessed that all the ancient manuscripts have it in them: and supposing that it doth not come in well, must we suppose it impossible for Josephus to write incoherently? Yet this is the main argument that ever I have seen urged against this testimony of Josephus. But I say we need it not; all other things concurring in so high a degree to prove the truth of the history of Christ. Yet, since you seem to express so much doubtfulness concerning it, *as though it were framed when there was no one living capable of disproving it*, give me leave to shew you the great absurdity of such a supposition. 1. Because we have the plain testimonies of the greatest enemies of Christianity, that there was such a person as Christ was, who suffered according to the Scripture story. For Tacitus not only mentions the Christians as suffering at Rome for their religion in the time of Nero, (Annal 15.) but saith, *That the author of this religion was one Christ, who suffered under Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judea, in the time of Tiberius;* which is an irrefragable testimony of the truth of the story concerning Christ, in an age when, if it had been false, nothing could have been more easily detected than such a fiction, by the number of Jews which were continually at Rome: and neither Julian, nor Celsus, nor Porphyry, nor Lucian, did ever question the truth of the story itself, but only upbraided the Christians for attributing too much to Christ. 2. If there were really such a person as Christ was, who suffered as Tacitus saith, then the whole story could not be a fiction, but only some part of it; and these additional parts must either be contrived by the Apostles, or after their time: not after their time, for then they must be added after Christianity was received in the world, for that, as appears by Tacitus, was spread in the Apostles' times as far as Rome; and if these parts were not received with it, the cheat would presently have been discovered as soon as broached, by those who had embraced Christianity before. And, besides, Tertullian in his time appeals to the authentic writings of the Apostles themselves, which were then extant, wherein the same things were contained that we now believe. If these things then were forged, it must be by the Apostles themselves; and I dare now appeal to you, whether ever any story was better capable of being disproved than this was, if it had not been true, since it was published in that very time

and place where the persons were living, who were most concerned to disprove it: as appears by the hatred of the Jews to the Christians, both then and ever since; which is a very observable circumstance for proving the truth of the Christian religion: for the Jews and Christians agreed in the Divine revelations of old: the Christians believed, moreover, that Christ was the Messias promised; this Christ lived and died among the Jews his enemies; his Apostles preached, and wrought miracles among their most inveterate enemies, which men that go about to deceive never care to do; and to this day the Jews do not deny the matters of fact, but look on them as insufficient to prove Jesus of Nazareth to have been the Messias. Nay, Mahomet himself, who in all probability would have overthrown the whole story of the New Testament, if he could have done it with any colour, yet speaks very honourably of Christ, and of the great things which were said and done by him.

5. That there is nothing in the Christian religion unbecoming the majesty, or holiness, or truth of a Divine revelation. As to the precepts, *you acknowledge their excellency;* and the promises chiefly refer either to Divine grace or future glory: and what is there herein unbecoming God? And as to what concerns the truth of it, we have as great characters of that throughout as it is possible for us to expect; there appearing so much simplicity, sincerity, candour, and agreement in all the parts of it. Some men would have been better pleased, it may be, if it had been all written by one person, and digested into a more exact method, and set forth with all the lights and ornaments of speech. This would have better become an invention of men, but not a revelation of God. Plainness and simplicity have a natural greatness above art and subtlety; and therefore God made choice of many to write, and at several times, that by comparing them we may see how far they were from contriving together, and yet how exactly they agree in all things which men are concerned to believe. But you say, *we have many infirmities of the Apostles discovered therein, their heats and animosities one against another.* But I pray consider, 1. How came you to know these things? Is it not by their own writings? And if they had been such who minded only their applause, had it not been as easy to have concealed these things? And would they not as certainly have done it, if that had been their aim? If St. Paul seems to boast, doth he not do it with that constraint to

himself, as a man that is forced to do it for his own vindication against malicious enemies? And who ever denied a man of a generous mind the liberty of speaking for himself? 2. But suppose *they had infirmities and heats among them*, doth this prove that God could not make use of them as his instruments to declare his truth to the world? Then it will follow, that God must never reveal his will by men, but by voices from heaven, or angels; or the assumption of the *human nature by the divine*. But, if God be not denied the liberty of employing mere men, we cannot find so great evidences of piety and zeal, of humility and self-denial, of patience and magnanimity, of innocency and universal charity in any men, as were in the Apostles; and therefore did appear with the most proper characters of embassadors from heaven. And I dare venture the comparison of them with the best philosophers, as to the greatest and most excellent virtues, for which they were the most admired, notwithstanding the mighty difference as to their education; allowing but the same truth as to the story of the New Testament, which we yield to Xenophon, or Diogenes Laertius, or any other writers concerning them.

But what is it then which you object against the writings of the New Testament, to make them inconsistent with the wisdom of God? I find but two things in the papers you sent me. 1. *Want of the continuance of the power of miracles, which you say is promised*, Mark xvi. 17. 2. *The number of the Beast in the Revelations*. But, good Sir, consider what it is to call in question a Divine revelation for such objections as these are? Must there be no revelation, unless you understand every prophecy, or the extent of every promise? Be not so injurious to your own soul, for the sake of such objections, to cast away the great assurance which the Christian religion gives us, as to the pardon of sin upon repentance here, and eternal happiness in another world. Would you reject all the writings of Plato, because you do no more understand some part of his Timæus than the number of 666? You must have a very nice faith that can bear with no difficulties at all, so that if there be but one or two hard things that you cannot digest, you must throw up all the best food you have taken; at this rate you must starve your body, as well as ruin your soul. But of these places afterwards.

3. I have hitherto removed the grounds of suspicion; I now come to shew the positive testimonies of their since-

rity which the Apostles shewed; which were greater than were ever given to any other matter of fact in the world. I will then suppose the whole truth of the Christian doctrine to be reduced to this one matter of fact, whether *Christ did rise from the dead or no?* For (as I have said already) it is plain the Apostles put the main force of all that they said upon the truth of this; and often declared that they were appointed to be the witnesses of this thing. Now let us consider how it is possible for men to give the highest assurance of their sincerity to others; and that must be either by giving the utmost testimony that men can give, or by giving some testimony above that of men, which cannot deceive; which is the testimony of God.

1. They gave the utmost testimony that mere men could give of their fidelity. I know no better way we have for a full assurance as to any human testimony, than to consider what those circumstances are which are generally allowed to accompany truth; and if we have the concurrence of all these, we have as much as can be expected; for nothing that depends on testimony can be proved by mathematical demonstration. But notwithstanding the want of this, either we may have sufficient ground to assent to truth upon testimony, or there can be no difference known between truth and falsehood by human testimony; which overthrows all judicial proceedings among men: the justice whereof doth suppose not only the veracity of human testimony, but that it may be so discerned by others, that they may safely rely upon it. Now the main things to be regarded as to the truth of human testimony, are these. 1. If men testify nothing but what they saw. 2. If they testify it at no long distance of time from the thing done. 3. If they testify it plainly, and without doubtful expressions. 4. If a great number agree in the same testimony. 5. If they part with all that is valuable to mankind, rather than deny the truth of what they have testified. And where all these concur, it is hardly possible to suppose greater evidence to be given of the truth of a thing; and now I shall shew that all these do exactly agree to the Apostles' testimony concerning the resurrection of Christ.

1. They testified nothing but what they saw themselves. The laws of nations do suppose that greater credit is to be given to eye-witnesses than to any others; thence the rule in the civil law, *Testimonium de auditu regulariter non valet.* Because, say the Civilians and Ca-

nonists, *witnesses are to testify the truth, and not barely the possibility of things.* That which men see, they can testify whether they are or not: that which men only hear, may be or not be; and their testimony is not of the fact, but is looked on as more uncertain, and ought to have greater allowances given it; but the Apostles testified only *what they saw and handled,* and that after the most scrupulous enquiry into the truth of Christ's body, and after many doubts and suspicions among themselves about it; so that they did not seem hastily and rashly to believe what they afterwards declared to the world. Now a body was a proper object of sense, and no trial could be greater or more accurate than theirs was, nor any satisfaction fuller than putting their fingers into the very wounds of the pierced side.

2. They did not stay till the circumstances might have slipt out of their memories, before they testified these things, but very soon after, while the impression of them was fresh upon them. If they had let these matters alone for any long time, the Jews would have asked them presently, If these things were true, why did we not hear of them as soon as they were done? Therefore we see the Apostles on the very day of Pentecost, a little after Christ's ascension to heaven, openly and boldly declare the truth of these things, not in private corners among a few friends, but in the most solemn meeting of their nation from all parts; which was the worst time that could have been chosen, if they had any intention to deceive.

3. They testify it in as plain a manner as is possible, on purpose to prevent all mistakes of their meaning. *This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses; therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.* Men that had a mind to deceive, would have used some more general and doubtful words than these were. Acts ii. 32, 36.

4. If this had been testified by one single witness, the world would have suspected the truth of his testimony; for, according to the rule in the civil law, in the case of testimony, *Vox unius, vox nullius est:* but this was testified by very many; not merely by the twelve Apostles, but by five hundred at once; among whom some might be supposed to have so much honesty, or at least capable of being persuaded to have discovered the imposture, if they had in the least suspected any.

5. But that which adds the greatest weight to all this is, that there was not one of all the Apostles, and scarce any one of the rest, but exposed themselves to the utmost hazards and dangers, rather than deny or retract the truth of what they had witnessed. If the people had been careless and indifferent about religion, it is possible men might have gone on in a lie so long, till they had gotten interest enough to maintain it; but no sooner did the Apostles appear, witnessing these things, but they met with an early and vigorous opposition, and that from the chiefest men in power, who made it their business to suppress them. Now in this case they were put to this choice, if they would renounce or conceal the truth of what they testified, they might presently enjoy ease, and, it may be, rewards too; but if they went on, they must look for nothing but the sharpest persecution; and this they met with almost in all places: and is it conceivable that men should be so fond of a lie to forsake all and follow it, and at last to take up their cross for it? If credit and interest in the hearts of people might carry a man on a great way in the delusion, yet he would be loth to die for it; and yet there was never a one of the Apostles but ventured his life for the truth of this; and all but one, they tell us, did suffer martyrdom for it. I pray, Sir, consider, where you ever meet with any thing like this, that so many men should so resolutely die for what themselves at the same time knew to be a lie: and that they must certainly do, if it were all a contrivance of their own heads.

2. But although in these things they went as high as it was possible for human testimony to go, yet they had something beyond all this; which was a concurrence of a Divine testimony, in the miraculous gifts and operations of the Holy Ghost. And this we assert to be the highest testimony that can be given in the world of the truth of any thing; because God will not employ his power to deceive the world. And as all other truth hath a criterion proper to it, so this seems to be the proper criterion of a Divine testimony, that it hath the power of miracles going along with it. For if we do suppose God to make known his mind to the world, it is very reasonable to believe there should be some distinguishing note of what is immediately from God, and what comes only from the inventions of men; and what can be more proper to distinguish what comes from God, and what from men, than to see those things done which none but God can do?

But against this you object several things, which I shall easily and briefly answer.

1. *You cannot tell what it is that miracles do attest; not all their doctrine, since Paul said, some was not from the Lord.* Answ. *Miracles* do attest the *veracity* of the *speaker*, and by consequence the *truth* of the *doctrine; not that you should believe that to be from the Lord, which he said was not;* but that which he said was from the Lord. But when he makes such a distinction himself, it is very unreasonable to urge that as an argument, that he had *nothing from the Lord:* it is much rather an argument of his candour and ingenuity, that he would not pretend to Divine revelation when he had it not.

2. *You would have it signified what doctrine it is which is attested by miracles, since the doctrines of Scripture lie in heaps and confusion.* Answ. To what purpose should any doctrines be singled out to have the seal of miracles set to them, since it is their Divine commission to teach and declare the will of God, which is sealed by it? And what they did so teach and declare, is easily known by their writings.

3. *But why do not miracles still continue?* Answ. Because there are no persons employed to teach any new doctrines; and no promise of Scripture doth imply any more: for the signs which were to follow them that believe, were such as tended to the first confirmation of the Christian faith; which being effected, their use ceased: and so to ask why God doth not continue a gift of miracles, to convince men that the former were true, is to the same purpose as to ask why God doth not make a new sun, to satisfy Atheists that he made the old?

4. *But doth not the Scripture say, that wonders are not always to be taken as confirmations of the truth of doctrine, since false prophets may work wonders,* Deut. xiii. 1. Answ. That signifies no more than that wonders are not to be believed against the principles of natural religion, or revealed religion already confirmed by greater miracles; and that those who would value such a particular sign above all the series of miracles their religion was first established by, may be justly left to their own delusions. You might as well object the lying wonders of the man of Sin, against all the miracles of Christ and his Apostles. If God hath once done enough to convince men, he may afterwards justly leave them to the trial of their ingenuity; as a father that hath used great care to make

his son understand true coin, may afterwards suffer false to be laid before him, to try whether he will mind his being cheated or no.

5. But you may yet farther demand, *What the testimony of miracles doth signify to the writings of the New Testament?* Answ. 1. The miracles do sufficiently prove the authority of that doctrine which was delivered by those who wrought miracles, as Christ and his Apostles. 2. If there had been the least ground to question the truth and authority of these writings, they had never been so universally received in those ages, when so many were concerned to enquire into the truth of these things; for we see several of the books were a long time examined, and at last, when no sufficient reason could be brought against them, they were received by those Churches which at first scrupled the receiving them. And I am so far from thinking the doubts of the first ages any argument against the authority of a book, that, by the objections of some against some of them, I am thereby assured that they did not presently receive any book, because it went under the name of an Apostolical Writing: as I am the more confirmed in the belief of the resurrection of Christ, because some of the disciples were at first very doubtful about it.

6. You may yet ask, *What doth all this signify to the writings of the Old Testament, which were written at a longer distance of time from us, and in a more ignorant age of the world?* Answ. There cannot be a more evident proof of the Old Testament, than by the New; for if the New be true, the Old must be so, which was confirmed so plainly and evidently by it; our Saviour and his Apostles appealing to Moses and the Prophets on all occasions. So that the same miracles which prove their testimony true, do at the same time prove the Divine authority of the Old Testament; since it is so expressly said in the New, *That holy men of God did speak as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.*

But after all this, you urge, that you have discovered such things in these writings as could not come from God, as,

1. *Contradictions in them.* 2. *Some things inconsistent with the wisdom of God.* 3. *Promises made that were never fulfilled.* 4. *Things so obscure as no one can tell the meaning of them.* Under these four heads I shall examine the particular allegations you bring against the Scriptures.

1. Under the head of contradictions, you insist on the *prophecy*, Gen. xv. 13, 14, 15, 16. *made to Abraham, concerning his posterity, compared with the accomplishment mentioned* Exod. xii. 40, 41. And the force of your argument lies in this, *That the prophecy in Genesis doth imply that the servitude of the children of Israel in Egypt was to be* 40 *years; or* 430 *saith Exod. but both these are repugnant to other places of Scripture, which make their abode in Egypt not to exceed* 215 *years; or at the highest, by the number of generations, could not exceed* 350 *years, stretching them to the utmost advantage.* To this which you lay so much weight upon, I answer distinctly,

1. By your own confession, supposing the 430 years to begin from the covenant made with Abraham, the accomplishment, mentioned Exod. xii. 40. doth fall out exactly in the time of the children of Israel's going out of Egypt; for you have proved from Scripture, that, from the covenant with Abraham to Jacob's being in Egypt, were 215 years; to which you add, *that Coath being supposed five years old at the going into Egypt; and that at* 70 *years he begat Amram, and that Amram at* 70 *begat Moses, to which Moses's* 80 *years being added, makes up the other* 215 *years; whereby we have the full* 430 *years, by your own computation.* Now, Sir, I pray consider what reason you have to charge the Scripture with contradiction, in a matter yourself acknowledges so exactly accomplished in this way of computation.

2. But you say, *the words will not bear this; because they speak of the* 400 *years to expire in their servitude in Egypt.* Answ. For this we must consider the importance of the words both in Genesis and Exodus. There is not a word of Egypt mentioned in Genesis; but only in general it is said, *Thy seed shall be a stranger in the land that is not theirs, and shall serve them, and they shall afflict them* 400 *years:* and it will conduce very much to the right understanding this prophecy, to consider the main scope and design of it; which was not to tell Abraham how long they should be in servitude to the Egyptians, but how long it would be before his seed would come to the possession of the promised land: and it seems Abraham, by the question, Gen. xv. 7, 8. did expect to have the inheritance of this land *in his own time.* To this therefore God answers, by telling him he meant no such thing, but it was intended for his seed, and that not suddenly neither, for they were to tarry *till the iniquity of the Amorites should be full,* which would not be

till the fourth generation; and then *his seed should, after 400 years, come to the possession of the promised land; but in the mean time they were to sojourn in a land that was not theirs, and to meet with many hardships and difficulties.* This is plainly the scope of this prophecy, and, by attending to it, the great objections presently appear without force; for the land of Canaan, notwithstanding the promise, was by the Patriarchs themselves looked on as a land wherein they were strangers. So Abraham saith, Gen. xxiii. 4. *I am a stranger and a sojourner with you;* and which is more remarkable in the blessing of Jacob by Isaac, to whom the promise was made, it is said, *And give thee the blessing of Abraham to thee, and to thy seed, that thou mayest inherit the land wherein thou art a stranger, which God gave unto Abraham,* Gen. xxviii. 4. Where the very same word is used concerning Jacob, that is expressed in the prophecy, Gen. xv. 13. So that the Patriarchs looked on themselves as *strangers in the land of Canaan* so long after the promise made, and after the increase of the seed of Abraham; and therefore the land of Canaan was called *Terra Peregrinationum,* the land wherein they were strangers, Gen. xxxvi. 7. xxxvii. 1. And when God was calling the people of Israel together out of Egypt, yet then the land of Canaan was called by the very same title, the *land of their pilgrimage, wherein they were strangers,* Exod. vi. 4; and Ps. cv. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. where we have a full account of the promise made to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, concerning the inheritance of that land, it is said, *that they were few, and strangers in it, when they went from one nation to another, from one kingdom to another people:* which doth fully explain the meaning of the prophecy in Genesis, and that it is not to be restrained to the servitude of the people of Israel in Egypt, but to be understood of their state of pilgrimage for 400 years, wherein they were to suffer great hardships before they should come to the inheritance of Canaan. *This is no forced or unnatural exposition of the words,* as you seem to suggest; but, to my apprehension, very plain and easy, if we attend to the main scope and design of them, which was to acquaint Abraham how long it would be before the prophecy were accomplished, and what the condition of his seed should be the mean time, viz. *That they should have no land which they should call their own by inheritance all that time, but they should be exposed to great hardships, yea even to servitude; but that nation, whom they should serve, should at last*

suffer for their ill usage of them, and they should come out of that captivity with great substance; and all this to be done in the fourth generation of the Amorites, when their iniquities should be arrived at the full height. All which particulars were so remarkably accomplished at such a distance of time, and under such improbable circumstances, that this very prophecy were enough to convince an unprejudiced mind that it came from Divine inspiration. For where do we meet with any thing like this in the histories of other nations, viz. a prophecy to be accomplished 400 years after, and the very manner foretold, which no human conjecture could reach to, since the manner of deliverance of the people of Israel out of their captivity in Egypt, was to all human appearance so impossible a thing, especially at such a time, when the spirits of the people were sunk and broken by so long a slavery: and not only the manner foretold, but the accomplishment happened to a day, according to Exodus xii. 41. *And it came to pass at the end of the 430 years, even the selfsame day it came to pass, that all the hosts of the Lord went out from the land of Egypt.* But against this you object, *that the sojourning is spoken of the children of Israel in Egypt for 430 years; which cannot hold good any ways; since, to make it up, the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, must be taken in, who could not be called the children of Israel.* Answ. For the 430 years, I grant, that, according to St. Paul, they did commence from the covenant made to Abraham, Gal. iii. 17. and that the 400 years began from Isaac's being owned for the promised seed; between which time the thirty years were passed: and all appearance of difficulty is avoided, if we admit the reading of the best copies of the LXX. which is in these words: Ἡ δὲ παροίκησις τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, ἣν παῴκησαν ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ, καὶ ἐν γῇ Χαναὰν, αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἔτη τετρακόσια τριάκοντα, *Now the sojourning of the children of Israel, who dwelt in Egypt and Canaan, they and their fathers, was 430 years.* This is the reading of our Alexandrian copy, and the Complutensian, and that of Aldus, and of Eusebius in his Chronicon, and of St. Jerome in his translation of it; and of the Church in St. Augustine's time, and afterwards; and lest any should reject this as a late interpolation, or gloss, received into the text, besides these testimonies of the antiquity of it, we find the very same in the Samaritan copy, which the enemies of it do allow to be as ancient as our Saviour's time. And that which very much confirms the truth of

this reading is, that the Jews themselves follow the sense of it, who are the most eager contenders for the authority of the Hebrew copy; who all agree, that the beginning of the computation of the 430 years is to be taken before the children of Israel's going into Egypt; and Menasseh Ben Israel contends with many others, that the 430 years did begin from the promise made to Abraham, and the 400 from the time of Isaac, to which their most ancient books of chronology do agree: and to the same purpose speak both Philo Judæus and Josephus; who although in one place he seems to make *the Israelites' affliction in Egypt to have been* 400 *years*, yet, when he speaks more particularly of it, *he makes the time of their abode in Egypt to have been only* 215, *and the* 430 *to begin from Abraham's entrance into Canaan.* The Targum of Jonathan begins the 430 from the vision of Abraham, and the 400 from the birth of Isaac; all which I mention, to let you see that the Jews themselves do in sense concur with the Samaritan and Greek copy; and therefore we have more reason to suspect something left out in the present Hebrew, than any thing added in those copies. *But doth not this take off from the authority of the Scripture?* Not at all: for the only question is about the true reading; and having the consent of the Samaritan, Alexandrian, and other copies of the LXX. and of the ancient Church, and of the Jews themselves, as to the sense of it, we have reason to look on this as the truer reading; which is making no addition to the Scripture, either as to persons or places, but only producing the more authentic copy: much less is this adding or changing as we please; for if we did this without so much authority as we have for it, you might as easily reject it as we produce it.

3. After all this, I do not see the mighty force of your reason to charge the Scripture with contradiction, supposing *the* 400 *years were to be spent in the servitude of the children of Israel in Egypt.* I confess, when I found the Scripture so boldly, so frequently charged with no less than contradiction, I expected something like demonstration in the case, especially in this place which you chose to put in the front of all: but I do not find any thing like such a proof of a contradiction, supposing we should allow the 400 years to be spent in Egypt. *Yes*, say you, *Coath was five years old when he came down into Egypt; and when he had lived there sixty-five years, he begat Amram, and Amram, being seventy years old, begat Moses; to which Moses's eighty years being added, we have only*

215 *years*. But since the Scripture doth not assign the particular age of any of these when they begat their children, I see no impossibility or repugnancy in the supposition, that 400 years should pass from Levi's going into Egypt to the eightieth of Moses, any more than from Salmon's entrance into Canaan to the time of David; for no more are reckoned in Scripture than Boaz, the son of Salmon by Raab, and Obed, and Jesse: so that by the same way this latter may be explained, the former may be so too. If it be said, *That either they begat their children at a great age, or that the Scripture in genealogies doth not set down all the intermediate parents, but only the most eminent (as Caleb is called the son of Esron,* 1 Chron. ii. 9, 18. *although there was at least one between them,)* the very same answer will serve to clear this part of the chronology of Scripture from any appearance of contradiction. These things you might have found more largely deduced, and fully handled, by those learned persons who have undertaken to clear the chronology of Scripture; who were men of more judgment, than from any difficulty of this nature to call in question the truth and authority of the sacred Scriptures. And although the opinions of chronologers are like the city clocks, which seldom agree, yet some come nearer the time of the day than others do; and therefore you ought to examine and compare them, before you pronounce so peremptorily about contradictions in Scripture, which you have no reason to do till you find that no one hypothesis among them will serve to free the Scripture from contradiction: for otherwise you do but blame the sun, because you cannot make the clocks agree.

This is all I can find in your papers under the head of contradictions; and I leave you now soberly to consider whether this place did afford you sufficient ground for so heavy a charge: but if you say, *you have a great many more by you, but you sent me this only for a trial of my skill,* before you send any more, I beseech you, Sir, to consider,

" 1. How easily things do appear to be contradictions to weak, or unstudied, or prejudiced minds, which after due consideration appear to be no such things. A deep prejudice finds a contradiction in every thing; whereas in truth nothing but ill-will, and impatience of considering, made any thing, it may be, which they quarrel at, appear to be so. If I had been of such a quarrelsome humour, I would have undertaken to have found out more contra-

dictions in your papers than you imagine, and yet you might have been confident you had been guilty of none at all. When I consider the great pains, and learning, and judgment, which hath been shewn by the Christian writers in the explication of the Scriptures; and the raw, indigested objections which some love to make against them; if I were to judge of things barely by the fitness of persons to judge of them, the disproportion between these would appear out of all comparison. A modest man would, in any thing of this nature, say with himself, methinks if there were such contradictions in the Bible, as now seem to me, so many persons of incomparable abilities, in the first and latter ages of the Christian Church, who have made it their business to enquire into these things, would have discerned them before me: and yet they retained a mighty veneration for the Scriptures, as coming from God himself; and therefore it may be only weakness of judgment, want of learning, or some secret prejudice, may make me suspect these things; or else I must suspect the honesty of all those persons who have pretended such a devotion to the Scriptures, and yet have believed them full of contradictions.

2. Wherein the contradiction appears. Is it in the main and weighty parts of the religion revealed herein? or is it only in some smaller circumstances as to time and place? The great thing you are to look after, are the matters those Scriptures tell you your salvation depends upon; and if there be a full consent and agreement therein, you find enough for you to believe and practise. And if some contradictions should still appear to you in smaller matters, what follows from thence, but only that the same care was not taken about little as about great things? And you ought to set that appearance of contradiction in small matters together with the real consent in the things of the highest importance; and from thence rather to infer that this was no combination or design to deceive others; for such persons take the greatest care to prevent suspicion by their exactness in every minute circumstance; and sometimes the overmuch care to prevent suspicion doth raise it the more.

3. What ways have been used by men of judgment and learning, to clear those places from the charge of contradiction. For not one of the objections you can start now, but hath been considered over and over, and all the difficulties that belong to it examined: if you will not take the pains to do this, it is plain you do not desire

satisfaction, but only seek for a pretence to cavil; especially if you only search the weakest or most injudicious writers on the Scriptures, and endeavour to expose their opinions, without taking notice of what others have said, with more clear and evident reason. This shews either want of judgment in choosing such expositors, or want of candour and fair dealing, and a desire of taking any advantage against the Scriptures.

4. How hard a matter it is for us, at this distance, to understand exactly the grounds of chronology, or the manner of computation of times used so long ago: and therefore in all difficulties of this nature, we ought to make the fairest allowances that may be, considering withal, that escapes and errors are nowhere more easily committed by transcribers, than in numbers: and that it is a very unreasonable thing that a book, otherwise deserving to be thought the best book in the world, should be scorned and rejected, because there appears some difference in the computation of times. We do not so exactly know the manner of the Hebrew chronology, nor the nature of their year, or intercalations, nor the customs of their genealogies, nor the allowance to be made for interregnums, so as to be able to define peremptorily in these things; but it is sufficient to shew that there is no improbability in the accounts that are given; and no sufficient reason can be drawn from thence to reject the authority of the Scriptures.

2. I come to consider the places you object, *as containing things inconsistent with the wisdom or goodness of God, according to a rational persuasion;* and those are either, 1. *From the laws of Moses.* 2. *From the express story of the Bible, or actions of the prophets.*

1. *From the laws of Moses:* Your first objection is from Exod. xxi. 7. *where a man is supposed to sell his daughter; which, you say, it is incredible to believe that God should permit, because it implies unnatural affection and covetousness in the father.* But, Sir, 1. You do not consider that this is barely a provisional law, and is not the permission of the thing, so much as the regulation of it, supposing it to be done, i. e. in case a man should part with his interest in his daughter to another person, upon an extraordinary case of necessity, as the Jews understand it; yet then she was not to be in the condition of a servant, but to be either betrothed to the person who received her, or to his son; which was intended for the restraint of promiscuous buying and selling daughters,

merely for the satisfaction of lust. The Jews, who certainly best understood their own judicial laws, do say, that this was never to be done but where there was a presumption of such a betrothing; for no man could sell his daughter to those to whom it was unlawful to marry by their law; so that this was looked on as a kind of espousals of a young girl, taken into wardship by another; but so, that if she were not betrothed, she was to remain her six years during her minority, as the Jews understand it, unless she were redeemed, or set free, or the jubilee came, or the master died, or the time of her minority expired.

2. The case of necessity being supposed, it hath been thought lawful for parents to make advantage by their children, not only by the Jews, but by other nations, who have been in the greatest esteem for wisdom. For, by the law of the Twelve Tables among the Romans, the father had the liberty of selling his son three times for his own advantage, as Dionysius Halicarnasseus relates; and before that time it was not only in use among the Romans, but in such esteem among them, that, upon the review of their laws, the Decemviri durst not leave it out: but, by one of the laws of Numa Pompilius, it was restrained to times before marriage; for in case the son had the father's consent to marry, he could not sell him afterwards, as the same author tells us. This law continued in force among them till Christianity prevailed in the Roman empire; for although there were a prohibition of Diocletian against it, yet that signified nothing, till Constantine took care *that such indigent parents should be relieved out of the public charge.* Cod. Theodos. l. xi. tit. 27. 2. And yet after this the custom did continue, when the parents were in great want, as appears by a law of Theodosius, Cod. iii. tit. 3. *Omnes quos parentum miseranda fortuna in servitium dum victum requirunt addixit, ingenuitati pristinæ reformentur.* And it farther appears, that even in Constantine's time, notwithstanding the law made by him, parents would still, when they thought themselves overcharged with children, part with their interest in them to others for advantage; but it was chiefly while they were *sanguinolenti*, as the law expresses it, i. e. new born. Cod. Theod. l. v. tit. 8. By the laws of Athens, before Solon's time, parents might sell their children, as appears by Plutarch, in his Life; and the same Philostratus reports of the Phrygians, l. iii. Vit. Apollon. Tyan. and the like custom doth obtain among

the Chinese to this day, if persons do think themselves unable to bring up their children themselves. And there are two things to be said for it. 1. The natural obligation lying on children to provide for their parents in necessity, by any way they are able. 2. The probability of better education under more able persons; and therefore the Thebans had a law, *That parents, in case of poverty, were to bring their children to the magistrate, as soon as they were born, who put them out to such as were judged fit to bring them up, and to have their service for their reward.* Ælian. Var. Hist. l. ii. c. 7.

But however, you say, *this place implies a toleration of having many wives; because it is said, if he take him another wife,* ver. 10. I do not deny that the Mosaical law did suppose the practice of polygamy; but as it doth nowhere expressly allow it, neither doth it expressly condemn it. And although we say, the Christian law is far more excellent, which reduceth marriage to its first institution, yet you will find it a hard matter to prove such a permission of polygamy as this was, to be so repugnant to the law and principles of nature, as from thence to infer, that this law of Moses could not be from God. You might have said the same about the matter of divorce, which was permitted them, Christ saith, *for the hardness of their hearts:* which shews that God doth not always require that from men which is best pleasing to himself; and that, as to his political government, he may not always punish that which is not so pleasing to him.

The next law you quarrel at is that, Deut xxii. 13, &c. *about the trial of virginity;* which you object against *as immodest, and uncertain, and therefore unbecoming the wisdom of God.* So, many customs of those elder-times of the world, and of the Eastern parts, to this day seem very strange to us, that are not so well acquainted with the reasons of them. Methinks it better becomes our modesty, in such cases, to question our understanding those customs, than presently to cast so much disparagement on the author of them. If you had been offended at the literal sense of those words, many of the Jews themselves say, they are to be understood figuratively of the evidence that was to be brought and laid open before the judges on behalf of the defamed person. And both Josephus and Philo omit the laying open the cloth. But supposing it to be taken in the plainest literal sense, I have two things to say in vindication of this law. 1. That however uncertain some physicians have thought that way of

trial to have been in these parts of the world; yet it is generally agreed to have held for the Eastern parts, by the most skilful physicians among the Arabians: and a custom of the same nature is said by good authors to have been observed among the Egyptians, and other Africans, as well as the Arabians; so that this could not be thought so strange or immodest among the inhabitants of those parts: and it is very probable that some particulars, as to the practice of these laws, are not set down, which might very much tend to the certainty of them, as the age of the married persons, which was most likely then, as it is to this day in the Eastern parts, very early; the Jews say at twelve years old, which would make the trial more certain. 2. As to the modesty of it, you are to consider that the law was intended to keep persons from unjust defamations, and such a way of trial was therefore pitched upon to deter persons from such defamations; which men might otherwise have been more ready to, because of the liberty of divorce, and the advantage they had in saving the dower, if they could prove the party vitiated before marriage; therefore all the proof of that nature was to be passed soon after the consummation of marriage, which being agreed then by all the friends, there was to be no liberty left for defamation afterwards; but in case any man should be guilty of it, the producing those evidences, which before they were agreed upon, should be sufficient to clear the innocency of the party accused. And therefore I look on this law, as the Jews do on that of the rebellious son, of which they say, that there is no instance of the practice of it; the penalty threatened being so effectual to prevent the occasion of it.

And such, in a great measure, I suppose the other law mentioned by you to have been, viz. *of the water of jealousy*, which you make so strange a matter of; and think it *savours too much of a design to gratify the jealous humour of the Jewish nation*. But you might have put a fairer construction upon it, viz. that it was intended to prevent any occasion of suspicion being given to the husband, by too much familiarity with other persons; since the law allowed so severe a trial, in case the wife, after admonition, did not forbear such suspected familiarity: but if you had looked on the law as it is, Num. v. 12, 13, &c. you would have found that the design of it was to keep women from committing secret adultery, by so severe a penalty; yet withal, allowing so much to a reasonable

suspicion, (for so the Jews understand it, with many cautions and limitations,) that, rather than married persons should live under perpetual jealousies, he appointed this extraordinary way of trial, whereby adultery was most severely punished, and the honour of innocency publicly vindicated; which certainly are not ends at all unbecoming due conceptions of God.

The last of the Jewish laws which you quarrel with, is, *the prohibition of usury, in several places of Moses's law and the Psalms.* And from hence you fall into a long discourse *to prove the lawfulness of usury:* but to what purpose I beseech you? For you were to prove that God could never forbid it; you might have spared *your pity for men,* as you think, *blinded with superstition, and cheated with new and airy notions.* For by all that I can see by these papers, some pretended enemies to superstition have no better eyes than their neighbours, and are as easily cheated with groundless fancies and airy imaginations. The only thing to the business in that long discourse is this, *that you cannot imagine that God should make a law so much to man's inconvenience, and forbid him so nice and indifferent a thing as moderate increase of profit by letting out of money, when it is allowed upon lands, houses, and trade,* &c. To this I answer, That the prohibition of usury to the Jewish nation was upon political grounds peculiar to the constitution of that people; as appears by the words of the law, Deut. xxiii. 19, 20. *Thou shalt not lend to usury unto thy brother—unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury.* But none of the laws which are founded upon common and moral reasons have such limitations as this; for God would never have said, *Thou shalt not commit adultery with thy brother's wife,* but *with the wife of a stranger thou mayest.* But there was this particular reason for the prohibition of usury to the Jewish nation. It pleased God to fix their habitation, not upon the sea-side, as Tyre and Sidon stood, but within land, where they had no conveniencies of trading; but the riches of the nation lay in agriculture and pasturage; in which the returns of money are neither so quick nor so advantageous to make sufficient compensation for the interest of the money in the time they have it: for the main thing valuable in money is the advantage the borrower makes of it; and where that is great, it seems reasonable that the person whose the money is, should have a proportionable share of the advantage made by it; but where persons borrow only for present occa-

sions to supply their necessities, there it is only an act of kindness to lend, and it would be unreasonable to press upon, or take advantage by, another's necessities. And this seems to have been the case among the Jews: they were only the poor that wanted money for present necessities; the rich had no way to employ it in trading, unless that they lent to the Tyrian merchants, which it was lawful by their law to do. Now if they took usury of their own people, it must be of those whose urgent necessity, and not hopes of a mighty increase by it, made them borrow, and therefore it was a very just and reasonable law to forbid usury among them; which I believe he would never have done, if he had placed the Jews upon the coasts of Phœnicia, where trading was so much in request.

These are all the laws which you have picked out of the whole body of the Jewish law, to represent it unbecoming the wisdom of God. And now I pray, Sir, look back again upon them; see how few, how small, how weak your objections are, and compare them with the weight, and justice, and prudence, and piety, expressed in all the rest, and I hope you will find cause to be ashamed of speaking so harshly of those laws, so well accommodated to those ages of the world, and the condition of that people for whom they were appointed.

2. I now consider what you object against the story of the Bible.

1. *That passage of Moses*, Exod. xxxii. 32. *Blot me out of thy book which thou hast written:* where your design is to shew *that Moses prayed to be damned; and that this was a very irrational thing, and savouring more of passion than of the spirit of God.* But what if Moses meant no such thing as damnation? As there is not any word in the context relating that ways; but all the design of that chapter is about a temporal punishment, which was a present destruction of the people for their sins. And the book, out of which he prayed *God to blot him*, seems to me to be no other than the roll of *God's chosen people, who were to possess the land of Canaan:* for so סֵפֶר properly signifies a roll or register. Psalm lxix. 28. we meet with סֵפֶר הַחַיִּים *the roll of the living*, or *the book of the living*, we render it, because all ancient books were in the fashion of rolls. In that chapter Moses intercedes with God on behalf of the people, that he would make good his promise to them, of bringing them into the land

of Canaan, ver. 13. and ver. 30. he goes up to make an atonement for the people, i. e. *as to the cutting them off in the wilderness;* and therefore he desires, rather than the people should de destroyed, *that God would strike him out of the roll, that he might die in the wilderness rather than the people.* And God gives that answer to this purpose, ver. 33. *Whoever hath sinned against me, will I blot out of my book:* the sense of which is the same with those words of the Psalmist, *He sware in his wrath that they should not enter into his rest,* Psalm xcv. 11. And according to this interpretation, which is most natural and easy, all your long discourse, *against praying to be damned,* comes to just nothing; there being no pretence for it, either in the text or context.

2. The story of Ruth doth not please you, *as savouring, in your opinion, of a great deal of immodesty:* but you would have a better opinion of it, if you consider that the reason of her carriage towards Boaz, in such a manner, was upon Naomi's telling her, *that he was one to whom the right of redemption did belong, and by consequence,* by their law, *was to marry her.* Ruth ii. 20. And this Ruth pleaded to Boaz, Ruth iii. 9. By which it appears that she verily believed that he was legally her husband; and Boaz, we see, speaks of her *as one that was a virtuous woman, and known to be such in the whole city,* ver 11. And he confesses *he was her near kinsman; only,* he saith, *there was one nearer,* ver. 12. By which it seems, if there had not, Boaz had made no scruple of the matter: and the Jews say, in such marriages very little ceremony was required, if the next of kin did not renounce his right, because the law had determined the marriage before hand. If you had but considered this one thing, you would have spared the many observations you make on this story.

3. You object against 2 Sam. xii. 8. *as too much countenancing either incest or adultery; because it is said, that God gave to David his master's wives into his bosom.* But, 1. It is very strange to bring this place as a countenance to adultery, which was purposely designed to upbraid David with the sin of adultery; and you will find it no easy matter, by the constitution of the Mosaical law, to prove polygamy to be adultery. 2. The Jews give a fair interpretation of this place; for they say, that the wife of a king could never marry after her husband's decease, as the Gemara on the title Sanhedrim expressly saith; although some among them follow the opinion of

R. Jehuda, that she might marry the succeeding king: but that is built chiefly on this place; of which the rest give a better account, viz. that נשים doth not imply Saul's wives, but the maids of honour, or attendants on the court of Saul, which all fell into David's power, and out of whom he might choose wives without danger of incest; and even some of those who assert it lawful for one king to marry his predecessor's wife, yet say in this case of David, that the word only implies that they were of Saul's family; as Merab and Michal were, but not Saul's wives. So that all the difficulty here arises only from the interpretation of an unusual word, in which we have much more reason to trust the Jews than other writers.

Selden. Uxor Ebra. l. i. c. 15. Schick. de Jure Reg. c. 16. Theor. 19.

4. You are much offended *at Hosea's marrying an adulteress.* But all the formidable difficulties of that place will presently vanish, if you allow the Prophetical Schemes, wherein those things are said to be done; which are intended only to represent in a more lively manner the things signified by them. And so you may see the Chaldee Paraphrase fully explains this place of Hosea, and Maimonides purposely discourseth on the Prophetic Parables, and brings this as one of the instances of them; and with him the rest of the Jewish interpreters agree. But you object against such a way of teaching, *as tending to the encouragement of vice;* which it is very far from, being designed to represent the odiousness of it: for the whole scope of the prophet is to let the people understand that their idolatry was as hateful to God as the sin of adultery, and that the consequences of it would be their misery and ruin. And yet that God expressed as much tenderness to them, as a man that was very fond of a woman would do, in being unwilling to put her away, although he knew she were false to his bed: the former is intended in the first chapter, and the latter in the third. And what is there tending to immorality in all this? May not God make use of one vice, whose evil is more notorious, to represent another by, whose evil they are more hardly convinced of? May not he set forth a degenerate people by the sons of an adulteress? and by the names given to them express his detestation of their wickedness? especially when the parabolical terms are so clearly explained, as they are in the second chapter.

Maim. More Nevoch. l. ii. c. 46.

But you will say, *these things are related as plain matters of fact; with the several circumstances belonging to*

them. It is true, they are so; but so parables use to be; so was Nathan's to David; so is that of the rich man and Lazarus, in the New Testament: so is Jeremy's going to Euphrates *to hide his girdle,* (for it is not very likely the prophet should be sent eighteen or twenty days' journey into an enemy's country for no other end;) so is Ezekiel's *lying on one side for* 390 *days, and shaving his head and beard,* contrary to the law, as Maimonides observes; and his *digging in the walls of the Temple at Jerusalem,* while he was in Babylon; and many other things of a like nature, which are set forth with as punctual a narration of circumstances as this of Hosea; and yet they were only figurative expressions. We, that are accustomed to another way of learning, think these things strange; but this was a very common way in the elder times, and it is to this day much used in the Eastern countries, to represent duties to some, under the parables of things as really done by others: as may be seen in Lockman and Perzoes; besides what Clemens Alexandrinus and others have said, concerning the antiquity and common use of this parabolical way of teaching.

Jer. xiii. 4, 5. Ezek. iv. 5, 6. Ezek. v. 1. Ezek. viii. 8.

I now come to your objections against the New Testament; but I find them so few, and those so slight and inconsiderable as to the end for which you produce them, that I may easily pass them over. To that *about the continuance of miracles,* I have already answered; and I find not one word in the places mentioned by you, which implies the necessity of the continuance of them in all ages of the Christian Church. That place, Mark x. 29, 30. speaks of no more but such a recompence in this life *as is consistent with persecution,* and therefore must chiefly lie in inward contentment; which all wise men have valued above external accommodations: although withal, by the account St. Paul gives of himself and his brethren, God did abundantly provide for them one way or other. *As having nothing, and yet enjoying all things;* which amounts to a hundred fold in this life.

2 Cor. vi. 10.

But certainly you are the first man, who have objected *the obscurity of the book of Revelations against the authority of the Scriptures*; which is just as if one should object the quadrature of the circle against mathematical certainty. If we grant that there are some things in that mystical book we do not yet well understand, what then? Must neither that book, nor any other of the Bible, be of Divine revelation? I will not pursue the un-

reasonableness of this way of arguing so far as I might; but I leave yourself to consider of it, and of all that I have written, in order to your satisfaction. If you think fit to return an answer, I pray do it clearly and shortly, and with that freedom from passion which becomes so weighty a matter. And I beseech God to give you a right understanding in all things. I am,

SIR,

June 11, 1675.

Your faithful Servant.

THE END.

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